An investigation into the validity and reliability of the AcciMap approach by Branford, Kate
An Investigation into the 
Validity and Reliability of the 
AcciMap Approach.
Kate Branford
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy of The Australian National University.
February, 2007.
Unless otherwise acknowledged in the text, this 
thesis represents the original research of the author.
Kate Branford.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to my supervisors Prof. 
Andrew Hopkins and Dr. Neelam Naikar for their constant encouragement and guidance 
throughout this process. Their insightful discussions, helpful comments on my text and 
enthusiastic supervision of my progress were invaluable in the production of this work. 
I would also like to thank those individuals who participated in my studies and Dr. 
Neelam Naikar and Mr. Ben Elix for assisting me in the time-intensive process of 
coding the experimental results. Special thanks are due to Arvind Chandran and to my 
family for their constant support during this project. I am also grateful to the staff at the 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation for providing me with resources, helpful 
advice and a friendly environment in which to conduct this research and to the 
Australian National University and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation 
for granting me a scholarship for this work.
Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the validity and reliability of the AcciMap 
approach, a systems-based technique for analysing the causes of organisational 
accidents. This approach has been used to analyse accidents in a number of complex 
systems and to identify areas in which safety interventions should be directed. 
However, while the technique is implicitly assumed to be valid and reliable, the 
questions of whether or not it does, in fact, allow analysts to identify the causes of 
accidents correctly and whether or not the results obtained are consistent and replicable, 
have not been addressed. These questions are of critical importance when the findings 
of AcciMap analyses are used to determine the corrective actions to be taken after an 
accident, since the safety of the system may be jeopardised if problems are not correctly 
identified and remedied.
In the investigation into the validity and reliability of this technique, a study was 
performed in which several participants independently analysed an accident, using 
AcciMap guidelines developed during this research. The aim of the study was to enable 
the validity of the participants’ results (assessed against results produced by AcciMap 
experts), the reliability of their results (assessed by comparing participants' findings 
with those of one another) and the nature and significance of any observed variations in 
these results, to be examined. The qualitative and quantitative analysis of the results 
obtained in this study revealed that, although similarities existed between their findings, 
each participant’s results differed from those of the experts and the other participants. 
Examination of the nature and significance of these differences indicated that some 
were insignificant with respect to the meaning portrayed or the potential outcomes of 
analyses, while others were significant in these terms but could feasibly be eliminated if 
changes were made to the analysis process. Several observed variations, however, were 
both significant in these respects and arguably unavoidable, stemming from parts of the 
analysis requiring subjective analyst judgement and areas in which human error or 
differences in interpretation were possible. The existence of such variations 
demonstrates that AcciMap analyses do not always produce entirely valid and reliable 
results.
These findings are significant in highlighting that AcciMap analyses may not always 
correctly identify the causes of accidents or the most appropriate corrective actions to 
prevent their recurrence. In light of this revelation, questions arise regarding the future 
of the AcciMap approach. The proposed response is not to recommend against the use 
of this technique, since it is argued that systemic accident analyses cannot be performed 
without the types of interpretation and judgement that allowed the observed variations 
to occur in this case. Rather, it is suggested that the subjectivity and judgement 
involved in AcciMap analysis must be recognised by AcciMap users and those 
considering AcciMap findings. It is also proposed that the AcciMap process be 
modified to incorporate a thorough documentation of the judgements and decisions 
underlying the findings, so that the benefits of the approach can be reached while its 
limitations are properly taken into account.
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1Introduction
This thesis focuses on a systems-based technique for analysing the causes of 
organisational accidents, referred to as the AcciMap approach. The method involves the 
construction of a multi-layered causal diagram that arranges the various causes of an 
accident “in terms of their causal remoteness from the accident'’ (Naikar, Saunders & 
Hopkins, 2002: 2). The AcciMap approach has been used to analyse accidents 
involving the transport of dangerous goods (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000), the 
contamination of drinking water (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006; Woo & Vicente, 
2003), the Toronto Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak (Piche & Vicente, 
2005), the Esso Longford gas plant explosion (Hopkins, 2000), the Glenbrook train 
crash (Hopkins, 2005) and several Australian Defence aircraft accidents (Naikar, 
Saunders & Hopkins, 2002; Royal Australian Air Force, 2001) among others. It is 
particularly useful for establishing how factors in all parts of a system contributed to an 
accident and for arranging these causes1 into a coherent diagram that reveals how they 
interacted with one another to produce an accident. By identifying these causal factors 
and the interrelationships between them in this way, it is possible to identify problem 
areas that should be addressed to improve the safety of the system and prevent accidents 
from recurring.
For accident analysis and prevention purposes, this appears to be a very useful 
approach. However, whether or not it is a valid and reliable technique for analysing 
accidents, that is, whether analysts using this approach correctly identify the causes of 
accidents and whether the obtained results are consistent and replicable, is unknown.
1 The terms ‘cause’, ‘causal factor’ and ‘contributing factor’ are used interchangeably in this thesis.
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This issue is of particular importance when the results of such analyses are used to 
recommend actions to improve safety, since accidents might recur if problem areas are 
not correctly identified and addressed. The aim of this thesis is to develop knowledge 
in this area by determining whether or not the AcciMap approach is, in fact, valid and 
reliable and by examining the nature and significance of variations in AcciMap results, 
if variations do in fact exist.
In order to achieve this aim, a three-step process is required. The first step involves 
addressing inconsistencies in the ways in which AcciMaps are currently used which 
prevent the method from being readily testable for validity and reliability. There are 
several varieties of AcciMap in existence, differing from one another in a number of 
ways and aiming to fulfil slightly different purposes. Analysts who use this method 
adopt different formats and rules in their analyses. In addition, there are no written 
instructions for how to perform an AcciMap analysis and the process followed in 
AcciMap construction therefore differs from analyst to analyst. The variations within 
the method and the lack of consistent guidance on how to apply this technique are 
problematic with respect to method validation2 because, as a result of these factors, the 
findings of an AcciMap analysis are likely to differ depending on the particular style of 
AcciMap adopted and the process followed during the analysis. The first step in this 
research is therefore to formalise and standardise the method so that the validity and 
reliability of AcciMap results can be analysed independently of these variations.
The second step required for achieving the aim of this research is to determine precisely 
how the validity and reliability of such an accident analysis technique can be assessed. 
Although a large number of accident analysis methods exist which, like the AcciMap 
approach, involve the construction of causal diagrams to identify the factors that 
promoted an accident, none has been formally validated and a process by which their 
validity and reliability can be assessed is therefore not known. The second step in this 
research is to address this problem by determining precisely how one can assess whether 
or not an accident analysis method of this type does produce valid and reliable results.
The third step is to apply the proposed validation procedure to the formalised AcciMap 
approach so that the validity and reliability of the method can be assessed. The
2 ‘Validation’ is used in this thesis as a generalised term to refer to testing for both validity and reliability.
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completion of this step will allow us to answer the question of whether the approach is, 
in fact, valid and reliable. It will also allow the nature and significance of any observed 
variations in AcciMap results to be considered, so that the implications and 
management of such variations can be discussed. The contributions of this research are 
therefore not only in developing knowledge of the validity and reliability of the 
AcciMap approach but also in standardising the approach and producing the first 
written guidelines for its use, exploring precisely what validity and reliability mean in 
this context and introducing an appropriate means by which the validity and reliability 
of this technique (and other similar techniques) can be assessed.
This thesis describes the process by which the three above steps were taken. It begins 
by introducing the theory behind the AcciMap approach and the benefits of using this 
method, so that the importance of its validation is understood. Chapter 2 introduces the 
theories underlying the analysis of organisational accidents within complex 
sociotechnical systems. It outlines the range of factors that can contribute to such 
accidents and discusses theories of how these factors can come together, in practice, to 
result in situations in which accidents occur. In doing so, it highlights the importance of 
adopting a comprehensive, systems-based approach to accident analysis, so that 
accidents can be understood properly and their underlying causes can be identified and 
addressed.
Chapter 3 introduces the AcciMap approach as a method with the capacity to analyse 
organisational accidents in this way. It shows that the AcciMap diagram is specifically 
designed to illustrate the sociotechnical context within which accidents occurred and to 
show how a range of factors throughout the system interacted to produce those 
outcomes. It also points out that the AcciMap approach has the capacity to take into 
account factors and causal relationships that cannot be incorporated in similar accident 
analysis techniques and to organise the causes of an accident in a way that highlights 
problem areas in need of attention. It proposes that, for these reasons and others, the 
AcciMap approach has been and continues to be considered useful for the analysis of 
organisational accidents. It also highlights the current lack of information regarding the 
validity and reliability of AcciMaps and discusses why it is necessary to validate the 
technique.
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Chapter 4 begins the three-step process towards AcciMap validation by presenting a 
standardised AcciMap approach, developed from the existing varieties of AcciMap. It 
also proposes a set of AcciMap guidelines, aimed to provide users with consistent 
instructions for how to apply the technique to analyse organisational accidents and 
propose safety recommendations to prevent their recurrence.
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the second step in the validation process. In these chapters, 
the meanings of validity and reliability in the context of accident analysis are discussed 
and a number of possible ways in which the method could be tested for validity and 
reliability are considered. An appropriate means of validating the approach, to be used 
in the final stage of this research, is proposed.
Chapter 7 discusses the third step in the validation process; that of applying the chosen 
methods of validation in order to determine whether or not the AcciMap approach is, in 
fact, a valid and reliable technique. This chapter describes the process by which the 
validity and reliability of the AcciMap approach were assessed in this research. Chapter 
8 then describes the results of the validation study and discusses the nature of the 
variations in AcciMap results that were observed in this study.
Chapter 9 discusses the results of the validation study, examines the significance of the 
observed variations in AcciMap analyses and considers the validity and reliability of the 
approach in light of the findings of the study. Consideration is then given to the 
implications of these findings for the AcciMap approach and to how these might be 
managed. Attention is also given to the limitations of this study and to unanswered 
questions that could be addressed in future research. Finally, the conclusions of this 
thesis are drawn.
4
2Organisational Accidents
The aim of this thesis is to determine the validity and reliability of the AcciMap 
approach, a technique for analysing the causes of organisational accidents. This chapter 
provides the background information necessary for understanding what organisational 
accidents are, why they occur and how they can be analysed and prevented. It begins by 
defining the terms used in this thesis. It then goes on to discuss the ‘person' and 
‘system' approaches to accident analysis and highlights the benefits of the latter 
approach for accident prevention. The literature concerning why accidents occur in 
complex sociotechnical systems and how they can be prevented is outlined in order to 
provide insight into the types of problem that occur in such systems, and which must be 
accounted for by any systemic method for accident analysis. Finally, three systems- 
based models of accident causation are considered, to show precisely how factors 
throughout a sociotechnical system can interact to produce an organisational accident. 
Recognition of this background context is essential for understanding why the AcciMap 
approach is considered useful for analysing the causes of organisational accidents and 
why its validation is important.
2.1 Defining Organisational 
Accidents
The focus of this thesis is on the analysis of organisational accidents. In the discussion 
of why such accidents occur and how they can be analysed, it is useful to begin by 
defining what an organisational accident is and how it differs from other similar types
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of event. An accident is generally thought of to be “something which happens 
unexpectedly and unintentionally, and which often damages something or injures 
someone” (Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2006), or “an undesirable or 
unfortunate happening” which occurs “without design” (Macquarie Dictionary, 2001:
11). The types of organisational accident (or system accident as they are also called) 
that are of interest in this thesis are more specifically defined as the “comparatively rare, 
but often catastrophic, events” that take place in complex technological systems and 
have “multiple causes involving many people operating at different levels of their 
respective companies” (Reason, 1997: 1). They occur within complex systems such as 
nuclear power plants, chemical process plants and aviation, marine and rail transport 
systems (Reason, 1997: 1) and result in damage to people, objects, the environment or 
the “functioning of the system” (Bahr, 1997: 6; Perrow, 1984: 66). These are the types 
of event that the accident analysis technique discussed in this thesis is designed to 
analyse.
In the literature on this topic, the distinctions between accidents and other similar events 
such as disasters, incidents and near misses, are not clear-cut. However, not all of these 
types of event fall into the category of organisational accidents, so it is useful to 
distinguish those that are relevant for present purposes from those that are not.
The distinction between accidents and disasters is unclear and is not universally agreed 
upon (Levinson & Granot, 2002: xi). Disasters have been defined as events that cause 
“death and/or extensive property damage” which override the “usual response 
capabilities”, as events “involving injury, death or damage that constitutes a significant 
disruption to public life” (Levinson & Granot, 2002: xi) and as events “involving 
multiple fatalities” or “major environmental damage” (Hopkins, 1999: 11). The main 
distinction between a disaster and an accident, in terms of these definitions, appears to 
relate to the magnitude of the damage involved. However, as Levinson and Granot 
(2002: xi) note, this distinction is highly subjective. The decision of how many people 
must be killed or injured or how much property or environmental damage must occur 
before an accident is termed a disaster is a matter of judgement. There are also 
occasions in which the two terms are used interchangeably. For instance, the 
destruction of the Challenger space shuttle, the explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear plant 
and the gas leak at the Bhopal chemical factory were all frequently referred to both as
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accidents and as disasters (BBC News, 1984; Federation of American Scientists, 1997; 
World Nuclear Association, 2004).
The term organisational accident encompasses these types of event when they occur 
within sociotechnical systems and have multiple systemic causes. Thus some events 
referred to as disasters fall under the heading of organisational accidents. However, 
the word disaster is also used to describe events such as floods, hurricanes and 
earthquakes, which do not occur within sociotechnical systems and are generally not 
thought of as accidents. Natural disasters with solely environmental causes are not 
organisational accidents and are not suitable for analysis using the techniques discussed 
in this thesis. The accident analysis methods discussed here are designed to illustrate 
how a range of systemic causes brought about a final negative outcome, thus events that 
do not take place within such systems will not be included in the category of 
organisational accidents for present purposes.
The terms incident and near miss generally refer to events involving less damage than 
accidents and disasters. Some people use these terms interchangeably when referring to 
situations that almost resulted in accidents (Bahr, 1997: 6). Others distinguish between 
them, although the precise difference is, again, unclear. Incidents are sometimes 
defined as events that result in minimal damage, such as adversely affecting the 
“completion of a task" or causing injury to personnel, equipment or property to a value 
of less than a certain dollar amount (Bahr, 1997: 194; U.S. Department of Labor, 2004). 
When these definitions are used, the distinction between an accident and an incident 
again involves a judgement about the severity of the damage involved. Where incidents 
are defined as resulting in minimal damage, near misses are sometimes distinguished as 
events in which no damage or personal injury occurred, but in which there was a high 
potential for such negative outcomes to occur (Bahr, 1997: 194).
As noted above, the definition of organisational accidents includes that they are events 
and that they result in damage of some sort. Therefore, incidents may fall into this 
category, but near misses in which no event actually occurs do not. The primary 
concern for present purposes is with analysing accidents and incidents in which a 
negative outcome did occur, since the analysis techniques considered in this thesis 
involve working back from existing events to uncover how and why they happened. 
Such accident analysis techniques can be used to identify the causes that almost allowed
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a negative event to occur. However, since the main purpose of applying such methods 
is to uncover the events and conditions that produced a real adverse event, the term 
organisational accident, as it is used here, will refer only to situations in which a 
negative outcome did actually occur.
Organisational accidents have also been defined as having the potential to result in 
“devastating effects on uninvolved populations, assets and the environment" (Reason, 
1997: 1). However, since it is appropriate and useful to analyse events that resulted in 
minor adverse outcomes as well as major ones, the former will not be excluded in the 
discussion of accidents in this thesis. Any disasters, accidents and incidents will be 
included here under the heading of organisational accidents as long as they fit the 
criteria of being unplanned and unintended, of having resulted in some sort of damage 
or adverse event, of having occurred within complex technological systems and of 
having multiple systemic causes. These are the types of event referred to in this thesis 
in discussions of the accidents or outcomes to be analysed.
2.2 Sociotechnical Systems
Before going on to discuss the details of how organisational accidents occur within 
complex sociotechnical systems, it is also necessary to define what is meant by the term 
system in this context. A system is defined as an “assemblage or combination of things 
or parts forming a complex or unitary whole” (Macquarie Dictionary, 1997: 1907) or a 
“set of interrelated elements” with a common purpose or goal (Vicente, 1999: 9). 
Sociotechnical systems, the type of systems within which organisational accidents 
occur, are those characterised by having interactions between humans and technology, 
that is, between elements such as hardware, software, physical processes, people, 
procedures, laws and regulations (Computing Cases, 2002). They are made up of a 
number of different parts, including production processes and system operators, staff 
members, supervisors and managers, and are affected by the activities of the companies 
involved and the actions of the government and regulatory bodies associated with 
activities in that sector (Rasmussen, 1997: 183; Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 95). 
The characteristics of such systems that make them complex are harder to define. 
Complex sociotechnical systems may exhibit characteristics such as involving large 
numbers of components or people who must work together in order for the system to
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function, requiring communication and coordination of people from different cultures, 
disciplines or geographical locations, having a “high degree of potential hazard*’ in their 
operations, being highly automated and incorporating multiple interacting subsystems 
(Vicente, 1999: 14-17). Sociotechnical systems will be considered complex, for present 
purposes, when they exhibit some (or all) of the above characteristics. Therefore, 
systems such as nuclear power plants, hospitals, military command and control systems, 
banks and commercial aircraft are all types of complex sociotechnical system (Vicente, 
1999: 11). In this thesis, the term systemic is used when describing things that relate to 
these complex sociotechnical systems, thus systemic deficiencies and systemic causes, 
for instance, are factors associated with the system being studied.
2.3 Approaches to Accident Analysis
This thesis aims to determine the validity and reliability of a method for analysing how 
organisational accidents occur within these types of system and how they can be 
prevented. How these accident analyses are approached depends on the analyst’s 
understanding of accident causation, specifically, whether accidents are viewed as being 
caused by errors made by individuals working within complex systems or by flaws in 
the systems that failed to prevent an accident from occurring (Reason, 2000: 768). 
These two perspectives, referred to as the “person approach" and “system approach" 
respectively, determine how accidents are understood as well as the type of 
countermeasures that are employed to prevent their recurrence (Reason, 2000: 768). It 
is useful to begin by outlining these approaches, since the latter forms the basis of the 
accident analysis techniques discussed in the following chapters.
2.3.1 The Person Approach
The person approach (Reason, 1997, 2000) has already implicitly been discounted for 
the present purposes by defining organisational accidents as outlined above. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to consider this perspective to accident analysis before 
discussing the system approach. The person approach stems from the assumption that 
people are free agents who have choice and control over their behaviour. This approach 
focuses on errors, violations and unsafe actions committed by individuals at the “front
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line’' of complex systems, such as pilots, control room operators, maintenance personnel 
and air traffic controllers (Reason, 1997: 10-11). In the person approach, errors made 
by these individuals are seen to be determined primarily by their “aberrant mental 
processes” such as inattention, carelessness, forgetfulness, poor motivation or 
recklessness (Reason, 2000: 768). Errors are considered to be a result of factors internal 
to the individuals involved, and the steps taken to try to prevent such errors from 
recurring consequently focus on reducing the “unwanted variability” in workers’ 
behaviour (Reason, 2000: 768). These countermeasures include methods such as fear- 
based poster campaigns, threats of litigation, introducing additional procedures and 
“naming, blaming, and shaming” the individuals involved to encourage workers to act 
safely (Reason, 2000: 768).
The person approach was the perspective originally taken in accident studies, with early 
psychological work focusing heavily on the “accident proneness” and “neurotic 
tendencies” of workers (Bohle & Quinlan, 2000: 117). For instance, several studies 
conducted in the 1920s concluded that injuries sustained by workers were the result of 
individual traits such as anxiety, fear, dependency, “nervous instability”, bravado and 
in-coordination, while later work looked into how interpersonal relationships, 
motivation and morale, for instance, affected illness and injuries at work (Bohle & 
Quinlan, 2000: 82, 117). The person approach is still the dominant perspective in 
occupational health and safety studies and for insurance purposes and remains prevalent 
in many fields that involve “close encounters with hazards” (Bohle & Quinlan, 2000: 
90; Reason, 1997: 224, 2000: 768).
One reason for the popularity of the person approach is that blaming individuals for 
their errors is “emotionally more satisfying” than identifying faults within systems or 
institutions as the causes of accidents (Reason, 2000: 768). This approach also 
corresponds to people’s “common-sense understandings” that accidents result from 
actions of the individuals involved and that training, advice, disciplinary measures and 
warnings can be used to encourage individuals to behave appropriately (Hopkins, 2000: 
12; Reason, 1997: 129). The person approach also benefits managers, since holding 
individuals accountable for their errors absolves management of any responsibility for 
accidents (Reason, 2000: 768). In addition, it allows management to implement 
relatively inexpensive countermeasures, such as training and improvements in selection 
procedures, thus drawing attention away from problems with the organisation itself,
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which are often considerably more expensive to address (Bohle & Quinlan, 2000: 89). 
Bohle and Quinlan (2000: 141) therefore suggest that the ongoing popularity of these 
“victim-blaming” explanations for accidents results from their “attractiveness to vested 
interest groups”. It has been recognised, however, that this approach has little real value 
in explaining how accidents actually occur and may, in fact, impede the development of 
safe systems (Bohle & Quinlan, 2000: 141; Reason, 2000: 768). As a result, most 
analyses of major accidents now go beyond identifying human failings as the causes of 
accidents (Reason, 1997: 10).
2.3.2 The System Approach
The alternative perspective to accident analysis concentrates on the context and 
circumstances within which workers’ behaviour takes place, rather than the errors made 
by individuals. This “system approach” works on the assumption that humans are 
fallible and that this fallibility can be “moderated” to a degree but cannot be eliminated 
altogether (Reason, 1997: 129). From the system approach, it is acknowledged that 
people’s behaviour within complex systems is highly constrained by external factors 
such as rules, procedures and managerial, administrative and regulatory controls 
(Reason, 1997: 61). It is therefore argued that the systemic context within which human 
errors are made must be taken into account in order to make sense of how and why 
organisational accidents occur (Reason, 1997: 62).
When accidents do occur, they are viewed from this perspective as being the result of 
error-prone situations rather than the actions of error-prone people (Reason, 1997: 129). 
Human errors are viewed not as the causes of accidents but as consequences of 
“upstream” systemic problems, such as inadequacies in design, supervision, procedures, 
training or equipment (Reason, 1997: 10, 2000: 768). The aim of accident analysis, 
from this perspective, is to uncover how and why the system provoked those errors 
and/or failed to prevent them from resulting in accidents. The countermeasures 
employed to prevent such accidents are based on the idea that “although we cannot 
change the human condition, we can change the conditions under which humans work” 
(Reason, 2000: 768). These measures therefore focus on repairing the properties of the 
system that induce workers to make errors and on ensuring that the system’s defences, 
such as alarms, barriers and automatic shutdowns, are successful in preventing accidents 
from occurring (Reason, 2000: 769).
1 1
The system approach is now widely recognised as beneficial for understanding and 
analysing organisational accidents. As Bohle and Quinlan (2000) note, there is an 
increasing understanding that workers’ behaviour is affected by organisational and 
environmental factors and that changes must be made in these areas if accidents are to 
be prevented. This organisational focus facilitates the understanding of accident 
causation because it provides insight into why individuals behaved as they did and how 
the system failed to cope with their errors, as well as highlighting the systemic causes of 
the accident. This information is missed if a person approach is adopted.
As Hopkins (2000) points out, the system approach is also more useful for preventing 
accidents than a person-based approach. It is important, for prevention purposes, to 
focus on factors that are controllable, that is, on those that can be altered to prevent 
future accidents (Hopkins, 2000: 6). For this reason, Hopkins (2000: 6) argues that it is 
not useful to concentrate on human errors in accident analyses, as is done when using 
the person approach. The psychological factors that cause these errors, such as 
forgetfulness, preoccupation or inattention, are arguably the “least manageable" of the 
numerous causes of organisational accidents (Reason, 1997: 129). Attempts to alter 
these states using sanctions and appeals, for instance, are largely ineffective, since the 
individuals involved usually did not intend to commit the errors and because people 
inevitably will make mistakes where it is possible for them to do so (Hopkins, 2000: 6; 
Reason, 1997: 154). These types of countermeasure can also be harmful to the sense of 
justice, morale and self-esteem of the individuals involved (Reason, 1997: 129). 
Adopting a systems approach enables analysts to focus instead on factors that 
something can be done about, like problems in training, defences or procedures. The 
conditions and contexts that provoked errors can then be repaired so that future errors 
can be avoided.
Logsdon (2001) notes that corrections aimed at addressing these system inadequacies 
also have considerably greater and longer-lasting effects on system safety than efforts 
aimed at the particular individuals involved. Corrective actions taken at the 
organisational level will improve safety for all workers in an organisation, while those 
aimed at specific individuals will only affect the behaviour of those people. Reason 
(2000: 769) notes that problems and inadequacies in the system can provoke the same 
sorts of errors “regardless of the individuals involved” and that it is therefore useful to 
take a generalised approach which influences all the people working in a system. In
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addition, the types of organisational problem addressed by the system approach 
generally have broad negative effects on systems, with the potential to contribute to a 
number of different types of accident (Reason, 1997: 11). Discovering and repairing 
these systemic problems can therefore help to prevent a range of potential future 
accidents, rather than just a recurrence of one particular type. Efforts aimed at 
addressing broad problem areas are therefore more beneficial for the safety of the 
system as a whole than attempts to minimise and prevent specific human errors and, 
because such solutions aim to repair the “underlying preconditions’" that provoke 
accidents and do not rely on people “doing the right thing”, they are often more 
effective in preventing accidents (Hopkins, 1995: 8; Reason, 1990: 173).
2.4 The Causes of Organisational 
Accidents
The system approach is widely recognised, then, as a useful perspective to take for 
accident explanation and prevention purposes. However, in order to comprehend how 
and why organisational accidents occur, it is necessary to understand the types of 
problem that can result in accidents within complex sociotechnical systems. A systems- 
based method of accident analysis must have the potential to incorporate these types of 
factor if it is to be useful in determining precisely how and why an organisational 
accident occurred. Several theories of accident causation have been developed, on the 
basis of the system approach, to explain organisational accidents in terms of the types of 
problem that can emerge within these systems.
2.4.1 Normal Accident Theory
Perrow (1984) identifies two specific characteristics that make complex systems prone 
to organisational accidents. His research focuses on high-risk technological systems 
with “catastrophic potential”, that is, with the potential to kill or injure large numbers of 
people (Perrow, 1984: 3). Perrow (1984: 4-5) notes that such systems, including 
nuclear power plants, nuclear weapon production systems, chemical plants, air traffic 
control systems and complex transport systems have certain characteristics that make it 
“inevitable” and even “normal” for them to experience major accidents. These
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characteristics relate to the way the systems are organised and how failures within them 
interact. Specifically, Perrow (1984: 4-5) claims that accidents are “normal'’ in systems 
that exhibit “interactive complexity” and “tight coupling'’. Interactively complex 
systems are those in which failures of individual system components interact in 
“unexpected and even incomprehensible ways'’ to defeat the system’s safety defences 
(Perrow, 1984: 4, 1994: 216). Because these interactions are unexpected, they cannot 
be anticipated and workers cannot be trained in how to respond (Sagan, 1993: 41). 
Perrow (1984) notes that, in some interactively complex systems, accidents are 
preventable because there is time to identify what happened and consider alternative 
courses of action. However, some systems are also tightly coupled, that is, the system’s 
parts are linked to one another and are highly interdependent so that a failure in one 
directly affects the status of other parts. Processes in these tightly coupled systems 
occur quickly and cannot be stopped because it is not possible to isolate the faulty parts 
from the rest of the system. In tightly coupled systems, the only available safety 
devices and redundant systems to prevent failures from occurring or spreading are those 
that have been planned in advance and built into the system. If these defences are 
ineffective, there is insufficient time to improvise new ones, so it is impossible to 
recover from the original failure and the “disturbance” will spread rapidly throughout 
the system, resulting in large-scale failure (Perrow, 1984: 4, 1994: 216; Sagan, 1993: 
34). Perrow (1984: 9) concludes that accidents are inevitable and “normal” in systems 
that are both interactively complex and tightly coupled, not in the sense that they are 
frequent or expected, but in the sense that it is “an inherent property of the system” to 
experience these sorts of outcome occasionally.
In addition to complexity and tight coupling, proponents of normal accident theory 
identify a number of other characteristics of complex sociotechnical systems that 
contribute to accidents. Perrow (1982: 175) argues that the features built into these 
systems to enhance safety can actually “generate more normal accidents than they 
prevent” because they are often less independent than believed and therefore increase 
the interactive complexity of the system. Sagan (1993: 39) notes that redundant safety 
features also make problems less visible to the operators because failures are 
compensated for before they are identified. Accidents can also occur when operators 
take advantage of these redundant safety features to increase production to “higher and 
more dangerous levels” (Sagan, 1993: 40). The development of marine radar, for 
example, was quickly recognised as a means of allowing merchant vessels to travel
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faster and in more crowded and confined seaways than was previously possible 
(Reason, 1997: 6).
However, catastrophic accidents primarily occur, according to this theory, because 
humans have built systems with interactively complex and tightly coupled parts 
(Perrow, 1984: 8). The way of preventing normal accidents, then, is to alter 
sociotechnical systems so that they are not complex and tightly coupled (Sagan, 1993: 
275). Perrow provides little indication on how this situation can be improved (Hopkins, 
1999: 14). He notes that complexity and tight coupling make systems more efficient in 
terms of production because these systems utilise components with multiple functions 
and use time, resources and space economically (Perrow, 1984). He also points out that 
complexity cannot be reduced in some systems, since chemical refineries and nuclear 
power plants, for instance, require interactive complexity in order to function. Perrow 
(1984: 89) concludes, then, that accidents are inevitable in complex and tightly coupled 
systems, and that where these systems also have the potential for catastrophic outcomes, 
“the issue is much graver”. His proposed solution, in such situations, is for efforts to be 
made to obtain the product in a different way or to abandon the process altogether.
Obviously, the total elimination of these systems is not an ideal answer. The 
abandonment of complex, tightly coupled systems is likely to reduce the occurrence of 
accidents but is probably not a realistic solution to this problem since, as Perrow (1984: 
4) himself points out, we have built our society around some of these systems. Sagan 
(1993: 277), on the other hand, argues that a reduction in complexity and coupling is 
possible in U.S. nuclear weapons systems, the focus of his studies, by keeping nuclear 
materials geographically separate from their detonation devices in peacetime. The issue 
of how to prevent normal accidents in other types of sociotechnical system is not 
addressed in the normal accidents literature. This literature is not, therefore, particularly 
useful for general accident prevention purposes (Hopkins, 2000: 13). It is valuable, 
however, in highlighting the problems associated with complexity and tight coupling in 
complex systems and in proposing that redundant safety features can contribute to 
accidents in these systems.
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2.4.2 High Reliability Theory
Another group of theorists focus instead on how some high-risk, complex organisations 
have ‘'beaten the odds” and managed to avoid accidents in hazardous situations (Roberts 
& Bea, 2001: 71). Theorists such as Rochlin, Roberts, LaPorte, Consolini and Bea 
study the characteristics of these “high reliability organisations” (HROs) that allow 
them actively to avoid failures despite their high potential for error (Rochlin, 1993: 15). 
The organisations of interest to these theorists are those that “operate, manage, or 
regulate complex, advanced technologies that embody sufficient inherent hazard to pose 
a significant public risk if they are not properly administered” (Rochlin, 1993: 28). 
They include systems like nuclear power plants, naval aircraft carriers, air traffic control 
systems, international banking and power distribution grids (Hopkins, 2000: 139; 
Roberts, 1990: 160). The definition of when high-risk organisations are considered to 
be highly reliable is a matter of judgement, based on the question, “How many times 
could this operation have failed with catastrophic results that it did not fail?” (Roberts, 
1989: 112-113). Organisations qualify as “high reliability organisations” if the answer 
to this question is “on the order of tens of thousands of times” (Roberts, 1990: 160). 
However, organisations are only classified as “high reliability” if they maintain safe 
operations by actively controlling and reducing risks -  not if accidents are simply 
avoided by luck or chance (Rochlin, 1993: 15).
The studies of HROs arose in response to Perrow’s theory of the inevitability of 
accidents in complex and tightly coupled systems (Hopkins, 1999: 15, 16). The “high 
reliability theorists” (HRTs) note that many of the systems which Perrow claims are 
inevitably prone to accidents are, in practice, remarkably accident-free (Hopkins, 1999: 
16; Sagan, 1993: 15). The HRTs do not reject Perrow’s inevitability theory, that is, they 
do not claim that HROs are, or can be, entirely free from major accidents (Hopkins, 
1999: 16). However, they take a more optimistic view, arguing that organisations can 
take “proactive measures” to reduce significantly the severity and frequency of such 
accidents (Roberts & Bea, 2001: 70). Thus, as Sagan (1993: 48) puts it, Perrow sees the 
glass of safety as one percent empty, while the HRTs see the same glass as 99 percent 
full. This difference in perspective means that the HRTs focus on different system 
features from those considered in Perrow’s work. Rather than studying the inevitability 
of organisational accidents, the HRTs instead seek to uncover the characteristics that
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allow these HROs to avoid accidents, so that “clues” can be found for how to improve 
safety within sociotechnical systems (Snook, 2000: 12).
The types of organisation studied by the HRTs are under great pressure to avoid 
accidents. These organisations involve highly hazardous processes with the potential to 
affect large numbers of people when things go wrong (Perrow, 1984: 3). Because of the 
magnitude of the consequences of error, there are strong public pressures for HROs to 
maintain reliable, safe operations, while also aiming for economic efficiency (LaPorte 
& Consolini, 1991: 23). Indeed, as TaPorte and Consolini (1991: 21) point out, safety 
must be the top priority in HROs since “'failure-free performance is a condition of 
providing benefits” in these organisations. It is recognised by the U.S. nuclear power 
industry, for instance, that “an uncontrolled release of radiation at any one plant will 
mean the end of the entire industry in that country” (Hopkins, 1999: 15). As such, a 
great deal of effort is invested in maintaining safe operations within these organisations 
and a number of proactive measures have been adopted for this purpose.
Before going on to discuss the strategies adopted by HROs, it is important to point out 
that high reliability theory is not without flaws. Problems firstly arise with respect to 
distinguishing HROs from other organisations when using definitions such as Roberts' 
(noted above). Hopkins (2007: 4) makes the point that, since many hazardous 
organisations could ‘fail catastrophically’ every second of every day, such organisations 
could experience a major accident every day and still be classified as highly reliable in 
accordance with Roberts’ definition. Marais, Dulac and Leveson (2004: 3) point out 
that, based on such a definition, “it is difficult to think of any low reliability 
organizations”. The statistics upon which judgements of high reliability are based are 
equally problematic. Claims of the reliability of nuclear reactors, for instance, have 
been based on the number of days of consecutive, uninterrupted running. However, as 
Hopkins (2007: 4) argues, reliability of supply is not necessarily indicative of safety and 
safety may, in fact, only be achieved at a cost to reliability of supply. The statistics on 
which claims of the reliability of naval aircraft carriers are based are similarly 
questionable since these reflect peacetime training activities rather than combat 
situations and do not, therefore, reflect the realistic operating environment of such 
organisations (Clarke, 1993: 682). Such statistics are also open to interpretation, with 
HRO researchers claiming that naval aircraft carriers are unusually safe on the basis of 
the accident statistics, while critics argue that the accident rate is in fact “relatively high
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compared to many other high-risk activities'’ (Marais et al, 2004: 3, quoted in Hopkins, 
2007: 4).
The point has also been made that the types of organisation labelled as HROs, such as 
nuclear power plants, naval aircraft carriers and air traffic control systems (Weick, 
Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999: 83) are not as safe, effective and reliable as the HRO 
theorists suggest, with examples such as Three Mile Island, the accidental shootdown of 
an Iran Air jet by the USS Vincennes and the Überlingen mid-air collision used to 
reinforce this point (Clarke, 1993; Marais et al, 2004; Perrin, Kirwan & Drogoul, 2005). 
As discussed below, however, a review of the strategies adopted by HROs to promote 
safe operations is useful when considering the kinds of problem that can lead to 
accidents within complex sociotechnical systems.
2.4.2.1 Culture of ‘Mindfulness’
The main strategy adopted by HROs is a safety culture encouraging a “state of 
continuous mindfulness of the possibility of disaster’' (Hopkins, 2000: 140). HROs 
work on the assumption that errors are “omnipresent and insidious” and that the 
operating environment presents a constant, active threat to safety (Rochlin, 1993: 23). 
This preoccupation with failure means that accident-avoidance is an ongoing process in 
HROs, involving the constant search for errors and threats in the system (Schulman, 
1993: 36). While conventional organisations view the absence of accidents as a sign 
that safety is being properly managed and that threats are under control, HROs 
recognise that reliability is not guaranteed by a history of failure-free performance 
(Hopkins, 2000: 141; Schulman, 1993: 36). Rather, they note that reliability is only 
easily identified when absent and that an organisation is “only as reliable as the first 
error ahead" of it (Schulman, 1993: 36). They work on the principle, then, that “eternal 
vigilance is the price of success” (Rochlin, 1993: 23).
HROs also recognise that the error sources in a system are “dynamic” and must be dealt 
with as such (Rochlin, 1993: 23). They note that technologies and system 
characteristics are constantly changing and that operators must continually adapt to, and 
be alert to, these changes if reliability is to be maintained (Eisenhardt, 1993: 120). 
Because the sources of error are ever changing, HROs see the need for continuous 
reviewing of the mechanisms used to monitor and identify hazards in these systems
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(Rochlin, 1993: 23). From this perspective, it is change and adaptation that produces 
reliability, not the repetition of actions that have been without incident in the past 
(Weick, 1987: 118). Therefore, ‘safety’ and ‘reliability’ are not seen by HROs as 
conditions that can be achieved by repeating previously successful activities, or by 
having a long history of safe operations. Non-eventful “quiet periods” are, in fact, 
viewed with suspicion in these organisations, because they indicate that the system’s 
error-monitoring mechanisms might not be functioning adequately (Rochlin, 1993: 14, 
27). Efforts to maintain alertness are, therefore, increased at times when everything 
appears to be going as planned (Rochlin, 1993: 23).
Another facet of the culture of “mindfulness” adopted by HROs is that personnel within 
these organisations are never content that everything is under control (Roberts & Bea, 
2001: 72). Employees in HROs “aggressively seek to know what they don't know”, that 
is, they are constantly in search of errors, problems and anomalies in the system and are 
encouraged to be aware of the system’s vulnerabilities, rather than assuming that 
potential problems have been anticipated and addressed by the system’s designers 
(Roberts & Bea, 2001: 72; Rochlin, 1993: 29).
2.4.2.2 Learning from Experience
Because of the potential magnitude of the consequences of mistakes, HROs are not able 
to use the learning strategy of “trial and error” to improve safety in their systems and 
must, therefore, adopt alternative ways of learning how to avoid accidents (Eisenhardt, 
1993: 120; Weick, 1987: 112). This aim is complicated by the fact that failures rarely 
occur in such organisations, so HROs must make the most of whatever learning 
experiences are available to them (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999: 92). One tactic is 
to simulate possible errors and accidents so that employees can be trained in how to 
respond to these situations. Telling stories about accidents and near misses is another 
important learning method because it provides workers with insight into the types of 
error that have occurred in the past and how they have been and should be addressed 
(Weick, 1987: 113). As Eisenhardt (1993: 120) points out, this sharing of experience is 
essential for maintaining high reliability in these organisations, since most workers do 
not have personal experience in managing errors or accidents.
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Because HROs experience so few errors and accidents, they also aim to learn whatever 
they can from any errors or accidents that do occur (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999: 
92). They encourage their employees to report all errors that have been made and 
reward them for doing so, both to reinforce the importance of safety and reliability and 
to ensure that every opportunity for learning is utilised. A popular example involves the 
case of “a seaman on the nuclear carrier Carl Vinson who loses a tool on the deck, 
reports it, all aircraft aloft are redirected to land bases until the tool is found, and the 
seaman is commended for his actions the next day at a formal deck ceremony” (Weick, 
Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999: 93). In addition to encouraging error-reporting, HROs 
document all accidents and incidents that have occurred, in order to highlight problem 
areas in the systems and to allow staff to “benefit from the accumulated experience” of 
the organisation (Eisenhardt, 1993: 120). Because there are so little data to work with, 
they also treat all failures that do occur as “windows on the health of the system”, 
aiming to discover as much as possible from any adverse event that occurs (Weick, 
Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999: 92). They do this by generalising from all small-scale 
failures and working on the assumptions that localised failures do not exist and that the 
causal chains that lead to small failures “are long and wind deep inside the system” 
(Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999: 92). Any lapses in safety are consequently viewed 
as signs that the system is vulnerable to failure (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999: 92).
2.4.2.3 Communication
HROs also use communication to improve reliability in their systems. They aim to 
communicate the “big picture” to all employees, so that everyone involved is aware of 
what the organisation is trying to achieve, why it is arranged as it is, which hazards and 
potential problems are of concern and how they personally fit into the broader system 
(Roberts & Bea, 2001: 71, 76). According to Roberts and Bea (2001: 75), organisations 
with members who are encouraged discuss how decisions and actions affect the 
organisation as a whole have fewer accidents than those that do not. Rich 
communication in these organisations is also viewed as contributing to trust and 
teamwork among employees (which are essential in crisis management and avoidance) 
and as improving system reliability by providing greater information and early warnings 
about any problems that do arise (Eisenhardt, 1993: 132).
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2A.2.4 Decision Making
Another strategy adopted by HROs is to give frontline operators decision-making power 
in times of the greatest pressure. HROs normally function in a bureaucratic fashion. 
However, in critical situations in which immediate action must be taken to avoid 
accidents, decision-making power is pushed down to the operators who are most closely 
involved in the operations (Hopkins, 1999: 16). The assumption behind this action is 
that frontline operators will be able to respond considerably more quickly to problems at 
hand and will have more accurate information on the source of those problems than 
their senior managers (Hopkins, 1999: 16; Roberts, 1989: 119). This “decentralisation'“ 
of decision-making authority is viewed as appropriate in HROs because the individuals 
involved are aware, through their training and shared cultural norms, of the assumptions 
and premises on which the organisation makes such decisions (Sagan, 1993: 23-25). 
Because all employees are socialised to adopt these shared assumptions and values, it is 
expected that the actions of frontline workers in these emergency situations will 
conform to the goals of the organisation, therefore preserving overall coordination while 
allowing decisions to be made at the most effective levels (Sagan, 1993: 23-25).
2.4.2.5 Prioritising Safety
HROs also avoid accidents by prioritising safety. For such organisations to remain 
highly reliable, they must hold safety and the avoidance of operational failures as 
priority objectives, with other organisational goals in second place (Sagan, 1993: 18). 
HROs do this by balancing the rewards of efficiency and profit with the costs of 
failures, aiming for outcomes that are both profitable in the long run and safe in the 
short term (Roberts & Bea, 2001: 123). Part of this process involves recognising that 
the costs of training and redundancy in these systems, although high, are less than the 
costs associated with accidents (Roberts, 1989: 123).
Training is used in HROs to teach employees how to respond to potential system 
problems (Rochlin, 1993: 27). HROs spend their “quiet and stable periods’' rehearsing 
the appropriate responses to a range of errors, mistakes, system difficulties and external 
disasters that could jeopardise the safety of the system (Eisenhardt, 1993: 121; Rochlin, 
1993: 27). The purpose of such training is to teach employees how to respond to real 
and potential future situations so that they are better able to deal with unanticipated
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events (Eisenhardt, 1993: 121). It is believed that frequent, realistic simulations of 
emergency situations greatly reduce the error rates in these organisations (Sagan, 1993: 
24).
Redundancy, on the other hand, involves the use of back-up systems that ensure the 
“execution of a task if the primary unit fails or falters” (Rochlin, LaPorte & Roberts, 
1998: 107). This means that when something goes wrong, alternative systems come 
into action so that production continues and accidents do not result. Redundancy can be 
provided in two forms; duplication, where multiple units perform the same function, 
and overlap, where multiple units have “functional areas in common” so that one can be 
used to supplement the other where necessary (Sagan, 1993: 21). HROs make use of 
redundancy in both people and technical safety measures (Sagan, 1993: 17). They 
utilise multiple staff during critical events, so that there are more people observing the 
activities and therefore a greater chance that errors will be noticed (Hopkins, 1999: 16). 
They also use more staff than are required for everyday production so that there will be 
adequate numbers to cope with abnormal circumstances or emergencies if they arise, 
and they assign the task of checking or monitoring systems to multiple people, so that 
there is less chance that mistakes will be made (Hopkins, 2000: 140; Sagan, 1993: 24). 
Technical redundancy, on the other hand, involves having independent backup 
computers, safety devices and communication channels, for instance, to take the place 
of any failed components in the system (Sagan, 1993: 19, 21). HROs see redundancy as 
a way of producing a highly reliable system, even if the components of that system are 
imperfect and subject to error (Sagan, 1993: 19, 21).
HROs also invest resources into protection against the negative results of potential 
errors. For instance, HROs design their systems to be “forgiving of errors” so that 
mistakes, when made, will be unlikely to result in serious consequences (Morone & 
Woodhouse, 1986: 55). This can be achieved by ensuring that it is possible to intervene 
in the time between an error being made and its consequences being felt (Morone & 
Woodhouse, 1986: 127), that is, by ensuring that system processes are loosely coupled. 
Serious consequences can also be avoided by ensuring that important components have 
wide error margins and emergency systems in place (Morone & Woodhouse, 1986: 
122). HROs also focus on minimising the negative outcomes that potential accidents 
might produce by, for instance, operating hazardous systems in remote, unpopulated 
settings or by designing systems with containment facilities in place so that the negative
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consequences of errors cannot spread to areas where they can cause harm (Morone & 
Woodhouse, 1986: 126-127).
2.4.2.6 Learning from High Reliability Theory
The characteristics and proactive measures described above are, according to high 
reliability theory, why HROs are able to avoid accidents despite operating complex, 
hazardous and high-risk technologies. The literature on HROs is therefore phrased 
differently from that of normal accident theory because the focus is on features that 
prevent accidents rather than on factors that cause them. However, since high reliability 
theory indicates that accidents would occur in such systems if these precautions were 
not taken, several possible causes of organisational accidents are clear from this 
literature. With respect to the culture of ‘mindfulness’ in HROs, for instance, it is 
assumed that accidents can result if ‘eternal vigilance’ about hazards and errors is not 
maintained. Therefore, the assumptions that systems are safe and that hazards have 
been anticipated and dealt with, are seen as factors that can contribute to accidents in 
these systems. Similarly, assumptions that error-monitoring systems are functional and 
that an absence of errors signifies that the system is running smoothly both lead to 
complacency which can. in turn, contribute to organisational accidents.
The HRO literature also implies that failure to learn from experiences can contribute to 
organisational accidents. For instance, if organisations do not encourage learning from 
simulated or imagined errors and accidents or employees are not prompted to share and 
learn from each other’s experiences, they may be less capable of dealing with failures 
that do occur. Similarly, if organisations do not encourage error-reporting and ‘making 
the most’ of the incidents that do occur, learning opportunities may be lost.
The HRO research on communication indicates that accidents might result from the 
inadequate communication of goals, procedures and rules to employees throughout the 
system. Ineffective communication can lead to situations in which employees are 
unaware of dangers, lose situational awareness, misinterpret instructions and do not 
receive warnings about hazards, for example. Similarly, the HRO policy of pushing 
decision-making power down to the operators themselves implies that, without this kind 
of flexibility, errors and failures may not be responded to in an appropriate and timely 
manner.
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In addition, the HRO literature suggests that accidents can occur if adequate resources 
are not provided in areas such as training, redundant safety features and protection 
systems. Inadequate or insufficient training can contribute to organisational accidents 
by bringing about situations in which employees make mistakes, fail to identify 
problems, or respond inadequately to hazards, while cutbacks in redundant systems can 
produce situations in which back-up system components are not in place or there are too 
few staff available to deal with emergencies. Similarly, an insufficient commitment to 
containment and protection systems has the potential to result in situations in which 
failures are not prevented from spreading throughout the system and people and the 
environment are not protected from their effects.
Therefore, as is true for the literature on normal accidents, the research into HROs 
highlights several factors that can result in accidents within complex sociotechnical 
systems. However, a number of additional problems have the potential to cause 
accidents within these systems.
2.4.3 Changes in Complexity and Coupling
Weick (1990), for instance, makes the important point that accidents are not necessarily 
prevented by reductions in system complexity and coupling because these system 
characteristics can change over time. He uses as an example the 1977 runway collision 
between two 747 aircraft which had been diverted to Tenerife after a bomb explosion at 
their Canary Islands destination. Weick shows that factors such as adverse weather 
conditions, time limitations and an insufficient number of air traffic controllers to deal 
with the aircraft, led to a situation in which the operators were overloaded with 
information, lost situational awareness and responded inappropriately. These factors, in 
turn, caused the system to become tighter and more interactively complex than it had 
previously been. Weick therefore argues that it is incorrect to view an organisation as 
either vulnerable to or immune from normal accidents, as Perrow suggests, because this 
vulnerability can change over time. Rather, particular attention should be given to 
systems that exhibit either interactive complexity or tight coupling, he argues, because 
these can, in some circumstances, become susceptible to normal accidents.
Weick's (1990) suggestions for improvement include the cultivation of interpersonal 
skills that will allow individuals to benefit from teamwork and the encouragement of
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individuals to be wary of the types of situation that result in misunderstandings and 
false beliefs. His main suggestion, however, is to encourage communication in these 
systems. Effective communication, he argues, not only reduces confusion and 
ambiguity among workers, but also reduces system complexity by making 
circumstances understandable and loosens coupling by making processes more 
predictable and controllable.
2.4.4 Communication and Information Failure
Turner similarly argues that ineffective communication can lead to accidents in complex 
sociotechnical systems, claiming that all disasters in these systems involve some kind of 
information or communication failure (Hopkins, 1999: 17). Turner and Pidgeon (1997: 
160) claim that accidents and disasters are preceded by an ‘‘incubation period" in which 
the “resources of energy, materials and manpower” which produce the accident are 
assembled. Disasters can be prevented, they argue, if people working in the system are 
aware of these developments, understand their significance and deal with them (Turner 
& Pidgeon, 1997: 161). Their central question, then, is “what stops people from 
acquiring and using appropriate advance warning information, so that large-scale 
accidents and disasters are prevented?” and their answer is that the appropriate 
information, for one reason or another, does not reach the right people, at the right time, 
in a format they can use (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997: 162). This unfavourable situation 
can occur when the information is completely unknown or is known but not fully 
appreciated because, for instance, workers are experiencing complacency or distractions 
or they do not trust its source (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997: 163). It can also arise when 
important information is available but is not assembled in a useful way. It might, for 
instance, be “buried in a mass of irrelevant information" or distributed throughout the 
organisation in a way that prevents it from being properly addressed (Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997: 163). Alternatively, important information might be known but never passed up 
to people who can do anything about it (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997: 52). These types of 
communication problem can be remedied, according to Hopkins (1999: 18, 29), by 
ensuring that important information is “highly visible” so that it will be made known to 
those individuals who understand its significance and have “the capacity and inclination 
to do something about it”. In addition, effective mechanisms for communicating 
feedback must be developed so that those who reported the initial problem are informed 
of the outcomes (Hopkins, 1999: 31). Such processes encourage workers to continue to
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report the problems they encounter and “obligate” managers to properly address those 
problems (Hopkins, 1999: 31).
2.4.5 Production over Safety
As suggested in the section on HROs, placing production or profit ahead of safety can 
also contribute to organisational accidents. In fact, analyses of major accidents almost 
always identify production or operational pressures as significant contributing causes 
(Royal Australian Air Force, 2001: 4.1). A consequence of giving precedence to these 
other objectives is that time and resources can be shifted away from areas like training, 
system defences, equipment and human resources, and toward areas more directly and 
visibly profitable for the organisation, increasing the risk of accidents.
Decisions to make these cutbacks often stem from economic calculations that weigh the 
benefits of productivity and profit against the costs of errors and accidents (Glasbeek & 
Tucker, 1993: 20). In HROs for which accident-free performance is a condition of the 
organisation’s survival, safety must necessarily be given precedence. However, in other 
complex sociotechnical systems, the safety of employees is sometimes “only a minor 
consideration" in the decisions made by government officials, politicians and private 
investors (Glasbeek & Tucker, 1993: 14). Indeed, these decision-makers, who are not 
themselves workers, sometimes accept that production in such organisations is 
hazardous and that the risks “are worth taking if profit is likely to be made” (Glasbeek 
& Tucker, 1993:20).
However, safety can also be put second to production in these organisations for the less 
sinister reason that when production targets are not met, there are direct and immediate 
consequences, while the failure to meet safety requirements does not usually result in 
any visible negative consequences (Royal Australian Air Force, 2001: 4.4). As Reason 
(1997: 37) points out, safety is indicated by the absence of adverse events, and is 
therefore a “non-event” that generates relatively little interest. He notes that it is 
difficult to maintain fear and alertness about things that rarely occur, especially “in the 
face of productive imperatives such as growth, profit and market share” (Reason, 1997: 
6). It sometimes takes an accident or “frightening near-miss”, he argues, for safety to 
become the primary concern of management (Reason, 1997: 4). Production can also
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inadvertently take precedence over safety when safety defences remain constant while 
production levels rise, increasing the risk of accidents (Reason, 1997: 6).
2.4.6 Inadequate Hazard Identification and 
Risk Assessment
Failures to conduct adequate hazard identification and risk assessment activities have 
also been identified as factors that have contributed to several organisational accidents. 
A hazard is any condition that can cause death or injury, environmental harm, or loss or 
damage to equipment or property (Bahr, 1997: 10). Hazard identification is a proactive 
process that involves ‘"brainstorming'’ about the safety of a system to try and ascertain 
what these potential hazards are so that efforts can be made to prevent them from 
occurring or to alleviate their effects (Bahr, 1997: 12-13). If the process of considering 
and anticipating hazardous conditions is not properly carried out, potential hazards may 
not be identified and preparations to control them may not be put in place. Risk 
assessment, on the other hand, involves evaluating the severity of the consequences of 
hazards and the likelihood that those consequences will occur (Bahr, 1997: 10). 
Reducing risk within technical systems is achieved by lowering the probability of the 
hazard, the severity of its consequences, or both (Bahr, 1997: 10). Risk assessment is 
therefore a useful tool to use for choosing between various alternative courses of action 
(Bahr, 1997: 3). Again, however, the safety of the system can be jeopardised if 
conscientious efforts are not made to anticipate and evaluate these risks properly.
The concepts of hazard identification and risk assessment are based on the idea that 
accidents occur as a result of hazardous conditions and that anticipating and addressing 
these risks can reduce the likelihood of accidents. Further, there is an implication that 
organisations should make a concerted effort to predict and assess problems so that they 
can be studied and planned for in advance. Inadequacies in risk assessment and hazard 
identification have been identified as contributing factors for numerous accidents. The 
Royal Commission’s findings in regard to the Esso gas plant explosion in 1998, for 
instance, identified Esso’s failure to conduct a hazard identification as a contributing 
factor, with the Commission concluding that it was “inconceivable” that a systematic 
hazard identification study would have failed to identify the physical processes which 
produced this accident (Hopkins, 2000: 28). It suggested that, had hazard identification 
been performed, the problems would have been identified and addressed in advance and
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the explosion would have been prevented. Similarly, a report into the Challenger space 
shuttle accident found that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's 
(NASA) inadequate risk assessment procedures caused them to overlook and misjudge 
“obvious weaknesses” in the system and hence to underestimate significantly the risks 
associated with the launch (Bemasconi, 2004). It is apparent, then, that if risk 
assessment and hazard identification activities are not performed properly, hazards 
might be overlooked or misjudged and accidents may occur as a result.
2.4.7 Inadequate Auditing and Compliance
In order to ensure that systems are functioning as intended and that safety precautions 
are effective, organisations must also audit their systems. The purpose of internal 
auditing is to ensure that the system meets regulatory requirements, functions 
adequately and protects workers, the company and the public against losses (Bahr, 
1997: 65). Auditing involves collecting and analysing information about how the 
organisation actually operates on a day-to-day basis. This information can be used to 
assess matters such as the status of tools, equipment and system defences, the 
effectiveness of human resource management, the adequacy of manuals and procedures 
and the overall functionality and safety of the system. Auditing is also essential for 
ensuring that the appropriate rules, regulations and procedures are implemented and 
enforced within the organisation. Bohle and Quinlan (2000: 493) point out that audits 
must be performed regularly in order to provide an accurate assessment of the system 
and they suggest that “informal but systematic walk-around audits” are particularly 
valuable for identifying problems and reinforcing a culture of safety and compliance. 
Employing auditors from outside the organisation can also be useful because 
“outsiders” can pick up on hazards that workers are familiar with and therefore fail to 
report (Kletz, 1993: 14). Auditing provides a proactive means of identifying system 
inadequacies so that they can be addressed in advance. A failure to conduct regular 
internal auditing might mean that these problems go unnoticed and unaddressed, 
allowing the system’s safety to deteriorate over time.
2.4.8 Regulatory Processes
The causes listed in the sections above are system problems that are within the control 
of an organisation to identify and address. However, there are also factors that can lead
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to accidents, which are largely beyond the control of the organisation, such as those 
relating to regulatory, governmental and societal processes. Inadequacies in these areas 
also have the potential to detract from system safety and result in adverse outcomes. It 
is therefore essential to consider these areas when identifying the factors that can 
contribute to organisational accidents.
Ensuring that risk assessment, hazard identification and internal auditing are properly 
carried out, as well as making certain that operations are conducted safely and in 
accordance with rules and requirements, in turn depend on the adequacy of the 
regulation of a system. Regulatory bodies are responsible for overseeing and 
monitoring the products, performance and activities of organisations within a particular 
sector (Vaughan, 1990: 226; Woo & Vicente, 2003: 254). If they fail to do so 
adequately, hazardous conditions can emerge and remain within sociotechnical systems, 
contributing to organisational accidents. Woo and Vicente (2003) provide an example 
of regulatory failures that contributed to the contamination of drinking water with E. 
coli bacteria in a Canadian town in 2000, causing seven fatalities and widespread 
illness. They note that the regulatory body responsible for overseeing water system 
operation in that province did not provide adequate certification and training for 
operators and had a “lenient” inspection program, an inadequate information system and 
ineffective processes in place for ensuring that it was notified of arising problems, 
among other failings (Woo & Vicente, 2003: 258). These inadequacies led to 
circumstances in which the regulators did not understand the daily workings of the 
system, the operators did not fully appreciate the technical issues regarding drinking 
water safety, infractions and violations were overlooked and a culture of non- 
compliance was encouraged (Woo & Vicente, 2003: 257-258). As a result, the system 
operators did not regularly monitor and test water wells, failed to chlorinate all sources 
of drinking water and concealed negative test results, leading to the situation in which 
contaminated water was distributed to the community without the public being informed 
of the hazard (Woo & Vicente, 2003: 257-258).
Regulatory bodies ideally understand the operations of the organisations they oversee, 
are in a position to identify and address hazards within the system and can ensure that 
operations are carried out safely. Therefore, as Reason (1997: 188) notes, they are 
“potentially one of the most important defences against organizational accidents”. Thus 
when such accidents do occur, regulators are often blamed for not being sufficiently
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familiar with the system in question and for overlooking important warnings (Reason, 
1997: 171). However, it is often extremely difficult for regulatory bodies to oversee 
technical systems with the degree of detail necessary to prevent accidents. Firstly, as 
Vaughan (1990: 228) points out, regulators may not be able to access the necessary 
information because they can only do so via site visits and by requesting information 
from the organisation. Such sources provide only limited information about the 
organisation's normal operations. In addition, because sociotechnical systems are large 
and complex, involving developing technology and specialised knowledge and 
language, regulators often depend on people in the organisation to assist them in 
collecting and interpreting data, potentially resulting in situations in which regulators’ 
opinions and knowledge are shaped by their informants, and in which important 
information is sometimes deliberately distorted or withheld (Vaughan, 1990: 228-229, 
252). In addition, because these arrangements foster continuing relationships between 
operators and regulators, the latter sometimes develop “sympathy and affinity” for the 
former, “compromising the ability both to identify and report violations” (Vaughan, 
1990: 228). When this sort of relationship exists, the ability of the regulators to 
“impose meaningful sanctions” on the operators is also diminished and the enforcement 
of procedures and regulations can become reliant on “negotiation and bargaining” 
(Vaughan, 1990: 229).
The ability of regulators to oversee operations in complex organisations properly has 
also been affected by the steady trend in recent decades away from prescriptive safety 
regulations, which require employers to comply with precise rules about occupational 
health and safety, and towards self-regulation, which requires only that employers 
“provide a safe and healthy workplace for their employees, as far as practicable” 
(Hopkins, 2000: 92). The newer legislation requires employers to achieve the outcome 
of safe operations, and incorporates prosecution and penalties if they fail to do so, but 
does not specify precisely how this should be done (Hopkins, 2000: 92). Such an 
arrangement is thought to give employers the freedom to choose the most appropriate 
safety strategies for their particular industry (Hopkins, 2000: 94). The difficulty for 
regulators is that they can no longer evaluate system safety by examining whether or not 
organisations are in compliance with the strictly defined rules and procedures because 
these no longer exist (Reason, 1997: 181). Rather, they must now determine whether or 
not an organisation is reaching the desired safety outcomes by examining the extent to 
which it has reduced the probability of accidents by identifying and addressing hazards,
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and the degree to which it has created procedures for accident mitigation and emergency 
response to reduce the severity of adverse events that do occur (Reason, 1997: 175). As 
Reason (1997: 181-182) notes, these kinds of process are difficult for regulators to 
assess since they are considerably less specific than the previous prescriptive rules and 
they vary vastly in different organisations. In order to determine whether or not the 
desired safety outcomes are being met, regulators must now have a comprehensive 
appreciation of the intricacies of the system, so that they can determine whether or not 
the safety strategies adopted by the company are sufficient to prevent accidents. Reason 
(1997) suggests that, owing to gaps in the knowledge about how human, organisational 
and technical factors can combine to produce organisational accidents, and because 
most regulators have technical and operational expertise rather than knowledge of 
human and organisational factors, it is extremely difficult for regulators to determine 
whether or not such safety outcomes are, in fact, being achieved. For all of these 
reasons, regulatory bodies might be inadequate in their oversight of complex systems, 
allowing unsafe practices and conditions to develop and persist.
2.4.9 Governmental Factors
A range of governmental factors can also contribute to organisational accidents. As 
noted above, safety legislation can affect the adequacy of system regulation. However, 
inadequate legislation can also contribute to accidents more directly. In the Canadian 
drinking water contamination case mentioned above, for instance, Woo and Vicente 
(2003) noted that the laboratories for testing the water samples had been privatised prior 
to the outbreak but that no corresponding legislation had been enacted to require the 
new private laboratories to notify regulators of adverse test results. As a result, the 
laboratory that tested the contaminated water informed only the system manager of the 
results (Woo & Vicente, 2003: 258). Woo and Vicente (2003: 257-258) suggest that 
this legislative inadequacy was a ‘"major contributor’7 to the delays in the discovery of 
the contamination source and the subsequent deaths and illness in the community.
Budget cutbacks have also been identified as contributors to several organisational 
accidents. In this same accident, Woo and Vicente (2003: 258) argue that provincial 
budget cutbacks at the government level contributed to the failure of the regulatory 
body to oversee the water system effectively, since these reductions forced the regulator 
to limit its inspection and compliance activities. Had it been properly funded, they
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argue, the dangerous practices would not have continued and the lack of water 
monitoring and chlorination systems would probably have been identified and rectified 
prior to the outbreak (Woo & Vicente, 2003: 258). The Royal Australian Air Force 
(RAAF) (2001) also identified government cost-cutting as a contributing factor in its 
inquiry into the exposure of Air Force maintenance workers to toxic chemicals. The 
report proposed that, as a result of government cost-cutting activities, the Air Force 
outsourced its medical services, leading to the situation in which its patient care was 
provided primarily by contract doctors (Royal Australian Air Force, 2001). These 
contract doctors were paid for office consultations but not to investigate the patients’ 
working environment or to conduct research into why the maintenance workers were 
experiencing ill health. The report implies that, had the Air Force’s medical centre been 
adequately funded, the doctors would have had the resources to recognise and respond 
to the workers’ symptoms of illness. As it was, the medical centre failed to identify the 
cause of their illness for more than a year, allowing the chemical exposure to continue 
(Royal Australian Air Force, 2001).
Privatisation may also contribute indirectly to accidents in sociotechnical systems. The 
privatisation of previously government-owned enterprises, such as transport, gas, 
electricity and water services has occurred in numerous countries in recent decades, 
based on the belief that private enterprises are more efficient than those owned and run 
by the government (Hopkins, 2000: 110). However, the privatisation of these services 
has led to fear that safety and reliability have been jeopardised as a result (Hopkins, 
2000: 110). Hopkins (2000: 110) notes, for instance, that privatisation is often followed 
by reductions in maintenance to save money. Critics of the privatisation of the British 
rail system have argued that the cutbacks to equipment, safety defences, personnel and 
repairs associated with the privatisation of this industry have contributed to numerous 
serious rail accidents {Another fatal rail accident, 2000; Hyland & Marsden, 1999; 
Stuart, 1997). Of course, this is not to say that privatisation always results in reduced 
safety, nor that non-privatised enterprises are necessarily safe. However, where 
privatisation is associated with cost-cutting activities, the risk of organisational 
accidents can increase. These examples illustrate that processes at the governmental 
level, such as those relating to legislation, budgeting and privatisation, can contribute to 
accidents in sociotechnical systems.
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2.4.10 Societal Factors
Finally, factors at the broader societal level also have the potential to contribute to 
accidents within complex systems, primarily by bringing about the types of condition 
listed above. As Hopkins (2000: 123) argues, “we live in an increasingly global, 
capitalist society in which competition and the market affect most aspects of our lives'’. 
These market forces, he suggests, contribute to the prioritisation of production over 
safety and the sorts of company cost-cutting activities that can result in organisational 
accidents. They also encourage the move towards privatisation and outsourcing which, 
as argued above, can have negative implications for system safety, as well as 
reinforcing commercial and production pressures within complex systems (Hopkins, 
2000: 123-124).
Cultural priorities and values can also encourage the kinds of accident-producing factors 
identified in this chapter. In a broad sense, the views of the community are ideally 
reflected in a country’s legislative and governmental systems, in a democratic society. 
Therefore, the types of condition in these sectors that may have the potential to 
contribute to accidents, such as outsourcing and budget cutbacks, are, in turn, affected 
by societal values. Cultural values can also have more direct effects on system safety. 
The RAAF (2001: 11.2) inquiry into the exposure of maintenance workers to toxic 
chemicals, for instance, identified the preference among medical professionals for 
“signs visible to the external observer rather than symptoms reported by patients” as a 
contributing factor at the broader societal level. The report indicated that this cultural 
preference led directly to the medical centre’s failure to respond to the workers’ 
symptoms of illness which, in turn, contributed to the workers’ continued health 
problems.
Governmental, legislative and regulatory processes within a given country, as well as 
the processes that occur within sociotechnical systems, can also be affected by global 
factors such as international law, safety requirements and politics. Sagan (1993: 270) 
points out, for instance, that safety in nuclear weapons production systems in Russia and 
the United States could be significantly improved through vicarious learning, that is, by 
the different production organisations sharing details about the adverse events, incidents 
and safety problems that they have experienced. Sharing such information, Sagan 
argues, would allow the organisations to learn from each other’s mistakes, potentially
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improving safety in both countries. This opportunity for learning is unlikely to be 
adopted, however, because it would require that the organisations share details about 
their weapons and systems design, which would have implications for national security 
(Sagan, 1993: 270).
In these ways, processes that are entirely external to organisations can also impact upon 
the safety of their operations. Consideration of these factors is useful, then, for 
highlighting the broader context within which problems and inadequacies occur and, 
consequently, for understanding how and why organisational accidents happen.
2.5 From Causes to Accidents
In line with the system approach, it has therefore been suggested that there are 
numerous factors, both internal and external to organisations, which can undermine 
safety and contribute to accidents in complex systems. However, it is perhaps also 
apparent that some of these problems exist in most, if not all, sociotechnical systems 
without necessarily resulting in organisational accidents. The questions arise, then, as 
to how, and in which circumstances, these factors actually result in adverse events. 
Research in this area has led to several models of how this process can occur.
2.5.1 Reason’s Model of Accident Causation
Reason (1997, 2000) argues that organisational accidents occur within complex, high- 
technology systems when deficiencies in the system combine with local circumstances 
and human errors to penetrate the system’s defences. He notes that all complex systems 
are designed with a series of defences in place, such as procedures, alarms and physical 
barriers, to protect assets and potential victims from hazards. This “multiplicity of 
overlapping and mutually supporting defences”, he argues, is what protects complex 
systems from the effects of human and technical failures (Reason, 1997: 7). Ideally, 
each of the system’s defensive layers prevents accidents from being possible. However, 
in reality, these defences are never completely “intact” because, like slices of Swiss 
cheese, they contain gaps (Reason, 2000: 769). Reason (2000: 769) points out that the 
weaknesses in any one defensive layer do not normally lead to accidents, but that
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accidents can occur “when the holes in many layers momentarily line up to permit a 
trajectory of accident opportunity’’, that is, when the defences simultaneously fail so 
that control over hazards is lost (see Figure 1).
Reason (1997: 19) argues that gaps in the system's defences are caused by “active 
failures" and “latent conditions". The former are unsafe acts such as slips, lapses, 
mistakes and violations which are made by individuals at the “front-line" of the system 
and which have an immediate and direct adverse effect on the system or its defences 
(Reason, 1997: 10-11). Reason (1990: 173) suggests that workers are often the 
“inheritors of system defects" and that their involvement in accidents is “usually that of 
adding the final garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have already been long in the 
cooking". As such, he considers accidents to be caused by error-prone situations, rather 
than error-prone individuals, and consequently focuses less on human error than on 
systemic problems, such as latent conditions (Reason, 1997: 129). “Latent conditions" 
are like “resident pathogens" within sociotechnical systems (Reason, 2000: 769). They 
weaken the system's defences by creating gaps such as inadequate design, unworkable 
procedures and unreliable indicators, which both increase the chances that hazards will 
come into contact with potential victims and create circumstances that promote unsafe 
acts (Reason, 1997: 10, 2000: 769). The organisational problems and inadequacies 
outlined in the previous sections, then, are the types of latent condition to which Reason 
refers.
Lo$?
Figure 1 -  Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model 
(Reason, 2000: 769)
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Latent conditions consist of “local workplace factors'’ and “organizational factors" 
(Reason, 1997: 121). The former are the “immediate mental and physical precursors" 
of unsafe acts, such as time limitations and inadequate training, supervision and 
equipment (Reason, 1997: 121). Reason (1997: 121) argues that while local workplace 
factors “breed” unsafe acts, they are, in turn, the result of problems at higher levels of 
the organisation. These higher-level problems, referred to as “organizational factors”, 
are the “parent” failures that produce these “problem children” in an organisation (see 
Figure 2) (Reason, 1997: 121). They exist in all complex systems, he argues, because 
“they are an inevitable product of strategic decisions” made at the design, management, 
government and regulatory levels (Reason, 1997: 10, 36). These decisions, relating to 
processes such as resource allocation, communication and budgeting, distribute “error- 
producing factors” throughout the organisation (Reason, 1997: 10, 16). Latent 
conditions can “lie dormant” for long periods in a system without causing any harm but 
can then interact with active failures and local conditions to “defeat the system's 
defences” (Reason, 1997: 11, 2000: 769). Reason (1997: 18) points out that accidents 
can also be caused by latent conditions directly, without any unsafe acts having been 
performed (see the latent condition pathways in Figure 2). However, he notes that most 
organisational accidents occur when a combination of active failures and latent 
conditions permit a complete accident trajectory through the system’s defences, 
enabling hazards to come into contact with assets and people (Maurino et al., 1995: 23; 
Reason, 1997: 17).
Figure 2 -  Reason’s Model of Accident Causation 
(Reason, 1997: 17)
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The system approach to accident analysis is based on Reason's work and is very much 
reflected in his theory of accident causation. Reason (1997: 11) points out that it is 
more beneficial to focus on removing latent conditions within the system than active 
failures since, rather than resulting in one specific accident as active failures tend to do, 
these conditions can have a broader negative effect on the system, with the potential to 
contribute to a number of different types of accident. He therefore argues that latent 
errors “pose the greatest threat to the safety of a complex system" and that discovering 
and repairing these latent conditions will be more beneficial to the safety of the system 
as a whole than attempts to minimise active failures (Reason, 1990: 173). Reason 
(1997: 15) argues that active failures occur in all complex systems, but that most are 
“caught by the defences” so that they do not result in accidents. The less effective the 
system's defences are, however, the more likely it becomes that active failures will 
result in accidents (Maurino et al., 1995: 14). Reason sees organisational accidents as 
caused, then, by the inability of the system to “absorb the consequences" of active 
failures as a result of having inadequate defences in place (Maurino et al., 1995: 31). It 
is therefore the weaknesses in the system’s defences, according to this model, that allow 
people, the system and the environment come into direct contact with hazards (Reason, 
2000: 769).
2.5.2 Rasmussen’s Model of Accident 
Causation
Rasmussen (1997) takes a similarly systems-based approach to accident causation but 
focuses on the migration of work processes towards the boundaries of safe operations, 
rather than on failed system defences. He views organisational accidents as the result of 
loss of control over potentially harmful physical processes and therefore sees safety as 
requiring “control of work processes so as to avoid accidental side effects causing harm 
to people, environment, or investment” (Rasmussen, 1997: 184).
Rasmussen’s model of accident causation is based on several assumptions about how 
complex technical systems function. Firstly, he and Svedung (2000: 10) argue that, 
while societal conditions were “stable” in the past, modem society is “dynamic”, with 
the unstable political and economic “climate” causing society to undergo continuous 
changes. In addition, technology is developing rapidly in the “operative level of 
society”, that is, within the transport, manufacturing and shipping industries, for
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example, but the management, regulatory and legislative sectors associated with these 
industries are changing at a considerably slower rate (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 
10). The different rates of change in these interrelated parts of society, they argue, 
result in a “dynamic interaction" between these areas (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 
10). They also claim that developments in information technology, transportation and 
“just-in-time" systems (where materials are produced as they are required, rather than in 
advance) have led to increased “integration and coupling” within these systems, so that 
a single decision or action can propagate quickly through the system, producing far- 
reaching effects (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 10). Rasmussen suggests that each of 
these factors contributes to a situation in which the constraints and forces that determine 
work practices are continuously changing, and that this state of change must be taken 
into consideration when analysing accidents (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 95). As a 
result of the dynamic interactions between technology, work procedures and societal 
changes, work systems are inseparable from society as a whole and accident avoidance 
is therefore a “socio-technical system problem" rather than a problem of controlling 
“local factors" within the workplace (Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002: 398).
Rasmussen argues that, in addition to interacting with other parts of society, the 
different areas in this sociotechnical system influence one another. He views systems 
for controlling hazards as being made up of a number of levels (see Figure 3), although 
he notes that the exact number and type of level varies between industries (Vicente & 
Christoffersen, 2006: 95). The bottom level of this hierarchy incorporates activities 
immediately related to the control of the hazardous process. The next level describes 
the actions of workers who are directly involved in controlling the hazardous process, 
such as control room operators or pilots. The next level describes the managers who 
supervise those staff and the fourth-highest level concerns the behaviour of the company 
itself. The fifth level refers to the activities of the regulatory bodies and associations 
responsible for overseeing the activities of the company. The top level refers to 
government activities, such as the control of safety with legislation and public policy 
(Rasmussen, 1997: 184; Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 95).
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Figure 3 -  The Levels of a Complex Sociotechnical System 
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 11)
Rasmussen argues that these levels are connected to one another by the flow of 
decisions and information, with decisions propagating downwards in the form of laws, 
regulations, policies and plans, while information about the actual “state of affairs’’ in 
the system propagates upwards, by way of observations, reports and reviews (as 
symbolised by the arrows in Figure 3) (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 95). The 
successful transmission of instructions and feedback throughout the system is essential 
for safe operation because, if the orders from the higher levels are not followed or if the 
information from the lower levels is not conveyed upward, the system can lose control 
over the hazard it is designed to manage (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 96). In this 
way, Rasmussen sees safety within a sociotechnical system as affected, not only by the 
activities of the workers who interact directly with the hazardous process itself, but by 
the activities of individuals at every level in the system and by the interaction and 
integration across each of the different levels (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 96). An
39
additional factor that must be taken into account is that the levels within a 
sociotechnical system are not stable, as they are constantly changing to adapt to the 
external pressures of modern society, such as those relating to political, financial and 
technological circumstances (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 97).
Rasmussen's theory of accident causation is based on these ideas about the dynamic, 
interactive nature of complex systems. He argues that companies operate within a 
highly competitive and aggressive environment in which employees are under constant 
pressure to work in a cost-effective manner (Rasmussen, 1997: 186; Vicente & 
Christoffersen, 2006: 97). This force pushes workers and the system as a whole 
towards efficiency and away from the “Boundary to Economic Failure” (Rasmussen, 
1997: 190). At the same time, however, workers are under pressure from a 
psychological “effort gradient”, which pushes them away from unacceptable workloads 
and towards the easiest way to do the job (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 97). As a 
result of these two sources of pressure, work practices go through a process of 
“migration" as workers at every level of the sociotechnical system try to find the most 
appropriate balance between effort and cost-effectiveness in their work (Vicente & 
Christoffersen, 2006: 98). The result of this competitive pressure is a movement 
towards the “Boundary of functionally acceptable performance” and, when such 
boundaries are crossed, accidents can result (Rasmussen, 1997: 189) (see Figure 4).
Real safety 
boundary
(Invisible)
Boundary to 
economic failure
Boundary to 
unacceptable 
workload
Boundary defined 
by official
work practices
Figure 4 -  Migration Towards the Boundaries of Safe Operation 
(Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 97)
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Rasmussen (1997: 184-189), then, sees accidents as stemming from the loss of control 
over the relevant physical processes and argues that this situation occurs as a result of 
the “systematic migration of organisational behaviour ... under the influence of pressure 
toward cost-effectiveness in an aggressive, competitive environment”. He uses the 
Zeebriigge shipping accident as an example, showing that it was caused, not by any 
major error, but by the interaction of the effects of the decisions made by several 
individuals “in their normal work context” (Rasmussen, 1997: 189). Under local 
pressures to be cost-effective, individuals in different parts of the company had been 
“preparing the stage for an accident” so that, in the end, it only took “a single human 
act” to release the flow of events that caused the ship to capsize (Rasmussen, 1997:
189) . Rasmussen (1997: 190) points out that, often, accidents ultimately occur as a 
result of a “quite normal variation in somebody’s behaviour" which ‘releases’ the 
accidental sequence of events that was shaped by the independent actions and decisions 
of other individuals throughout the system. This final action is often identified as the 
“root cause” of the accident, even though it is likely that, had this particular cause not 
“released" the accident, another would eventually have done so (Rasmussen, 1997:
190) . This part of Rasmussen’s model is equivalent, then, to Reason's idea that a series 
of weakened system defences can create the circumstances in which one condition or 
action, which would otherwise have had no visible effect, creates the final condition 
necessary to create an ‘accident trajectory’. Rasmussen argues that, frequently, the 
workers involved in an accident will not understand what has happened because the 
behaviour that led to the accident was not particularly different from past behaviours 
that had no negative effect (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 98). He suggests that 
workers are simply trying to meet their local requirements and, in their “daily busy flow 
of activities”, are not aware of the “potentially dangerous side-effects” of their decisions 
(Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002: 403).
One of the issues Rasmussen highlights in discussing this process of migration is that 
variation in work practices is required in order to “get the job done” (Vicente & 
Christoffersen, 2006: 98). While work within sociotechnical systems is certainly 
influenced by objectives, instructions and procedures, Rasmussen (1997: 187) argues 
that workers never follow rules “to the letter”, but rather modify the instructions to suit 
other criteria, such as their actual workloads and time limitations. He suggests that the 
violation of formal procedures is often quite rational when these additional pressures are 
taken into account and that it is normal for workers in sociotechnical systems to have
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highly variable behaviour as a result (Rasmussen, 1997: 187). In addition, he argues 
that most workers have “considerable degrees of freedom" to choose between different 
sequences of actions and different ways of doing things in their work (Rasmussen, 
1990: 455). He suggests that individuals go through a process of searching for the best 
way to work and that errors are “unavoidable side effects” of this exploration in 
behaviour (Rasmussen, 1990: 456). He points out that, in light of the required 
deviations in work practice, it is no great surprise that 70-80% of accident reviews find 
that workers have violated procedures and therefore identify “human error” as the cause 
(Rasmussen, 1997: 188).
The problem, according to Svedung and Rasmussen (2002: 403), is that individuals 
cannot judge the state of the system as a whole because this status depends on the 
decisions made by other people at different times, in different parts of the system and in 
other organisations. The outer boundary of safe performance is not visible to those 
working within the system, thus they cannot tell how close the system is to encountering 
a hazardous outcome (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 98). Therefore when making 
decisions, they are unable to see the “complete picture" and it is only after an accident 
that the “relational structure” between the independent decisions and daily actions of 
different individuals becomes clear (Rasmussen, 1997: 189; Svedung & Rasmussen, 
2002: 403). Rasmussen views system defences as part of the reason why these safety 
boundaries are invisible. These defences are usually designed in a series so that if one 
fails, there is a back-up defence to prevent an accident from occurring. One 
consequence is that defences tend to “degenerate systematically” over time because the 
unseen failures are not repaired (Rasmussen, 1997: 190). Another is that the 
effectiveness of the defences protecting one individual from a hazard source is 
dependent upon on the extent to which the system's defences have been violated by 
other individuals (Rasmussen, 1997: 190). It is only after an accident that the 
degradation in safety that may have been occurring slowly over a number of years is 
revealed (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 107). Therefore, in striving to work more 
efficiently, workers may come closer and closer to the actual safety boundary but, 
because they cannot “see” it, they are unaware of the possible dangers of their decisions 
and actions (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 107). Svedung and Rasmussen (2002: 
399) additionally note that there are distinct benefits to be gained from working near 
this invisible safety boundary since “success in a competitive environment implies 
exploitation of the benefit from operating at the fringes of the usual, accepted practice'’.
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Rasmussen, then, argues that safety is affected by the decisions and actions of all 
individuals working in a system and that accidents can occur as a result of the 
inadequate integration of the different parts, not just from errors at any one level 
(Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006: 96). He therefore argues that safety is dependent upon 
the “control of work processes” so that side effects that can cause harm to people, 
investment or the environment, are avoided (Rasmussen, 1997: 184). Rasmussen and 
Svedung (2000: 15) suggest that the way to prevent accidents is to make the system’s 
“boundaries of safe performance” clear so that workers are aware of the possible side- 
effects of their decisions and actions. Ideally, Rasmussen (1990: 457) argues, the 
communication and feedback in a system should be such that workers are “familiar” 
with the boundary of safe behaviour and able to “recover from the effects of errors” in 
the system. Without such knowledge, workers can inadvertently contribute to the 
situation in which work processes drift towards the boundaries of safe practices and a 
simple variation in behaviour is all that is required to produce an accident.
2.5.3 Snook’s Model of Accident Causation
Snook similarly argues that drift in work practices can affect safety in complex systems. 
However, he views this drift as only one part of the series of processes that lead to 
organisational accidents. Snook's model of accident causation differs from the above 
models because, rather than aiming to create a generalised theory of accident causation, 
Snook’s aim is to explain how one particular accident occurred. His model is useful for 
current purposes, however, because it provides insight into how system processes and 
inadequacies have, in practice, combined to produce an organisational accident.
Snook’s (2000) research focuses on a military aircraft accident in 1991 in which two 
U.S. Air Force fighter jets shot down two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters by 
mistake, destroying the helicopters and killing 26 peacekeepers on board. The U.S. 
military was in Northern Iraq as part of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), a 
multinational humanitarian effort to provide assistance to numerous Kurdish refugees 
who had “fled into the hills of northern Iraq” during the Persian Gulf War (Snook, 
2000: 3). OPC’s aim was to assist in their resettlement, to protect the relief workers 
who were assisting them and to “occupy the airspace over northern Iraq” (Snook, 2000: 
28-29). The U.S. fighter jet pilots had been instructed to perform the initial “sweep” of 
the no-fly zone, to ensure that no “hostile aircraft'’ were present (Snook, 2000: 4). As a
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result of various integration, procedural and communication problems, the two Army 
helicopters were already in the no-fly zone at that point and the fighter jet pilots were 
not able to identify them as “friendly” aircraft (Snook, 2000: 5-6). As a consequence of 
a complex sequence of events, the fighter jet pilots misidentified the Black Hawks as 
Iraqi helicopters and shot them down and the Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) aircraft that was responsible for controlling both parties failed to intervene 
(Snook, 2000: 5-6). Snook’s model of accident causation emerges in his attempt to 
make sense of how this accident occurred.
From his comprehensive study of the factors that contributed to this accident, Snook 
(2000: 10) concludes that there was no one “root cause” for this shootdown and that 
nobody was responsible or blameworthy for the outcome. Rather, he sees the accident 
as resulting from the “unanticipated interaction” of a number of independently “non­
failing components” (Snook, 2000: 15). He proposes a multi-stage theory of accident 
causation to account for the complex chain of events that led to this occurrence. 
According to Snook (2000: 191), the individuals who design systems (such as those 
involved in OPC) are unlikely ever to work in the systems themselves and will therefore 
never experience the “practical costs of overly burdensome rules”. They may, however, 
feel the costs of being blamed for “shoddy design” if the system later turns out to be 
inadequate (Snook, 2000: 191). From their perspective, it is therefore best to 
“overdesign”. For instance, it is best to assume that the system will be tightly coupled 
and to design conservative rules that will handle worst-case scenarios in such situations 
(Snook, 2000: 187). This is particularly true when the design is for a hazardous 
organisation that cannot “afford to learn from trial and error”, such as Task Force OPC 
(Snook, 2000: 229).
The problem with this tendency towards “overdesign” and “overcontrol” is that, in 
practice, these rules are often perceived by those individuals working in the system to 
be inappropriate and largely unsustainable (Snook, 2000: 192, 201). This is the second 
phase in Snook’s theory. He argues that, in reality, systems are loosely coupled most of 
the time, with the different parts of the system largely independent of one another 
(Snook, 2000: 190). Therefore, to the operators working within the system, the 
“conservatively written rules” designed for a tightly coupled system appear not to match 
the actual requirements of the situation (Snook, 2000: 193). When the formal rules are 
inappropriate, Snook (2000: 193-194) suggests, workers tend to adjust their behaviour
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to suit the demands of the current situation, particularly as they gain “personal 
experience in the field”. The overall result is that workers’ behaviour becomes 
determined less by established rules and more by the requirements of the task, that is, 
they begin to break the rules and work in an “applied” mode (2000: 193-200). Snook 
(2000: 24) refers to this process as “practical drift” and defines it as “the slow steady 
uncoupling of local practice from written procedure”. Like Rasmussen, he argues that 
the alteration of behaviour to suit local circumstances is rational and effective from the 
worker's perspective and suggests that the successful adjustment to local conditions “is 
often the mark of professional expertise” (Snook, 2000: 228). Snook (2000: 184) also 
argues that if these task-based actions are seen to have no negative consequences, they 
are likely to be permanently adopted by workers since “locally efficient practices can 
gain legitimacy through unremarkable repetition". These behaviours are then passed on 
to other workers through “informal socialization procedures” (Snook, 2000: 195). The 
result of these behavioural adaptations is that procedures are carried “far afield” from 
the originally designed rules while, at the same time, the “false sense of confidence that 
everything is all right" is constantly reinforced by the absence of negative consequences 
(Snook, 2000: 199-200).
One problem is that this practical drift occurs all over the system as individuals in 
different parts adapt to their own local conditions (Snook, 2000: 197). The result is 
that, in the attempt to eliminate what appear as “ill-conceived design deficiencies”, 
numerous sets of procedures emerge for the different “subgroups" in the system (Snook, 
2000: 197-198). In an argument similar to Rasmussen's, Snook (2000: 198) claims that 
the problem with these adaptations is not the practical drift itself, but that the 
individuals in the system are not aware of the local procedures that everyone else in the 
system is following. He argues that individuals cannot be aware of the extent to which 
other groups have drifted away from the formal practices (Snook, 2000: 198). Within 
OPC, for instance, social and physical separation, “interservice rivalry” and the military 
hierarchy system all prevented this sort of information from being shared between the 
subgroups operating in Northern Iraq at the time of the shootdown (Snook, 2000: 174, 
222). All individuals can do in such situations, he argues, is assume that others are 
behaving in accordance with the formal, standard procedures, even though they are 
aware that they are not following these rules themselves (Snook, 2000: 199). As a 
result of this trend, the different subunits have a false impression of the procedures 
guiding the behaviour of other subunits in the system.
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This situation becomes problematic when the system does become tightly coupled, the 
third phase in Snook’s theory. Snook (2000: 232) claims that overdesign and practical 
drift do not result in accidents if the system remains loosely coupled. In order for an 
accident to occur, he argues, a situation must arise in which the activities of different 
subgroups cease to be independent of one another (Snook, 2000: 231-232). His theory 
therefore echoes Weick’s work on the effects of changes in coupling within complex 
systems. When this happens after practical drift has occurred, Snook (2000: 200) 
argues, there are likely to be significant “coordination gaps" between the actions of the 
different groups, so that their individually developed, locally efficient procedures may 
fail to meet the demands of the tightly coupled situation. In addition, because they are 
not aware of each other's local procedures, they will each assume that everyone else is 
following the original set of rules and their assumptions about each other’s behaviour 
will therefore be wrong (Snook, 2000: 199). The cues on which they had based their 
behaviour when the system was loosely coupled will no longer be valid and accidents 
can occur as a result of this coordination and communication failure (Snook, 2000: 
200). In the Black Hawk shootdown, for instance, members of the U.S. Air Force and 
U.S. Army had adjusted their behaviour over the course of the three years prior to the 
accident to suit the local conditions of the loosely coupled system. One outcome of this 
drift was that the U.S. Army helicopters were not integrated into OPC flight operations 
and they entered the no-fly zone before the Air Force fighter jets went in to perform the 
initial sweep (Snook, 2000: 21). The fighter jet pilots had not been expecting any 
friendly aircraft to be in the no-fly zone before them and thus viewed the helicopters as 
potentially hostile. In this tightly coupled situation, the fighter jet pilots assumed that if 
the helicopters were friendly, they would have been emitting a certain radio frequency, 
in accordance with the original standard procedures. The helicopters were not emitting 
this frequency because, for a number of reasons relating to practical drift, they had not 
been told to change to this frequency (Snook, 2000: 21). Therefore, the jets assumed 
that the helicopters were hostile and shot them down. This is a simplified description of 
the events leading to the Black Hawk shootdown but it illustrates the interaction of 
events that Snook’s theory describes. It also supports Snook's view that accidents are 
not caused by isolated incidents or individual causes but by the process of overdesign 
and practical drift combined with changes in the “tightness” of coupling within a 
system.
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter described a range of conditions, problems and processes that can occur 
within complex sociotechnical systems to degrade their safety and make them 
susceptible to organisational accidents. It also highlighted several models of accident 
causation that indicate processes by which these factors can come together to produce 
accidents. From these discussions, it is evident that organisational accidents are the 
result of a range of factors throughout the sociotechnical system combining or 
interacting in ways that allow control over hazards to be lost. In addition to providing 
an understanding of what organisational accidents are and how they occur, this 
information is important because it indicates two significant points with respect to the 
analysis of such accidents. The first is that, in order to develop a complete picture of 
how and why an organisational accident occurred and to take appropriate steps to 
prevent recurrence, it is necessary to take a systems-based approach that has the 
capacity to incorporate the full range of contributing factors, stemming from all parts of 
the sociotechnical system, into the analysis. Secondly, such an approach must have the 
capacity to show how these factors came together to produce the situation in which an 
accident could occur. It is therefore also necessary to adopt a holistic approach that 
enables the interactions between system components, as well as external pressures and 
conditions that contributed to an accident, to be taken into account. The accident 
analysis technique of interest in this research - the AcciMap approach - is appropriate 
for these purposes.
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3Introduction to AcciMaps
The previous chapter highlighted the importance, in the analysis of organisational 
accidents, of adopting a systems-based approach with the capacity to illustrate how 
multiple factors throughout the sociotechnical system interacted to result in an accident 
or incident. As we shall see in the course of this chapter, Rasmussen's AcciMap 
approach meets these criteria more effectively than several other systemic accident 
analysis techniques. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the AcciMap approach, 
to illustrate why it is considered to be a useful and valuable technique for analysing 
organisational accidents and to discuss the necessity for validating this approach.
3.1 The AcciMap Approach
The AcciMap approach was developed by Rasmussen on the basis of his model of 
accident causation, outlined in the previous chapter, and has been used by several 
analysts (e.g. Hopkins, 2000, 2005; Naikar, Saunders & Hopkins, 2002; Piche & 
Vicente, 2005; Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen & Svedung, 1997, 2000; Royal Australian 
Air Force, 2001; Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002; Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006; Woo & 
Vicente, 2003). It is a technique for the retrospective analysis of organisational 
accidents that incorporates the use of a causal diagram to identify the systemic causes of 
an accident and to illustrate how these causes combined to allow the accident to occur. 
An “AcciMap" (pronounced axi-map, referring to the map of an accident) is “a multi- 
causal diagram which locates the various contributing factors to an accident in terms of 
their causal remoteness from the accident” (Naikar, Saunders & Hopkins, 2002: 2). It is
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a tree-shaped diagram with the accident located at the bottom and the causes of that 
event branching upward, with the most immediate causes in the lower sections of the 
diagram and the more remote causes at the top (see Figure 5). The causal factors are 
organised into a series of layers representing the different parts of the sociotechnical 
system in which the accident occurred and include levels relating to the organisation(s) 
involved as well as the relevant governmental and regulatory bodies. Each of the causal 
factors in the diagram is linked to its effects in a way that illustrates how that factor 
affected other factors and contributed to the accident. The AcciMap diagram is 
therefore a graphical representation of the sequence of events and conditions that 
resulted in an organisational accident. The term ‘AcciMap approach' is a general term 
used in this thesis to refer to the technique for analysing an accident by creating an 
AcciMap and to the generation of safety recommendations from the AcciMap (in those 
cases in which recommendations are made).
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Immediate Causes
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Figure 5 -  The AcciMap Layout
The AcciMap approach is one of several techniques for analysing organisational 
accidents in the ways described in the previous chapter. It extends the causal analysis 
well beyond the immediate causes of an accident to uncover the range of factors 
throughout the sociotechnical system that promoted the conditions in which the accident
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occurred, or which failed to prevent these conditions from arising (in accordance with 
the system approach). As such, it is clear from following the causal chains in an 
AcciMap, that an organisational accident is the result of multiple systemic causes and 
that the immediate causes of an accident are consequences of these higher-level 
problems, rather than the sole causes. In addition, AcciMaps clearly illustrate how the 
multiple causes came together to produce the situation in which an accident occurred, 
by showing the relationships between the causal factors in the diagram and the way in 
which the combination of these factors resulted in the accident. In doing so, the 
AcciMap approach highlights the context within which an organisational accident 
occurred and the precise combination of events and conditions leading to that outcome, 
thereby providing a comprehensive picture of how and why it happened. It also 
facilitates accident prevention by pinpointing problem areas in the system that could be 
addressed to prevent recurrences.
3.2 The Advantages of the AcciMap 
Approach
In addition to these benefits, the adoption of the AcciMap approach in analysing 
organisational accidents is advantageous in several respects.
3.2.1 High-level Causes and Corrective 
Actions
Firstly, the AcciMap approach extends the causal analysis of an accident further than 
many other systems-based methods of analysis, thereby producing a more holistic 
picture of the accident scenario. In accordance with the systems approach, many 
accident analysis methods extend beyond the immediate causes to uncover the 
organisational causes of accidents so that the problems and deficiencies in these areas 
can be identified and addressed. However, few continue beyond this point. For 
instance, the Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM), developed on the basis of 
Reason's model of accident causation, extends the causal analysis only to the 
organisational level (see Figure 6, an example of an ICAM chart for an accident that 
occurred on an oil rig during the reconnection of high pressure hoses).
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For a given incident or accident (shown on the right-hand side of the diagram), the 
ICAM tree begins with the identification of the absent or failed defences that allowed 
the accident to occur, then considers the individual or team actions behind those absent 
or failed defences, then identifies the conditions associated with the task and 
environment that led to these unsafe acts, and finally considers the organisational 
factors that contributed to those conditions (BHP, 2000: 27; Hopkins, 2003: 8). The 
ICAM investigation guide specifies that each branch should be continued until the 
uncovered events are outside the organisation's control and an organisational failure has 
been uncovered (BHP, 2000: 10). The approach does not continue beyond this point 
because it is designed to assist organisations in accident prevention, and therefore aims 
to focus on factors that are within the organisation’s control (Hopkins, 2003: 5). 
However, as Hopkins (2003: 2) points out, the ICAM causal tree does not appear, in
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practice, even to reach the highest levels of the organisation. This problem perhaps 
occurs because the ICAM causal tree is restricted to four levels of causation so that, 
once an organisational failure has been identified (on the left-hand side of the diagram), 
there is nowhere in the diagram for higher-level organisational factors to be represented. 
For instance, in Figure 6, the organisational factor “GS has not received safety induction 
training" is presumably the result of a more general and remote problem relating to the 
processes in place for ensuring that employees have been given adequate training prior 
to commencing work. Flowever, as the branches in an ICAM tree terminate once the 
first organisational factor has been identified, this type of high-level cause is potentially 
overlooked. As Hopkins (2003: 2) points out, this results in a situation in which the 
corrective actions proposed from such analyses are reasonably “low level”.
Several other causal accident analysis approaches do enable multiple organisational 
causes to be incorporated into the analysis but, again, do not extend the analysis beyond 
the organisational level. For instance, in REASON Root Cause Analysis (RCA), a root 
cause (the most causally remote factor in a causal chain) is defined as “a deficiency 
within your business process that leads to a greater failure” (Decision Systems Inc., 
2003). As such, the factors identified as root causes in this approach, and the corrective 
actions proposed to address those factors, are restricted to those within the control of the 
particular business. Similarly, the version of root cause analysis adopted by NASA 
requires analysts to continue the analysis until the organisational causes are identified 
and a point is reached where there is insufficient information to continue or a “problem 
that is not correctable by NASA contractor^]” is reached (NASA, 2003: 16). As is the 
case for the ICAM, these techniques are clearly intended to be used by an organisation 
to detect organisational deficiencies, so that the highest level of corrective action within 
the control of the organisation can be taken. However, there are distinct benefits to be 
gained from continuing beyond this level.
The AcciMap approach has the capacity to incorporate contributing factors beyond 
those that are controllable by a particular organisation and therefore to consider the 
influence of factors relating to legislation, regulations, certification, auditing and 
governmental budgeting, for instance, on organisational accidents. The capacity to 
incorporate such factors is important for two reasons. First, it provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of how and why an organisational accident occurred 
because the wider context within which the event occurred is taken into consideration.
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Holloway and Johnson (2004: 1) note that the causes of adverse events “will ultimately 
trace back to the regulatory authorities and certification bodies that help to create the 
environment in which a management board operates’' but that there are also “legislative 
and political constraints that limit the regulators’ scope for intervention’’. Methods 
without the capacity to incorporate these external factors ignore the context within 
which the organisation operates, thereby providing only a limited understanding of the 
circumstances in which the accident occurred (Hopkins, 2003: 2). They also overlook a 
range of external factors that may be highly relevant to the occurrence of organisational 
accidents, such as inadequacies in externally imposed legislation or regulations or in the 
standards or methods of external oversight of the organisation. In addition, such 
analyses are typically restricted to the consideration of a single organisation, thereby 
providing only a limited understanding of accidents in which factors stemming from 
multiple organisations contributed to an accident (as was the case for the crash of 
Singapore Airlines flight SQ006, in which deficiencies in both Singapore Airlines and 
Chiang Kai-shek Airport, were identified as causes) or in which problems stemming 
from the integration of different organisations contributed to accidents (as was the case 
for the accidental shootdown of U.S. Black Hawk helicopters in Northern Iraq) 
(Ministry of Transport, 2002; Snook, 2000).
The second reason why the inclusion of these external factors is important is that the 
identification of high-level causes promotes the implementation of high-level corrective 
actions (Hopkins, 2003: 2). This is a “particularly desirable feature of accimaps”, 
according to Hopkins (2003: 2), “because the higher the level of the corrective action, 
the broader is the class of unwanted events which may be prevented”. For instance, the 
Ministry of Transport's (2005) investigation into the Waterfall train crash highlighted 
multiple deficiencies in the regulatory oversight of the rail company as causes of the 
accident and indicated that these inadequacies occurred, in part, because the regulator 
had not been provided with sufficient resources for conducting audits and 
investigations. In addition to promoting a comprehensive understanding of the accident 
by illustrating the regulatory context within which this accident occurred, the 
identification of these deficiencies enabled a number of safety recommendations to be 
proposed to address these regulatory problems and also promoted a recommendation 
that the regulator be provided with sufficient resources to “fulfil its accreditation, audit 
and investigation responsibilities” (Ministry of Transport, 2005: 77). Safety 
recommendations at this level clearly have far reaching preventative effects because the
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improvements benefit all organisations under the influence of the regulator, rather than 
the single company affected in this particular accident, and because they address a range 
of problem areas with the potential to contribute to a variety of unsafe outcomes. Had 
the investigation not continued beyond the organisational level, the regulatory 
deficiencies that contributed to this accident would not have been identified and the 
safety recommendations proposed would have addressed only part of the problem.
3.2.2 Unrestricted Causal Categories
Another advantage of the AcciMap approach is that analysts are free to identify causal 
factors without being restricted by predefined causal categories. Several techniques 
require that analysts select categories of cause from a predefined list. Although this 
approach has the benefit of highlighting a range of possible causes for any accident, 
thereby reducing the likelihood that an analyst will fail to include all relevant causes, 
there are disadvantages associated with adopting this sort of approach. One is that, in 
practice, the categories of causes are sometimes ambiguous in the sense that the 
category within which a particular item belongs is unclear. This problem can be 
illustrated by referring to the ICAM example in Figure 6. In this method, the most 
immediate causes of the accident are the “Absent or Failed Defences” (the “last minute 
measures” which were unsuccessful in detecting the inadequacies in the system and 
which failed to protect the system from active failures and latent conditions) (BHP, 
2000: 16). The most remote causes of the accident, shown on the left-hand side of an 
ICAM causal tree, are the “Organisational Factors”. The ICAM identifies 11 
“Organisational Failure Types” (OFT), which are described in detail and are intended to 
incorporate every possible system failure at the organisational level (Hopkins, 2003: 6). 
In this case, ambiguity arises in the categorisation of defence failures, since these are 
listed both as the immediate causes of accidents and as one of the 11 categories of 
Organisational Factor (Hopkins, 2003: 7). The ICAM Investigation Guide suggests that 
such factors should be classed as absent or failed defences if they are “active failures” 
and as organisational factors if “the system has tolerated their existence for a significant 
time” (BHP, 2000: 19). However, it is not clear how much time reflects a “significant” 
amount. In addition, this solution complicates the distinction between the categories of 
“Absent or Failed Defences” and “Individual/Team Actions” because it indicates that 
failed defences can be active failures, while the ICAM Guide implies that failed 
defences are the result o f active failures (BHP, 2000: 19, 27). A reliability assessment
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of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), another analysis 
technique based on Reason's model and involving the classification of causal factors 
into a predefined framework, suggests that similar ambiguity may also arise with 
respect to the categorisation of causes in this technique. In a study of the application of 
HFACS to a number of commercial aviation accidents, different analysts initially 
disagreed with one another on the classification of almost one quarter (24%) of the 
causal factors classified (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001: 1012). Although the observed 
rates of agreement in this study were significantly higher than would be expected by 
chance and higher rates of agreement have been observed when the method was applied 
in different domains (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001: 1012-1014), such disagreements 
highlight the potential difficulty associated with using predefined causal categories.
Of greater concern for present purposes, however, is the fact that, unless the predefined 
categories of cause are exhaustive, the reliance on such categories might prevent 
analysts from identifying every relevant cause of an accident. This could potentially 
occur in the ICAM, where the OFT relating to defences is defined as incorporating 
awareness, detection and warning, recovery, protection and containment, and escape 
and rescue (BHP, 2000: 62). As Hopkins (2003: 7) notes, most of these types of 
defence are designed to work after the incident has occurred, to “minimize the harm or 
loss”. This category of cause does not incorporate proactive system defences “such as 
hazard identification, permit to work schemes and audits”, which are beneficial for 
accident prevention (Hopkins, 2003: 7). Hopkins (2003: 8) points out that “Systematic 
hazard identification at the design stage" is an important system defence which, if 
inadequate, may ultimately lead to future accidents. Proactive system defence failures 
have played a part in numerous past accidents and have been identified as causal factors 
in past accident analyses, such as one by Naikar, Saunders and Hopkins (2002: 3, 6) 
which identified “Inadequate risk assessment'’ and “Lack of risk assessment training'’ as 
causes and therefore proposed safety recommendations to address these failures. 
However, proactive system defences fit neither into the “defences” OFT as defined in 
the ICAM guide, nor into any of the remaining OFT categories. As such, the 
contribution of these causes to accidents, as well as the important safety 
recommendations associated with such factors, may be overlooked by an analyst using 
the ICAM categories.
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Problems of ambiguous categories and the incapacity of a method to incorporate certain 
relevant factors are avoided if the process of identifying the causes of an accident 
focuses, not on identifying relevant factors from a predefined list, but on considering 
M’hy the accident occurred and continuing to ask why for each cause uncovered until a 
thorough understanding of the factors contributing to an accident is achieved. This is 
the approach adopted in AcciMap analysis. The result is that every causal factor that 
the analyst feels should be included in the analysis, based on the evidence, can be 
incorporated into the AcciMap diagram and taken into consideration in the formulation 
of safety recommendations (Hopkins, 2003: 11).
3.2.3 Unrestricted Diagram Formations
A third advantage of the AcciMap approach is that the format of the causal diagram is 
not predetermined in ways that restrict how causal relationships can be depicted. In 
some accident analysis methods, the ways in which the tree diagrams are constructed 
can potentially lead to oversight of certain causes. Again, this problem can be 
illustrated with reference to the ICAM example. The ICAM procedure assumes that the 
events leading up to an accident are sequenced in the order illustrated in the causal tree 
in Figure 6 (Hopkins, 2003: 8). Analysts are trained first to identify the inadequate 
defences, then the unsafe acts that contributed to them, then the contributing task and 
environmental conditions and finally the organisational factors that caused those 
conditions (Hopkins, 2003: 8). As such, analysts are at risk of overlooking factors that 
do not fit into this sequence. For instance, as Hopkins (2003: 8) notes, this procedure 
overlooks the possibility that failures at the organisational and workplace levels can 
breach the system’s defences without unsafe acts having occurred. Reason (1997: 18), 
whose model of accident causation forms the basis of this technique, points out that 
unsafe acts do not occur in every organisational accident and that, in some cases, the 
system defences fail as the direct result of latent conditions (as is clear from the “Latent 
condition pathways” in his diagram in Figure 2). However, the possibility that latent 
conditions might contribute directly to accidents is systematically ignored by the ICAM 
method and this approach may, therefore, prevent analysts from uncovering causal 
factors of this type (Hopkins, 2003: 2). The potential for the oversight of such factors is 
problematic given that accidents such as the Challenger explosion and the King’s Cross 
Underground fire were caused, in part, by latent conditions that contributed directly to 
those events, without unsafe acts having been committed (Reason, 1997: 18). The
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AcciMap approach has the capacity to incorporate these types of causal relationship 
since the identification of causal factors in this technique relies on an investigative 
process of determining why each particular causal factor or condition occurred, rather 
than following a predetermined sequence of events.
The formats of some systemic accident analysis techniques also prevent the possibility 
of showing that high-level causes can lead to multiple lower-level events. In REASON 
RCA and the RCA approach adopted by NASA, for instance, each organisational factor 
is linked to only one lower-level factor and it is not possible to combine causal chains to 
show that a single factor at one level contributed to multiple 'downstream* causes. The 
only way to show that a particular factor resulted in more than one downstream cause, 
in these diagrams, is to repeat that factor in the causal chains stemming from each of 
these downstream causes. The AcciMap format allows analysts to insert causal 
connections between any factors in the diagram that are judged to be causally related, so 
broad problem areas can be linked to multiple outcomes if appropriate. This approach 
is advantageous in terms of the efficient use of diagram space, since it is not necessary 
to incorporate the same factor (and the chain of causes leading to that factor) more than 
once in the diagram. More importantly, however, arranging causal factors in this way 
makes it clear that corrective actions taken to address certain factors in the diagram 
could prevent a range of lower-level causes from recurring, thereby helping analysts to 
decide on the most useful areas of attention for accident prevention purposes. Such an 
approach is more likely to promote safety recommendations that address broad problem 
areas, thereby preventing a range of safety problems from arising, than the technique of 
illustrating such factors as though they are largely unrelated to one another and 
therefore forming specific safety recommendations to address each cause separately.
3.2.4 Sociotechnical Context
The AcciMap approach also has the advantage of organising the factors in a way that 
illustrates the sociotechnical context within which the events and conditions occurred. 
The AcciMap diagram is divided into a series of levels representing the different 
sections of the sociotechnical system and the causal factors are arranged into their 
corresponding levels in the diagram, so that causes within the control of the 
organisation are separated from those that are controllable by the government or 
regulatory bodies, for instance. Other accident analysis techniques that are similar to
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AcciMaps in terms of their scopes, their processes for identifying causes and their 
diagram formations, such as Ladkin’s (2005) Why-Because Analysis and Snook’s 
(2000) Causal Map, arrange causes essentially in terms of their causal remoteness but 
do not also group causal factors according to their place within the broader 
sociotechnical system. However, the arrangement of the causal factors according to the 
levels of the sociotechnical system is helpful in promoting an understanding of the way 
in which factors in each part of the system contributed to events and conditions in the 
other parts. It also assists in producing an intelligible diagram because causes relating 
to organisational deficiencies, for instance, are clearly identified within one section of 
the AcciMap rather than being spread throughout the diagram. The sectioning of the 
causal factors in this way is also useful with respect to safety recommendation 
development because the AcciMap diagram distinguishes between factors that can be 
controlled by organisational or external bodies from the effects of those factors. It 
therefore separates the types of factor for which useful recommendations can be written 
(i.e. those at the organisational level or above) from those which are the result of these 
inadequacies but which can not or should not be directly addressed (i.e. factors relating 
to the physical sequence of events or the activities of the particular individuals involved 
in the accident). In addition, the way in which the causes are organised in an AcciMap 
indicates which parties in the system have the capacity to change certain factors, thereby 
assisting analysts to identify the bodies responsible for implementing corrective actions.
For these reasons, the AcciMap approach has been, and continues to be, considered 
useful for the analysis of organisational accidents. As noted in the introduction to this 
thesis, this approach has been used to analyse accidents in a range of sociotechnical 
systems and has been found valuable both for making sense of the complex interactions 
between factors throughout the system that resulted in these accidents and for 
highlighting the areas at which safety recommendations should be directed. A 
disadvantage of the approach, however, is that it is not known whether or not the 
technique produces valid and reliable results. It is this gap in the current knowledge of 
AcciMap analysis that this thesis aims to address by determining whether or not the 
approach is valid and reliable and by examining the nature and significance of 
variations in AcciMap results, if such variations do in fact exist. Before commencing 
this process, however, consideration will be given to why it is necessary to validate 
methods for accident analysis and precisely what such a validation study might achieve 
in this instance.
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3.3 The Requirement for Validation 
of Accident Analysis Methods
Baber and Stanton (2002: 218) suggest that there is always a need for method 
validation, since “there seems little point in employing a method that does not pass even 
the basic requirements of validity and reliability”. They therefore propose that the 
acceptance of an approach should be preceded by “Empirical evidence of a method's 
worth" (Stanton & Baber, 2005: 1104). The validation of the AcciMap approach, in 
accordance with this view, is necessary simply for establishing whether or not the 
method is worth using. However, there are also significant practical reasons for 
considering the validity and reliability of accident analysis techniques.
The precise meanings of validity and reliability, as they apply to accident analysis, will 
be discussed in later sections. However, validity in this sense broadly relates to whether 
or not an analysis successfully identifies the causes of an accident and proposes the 
recommendations necessary for addressing those causes. It is essential that 
consideration be given to the validity of accident analyses because the future safety o f 
the system depends upon appropriate steps being taken to prevent recurrence. If an 
analysis fails to identify relevant causes, safety recommendations will not be written to 
address those causes and the system will remain vulnerable to future accidents 
(Woodcock, 1995). Similarly, if the safety recommendations that are proposed do not 
effectively address those causes, similar outcomes may not be prevented from recurring. 
In addition, if the analysis identifies as causes factors that did not in fact contribute to 
the accident, the recommendations designed to address such factors may not be 
effective in preventing future accidents. The validity of an accident analysis method, 
then, has direct implications for the safety of the system in which the accident took 
place since the ‘lessons’ from an accident will only be learned if the problems are 
correctly recognised and addressed.
The validity of such methods also has consequences relating to time and resource usage 
since the recommendations proposed after organisational accidents often involve major 
changes that take considerable amounts of time and money to implement. It is in the 
interests of those responsible for implementing the recommendations and those working 
in the system, among others, that resources are spent on effectively addressing the right
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problems so that safety is enhanced and resources are not shifted away from where they 
are most needed.
The validity of accident analysis results is also important for the emotional wellbeing of 
the people affected by organisational accidents. For instance, if accident analyses fail 
adequately to identify the systemic reasons behind the actions of workers involved in 
the accident, they may be unfairly blamed for causing the accident. Such a situation is 
upsetting and demoralising for the individuals involved (and for others in similar 
positions) and may also discourage workers from being open and truthful in future when 
being questioned about the circumstances leading up to accidents. In addition, it is 
important for the people who work in the system, accident victims, and their friends and 
relatives, for instance, that the causes of the accident are correctly recognised and 
addressed, so that similar outcomes cannot occur again. For all of these reasons, it is 
necessary to consider whether or not a technique for accident analysis produces valid 
results.
It is also important, for practical reasons, to consider the reliability of these methods. 
Reliability in this sense generally relates to whether different analysts adopting the 
approach produce the same results, or whether the results in fact differ depending on the 
analyst. Clearly, when the outcomes of an analysis identify the causes of an accident, 
determine the corrective measures to be taken (and therefore where time and resources 
are to be expended) and influence the future safety of the system, it is important that 
consideration be given to whether those results are determined by the actual data or, in 
fact, vary depending on the analyst. If the latter is true, there is a risk that analysts may 
intentionally or unintentionally direct the analysis in a certain way, leading to 
misrepresentation of causes and to safety recommendations that do not adequately 
address the system's problems.
Shaughnessy and Zechmeister (1994: 302) point out that consideration of reliability is 
also necessary because “a method cannot be valid if it is not reliable”. In the case of 
accident analyses, a method cannot be said to be valid, in terms of identifying the Tight' 
causes and recommendations after an accident if different analysts, using the same data, 
produce results that differ in any significant way. The capacity of a method to produce 
consistent results, regardless of the analyst, therefore affects its validity. It is possible, 
however, for a method to be reliable but not valid, if it produces consistent results
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regardless of the analyst, but these results are not ‘correct’. Accident analyses must be 
both valid and reliable, then, in order to identify the causes of accidents consistently and 
correctly and to propose recommendations that address those causes effectively.
In light of the practical implications involved, it is essential to determine whether or not 
techniques for accident analysis are, in fact, valid and reliable. However, despite the 
importance of this question, relatively few studies addressing this topic have actually 
been performed. The few formal studies that have been carried out have tended to focus 
on methods that, unlike AcciMap Analysis, involve the sorting of factors into 
predefined classification systems or the selection of causal factors from a predefined 
list. For instance, the Systems Theory Accident Modelling and Process (STAMP), has 
been qualitatively assessed for inter-analyst reliability in a study which compared the 
ways in which two analysts classified a number of “control related issues” into the 
classification scheme involved in this form of analysis (Johnson & Holloway, 2003:
1189). Another technique -  the Human Factors Investigation Tool (HFIT) -  has been 
empirically assessed in terms of the reliability and accuracy with which 25 investigators 
identified the relevant human factors elements in an incident from the elements 
specified in the HFIT model (Gordon, Flin & Meams, 2005).
Of the numerous methods for accident analysis which involve the identification of 
previously unspecified causes and the arrangement of those causes into a diagram to 
illustrate their contribution to the outcome, however, no formal, thorough assessments 
of validity and reliability have been performed to my knowledge (these methods 
include, among others, AcciMap analysis, Why-Because Analysis, REASON Root 
Cause Analysis, Snook’s Causal Map, the Schematic Report Analysis Diagram and 
some forms of Fault Tree Analysis). The REASON Root Cause Analysis technique has 
been informally validated in an unpublished and somewhat cursory study (the details of 
which are discussed in the following chapters) and the Fault Tree Analysis technique 
has been given a subjective evaluation regarding the extent to which it is “realistic” and 
“consistent” (among other criteria) (Munson, 1999: chapter 4, para 12). These ratings, 
however, were provided by judges who were not accident analysts and who had not 
applied the method themselves, solely on the basis of viewing a single example of a 
completed Fault Tree Analysis (rather than on the application of the method and an 
assessment of the validity or reliability of the results obtained, for instance) (Munson,
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1999). The extent to which people using these techniques produce valid and reliable 
results, in practice, is therefore largely unknown.
This shortage of method validation is not unique to accident analysis. Cooke (1994: 
802) points out that it is also the case with respect to methods of knowledge elicitation 
(involving the “collection from a human source of knowledge information that is 
thought to be relevant to that knowledge”). Cooke (1994: 837-838) notes that, although 
there are numerous different techniques for knowledge elicitation, “there is an amazing 
lack of evaluative information on the methods, particularly in the form of empirical 
data”. Cooke and others suggest several possible reasons for this shortage, including 
difficulties relating to choosing the criteria on which to evaluate the methods and 
establishing how to assess the results against “actual performance measures” (Cooke, 
1994: 838; Hoffman, Crandall & Shadbolt, 1998: 255). As will become clear in the 
following chapters, these same problems, and more, apply to the validation of accident 
analysis techniques.
One solution to this problem is to follow the path that has been taken in a number of 
evaluations of accident analysis techniques and assess the method in terms of criteria 
other than validity and reliability, such as how easy it is to use, how long it takes to 
master or the extent to which it satisfies the demands of the user (e.g. Benner, 1985). 
This option is not adopted in the current study because the importance of establishing 
the validity and reliability of the technique is, in my opinion, greater than that of 
knowing how usable and appropriate it is. If a method of accident analysis is found to 
have a high level of validity and reliability, it may indeed be beneficial to consider these 
additional criteria, so that issues relating to the method’s usability or appropriateness 
can be considered and, where necessary, addressed. However, if an accident analysis 
technique is unreliable and produces entirely invalid results, there is little practical use 
in knowing precisely how long it takes for a novice analyst to learn to use it, for 
instance. Such an approach is unlikely to be accepted and used, even if it is found to 
score very well in terms of these alternative criteria. When evaluating methods for 
which reliability and validity are of critical importance, it seems appropriate to assess 
these criteria first and to consider the alternative criteria afterwards, if it is worthwhile 
to do so. Of course, if the method is so time-intensive and difficult that it is not usable, 
or if it is obviously inappropriate for satisfying the user's demands, such problems must 
be addressed first. However, this is clearly not the case for the AcciMap approach, as is
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evidenced by the numerous AcciMap analyses that have been performed, presented and 
published. In this instance, then, the usability and appropriateness of the method have 
already been established, to some degree, while its reliability and validity remain 
unknown. It therefore seems appropriate to direct efforts towards addressing the latter 
criteria.
3.4 The Aim of this Validation Study
The aim of the present study is therefore to assess the validity and reliability of the 
AcciMap approach, in terms of whether or not analysts using the approach consistently 
and correctly identify both the causes of organisational accidents and the safety 
recommendations necessary for addressing those causes. This research therefore makes 
the first serious attempt to evaluate the validity and reliability of an accident analysis 
technique of this type. It is hoped that such a study will allow this knowledge to be 
made available for consideration by practitioners of the method, those who base their 
decisions on the results, the human factors community and other interested parties. 
Such a study is valuable whether or not the approach is found to be valid and reliable. 
A study that indicates that the approach is, in fact, highly valid and reliable, may 
promote the acceptance of the method and of the results that are obtained through its 
use. A study that indicates that the approach has poor reliability and validity, on the 
other hand, enables these shortcomings to be known and taken into account during the 
use of the method and the consideration of AcciMap results. If a validation study were 
to produce this finding, analysts would be able to bear this information in mind when 
presenting the results of AcciMap analyses and recommending safety actions on the 
basis of those results. It may also be possible to determine why the results are poor and 
whether or not alterations could be made to improve the validity and reliability of the 
approach. In either case, the outcome is preferable to that of having an accident 
analysis approach that is used to analyse large-scale organisational accidents and 
produce recommendations for corrective actions, but for which the accuracy and 
consistency of the results are entirely unknown. This situation is currently the case for 
the AcciMap approach and the majority of other accident analysis techniques and is the 
motivation for performing the present study.
63
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has introduced the AcciMap approach as a useful technique for identifying 
the systemic causes of organisational accidents and for pinpointing areas in which 
effective accident prevention strategies can be implemented. It has also highlighted the 
current lack of awareness of the validity and reliability of the method as it stands and 
why it is of practical significance that knowledge in this area be developed. The first 
step towards addressing this issue is taken in the next chapter.
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4Formalising the 
AcciMap Approach
The procedure for establishing the reliability and validity of the AcciMap approach 
involves a series of steps. The purpose of this chapter is to address the first of these 
steps - the formalisation and standardisation of the approach. The chapter begins by 
discussing the necessity to formalise the AcciMap approach before commencing 
reliability and validity testing. It then outlines the different varieties of AcciMap that 
exist in the accident analysis literature and highlights the similarities and differences 
between these varieties. A standard AcciMap format and a set of AcciMap guidelines 
are then proposed, based on a number of characteristics of the existing AcciMap 
varieties. These steps pave the way for the validity and reliability testing of the method 
in the next stage of this research.
4.1 Requirement to Formalise the 
Approach
The formalisation of the AcciMap approach is the first step in the process of validating 
this technique. This step is necessary because inconsistencies in the approach, in its 
current state, prevent it from being readily testable for reliability and validity. There are 
three main areas in which inconsistencies present a problem for a validation study. The 
first relates to the purpose of the approach. The existing varieties of AcciMap aim to 
fulfil slightly different purposes and the findings of accident analyses are therefore
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likely to differ depending on the particular type of AcciMap adopted. For instance, 
AcciMaps that aim to identify the high-level decisions that contributed to an accident 
scenario and the context within which those decisions occurred will produce slightly 
different results from AcciMaps that analyse accidents for the purpose of highlighting 
the systemic factors that promoted or failed to prevent an accident from occurring. This 
inconsistency presents a problem when attempting to assess the validity of AcciMaps 
because results that are valid for one variety of AcciMap may not be valid for another. 
Assessments of reliability, in terms of whether or not different analysts using the 
approach produce similar findings, are also hampered by the current variation in 
purposes, since analysts using different varieties of AcciMap are unlikely ever to 
produce identical results because they will be aiming for different outcomes. As such, 
when assessing the validity and reliability of the method, it would be difficult to 
determine whether any variation in results was attributable to the unreliability of the 
method itself or to the differences in purpose of the different varieties of AcciMap.
The second area of concern relates to thq formats of the different AcciMap varieties, 
which prevent AcciMap diagrams from being readily comparable. Reliability testing, in 
the context of the current study, involves assessing the degree of similarity between 
AcciMaps compiled by different analysts. However, the AcciMap levels, the wording 
used, the symbols, the meaning of the causal links and the ways in which the causes are 
arranged in the diagram all differ depending on the particular variety of AcciMap 
adopted. This lack of uniformity is problematic with respect to determining whether the 
causes identified in AcciMaps, the levels in which they are identified or the 
interrelationships between them are the same or different, when different varieties of 
AcciMap are being compared.
Thirdly, the lack of instructions or guidelines for how to perform AcciMap analysis 
means that the process and rules for performing this type of analysis are not consistent. 
Again, these inconsistencies hamper attempts at reliability and validity testing because 
they prevent analyses from being readily comparable. The analysts who use this 
approach are primarily those who developed the different varieties of AcciMap 
themselves or those who have learned how to use the techniques from the developers 
through apprenticeship, lectures or workshops, for instance. There is little written 
guidance on the process involved and there are inconsistencies ranging from how causal 
factors are defined and how they are arranged in the diagram, to how far back the
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analysis should continue and whether or not safety recommendation development is 
included in the process. For these reasons, analysts using the different varieties of 
AcciMap are unlikely ever to produce identical results because they will be working 
with different rules and adopting different procedures. It is ideal, in a controlled 
validation study, for the analysts to be adopting the same rules and processes so that any 
differences in the results of their analyses will not be attributable to differences in these 
areas.
For these reasons, it was determined that the first stage in the AcciMap validation 
process must be to develop a standardised AcciMap format and to provide written 
instructions for how to perform AcciMap analysis. These steps would enable a 
validation study of this technique to be controlled so that analysts performing AcciMap 
analyses as part of the study would have the same purposes and would be using the 
same logic, formats and processes in their AcciMap construction, thereby producing 
results that could meaningfully be compared in an evaluation of the validity and 
reliability of the approach.
4.2 The Varieties of AcciMap
It is useful to begin the process of standardising the AcciMap approach by outlining the 
varieties of AcciMap that have been used to analyse organisational accidents and 
considering the similarities and differences between these varieties. There are three 
varieties of AcciMap to be considered.
4.2.1 Rasmussen’s AcciMap Approach
AcciMaps compiled by Rasmussen, the developer of this technique, represent the 
sequence of events that led to an accident and the “organizational bodies that 
contributed to the creation of the accident scenario” (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 17). 
As can be seen in Figure 7, the bottom part of Rasmussen’s AcciMaps (and those 
compiled by Rasmussen and Svedung), display the sequence of events that led directly 
to the accident, with the “critical event” (the accident itself) located on the right-hand 
side of Level 5. The top four levels of the AcciMap show how decisions made in all
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parts of the sociotechnical system, from the lower levels of management right up to the 
governmental level, contributed to the situation in which this accident occurred.
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The arrows in Rasmussen and Svedung’s (2000: 21) AcciMaps refer to 
“influences”. The rectangles with rounded corners are preconditions to 
the accident that are not evaluated further (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 
21). Two adjacent rectangles, referred to as “Decision/Action boxes”, 
represent decisions in the top rectangle and the “accidental side-effect“ 
of those decisions in the bottom. Rasmussen and Svedung (2000: 20-21) 
argue that these are areas where the sequence of events “has been or 
could be changed by human (or automated) intervention”. Normal 
rectangles represent indirect consequences and the numbers in squares 
are references to notations from the official accident report (Rasmussen 
& Svedung, 2000: 21).
The focus on decisions and the activities of “organizational bodies” in the upper levels 
of Rasmussen's AcciMaps reflect his view of accidents in terms of the migration 
towards safety boundaries, as outlined in Chapter 2. Rasmussen (1997: 190) claims that
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once the “stage” for an accident has been prepared, it only takes a “normal variation" in 
someone's behaviour to “release” the accident. He therefore argues that it is not very 
beneficial, for improving the safety of sociotechnical systems, to explain accidents in 
terms of the specific errors, events and actions involved (Rasmussen, 1997: 190). 
Rather, the focus should be on the people who played a part in creating the “accident 
scenario” because an understanding can then be gained of who can improve safety in 
these systems (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 18-19). His AcciMaps are aimed, then, at 
the “design of improved systems, not at allocation of responsibility” (Svedung & 
Rasmussen, 2002: 406). They are not intended to be a “truthful representation of facts” 
but rather to identify “factors sensitive to improvement”, that is, all of the decision­
makers who could have influenced that course of events through their decisions 
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 20).
Unlike the other analysts considered here, Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) do not 
consider the AcciMap to be the final stage in the analysis process. Rather, their 
AcciMaps aim to identify the relevant decision-makers as part of a broader process of 
proactive risk management. The first phase in this risk management process involves 
the creation of a “cause-consequence chart" showing the causes that can contribute to an 
accident and the range of alternative consequences that may follow (depending upon the 
system's safety features and how people in the system react) (Rasmussen & Svedung, 
2000: 18). The AcciMap itself is the second phase in this process. As noted above, it is 
based on one particular accident and identifies the sequence of events involved, as well 
as the decision-makers throughout the sociotechnical system who “influenced the 
conditions leading to [the] accident through their normal work activities” (Rasmussen & 
Svedung, 2000: 20). Rasmussen and Svedung (2000: 20-23) argue that, because 
AcciMaps describe the sequence of events involved in one particular accident, 
suggestions for improvement identified from that AcciMap are likely to be ad hoc and 
they therefore aim to generalise from a set of AcciMaps to produce a “Generic 
AcciMap'’ (the third phase in this process), which provides “an overview of the 
interaction among the different decision-makers potentially leading up to release of 
accidents” in a particular domain. This generic AcciMap can then be used to develop an 
“ActorMap” (the fourth phase), which identifies the organisational bodies, decision­
makers and individual actors involved in the preparation of the “landscape” in which the 
sequence of events involved in an accident might evolve (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 
23). If necessary, an “InfoMap" can then be developed to illustrate how objectives,
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values and information flow between these actors and throughout the system 
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 24). Together, these analyses identify the actors and 
decision-makers who can contribute to accidents in a system and the relationships 
between their activities. This information assists analysts to define the conditions for 
safe operation that can be used to develop proactive risk management strategies for the 
system (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 14). For Rasmussen and Svedung, then, an 
AcciMap is not the endpoint of an accident analysis, but part of a broader process of 
identifying the organisational bodies that contribute to accidents in a specific type of 
system.
4.2.2 Vicente’s AcciMap Approach
For Vicente and his co-authors (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006; Woo & Vicente, 
2003), AcciMaps serve a slightly different purpose. Woo and Vicente (2003: 253) do 
not use the AcciMap approach as a tool for analysing particular accidents but, rather, in 
an effort to discover factors that are common to different sociotechnical systems. They 
note that accident analyses tend to uncover an “idiosyncratic set of factors” that are 
unlikely to occur again in the same system, and are even less likely in other systems 
(Woo & Vicente, 2003: 253). However, they suggest that the main reason why accident 
analyses have tended not to reveal common risk factors may be that a common 
theoretical framework has generally not been used to analyse accidents in different 
sociotechnical systems (Woo & Vicente, 2003: 253). Woo and Vicente (2003: 253) 
therefore use the AcciMap format proposed by Rasmussen as a standard framework to 
test this theory, attempting to “identify the risk factors that remain relatively invariant” 
across different systems and sectors. Figure 8 is an example of an AcciMap compiled 
by Woo and Vicente (2003: 267-268), which was used in conjunction with another 
AcciMap to illustrate that certain causes at the government and regulatory levels were 
common to both accidents and might be common to accidents in other systems. They 
propose that factors such as budget cutbacks at the government level and “insufficient 
attention to operator certification and training, inspection programs, enforcement and 
compliance policies and inadequate feedback at the regulatory level” were common to 
both accidents and may be generalisable beyond these cases (Woo & Vicente, 2003: 
268). This finding concurs with a claim made by Hopkins (2000: 7) that “the technical 
causes vary from one accident to another but the organisational failures which accident 
analyses reveal seem remarkably similar”.
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The AcciMaps produced by Vicente and his co-authors (Piche & Vicente, 2005; Vicente 
& Christoffersen, 2006; Woo & Vicente, 2003) differ from those of Rasmussen in 
several ways. One is that these analyses focus on the factors that caused accidents 
rather than on the decision-making context in which the accident scenario occurred. 
Thus the factors at the top of these diagrams incorporate events and conditions that 
contributed to the accident, as well as decisions that affected the outcome. There are 
also small differences in how these AcciMaps are displayed. Firstly, these analysts’ 
AcciMaps do not include numbered references to the accident report. Instead, the 
causes are phrased in enough detail that reference back to the original report is not 
required. Secondly, no distinction is made, in the shapes of the boxes, between 
preconditions, direct consequences and indirect consequences in these AcciMaps. 
Rather, it is assumed that all of the boxes in the diagram are causes (with the exception 
of the critical event) and that boxes with arrows leading to them are consequences as 
well. Thirdly, the AcciMaps compiled by Vicente and others do not include 
Decision/Action boxes. Instead, most of them incorporate “decision switches”, which 
are phrased as ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions (these are also present in Rasmussen's earlier 
AcciMaps).
The decision switches indicate areas in the system in which several alternative “routes” 
were available for the “accidental flow” to take and specify which course was actually 
taken in each case (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 14). For example, the decision switch 
on the left in Level 2 of Figure 8, labelled “Efficient Sewage treatment facility?” shows 
that this was an area in which the sequence of events could have been different. The 
sewage treatment facility was inadequate and this contributed to the contamination of 
drinking water and subsequent illness in the community. Had it been adequate, this 
sequence of events may have been prevented. These AcciMaps also differ from those 
of Rasmussen in their inclusion of “AND gates” (illustrated below) to represent 
instances in which more than one cause was required in order for a consequence to 
occur.
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The same concept is represented in Rasmussen’s AcciMaps by allowing several causal 
arrows to converge on a single outcome box. The AcciMaps compiled by Vicente and 
his co-authors are otherwise similar to those compiled by Rasmussen.
4.2.3 Hopkins’ AcciMap Approach
Hopkins also bases his AcciMaps to a large degree on Rasmussen’s format. Like the 
other theorists considered here Hopkins uses AcciMaps to assemble the causes of an 
accident into a diagram that shows how they relate to one another and how they 
contributed to the final outcome (Naikar, Saunders & Hopkins, 2002: 2; Royal 
Australian Air Force, 20013). In Figure 9, for instance, Hopkins illustrates how factors 
at all levels of the sociotechnical system, including government and societal levels, 
combined to result in the negative outcomes (depicted as irregular stars) at the bottom 
of the diagram.
For Naikar, Saunders and Hopkins (2002: 2), the purpose of constructing these 
diagrams is to uncover the causes of accidents and highlight the interrelationships 
between the contributing factors, so that the “most effective prevention strategies” can 
be identified. They argue that, “Successful accident prevention requires that we learn 
from the lessons of past accidents” (Naikar, Saunders & Hopkins, 2002: 50). Their 
AcciMaps aim, then, to identify all of the relevant causes of the accident so that these 
can be systematically explored in the consideration of “sensible points of intervention“ 
(Naikar, Saunders & Hopkins, 2002: 4). Hopkins (2003) emphasises the significance of 
achieving logical, comprehensive and causally valid diagrams that will identify the 
types of high-level problem that, if corrected, are likely to have far-reaching beneficial 
effects on the safety of systems.
' Hopkins was a co-author of the RAAF report.
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4.3 AcciMap Features
The current varieties of AcciMap therefore differ with respect to their purposes and 
formats to some degree. However, there are several features which they have in 
common.
4.3.1 The Critical Event
Firstly, AcciMaps begin with the “critical event”, that is, the final negative outcome to 
be analysed, at (or near) the bottom of the diagram. For Rasmussen and Svedung 
(2000: 10, 18), who define accidents in terms of the “loss of control of a physical 
process”, the critical event is defined as the “release o f the hazard? that the system is 
designed to control. They note that the chosen critical event can be one of several 
events in the “causal path” (Rasmussen & Svedung, 1997: 14). For instance, in the case 
illustrated in Figure 7, the critical event is the loss of containment that led to an oil spill 
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 22). However, in an AcciMap of the same event 
published three years earlier, Rasmussen listed “Lost control of dangerous cargo" as the 
critical event, and identified the actual spill as a consequence of that outcome 
(Rasmussen, 1997: 193). Rasmussen and Svedung (1997: 14) argue that the choice of 
critical event will depend on the focus of the analysis - in this case, whether the focus is 
on the containment or the transport of dangerous goods. Hopkins (2003: 12) similarly 
points out that the choice of event is somewhat arbitrary and includes the possibility, in 
his AcciMaps, that there might be more than one critical event (as evident in Figure 9, 
which contains two critical events). Nevertheless, each AcciMap approach begins with 
the negative outcome(s) near the bottom of the diagram so that the contributing factors 
can be arranged in the space above.
4.3.2 Causal Connections
The second feature common to these AcciMaps is that the contributing factors are 
connected to the critical event with arrows to illustrate the causal relationships. The 
analysts considered here differ with respect to how strictly their arrows imply causality 
but they all link the causal factors to one another and to the final outcome in a way that 
illustrates how these factors interacted to produce an accident.
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Rasmussen, for instance, argues that accident analyses must take into account the 
contextual factors that influence how systems operate and should consider accidents in 
terms of the dynamic, integrated systems in which they occur (Vicente & 
Christoffersen, 2006: 95). Rasmussen (1997: 187) suggests that accidents can only be 
understood if the “vertical interaction" between the different levels of the system is 
taken into account. The arrows between boxes in his diagrams, then, represent the 
“influences" between different parts of the system (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 21). 
They do not strictly imply causal relationships, as is evident by the circular connection 
of arrows between “Difficult road topography”, “Point in local risk analysis” and “Road 
plan & budget" in Figure 7. Ffls intention, more generally, is to highlight the decisions 
and actions throughout the system that led to the critical event.
The arrows in Vicente and Woo’s AcciMaps, on the other hand, do imply strict 
causality in the sense that one factor is only linked to another if the former event or 
condition resulted in the latter and their diagram is therefore free from any circularity 
(see Figure 8). However, there are two events in their diagram, (“DWS deem water 
guidelines for viruses/protozoa too expensive” and “no policy for record review”) which 
are not causally connected to the critical event at all. According to Woo (personal 
communication, March 14, 2004), these boxes are not connected to the critical event 
because they “did not directly affect the outcome of the disaster”. Presumably, they are 
included to highlight inadequacies in the system that should nevertheless be addressed. 
However, as is clear from the inclusion of these factors, it is not the case in Woo and 
Vicente’s AcciMaps that all factors identified are causal to the accident itself.
In Hopkins’ AcciMaps, the circumstances in which causal connections are placed 
between two factors are clearly specified. His arrows represent a “but for” relationship 
between causes, where “one event is a ‘but for' cause of another, if it can be said that 
but for the first, the second would not have occurred” (Hopkins, 2003: 5). Naikar, 
Saunders and Hopkins (2002: 4) argue that a cause should not be linked to another 
cause in an AcciMap unless the analyst is comfortable to make this statement. This 
means that Hopkins (2003: 5) does not incorporate events into his AcciMaps if their 
removal would not have altered the outcome and his diagrams are therefore free of 
circularity and any non-essential causes. A benefit of following this stream of logic is 
that ‘but for’ causes that are very remote from the critical event can still be shown to be 
causally related to the outcome (Hopkins, 2000: 22). This is useful in assisting analysts
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to propose the complete set of appropriate safety recommendations, including those 
directed at high levels of the sociotechnical system (Hopkins, 2003: 13). Some 
AcciMap analysts are, therefore, more stringent in their choice of criteria for depicting 
causal relationships than others. However, all seek to identify the immediate and 
underlying causes of an accident and to show how these factors combined to result in 
that outcome.
4.3.3 Levels of Causal Remoteness
A third feature common to the above varieties of AcciMap is that the causal factors are 
arranged in terms of their remoteness from the accident. The causes in AcciMaps are 
divided into a series of levels, each of which is more causally remote from the accident 
than the previous one (Hopkins, 2003: 4). The causes listed at the bottom usually refer 
to events that led directly to the accident, such as those relating to the physical 
environment and the actions of front-line workers. Higher up in the diagrams, systemic 
causes are listed, including factors such as inadequacies in procedures and defences, as 
well as the actions at the supervisory, management and company levels that contributed 
either directly to the accident or to other causes that in turn led to the accident. Higher 
still are causes relating to the regulatory bodies and government that contributed directly 
to the accident or that contributed to it indirectly by causing other factors. Some 
AcciMaps also go on to identify the societal causes behind these factors. Again, the 
different AcciMap theorists arrange these levels somewhat differently.
Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) organise their AcciMaps broadly in terms of the six 
levels of the sociotechnical system (as illustrated in Figure 3 on pg. 39), with the causes 
and relevant decision-making bodies arranged into these six levels. The bottom level 
focuses on the physical accident scenario and includes features such as the topography, 
equipment and tools involved in the accident (Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002: 407). The 
second level incorporates the physical sequence of events and activities that led directly 
to the outcome and also includes the negative outcome (the “critical event'’ or accident 
itself) (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 22). At this level, the events are displayed from 
left to right in the order in which they occurred, with the critical event located on the far 
right (Rasmussen & Svedung, 1997: 13). The decision-making bodies that influenced 
this flow of events are included in the four top levels of the diagram and are not 
arranged in any temporal order (Rasmussen & Svedung, 1997: 14). Rather, they are
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simply arranged in accordance with their position in the hierarchy of the sociotechnical 
system, that is, by whether they are part of the management, company, regulatory, or 
governmental sector (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000: 22). In this way, all of the parties 
who influenced the chain of events leading to the accident are incorporated into these 
diagrams.
The levels Rasmussen uses vary slightly depending on the accident in question. In 
Figure 7, for instance, where Rasmussen’s focus is on the containment of dangerous 
goods, Level 4 relates to “Technical & operational management” (Rasmussen & 
Svedung, 1997: 22). However, in his alternative AcciMap of the same accident, which 
focuses instead on the control of dangerous cargo, the equivalent level relates to 
“Company planning” (Rasmussen, 1997: 193). Nevertheless, Rasmussen’s levels are 
always loosely based on the six levels of the sociotechnical system. Vicente and Woo 
also use these levels but, since their aim is to use the AcciMap as a standard framework 
for analysing a number of accidents, they do not alter the levels to suit the accident in 
question.
The levels adopted by Hopkins in his AcciMaps are also based on Rasmussen’s work 
(Hopkins, 2000: 120). However, the levels he uses are not predetermined; they depend 
on the information available and the structure of the system under study (Hopkins, 
2003: 10). The only principles adopted by Hopkins (2000: 121, 2003: 10) are to 
organise the diagram so that “the more remote the cause, the higher up in the diagram it 
is located" and to continue the analysis as far as possible. For instance, in the example 
shown in Figure 9, Hopkins locates the outcomes at the bottom of the diagram with the 
immediate causes and the organisational causes listed above (Royal Australian Air 
Force, 2001). He includes an “Air Force Values” level, which is specific to the domain 
in which this accident occurred, to show how factors of this type influenced the causes 
below. Above this level are government and societal levels, which are both beyond the 
control of the Air Force but are included to illustrate the influence of government 
policy, social attitudes and cultural factors on this system (Royal Australian Air Force, 
2001). In other AcciMaps, Naikar, Saunders and Hopkins (2002: 2) organise factors 
into three levels, with task and environment factors at the bottom and the “direct 
causes” (actions and decisions “in the immediate lead-up” to the accident) listed above. 
In the top level, they then place the “indirect causes”, which are in turn divided into
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actions or decisions relating to the workers involved, “supervisory practices“ or 
influences at the organisational level (Naikar, Saunders & Hopkins, 2002: 2).
The temporal order of events is always clear in Hopkins’ AcciMaps because an arrow 
drawn from one cause to another in his diagrams means that the first caused the second 
(and therefore must have occurred at an earlier point in time). However, in some of his 
AcciMaps, he arranges the bottom level in temporal order from left to right as 
Rasmussen does (Hopkins, 2000: 122). The levels used in Hopkins’ AcciMaps are, 
therefore, somewhat arbitrary (Hopkins, 2000: 121) but nevertheless function to show 
how causes at differing degrees of remoteness contributed to the accident.
The specific levels identified in an AcciMap therefore differ depending on the variety of 
AcciMap adopted and, in the case of Hopkins’ and Rasmussen’s AcciMaps, on the 
particular system under study. Nevertheless, all AcciMap varieties categorise the causal 
factors in this way so that an understanding can be gained of how factors in different 
parts of the sociotechnical system affected one another and contributed to the accident.
4.3.4 Scope of Analysis
A related significant feature common to these AcciMap varieties is that they continue 
the analysis beyond the organisational level to show the influences of factors at higher 
levels of the sociotechnical system on organisational accidents (Hopkins, 2003: 4). The 
AcciMaps compiled by Rasmussen and by Woo and Vicente, for instance, extend to the 
governmental level. These analysts extend the search for causes to this point because 
they see interactions of the effects of decisions made at all levels of the system, 
including the government and regulatory levels, as affecting the safety of the system 
(Rasmussen & Svedung, 1997: 14; Woo & Vicente, 2003: 254). Hopkins takes the 
analysis one step further and identifies societal-level causes in many of his AcciMaps. 
He points out that when causal analyses are extended far enough, “market forces and 
cost cutting pressures are almost invariably implicated*’ (Hopkins, 2000: 6). Hopkins 
(2000: 6) notes that most accident analyses do not incorporate factors at these levels, 
largely because these societal pressures cannot realistically be reduced. He argues that 
it is necessary to incorporate these factors, however, because efforts can be made to 
counteract the effects of such factors and because a consideration of these pressures 
provides insight into the “seeming inevitability of accidents” (Hopkins, 2000: 6-7). The
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different varieties of AcciMap therefore push the analysis up to different levels but 
common to all varieties is an extension of the analysis beyond the particular 
organisation(s) involved so that higher-level influences are also taken into account.
4.4 Standardising the AcciMap 
Approach
In order to perform a validation study of this approach, it was necessary to adopt a 
single, clearly-defined AcciMap technique so that the validity and reliability of the 
method could be assessed without the variations within the method itself interfering 
with the results. The first step taken in the AcciMap validation process, then, was to 
standardise and formalise the approach, with the aim of removing the inconsistencies 
highlighted above, while also preserving the essential features of AcciMap analysis.
The path taken in standardising the AcciMap approach was not to select and formalise 
any one of the above varieties but, rather, to create a generalised approach incorporating 
the factors common to the above varieties and those judged most useful for analysing 
organisational accidents. This approach was considered preferable to choosing one of 
the above varieties because it would enable the benefits of each to be included in the 
final AcciMap. Specifically, it would allow an AcciMap format to be developed which 
incorporates a strict causal logic for identifying causal factors and illustrating how they 
contributed to the outcome, promotes safety recommendation development and, not 
being domain-specific, can be used to analyse organisational accidents in any 
sociotechnical system. Aspects of each AcciMap variety were required in order to meet 
these criteria.
A document outlining the AcciMap approach and specifying the process for performing 
an AcciMap analysis was developed for this purpose (see Appendix A on pg. 285). 
These AcciMap guidelines specify the aim of AcciMap analysis so that analysts 
adopting the approach will not produce different findings as a result of having different 
purposes in mind. They also present a standard AcciMap format, so that analysts using 
the approach will adopt the same levels and symbols in their analyses and will ascribe 
the same meanings to these items. This standardised format will allow different
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analysts to produce comparable results, so that the degree of similarity between their 
findings can be assessed during the reliability assessment. In addition, the guidelines 
include step-by-step instructions for how to compile an AcciMap and develop a list of 
safety recommendations, using existing accident data4. The guidelines also specify the 
process, logic and rules that should be adopted while performing this type of analysis so 
that different analysts will approach the analysis in the same way. The aim of these 
steps is to ensure that analysts will produce results that can meaningfully be compared 
and contrasted in the validation study and also to ensure that, if there are differences in 
their results, these will not be attributable to variations in how the approaches were 
structured or executed.
The step-by-step instructions for how to perform an AcciMap analysis were developed 
on the basis of the written guidance on AcciMaps, supplemented with knowledge 
developed from my personal experience in performing AcciMap analyses under the 
guidance of Hopkins. The instructions were reviewed by two experienced AcciMap 
analysts (my supervisors, Dr. Neelam Naikar and Prof. Andrew Hopkins), adjusted in 
accordance with their comments and then tested and revised in a series of pilot studies 
until they were judged suitable for allowing novice analysts to perform AcciMap 
analyses (the pilot-testing process is described in Chapter 7). The standardised 
AcciMap approach, designed for use in the validation study of this technique, is 
described in the following sections.
4 The AcciMap guidelines focus on the analysis of accidents using pre-existing accident report data 
(rather than on the initial identification of causal factors during the accident investigation stage) since the 
approach has, in practice, only been used in this way. The possibility of adopting the AcciMap approach 
in the initial stages of an accident investigation will be discussed in Chapter 9.
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4.5 The Standardised AcciMap
External
Organisational
Physical/Actor 
Events, Processes 
& Conditions
Outcomes
Figure 10 -  The Standard AcciMap Format
4.5.1 The Arrangement of Causes
The standard AcciMap format chosen for use in the current study is outlined in Figure 
10. The placement of the critical event is based on Hopkins’ AcciMaps, with the 
outcome located at the bottom of the AcciMap and the causes branching upward. This 
diagram arrangement was chosen because it allows the causes to be arranged strictly in 
terms of their causal remoteness from the outcome, rather than having causal factors 
located both above and below the outcome. This means that the causal links in the 
diagram will all face downwards, towards the outcome, making the causal chains easy 
to follow. It also gives the diagram a logical ‘tree' structure and makes the critical 
event easier to locate than when it is positioned amongst the causes.
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4.5.2 The AcciMap Levels
The criteria used to determine the levels in the standard AcciMap were that they should 
be unambiguous, that they should not be specific to a particular system or domain and 
that they should preserve the order of causal remoteness in the diagram. The 
'Physical/Actor Events, Processes and Conditions’ level was adopted in an effort to 
merge the lower two levels in Rasmussen’s and Vicente’s AcciMaps into a single 
category showing the immediate precursors to the accident relating to physical factors 
(i.e. those relating to environmental conditions, physical surroundings, tools, equipment 
and infrastructure, for example) and the activities of the frontline individuals. This 
heading was designed to provide more guidance on the types of cause that should be 
located within the level than the equivalent titles of “Immediate Causes” (as in Figure 9) 
or “Direct Causes” (Naikar, Saunders & Hopkins, 2002: 3). Also, despite being specific 
in meaning, the heading is not domain-specific; it will be applicable to any 
organisational accident. The ‘Organisational* level heading is borrowed from Hopkins’ 
(2000: 122) diagrams and was chosen because it is a self-explanatory and generic term 
that can incorporate causes relating to any of the organisations involved in an accident, 
regardless of the type of system in which the accident took place. Rasmussen’s 
equivalent terms of “Technical & Operational Management” (from Figure 7) or 
“Company planning*’ (1997: 13) are somewhat ambiguous and domain-specific, so were 
judged inappropriate for current purposes. Governmental and Regulatory causes were 
not separated into distinct levels in the standard AcciMap format because governmental 
causes are sometimes more causally remote, and sometimes less remote, than regulatory 
causes, leading to ambiguity about where they should be placed in a diagram arranged 
in terms of causal remoteness. Rasmussen and Vicente sometimes address this issue in 
their AcciMaps by having three separate levels - Government, Regulatory bodies and 
Local Government - so that different types of governmental cause can be placed above 
or below the regulatory causes as required. However, it is simpler, and does not result 
in any loss of meaning, to merge these levels so that both types of cause can be located 
in the same space, as Hopkins (2002: 122) does in his AcciMap of the Esso-Longford 
gas plant explosion. These factors are combined into an ‘External’ level in the standard 
AcciMap, representing all factors beyond the control of the organisation. This level 
includes all causes relating to the government and regulatory bodies, as well as the 
societal-level causes identified in Hopkins’ AcciMaps. It is useful to allow such causes 
to be included because they can provide insight into how the sequence of events came
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into effect and thus help readers to understand how and why an accident occurred. In 
addition, this format allows safety recommendations to be made to address these high- 
level causes, when appropriate.
The AcciMap guidelines include a table that defines each of these levels and provides 
examples of causes at each level (see Figure iii on pg. 295). This table is designed to 
provide novice analysts with an understanding of some of the causes that can occur 
within each section of the sociotechnical system and to assist them in determining the 
level within which certain factors should be placed.
In addition to providing written instructions for how analysts should arrange causes in 
their AcciMaps, the aim of standardising the AcciMap levels was to ensure that 
analysts’ results would be comparable for reliability and validity testing purposes. 
Previously, the different numbers and types of levels used by different analysts made 
comparisons between approaches difficult. For instance, it is currently unclear whether 
Hopkins’ “Organisational" level is equivalent to Rasmussen’s “Local Area Government 
Planning & Budgeting and Company Management" level or his “Technical and 
Operational Management” level. The levels in the standardised AcciMap have been 
clearly specified and defined so that different analysts will use the same levels in their 
AcciMap and ascribe the same meanings to those levels. This standardisation will 
allow meaningful assessments to be made regarding the types of cause that different 
analysts locate in each level, during the reliability and validity testing process.
4.5.3 The Causes
The types of cause incorporated into the standardised AcciMap approach are necessary 
or essential causes of the accident, as used by Hopkins in his AcciMaps. Defined 
precisely, this means that factors are only included in an AcciMap if they were 
necessary in order for the accident to happen, that is, if it is possible to say, “had this 
factor not occurred, the accident would (probably)'  ^ not have occurred” (Hopkins, 2000: 
124). This strict definition of cause was chosen because, like Hopkins’ AcciMaps, the
5 As highlighted in the AcciMap Guidelines, the word ‘probably’ is added because we cannot say with 
certainty that had a factor not occurred, the accident (or another factor) would not have taken place. We 
can only make a judgement about whether or not we think this is likely to have been the case (Hopkins, 
2000: 125).
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standardised AcciMap is designed to identify all of the factors that caused (or failed to 
prevent) a particular accident from occurring so that an understanding can be gained of 
how it occurred and where corrective action could be taken to prevent similar 
occurrences from happening again. Hopkins* criterion for necessary causes is useful for 
this purpose because it restricts the factors identified in an AcciMap to those that did in 
fact contribute to the accident. It has been pointed out, however, that there are a 
potentially infinite number of causes for an accident, and that any causal chain could, in 
theory, be extended back to the Big Bang (Hopkins, 2000: 22; Reason, 1997: 15). 
Therefore, the causes included in this standardised AcciMap, are restricted to the two 
following types.
Causes are included in these AcciMaps if they are of “practical significance”, that is, if 
something could conceivably be done about them (Hopkins, 2000: 22). This type of 
cause incorporates cases where parts or processes within the system were inadequate, 
insufficient, absent, inappropriate or ambiguous, for example. These causes, depicted as 
rectangles in the standard AcciMap format, make up the majority of the causes in an 
AcciMap. Causes that cannot sensibly be addressed are excluded from this category, 
such as those implied in statements like, ‘had I not gone to work that day, I would not 
have been injured* (Hopkins, 2000: 22) or ‘had aeroplanes never been invented, the 
crash would not have occurred*.
Causes relating to environmental conditions or physical surroundings which are not of 
practical significance, but which are necessary for making sense o f how and why the 
accident occurred, are also included in AcciMaps based on this standardised approach. 
The guidelines specify that these types of cause should be included in an AcciMap if the 
sequence o f events does not make sense without them. The sole purpose of including 
such causes is to ensure that the AcciMap contains sufficient information for readers to 
understand how the causes interacted to result in the accident without having to refer 
back to the accident report(s).
The addition of environmental and topographical causes to the AcciMap format is not 
new, as these sorts of factor are often included in the bottom two levels of AcciMaps by 
Rasmussen and Vicente. Rasmussen and Svedung's AcciMap in Figure 7, for instance, 
highlights snowfall, a narrow path and a boulder in the side of the road as causes of the 
accident. In the standardised AcciMap, however, these causes are located in the
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diagram with the other causes, rather than in a separate level beneath the critical event, 
so that the order of causal remoteness in the diagram is preserved. The guidelines also 
specify that there is no need to continue these causal chains up to the higher levels, that 
is, there is no need to consider why these types of cause occurred (primarily because if 
these factors were controllable or preventable in some way, they would have been 
treated as causes of practical significance). The guidelines specify that these causes 
should be drawn in rectangles with curved edges - the symbol used by Svedung and 
Rasmussen (2002: 407) to signify preconditions that are “evaluated no further'’. These 
causes, which are only included to enhance the reader’s understanding of the sequence 
of events, are therefore distinguished from the causes of practical significance in the 
AcciMap.
The AcciMap guidelines also specify the process by which analysts can ‘extract’ these 
necessary causes from an accident report. The process initially involves the analyst’s 
going through the report and identifying all of the factors for which he or she can say 
‘had this been otherwise, the accident would probably not have occurred’, that is, all of 
the necessary causes of the accident. At a later point in the procedure, the analyst is 
required to go through each of the causes in the AcciMap and ask why it occurred, in 
order to identify all of the factors that caused its occurrence, or failed to prevent it from 
occurring. This process of asking ‘why?’ is a common procedure for uncovering 
additional information in accident analysis and is used by Naikar, Saunders and 
Hopkins (2002), among others, to identify the systemic causes of accidents. The 
guidelines also suggest that analysts revisit the table of causes in the guidelines (Figure 
iii on pg. 295) to check that they have not overlooked any relevant types of cause. The 
purpose of these steps is to assist analysts to uncover all of the causes that were 
necessary for the accident to take place (including additional factors which they may 
have overlooked in their examination of the accident report and any others that may 
have been missed in the accident report itself).
4.5.4 The Causal Connections
The arrows in the standard AcciMap imply strict causation, in the way that Hopkins and 
Vicente adopt this concept in their AcciMaps. A cause is only linked to another if it 
was necessary in order for the next to occur, that is, if it can be said that, had the first 
cause not occurred, the second would (probably) not have occurred either (Hopkins,
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2000: 124). In order to promote coherent and logical AcciMaps, an additional criterion 
in the guidelines is that one cause should only be linked to another if the second was a 
direct cause of the first, that is, that no other factor needs to be inserted between them in 
order for a reader to understand how the first cause led to the second. This additional 
criterion is included to ensure that readers of the AcciMap will be able to understand the 
sequence of factors that led to the accident without difficulty and without having to refer 
back to the accident data.
The guidelines also specify the different ways in which the causes can be arranged in 
the diagram. Firstly, they highlight that the levels of the AcciMap do not place 
limitations on the numbers of causes in a chain of events. For instance, it is possible to 
have numerous linked causes in any level of the AcciMap.
Level 1 Cause A
Cause B
Cause C
Conversely, there is no need to have causes present in every level of the AcciMap.
Thus it is possible in the standardised AcciMap format to have a cause in one level 
linked directly to a cause several levels below, as in Hopkins’ AcciMap in Figure 9 (on 
pg. 76), where “Signs over symptoms” at the Societal level is linked to “Base med. 
failure to respond to symptoms”6 four levels below. The general principle is that the
6 This link illustrates that the medical preference for “signs visible to the external observer rather than 
symptoms reported by patients” led to a tendency for reports of symptoms to be ignored when negative 
test results were obtained (Royal Australian Air Force, 2001: 11.2).
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analyst must have as many (but only as many) causes in a causal chain as are required to 
ensure the logical progression from one cause to the next and for readers of the 
AcciMap to have no difficulty in understanding the sequence of events.
The guidelines also indicate that a cause may be linked to multiple effects.
Cause DCause C
Cause A
Cause B
For example, a cause such as organisational cost-cutting could lead to numerous 
effects, such as poor quality equipment, maintenance delays and staff cutbacks. The 
guidelines also recommend that separate causes be combined, where sensible, into one 
general cause, so that a general problem area is highlighted rather than a series of 
specific problems. This will ensure that safety recommendations developed from the 
AcciMap will aim to address the broader problem areas rather than to fix only specific 
inadequacies.
Similarly, multiple causes may be connected to one effect in an AcciMap.
Cause B Cause C
Cause D
Cause A
For instance, inadequate training, insufficient supervision and ambiguous procedures 
could, in combination, result in a worker making a critical error. Together, the last two 
arrangements ensure that no cause needs to be listed more than once in an AcciMap.
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4.5.5 Specified Wording
The wording that analysts should use in their AcciMaps has also been specified, based 
on observations of the types of phrasing in the above varieties of AcciMap. The 
guidelines specify that causes must be described briefly, to prevent the diagram from 
becoming overrun with text. The causes must also be described in a way that makes 
clear precisely how things might have been different, as can often be seen in Hopkins’ 
and Vicente’s AcciMaps. For instance, causes relating to staff shortages should be 
phrased as ‘insufficient staff numbers for task’, not just ‘staff numbers’. This is 
important because the causes in an AcciMap are used to develop safety 
recommendations, so they must provide an indication of what could be changed to 
improve the system. In addition, causes should be phrased in a way that suits the level 
in which the cause is located. Causes at the Physical/Actor Events, Processes and 
Conditions level should be phrased in terms of the actual sequence of events as they 
occurred, in order to describe the events leading up to the outcome. Causes at the 
organisational level and above, however, should not be phrased in terms of the 
particular individuals involved in the accident. Rather, they should be phrased in terms 
of the system inadequacies that allowed the accident to occur, so that efforts can be 
made to prevent the cause from recurring regardless o f the individuals involved. Thus, 
it is more beneficial to identify ‘inadequate staff training’ as an Organisational-level 
cause than 'Pete Smith had not been properly trained', because addressing the former 
would repair a system weakness, while addressing the latter might improve Pete’s 
performance but would have no lasting preventative effect on the system. The guidance 
provided about the sorts of wording to use helps to ensure that a reader of an AcciMap 
can understand how things could have been different and what sorts of intervention 
could prevent that kind of accident from recurring.
However, the attempt to standardise the language used in AcciMaps is also useful for 
validity and reliability testing purposes because it makes different analysts’ AcciMaps 
easier to compare and contrast. Although different people may use different words to 
describe a sequence of events, these instructions will help to eliminate some of the 
variation in their wording by, at the very least, encouraging them to be brief and to be 
specific or general where appropriate.
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It should be pointed out that it would be possible to further reduce the variability of 
analysts’ choice of wording by providing them with a specified sentence structure and 
an exhaustive vocabulary of words to use when identifying causes. The vocabulary 
could be based on the characteristics of the system in which the accident occurred and 
the types of cause that are likely to be present in an accident within that system, so that 
the analyst could select the appropriate words from the list and incorporate them into a 
predefined sentence order. This would make it considerably easier to determine 
whether different analysts identified the same causes because the causes would either be 
identical or different. However, although this tactic would make AcciMaps 
significantly easier to compare and contrast for reliability and validity testing purposes, 
it would be detrimental to the method itself because it would restrict the analyst’s 
freedom in identifying causes. Hopkins (2003: 13) points out that the process of 
identifying causes in an AcciMap requires analysts to be imaginative, because it 
requires them to imagine how events, conditions or circumstances might have been 
different. It is by this imaginative process that the full range of causes that contributed 
to an accident is uncovered. If the permissible vocabulary were defined in advance, the 
analytical process might become one of selecting appropriate causes from a list, rather 
than actively considering \\'hy each cause and event took place. As such, analysts might 
be less likely to capture the full range of causes leading to an accident and would also 
be unable to incorporate causes into the AcciMap that included words that were absent 
from the predefined vocabulary.
The guidance given on phraseology in the guidelines, then, is intended as a compromise 
between prescribing the appropriate wording in advance (and thereby limiting the types 
of cause that can be identified) and not specifying the wording at all (and thus risking 
that different analysts will adopt such different language that their AcciMaps will be too 
difficult to compare). The solution adopted in the guidelines is not ideal because it 
means that a degree of interpretation will be required in order to assess whether or not 
differently-worded causes in fact mean the same thing (this issue will be discussed in 
Chapter 6). However, it is not too restrictive to prevent analysts from identifying the 
full range of causes and it is likely to eliminate some of the inconsistencies that may 
otherwise have been evident when comparing different analysts’ diagrams.
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4.5.6 Safety Recommendations
The guidelines also provide instructions for how to compile a list of safety 
recommendations, that is, a list of actions proposed to address the problems identified in 
the analysis. Most AcciMap analysts have not extended their analyses to safety 
recommendation development. However, Hopkins (Royal Australian Air Force, 2001) 
and Naikar, Saunders and Hopkins (2002) have continued their analyses to include 
safety recommendations. These analysts argue that AcciMaps are useful for this 
purpose because they allow analysts to go through the diagram and systematically 
identify “those causal factors that were the most influential contributors to the accident 
and hence where it would be most beneficial to focus efforts to improve safety” (Naikar, 
Saunders & Hopkins, 2002: 4). Hopkins also suggests that if analyses stop once causes 
have been identified and do not go on to identify safety recommendations, “hard won 
lessons will be to no avail” (Royal Australian Air Force, 2001: 1.4). Since the AcciMap 
approach has the capacity to indicate where improvements can be made to enhance 
system safety, it seems appropriate to incorporate safety recommendation development 
into the AcciMap guidelines.
It is important to recognise, however, that safety recommendations are not generated 
automatically from the findings of an accident analysis. It is not the case that every 
cause identified in an AcciMap should be directly addressed - rather, safety 
recommendations “must stem from a consideration of where it is sensible to seek to 
make changes” (Naikar, Saunders & Hopkins, 2002: 4). The process of formulating 
safety recommendations, then, requires the analyst to make judgements about how 
safety can best be improved after an accident, rather than simply following a series of 
step-by-step instructions. Benner (1992: para 39) highlights this point in his finding 
that safety recommendations are often developed on the basis of the investigator’s 
“intuition”, “common sense”, “experience” and “knowledge of the system" or on group 
brainstorming activities, none of which are systematic or formalised processes. He 
points out that safety recommendation development is, in fact, “the least structured, and 
the most dependent on the investigators’ common sense and good judgment” of all 
aspects of accident analysis (Benner, 2003: para 53). In light of the requirement for 
analyst judgement, the AcciMap guidelines do not attempt to structure the safety 
recommendation development phase of the analysis so that it can be followed in a 
mechanical, unthinking manner. Rather, they outline a process to be taken, which
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guides how safety recommendation formulation should (and should not) be approached 
but leaves judgements about the most appropriate safety solutions up to the analyst.
The guidelines specify that recommendations should be written to address all of the 
causes in the AcciMap that could potentially be changed, controlled or compensated for, 
so that a similar accident would not occur again (see pages 287 and 288 in Appendix A 
for examples). They note that, where possible, recommendations should be written for 
all causes listed at the Organisational level and above. This is because, by identifying 
causes at these levels, the analyst has already judged that they are within the control of 
the above parties. However, the guidelines note that not all causes at the Physical/Actor 
Events, Processes and Conditions level (and some societal-type factors) can be 
addressed, and that recommendations should only be written for these causes where 
appropriate.
For each of the causes that can potentially be changed, controlled or compensated for, 
analysts are required to recommend what specifically should be done to address them, 
as well as considering whether or not there is a general problem area that should also 
be attended to. Recommendations for specific changes propose actions that address the 
identified causes so that they cannot contribute to accidents in the future. For example, 
if it is found that a cause of an accident was that the operating manual provided out-of- 
date information about a particular procedure, a specific recommendation might be to 
update the sections of the manual relating to that procedure. Recommendations that 
address general problem areas, on the other hand, are based on the idea that observed 
problems may be symptoms of broader issues and may not, therefore, be addressed 
adequately by making specific changes. From the above example, a more general 
recommendation might be to update the entire manual, based on the concern that if one 
part of the manual was outdated, this may also be true for other parts.
Sometimes, causes at the high levels of an AcciMap are phrased in a general way, so 
that recommendations made to address these causes automatically address the general 
problem areas. In other cases, however, the analyst must make a judgement about 
whether or not there is a requirement to address a general problem area as well as the 
specific problem. This decision is based, in part, on whether the analyst judges that the 
cause is likely to be part of a wider problem area in need of attention or is more likely to 
be a ‘one-off problem. The decision is also based on the feasibility of
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recommendations addressing the general problem area, since the guidelines require that 
safety recommendations be practical to implement. In practice, other considerations, 
such as the amount of time, work or money involved in implementing the 
recommendation, may also affect the analyst’s decision of whether or not to address 
broader problem areas. Nevertheless, where appropriate, it is preferable to propose both 
specific and general recommendations. The latter promote a more thorough and general 
approach to accident prevention and may extend the recommendations from preventing 
the recurrence of a specific accident to “preventing a broader group of similar scenarios 
in the future” (Benner, 1992: para 23). The former, however, are still required in order 
to ensure that the specific problems uncovered in the analysis are not overlooked when 
the safety recommendations are implemented.
The guidelines include some restrictions on the kinds of change that should be proposed 
in the safety recommendations. In line with the system approach, the recommendations 
should not be phrased in terms of the actual individuals involved in the accident. 
Rather, they should recommend changes that will promote safe behaviour regardless of 
the individuals involved, so that anyone in that position will be prevented from making 
the same kind of mistake. Similarly, recommendations should not seek to punish or 
dismiss the individuals involved in an accident. Such an approach fails to take into 
account the systemic factors that gave rise to the individual's unsafe behaviour and 
failed to prevent its resulting in an accident. It also goes against a generally accepted 
requirement that accident analyses be prevention-focused and blame-free. In addition, 
this type of solution does not prevent others in the same situation from making the same 
mistake. As Reason (1997: 208-212) suggests, unless the accident in question was 
caused by a deliberate act of sabotage or particularly unacceptable behaviour (where 
another individual in the same circumstances would probably have behaved differently), 
it is not useful to make recommendations concerning the particular individuals 
involved.
Recommendations to address specific causes should also aim to prevent similar 
accidents from occurring in the future regardless o f the particular circumstances 
involved. This means, for instance, that if a system component fails, recommendations 
should aim to address all systems with that component, not just the one in which the 
failure took place. The BHP Incident Investigation Guide (2000: 31) makes this point, 
suggesting that recommendations should address broader organisational and systemic
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issues, so that they do not result in a “one-time fix”. Like the requirement that 
recommendations do not address the specific individuals involved in the accident, this 
requirement helps to ensure that the corrective actions will prevent similar accidents 
from occurring in the future, rather than only preventing the exact circumstances from 
recurring.
Some accident analysts take the safety recommendation development process a step 
further and propose recommendations to address all “unsafe” factors that are uncovered 
during the accident analysis, rather than only the causes (Benner, 1992). This approach 
benefits system safety because it takes advantage of all of the information uncovered in 
the analysis, allows as many corrective actions to be made as possible and does not 
imply that a problem must cause an accident before it should be addressed. For the 
purpose of testing the AcciMap approach for validity and reliability, the guidelines have 
been limited to identifying the causes of accidents and the safety recommendations 
necessary for addressing those causes, as have previous AcciMap analyses involving 
safety recommendation development. However, the identification of unsafe factors that 
did not play a role in the accident, and the proposal of corrective actions to address 
those factors, would be beneficial to safety and should perhaps be included in future 
AcciMap analyses (this possibility is considered further in Chapter 9).
The AcciMap guidelines specify that the recommendations, once developed, should be 
numbered for reference purposes and should identify the party responsible for making 
the specified change. This information is standard in recommendations made by major 
accident investigation bodies and is useful for ensuring that there is no ambiguity with 
respect to the parties responsible for making the recommended changes.
Finally, the guidelines specify that the analyst should go through the recommendations 
and check that every causal factor that could potentially be changed, controlled or 
compensated for to prevent a similar accident from recurring, is addressed by one or 
more safety recommendations. The purpose of this step is simply to ensure that none of 
these causes has been overlooked and that every effort is made to prevent a similar 
outcome from occurring in the future.
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4.6 Conclusions
This chapter has introduced the different varieties of AcciMap currently in use, outlined 
their similarities and differences and proposed a standardised AcciMap approach, 
complete with a specified format and a set of instructions for use, based on these 
varieties. The purpose of standardising and formalising the approach in this way is to 
resolve the inconsistencies that previously prevented this approach from being readily 
testable for validity and reliability, so that analysts using the approach can now be 
presented with a formalised method which has a specified purpose and format as well as 
a written process and set of rules to follow. The next phase in the process of evaluating 
this method is to establish precisely how the reliability and validity of an accident 
analysis technique such as this can be established.
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5How to Measure Validity in 
Accident Analysis
The previous chapter paved the way for testing the validity and reliability of this 
approach by standardising the AcciMap format and proposing guidelines for the 
method. These steps have structured and controlled the technique so that different 
analysts using it will produce results that can meaningfully be compared and contrasted 
for testing purposes. The aim of this chapter is to begin the second stage in the process 
of assessing the validity and reliability of the AcciMap approach by considering what 
validity means in this context and determining precisely how an assessment can be 
made of whether or not an accident analysis method is, in fact, valid -  topics which 
have, prior to this research, received little attention.
5.1 Validity in Accident Analysis
The search for a method to test the validity of an accident analysis technique must begin 
with an understanding of what validity means in this context, so that clarification is 
obtained of precisely what we are trying to assess. Validity, according to Kassarjian 
(1977: 15), “is defined as the extent to which an instrument measures what it purports to 
measure”. It refers to the “match between a construct ... and a measure”, that is, “how 
well an idea about reality ‘fits’ with actual reality” (Neuman, 2003: 179). Validity, 
then, suggests “truthfulness” (Neuman, 2003: 179). Definitions of validity tend to focus 
on the validity of measures in terms of the extent to which an instrument of 
measurement (such as an IQ test or ruler) actually measures what it is supposed to
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measure (i.e. intelligence or length). For present purposes, however, it is the validity of 
a method that is of interest. When focusing on methods, validity does not relate to 
measurements and cannot be defined in the same way. Rather, the validity of a method 
refers to the extent to which it "‘does what it is supposed to do” (Rail Safety & Standards 
Board, 2004: 6).
The question of whether or not a method is valid in the sense of doing what it is 
intended to do can be viewed as consisting of two parts. One relates to the validity of 
the method itself that is, the extent to which the method is designed in a way that allows 
it to do what it is intended to do (Hill & Fowles, 1975: 185). The focus in this case is 
whether the process underlying the method is appropriate for its intended purposes. The 
other relates to the validity of the results that are obtained when the method is used 
(Hill & Fowles, 1975: 185). In this case, the focus is on whether, in practice, the 
outcomes of the method are what the method was supposed to produce. The validity of 
accident analysis methods can be considered from both perspectives.
5.1.1 The Validity of the Method
The validity of a method itself is not something that can be demonstrated empirically. It 
is not possible to prove that an accident analysis technique is an appropriate means of 
identifying the causes of an accident and highlighting suitable safety recommendations. 
Rather, a claim that a method does what it is intended to do can only be based on a 
consideration of whether or not the method has the capacity, in theory, to produce the 
kinds of results it is intended to produce and whether, “after careful scrutiny, no 
objection or contradiction can be sustained” (Annett, 2002: 228; Callahan, 2006). For 
this reason, Comer, Birkenholz and Stewart (2004: 160) refer to this as the “potential 
validity” of a method.
In assessing the validity of methods in terms of whether or not they do what they are 
supposed to do, some analysts have extended the types of consideration that are made 
when assessing the validity of measures to the validity of methods. For instance, 
reflecting distinctions that are made in assessments of measures, several analysts have 
considered the validity of methods in terms of their face validity (the extent to which the 
method appears, at face value, to be appropriate for its purpose), content validity (the 
extent to which the method “reflects the specific intended domain of content” by
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appropriately representing all relevant areas) and construct validity (the acceptability of 
the theory underlying the method) (Baber & Stanton, 2002: 218; Bea, 2005: 13; Isaac et 
ah, 2003: 5; Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2004: 7). However, while independent 
assessments of face, content and construct validity may be useful when assessing 
whether or not an instrument measures what it is intended to measure, the distinctions 
between these types of validity seem somewhat unclear when considered with reference 
to methods. It is difficult to envisage, for instance, how an assessment of a method's 
appropriateness (face validity) could be made without reference to whether or not it has 
the capacity to incorporate all relevant factors (content validity) and has a logical 
theoretical underpinning (construct validity). For the present purposes, then, the 
consideration of the validity of the method will focus more generally on the 
appropriateness o f the method for its purposes, with the capacity of the method to 
include all relevant factors and exclude irrelevant factors, and the soundness of the logic 
on which the method is based, taken into consideration as a part of this judgement.
The validity of the AcciMap approach, in terms of the appropriateness of the method for 
its purposes, has in fact already been argued in the previous chapters of this thesis. The 
capacity of the method to incorporate the sorts of causal factor that a systemic accident 
analysis technique should be able to include has been highlighted, as has the fact that 
this capacity is not limited by predefined causal categories or restrictive diagram 
formats (as is the case for some other methods). Similarly, the approach’s capacity to 
show how interactions between different parts of the sociotechnical system contributed 
to an accident and to thereby provide an understanding of how and why an accident 
occurred, has been noted. In addition, the capacity of the method to allow the types of 
corrective action that are appropriate, from the system approach, to be proposed, has 
been highlighted as one of its strengths. These points indicate that the AcciMap 
approach has been designed in such a way as to allow the types of cause and 
recommendation that a comprehensive, prevention-focused, systems-based accident 
analysis technique should include, to be incorporated into the analysis.
When considering whether or not this method does, in fact, do what it is supposed to do 
(and, equally importantly, that it does not do what it is not intended to do), however, it 
is useful to consider in further detail precisely what an accident analysis method should 
actually do -  a topic that has not previously been discussed in any detail. As is evident 
from earlier sections, accident analysis techniques such as the AcciMap approach aim to
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allow the causes of accidents to be identified and the corrective actions necessary to 
address those factors to be determined. An initial conceptualisation of the validity of an 
accident analysis method therefore relates to whether or not it has the capacity to allow 
the factors that did, in reality, lead to the accident to be successfully identified, and the 
safety recommendations that would, in practice, prevent recurrence to be proposed.
On closer examination, however, it is evident that the purpose of accident analyses is 
not to identify all of the factors that contributed to an accident, that is, every factor for 
which one can say, ‘had this factor not occurred, the accident would not have occurred’. 
Such an aim would be impossible to achieve since the number of these factors is 
potentially infinite. Take, as an example, the 2003 accident in which the driver of a 
Melbourne suburban train failed to apply the park brakes before departing the train to 
change ends and use the station amenities. The empty, driverless train then began to 
move, under the force of gravity, and ran for 16.848 km before crashing into a 
stationary train at a major Melbourne city station (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 
2003). It is clear that the driver’s failure to apply the park brakes was one of the causes 
of this accident. However, there are countless other events and conditions that were 
causal to this accident in the sense that had they not occurred, the accident would not 
have occurred. For instance, had there been an automatic system in place to apply the 
park brakes when the driver left the train, the accident would not have happened. 
Similarly, had there not been a stationary train further down the line, the collision would 
not have occurred. More remotely, had the driver adopted a different career path or had 
he never been born at all, he could not have failed to apply the brakes and the accident 
could not have occurred. Likewise, if Melbourne did not have a train system, or if 
trains had never been invented, the accident could not have occurred. These remote 
events are just as causally related to the crash as the driver failing to apply the park 
brake because had any one of these factors been otherwise, the accident would probably 
have been prevented. Such examples illustrate that there are countless events and 
conditions that are causal to any accident (or other event), if one traces these 
contributing factors back through time.
The purpose of accident analyses is clearly not to identify all of these factors, or even to 
identify as many of these factors as possible. Rather, the aim is to identify a small 
subset of these factors that are considered significant for one reason or another. It is this 
subset of factors that are generally referred to as the ‘causes’ of the accident in accident
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analysis (although, as noted above, they are in fact no more causally related to the 
outcome than countless other factors that contributed to that occurrence). The criteria 
used to judge particular factors as significant (and to therefore refer to them as ‘causes' 
or otherwise) vary depending upon the purpose of the analysis. If the aim of the 
analysis is to find someone at fault so that blame or punishment can be apportioned, the 
causes will be restricted to those in which an individual made a punishable mistake. In 
this case, the driver's failure to apply the park brake might be identified as the sole 
cause of the above accident. If the aim is not to apportion blame, but to identify factors 
that the organisation can address so that a similar accident could be avoided in the 
future, the causes might be restricted to the systemic deficiencies which the organisation 
has the power to address. In this case, the inadequacy of the procedures regarding park 
brake application and inadequate communication processes for providing station 
personnel with advanced warnings of emergency situations, for instance, might be 
identified as causes of the accident. Whether or not a particular factor that contributed 
to an accident constitutes a ‘cause’ cannot, therefore, be objectively determined. 
Rather, the distinction between ‘causes’ and other factors that contributed to an accident 
is based on subjective criteria, derived with reference to the purposes of the analysis.
The initial conceptualisation of validity in accident analysis in terms of the capacity of a 
method to allow the factors that did, in reality, lead to an accident, to be identified is 
therefore in need of modification. Specifically, a valid accident analysis method is one 
which allows the identification of the subset of factors that did, in reality, lead to an 
accident and which are also significant with respect to the purpose o f the analysis. A 
similar modification is required for the consideration of the validity of safety 
recommendations in accident analyses. On examination of this topic, it is clear that 
accident analyses do not aim to identify every action that could be taken to prevent a 
similar occurrence in the future. If this were the case, an analysis of the train crash 
described above might include recommendations to prohibit drivers from leaving their 
trains, to build all stations on the same altitude so that trains will not be affected by 
gravity or to abolish the rail system altogether. Such actions would no doubt be 
effective in preventing this scenario from recurring, but would be considered neither 
appropriate nor practical. As was the case for the causes of an accident, only a small 
number of the actions that would probably prevent the recurrence of an accident are 
considered relevant in accident analyses. In some situations, only those 
recommendations that can be put into action by the organisation carrying out the
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analysis will be considered relevant. In others, recommendations are proposed or 
disregarded on the basis of calculations of the risk and severity of particular outcomes. 
Again, therefore, the types of recommendation that are considered appropriate differ 
depending on the particular purpose of the analysis.
As noted in the previous chapter, the causal factors and safety recommendations in 
AcciMaps are restricted to exclude factors that are irrelevant for the purposes of this 
technique. Only two types of cause are included in AcciMaps, namely, those that are of 
practical significance (that is, those that something can conceivably be done about) and 
those that are necessary for making sense of why the accident occurred. Similarly, the 
safety recommendations included in an AcciMap analysis are restricted to those that are 
practical to implement and would prevent similar occurrences in the future, regardless 
of the particular individuals or specific circumstances involved. The causes and safety 
recommendations included in an AcciMap are therefore restricted to the subset of items 
that are relevant from a systems-based, prevention-focused perspective of organisational 
accidents.
These discussions highlight that the AcciMap method, in theory, has the capacity to 
allow the factors that should be identified in a systems-based accident analysis (and only 
those factors) to be incorporated into the analysis. It also has the capacity to provide 
insight into how and why an organisational accident occurred by showing how events 
and conditions throughout the sociotechnical system combined to produce that result. 
On the basis of argument, then, it is claimed that this method is appropriate for its 
intended purposes and is in this sense valid. It is not possible to extend the 
consideration of the method's validity beyond this sort of reasoning because there is no 
way to determine, in practice, whether or not the method does actually do what it is 
intended to do. The consideration of whether or not the results obtained when the 
method is used are valid, however, can be assessed empirically. The next section 
examines precisely how such assessments can be made.
5.1.2 The Validity of the Method’s Results
The second way of considering a method's validity is to focus not on the validity of the 
method itself, but on the validity of the results obtained when the method is used. In 
this case, the question of whether or not a method does what it is intended to do focuses,
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not on whether the method itself is appropriate for producing the required outcomes, but 
on whether or not the results obtained through the use of the method are, in practice, 
those that it is intended to produce. This is referred to as empirical validity -  “the 
degree to which the method works with real cases in a real sample” (Isaac et al., 2003: 
6). The two perspectives on validity are clearly related since, if the outcomes of a 
method are valid, there is an implication that the method used to obtain them is also 
valid. In fact, some analysts do not distinguish between these perspectives at all, 
arguing that, “To speak of the validity of a method is simply a shorthand way of 
referring to the validity of the data or accounts derived from that method” (Maxwell, 
1992: 284). However, the focus of the latter is on the application of the method, rather 
than the characteristics of the method itself. Thus, unlike the validity of a method, the 
validity of its results can be examined empirically.
The validity of the results of a method can be determined by applying the relevant 
method and evaluating the obtained results. In terms of AcciMap validation, this 
process would involve applying the standardised AcciMap approach outlined in the 
previous chapter and assessing whether or not the results obtained through that 
application are valid. In order to assess the validity of a method's results in this way, 
however, one must have a way of distinguishing results that are valid from those that 
are not. As suggested above, valid AcciMap results are those that successfully identify 
the factors that did, in reality, lead to the accident (and which are also either of practical 
significance or necessary for making sense of the accident) and the safety 
recommendations that if implemented would, in practice, prevent a similar accident 
from occurring again (and which are also practical to implement and not specific to the 
particular individuals or circumstances involved in the accident). However, the 
question of precisely how one can determine whether or not the results of a given 
AcciMap analysis are valid in terms of these criteria remains unanswered. Specifically, 
how do we determine which factors were causal to a given accident, whether a cause is 
of practical significance, whether the inclusion of a cause is necessary to produce a 
coherent analysis, which safety recommendations would prevent recurrence if 
implemented and whether such actions are practical to implement?
Flick (2002: 5) notes that one of the fundamental criteria for assessing the validity of 
research in the social sciences relates to “whether the methods have been appropriately 
selected and applied to the object under study”. For this reason, the process taken here
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is to consider in detail the available options for assessing the validity of AcciMap 
results and their suitability for the current study so that the most appropriate methods 
can be identified. Previous evaluations of the empirical validity of methods of analysis 
in similar areas suggest several kinds of criteria against which the validity of a 
technique's results can be assessed. Four such options will be considered: evaluations 
of results against objective external criteria, evaluations of results against those obtained 
from other methods, evaluations of results in terms of their internal logic and evaluation 
of the results against those of experts.
5.1.2.1 Evaluations of results against objective external 
criteria
The validity of a method's results has often been assessed in validation studies in other 
fields by checking the accuracy of the results against an objective external criterion (a 
“gold standard”) (Bolger & Wright, 1992: 48). This is an ideal approach when a 'gold 
standard' is available because the validity of the results is clearly evident by their 
agreement or disagreement with this standard. Evaluations of this sort have been made 
by assessing a method’s results against future occurrences, past events and concurrent 
measures.
Evaluations of results against future occurrences
The evaluation of the validity of a method’s results against future occurrences focuses 
on the method’s predictive validity -  “the ability of an instrument to predict events for 
which evidence is not at present available to the analyst" (Holsti, 1969: 144). 
Assessments of this sort involve comparing the method’s predictions against future 
events to gauge their accuracy. This approach has been taken, for instance, in the 
validation study of the “Technique for the Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of 
Cognitive Errors” (TRACEr) (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 2004: 4). In this study, 
TRACEr was used to predict “probable errors” that would occur during simulations of 
National Air Traffic Services systems. These predictions were then compared with 
actual errors observed during subsequent simulations, allowing a numerical assessment 
to be made of the technique’s predictive accuracy (Rail Safety & Standards Board, 
2004: 12). Such an approach is highly appropriate for the validation of techniques that 
predict future occurrences because the predictions can be directly compared with the
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succeeding events. However, a number of problems would arise if this approach were 
used in an attempt to assess the validity of accident analysis results.
If such an approach were adopted for the present purposes, the focus might be on 
whether or not the identification of causal factors in an analysis, and their subsequent 
rectification, did succeed, in practice, in preventing future accidents. If the factors that 
an analyst identifies as causes of an accident are addressed and a similar outcome does 
not recur, there is a suggestion that the causes were successfully identified and 
effectively addressed. Gordon, Flin and Mearns (2005: 168) have proposed this 
approach as a means of evaluating safety interventions, suggesting that future incident 
and accident rates could be examined to determine whether or not reductions occur after 
interventions are put in place. The problem with this approach with respect to the 
assessment of accident analysis results, however, is that future events (against which the 
results would be compared) can be misleading since, while the recurrence of an accident 
indicates the existence of problems, the absence of a recurrence does not necessarily 
signify that problems do not exist. As Benner (1992) points out, ‘causes’ do not 
produce accidents every time they are present. Reliance on this approach could 
therefore result in a false sense of security about the safety status of a system. The same 
issue arises with respect to safety recommendations. Woodcock notes, for instance, that 
uncorrected system problems usually do not produce negative outcomes continuously 
until they are addressed. Rather, the “system typically resumes apparently normal 
operation, regardless of remedy” (Woodcock, 1995: para 8). She points out that the 
“system's response is complex, delayed, ambiguous, and stochastic” and, therefore, 
cannot be relied upon to determine whether or not causes have been addressed 
effectively (Woodcock, 1995: para 8). The events that occur after an accident cannot, 
then, reliably indicate when relevant causal factors have been overlooked or safety 
recommendations have been ineffective. The ensuing events also fail to draw attention 
to recommendations that have been successful in averting accidents since, when 
accidents are successfully prevented, nothing happens and the effectiveness of the 
corrective action therefore goes unnoticed (McLucas, 2003: 43). The problem reflects 
the principle of falsification -  that it is possible to falsify a hypothesis by providing a 
counterexample but the truth of a hypothesis cannot ultimately be verified 
(Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2000: 129).
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Since evaluations of the validity of accident analysis results based on this approach rely 
on waiting to see whether or not an accident recurs, the question would also arise 
regarding the amount of time required to pass before confidence could be gained that 
the causes have been correctly identified and the corrective actions have been effective. 
Whether the specified time limit is a month, year or century, the absence of an accident 
may be equally likely to signify that one is about to occur as it is to signify that the 
problems have successfully been identified and managed. For these reasons, future 
events do not provide a reliable standard against which to assess AcciMap findings and 
an assessment of the validity of findings against this type of standard is therefore not 
appropriate for current purposes.
Evaluations of results against past occurrences
In other studies, the external criteria against which the results of a method are assessed 
are in existence prior to the application of the method. This was the case in 
Rouhiainems (1992: 155) validation study of QUASA, a checklist-based method for 
“assessing the quality of safety analysis”. In this study, validity was assessed by 
comparing the results obtained from the application of the QUASA method (the results 
consisted of a list of deficiencies in safety analyses) with the deficiencies highlighted in 
existing incident and accident data (Rouhiainen, 1992: 155-163). In this case, then, 
rather than being assessed against future events, the results obtained through use of the 
method were compared with data that were already available, allowing the accuracy 
with which the technique identified the deficiencies highlighted in those data to be 
measured. Rouhiainen (1992: 168) noted several problems associated with this 
approach, namely that data existed only for incidents that had actually occurred (and did 
not exist for all of the potential incidents that had not), that accidents are rare events that 
highlight only some of the risks within a system and that incidents are often not 
investigated or reported properly. In light of these issues, he noted that the available 
data were not “statistically sufficient” for evaluating the findings of QUASA analyses 
(Rouhiainen, 1992: 168).
For the purposes of validating methods of accident analysis, this type of approach could 
be of some use. Specifically, like assessments of validity based on future events, it 
could provide some insight into the types of safety recommendation that are ineffective 
in certain situations. For instance, a particular safety recommendation could be deemed
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inappropriate on the basis of previous accident data if it is known that the same 
recommendation, in the past, failed to prevent the type of outcome it was intended to 
avert. However, reference to previous occurrences is not a fail-safe way of assessing 
the validity of accident analysis results, since ineffective recommendations often have 
no visible result. More significantly, however, no two organisational accidents are the 
same and the causes of previous accidents and the recommendations proposed to 
address those causes may have no relevance to an analysis of a different accident. Thus, 
in many cases, there would be no relevant existing data against which to assess accident 
analysis findings. This retrospective approach cannot, therefore, be used as a reliable 
means of checking the accuracy of the causes identified or the appropriateness of the 
recommendations proposed in an accident analysis.
Evaluations of results against concurrent measures
A related approach focuses instead on concurrent validity, in which a method's results 
are assessed against data that are collected at the same time, such as concurrent 
measures of performance or the results of a previously validated method (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955: 282; Tähti & Niemelä, 2006: 15). An example is Stanton and Stevenage’s 
(1998) evaluation of Human Error Identification (HEI) techniques, designed to identify 
and predict the likelihood of human errors within high-risk environments. These 
techniques involve the decomposition of activities into smaller stages, identification of 
the errors that are possible or plausible in each stage, identification of the causes of 
these potential errors in terms of “psychological error mechanisms” and, where 
possible, specification of options for error reduction or recovery (Stanton & Stevenage, 
1998: 1738). In assessing the validity of the findings of HEI techniques, Stanton and 
Stevenage (1998: 1740) focused on the relationship between the errors predicted by 
analysts using the technique and the errors that were observed during the relevant task. 
Their validation study involved the use of an HEI technique called “Systematic Human 
Error Reduction and Prediction Approach” (SHERPA) to identify the potential errors 
involved in the process of purchasing a chocolate bar from a vending machine (Stanton 
& Stevenage, 1998: 1741). They assessed the concurrent validity of this approach by 
comparing the errors predicted by participants using SHERPA with the errors that were 
actually observed during 75 vending machine transactions. They were therefore able to 
determine the frequencies of 'hits’ (errors that were both predicted and observed), 
'misses’ (errors observed, but not predicted) and ‘false alarms’ (errors predicted, but not
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observed), allowing objective assessments to be made regarding the accuracy of the 
technique (Stanton & Stevenage, 1988: 1744).
Such an approach, however, requires that a suitable objective standard be available 
against which the method's results can be assessed. For methods of accident analysis, 
no such standard exists. It is not possible, for instance, to assess the validity of the 
causes identified in an accident analysis by comparing them with the causes that did, in 
reality, contribute to the accident because the latter cannot be objectively determined. 
In AcciMaps and many other accident analysis techniques incorporating causal trees or 
causal chains, as well as in everyday conceptualisations of causality, the process of 
determining whether or not a factor is a cause involves the consideration of 
count erf actuals. Specifically, A can be said to have caused B if it can be said that had 
A not occurred, B would not have occurred. The logic here is referred to as 
counterfactual (i.e. contrary to fact) because it involves a consideration of what would 
have happened had certain factors been different. The obvious difficulty, for the 
purpose of assessing the validity of such conclusions against external, objective criteria, 
is that, while it is possible to observe that an accident occurred when a particular factor 
was present, there is no way to determine whether the accident would actually have 
been prevented from occurring had that factor not been present. Since the logic relies 
on the consideration of “unactualised possibilities” (Menzies, 2001) the decision as to 
whether or not a given factor is a cause of an accident must be based on a judgement, 
developed from inferences of whether or not a certain outcome would have happened 
had that factor been different, rather than on objective, observable facts. A similar 
situation arises when considering the validity of safety recommendations in terms of 
whether they would, in practice, prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future. 
In the absence of observable knowledge about what the effects of a given 
recommendation would actually be if implemented (and what the effects would be if it 
were not implemented), such conclusions must, again, be based on judgements of the 
actions that seem most appropriate given the information available at the time, rather 
than on objectively derived data.
The nature of organisational accidents also precludes the possibility for controlled 
experiments to be conducted after an accident in an attempt to determine its causes and 
the appropriate safety recommendations in an objective manner (so that the validity of 
accident analysis results could be assessed against these data). As noted in Chapter 2,
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organisational accidents have multiple systemic causes (some of which develop years 
before an accident takes place), involve the decisions, actions and interactions of 
numerous people and organisations throughout the system and often develop as a result 
of normal variations in people’s behaviour, resulting from changing pressures from a 
variety of sources over time. Due to the enormous number of variables involved and 
the complexity of the interactions between those variables, it would not be feasible to 
replicate the complete scenario preceding an accident, in simulation or in reality, and to 
hold all factors constant while certain conditions, events, influences and interactions 
were manipulated to determine precisely which factors would have prevented the 
accident had they been otherwise (i.e. which factors were, in fact, causal to the 
outcome). However, even if such an approach were feasible, it would not have the 
capacity to determine objectively the whether or not proposed safety recommendations 
would, in fact, be effective in producing future accidents. Any process designed to 
simulate the implementation of corrective actions and to evaluate their effects on the 
future safety of a system would have to be based on a series of assumptions and 
judgements about how particular changes would affect the future system and whether or 
not accidents would be averted as a result. The option of objectively determining the 
‘correct' causes and recommendations for a given organisational accident 
experimentally, so that these results can be assessed against those obtained in an 
accident analysis, is therefore not feasible given the nature of this type of event.
The other way in which the validity of a method’s results can be assessed with reference 
to concurrent measures is by comparing these results with results produced from 
another method that has been validated (Tähti & Niemelä, 2006: 15). The problem with 
this approach, when considered in the context of AcciMap validation, is that no other 
techniques for systemic accident analysis have been shown to be valid in terms of 
correctly identifying the causes of an accident and the safety recommendations required 
to address those causes and, as Holsti (1969: 145) points out, “If the criterion itself is 
not a valid measure of the phenomena to be explained, little is gained by demonstrating 
that content data are significantly related to it”.
The option of assessing the validity of the results of an accident analysis with reference 
to future occurrences, past occurrences, or concurrent measures is therefore 
inappropriate for the current study owing to the unavailability and unreliability of 
objective criteria against which to assess the results. However, it is important to note
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that, even if objective means were available for determining the factors that did, in fact, 
cause an accident and the recommendations that would, if implemented, prevent future 
accidents from occurring, this information would not be sufficient to distinguish 
accident analysis results that are valid from those that are not. The reason is that valid 
accident analyses are not simply those that identify the factors that caused an accident 
and the corrective actions that would prevent its recurrence. Rather, as highlighted 
earlier, valid accident analyses are those that identify the subset of these factors that are 
relevant for the purposes o f the analysis. The causes and recommendations that are 
relevant cannot be distinguished from those that are irrelevant with reference to any 
characteristics inherent within these items - they are only significant or otherwise with 
reference to the intended outcomes of the analysis. As indicated in the AcciMap 
guidelines, causal factors are considered relevant in AcciMap analysis if they are of 
practical significance or if they are necessary for making sense of the accident. The 
question of whether or not a particular cause is necessary so that an AcciMap makes 
sense cannot be answered objectively, since the scope and level of detail required in 
order to make an analysis comprehensible to a wider audience is a matter of judgement. 
It is similarly impossible to determine whether or not a factor is of practical significance 
independently of analyst interpretation or judgement. This question relies on 
considerations of whether or not there are conceivable ways in which the factor can be 
addressed and therefore requires the use of analytical skills for devising potential 
solutions to the problems, as well as evaluations of the practicality and sensibleness of 
those solutions. At a later stage of the analysis, the same considerations are involved in 
forming safety recommendations that are practical to implement. Whether or not a 
particular recommendation meets this criterion depends upon whether or not it would be 
possible to implement at all, how difficult, time-consuming or expensive it would be to 
implement and how it would affect those working in the system, among many other 
considerations. Similarly, the question of whether or not a recommendation meets the 
criterion of not being specific to the particular circumstances involved in the accident 
requires a judgement of the appropriate level of specificity. Again, therefore, there are 
no objective standards against which the validity of such evaluations can be assessed.
From this discussion, it is evident that an assessment of the validity of accident analysis 
results cannot be made with reference to objective, external criteria, both because 
reliable criteria of this sort are not available in this case and because an entirely 
objective approach cannot distinguish the subset of causes and recommendations that
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should be included in an accident analysis from others that should not. It is therefore 
useful to consider alternative ways of assessing the validity of accident analysis results 
which have the capacity to incorporate this distinction.
5.1.2.2 Evaluations of results against those obtained 
from other methods
An alternative way of assessing the validity of a method's results focuses on convergent 
validity -  the extent to which the “results provided from different methods of data 
collection” are in agreement (Carael, 2001: 170). Assessing validity in this way 
involves a process of method triangulation, in which multiple methods are used to 
investigate the same question (Green, 2005: 66). This approach differs from the 
process, discussed previously, of assessing the validity of results against the results 
obtained through the use of other methods which are known to be valid because, in this 
case, it is not necessary that the other methods have been shown to be valid. Rather, the 
principle behind method triangulation is simply that, if multiple methods produce 
similar results, confidence can be gained in the accuracy of those results (Gray et al., 
1999: 12). This would appear to be a promising approach to adopt for the present 
purposes since documented methods of accident analysis and analyses of accidents 
based on those techniques are plentiful. It would not be difficult to analyse the same 
accident using alternative methods, so that the results of the analyses could be compared 
and contrasted. Unlike the option of evaluating results against objective, external 
criteria, such an approach might also be useful in distinguishing the relevant causes and 
recommendations from those that are irrelevant since the results of each method would 
include only those factors that were judged to be relevant (with respect to the particular 
method adopted).
A major problem with this approach, however, is that the different methods of accident 
analysis do not aim to ‘do’ the same thing and one cannot gain confidence in the results 
of one method's results on the basis that they ‘converge" with the results of a method 
that is designed for a different purpose. The purposes of accident analysis techniques 
differ, for instance, in terms of whether they aim to uncover multiple causes for accident 
prevention purposes or to identify one ‘root cause". The focuses of the techniques also 
vary, with some concentrating on human errors, some on organisational problems, and 
others on the greater systemic context within which the accident occurred. The different
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methods of accident analysis have different stop rules, with several approaches stopping 
once organisational-level causes have been identified and others continuing beyond this 
level. In addition, there are differences between the methods in the causal logic and 
definitions adopted, in whether or not the causes are sorted into predefined categories or 
levels, in whether risk factors are incorporated into the analysis (as well as causal 
factors) and in whether or not safety recommendations are included in the results. In 
practice, these differences mean, for example, that analysts adopting an ICAM approach 
will not identify causal factors relating to governmental or regulatory bodies that would 
be identified in an AcciMap because ICAM analyses stop once the organisational causes 
of an accident have been uncovered. Conversely, AcciMap analysts will not phrase 
their findings in terms of the 11 Organisational Failure Types that are used in ICAM 
analyses because this mode of categorisation is not part of the AcciMap approach. 
Similarly, analysts using the method of analysis outlined in the Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau (ATSB) Safety Investigation Guidelines (2005) will identify all factors 
that increase risk within the system but will not propose specific corrective actions, 
while those using REASON RCA will identify causal factors (but no additional risk 
factors) and will develop safety recommendations to address those causes. Thus, 
although the main purpose of all of these techniques is to analyse accidents in order to 
improve safety, the differences in their specific aims, scopes and formats mean that 
results that are valid for one method may not be valid for another. The triangulation of 
accident analysis methods would therefore probably not allow confidence (or otherwise) 
to be gained in the results of any one method, since the different methods would be 
unlikely to produce results that converge (to suggest that those results are valid), yet 
discrepancies in results would not necessarily indicate invalidity because they might 
simply reflect the differences in the purpose of each method.
In addition, the differences between the various methods of accident analysis would 
make it difficult, in practice, to assess the degree of similarity between results obtained 
from different methods. As noted in the previous chapter, the existing varieties of 
AcciMap incorporate different purposes, formats, stop rules and definitions, all of 
which make their results difficult to compare. However, as is clear from the above 
discussion, the differences in format, wording and the types of factor included in the 
analysis, for instance, are even more pronounced between AcciMap analyses and other 
methods of accident analysis, making assessments of the degree of similarity between 
results from different methods even more complicated. Rather than generating
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confidence or doubt in the accuracy of accident analysis findings, the triangulation of 
such methods would probably result in a collection of disparate findings for which the 
degrees of similarity are difficult to assess, leaving the question of which (if any) of 
these results is valid, unanswered.
5.1.2.3 Evaluations of results in terms of their internal 
logic
The difficulties associated with assessing accident analysis results against those 
obtained from other methods are avoided if one bases validity judgements on the 
internal logic underlying the results, rather than on a comparison of those results against 
an external standard. This was the approach adopted in the validation study of the 
REASON Root Cause Analysis (RCA) technique, a computer program that guides the 
analyst through the accident investigation process and uses the information provided by 
the user to produce a causal tree diagram, generate an accident report and propose safety 
recommendations (Decision Systems Inc., 2004a). Decision Systems Inc. (2004b: para 
8) claims that this is a valid approach, stating that the procedure teaches the analyst 
“how to ask the right questions at the right time, to get the right answers”. The 
producers of the system also maintain that it “validates” the analyst's causal logic to 
ensure that they have “included all of the relevant facts, and at the same time, only the 
relevant facts”, and state that the results “are complete and verifiably accurate" 
(Decision Systems Inc., 2004b: para 10, 2004d: para 15). They point out that ‘Wo other 
system has ... or even claims such capability' (Decision Systems Inc., 2004c: para 5). 
The validation procedure on which these statements are based, however, simply 
involves checking with analysts whether or not the information they inputted into the 
system is correct, in order to test their “clarity of ... thinking” (Decision Systems Inc., 
2003). According to Decision Systems Inc. (2003), the software formulates a series of 
“yes and no questions”, based on the words inputted by the user, in order to “make sure 
that we’re thinking correctly about our problem”. For instance, once the analyst has 
typed in the causes of the outcome, the program lists the causes in a sentence and asks 
the analyst if these causes are sufficient to explain why the outcome occurred. If so, it 
asks whether the outcome would still have taken place if one of the factors had not 
occurred. If not, it removes the unnecessary cause, leaving only those that the analyst 
agrees were required in order for the outcome to occur (Decision Systems Inc., 2003). 
This ‘validation' process, like steps 7 and 8 in the AcciMap guidelines, reduces the
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likelihood that causes will be overlooked in the analysis and that irrelevant causes will 
be included. It is therefore useful for checking that analysts are sure about the causes 
they have identified and that the internal logic of their analysis is sound. However, it 
clearly cannot demonstrate that the 'right answers’ have been obtained, as suggested by 
Decision Systems Inc., because it relies entirely on the analyst’s own assessment of the 
accuracy of his or her statements. Thus in situations where the analyst’s understanding 
of the events leading to the accident is flawed, or where he or she fails to realise that 
additional causes were necessary to explain why events occurred as they did, for 
example, the procedure is unlikely to ensure valid results. In such instances, analysts 
probably believe that the information they have inputted is correct and are unlikely to 
identify errors in their understanding of the accident sequence.
This problem could be minimised by modifying the process so that the logic checks 
were carried out by people other than those who performed the analyses, so that 
omissions and misunderstandings would be more likely to be identified. However, 
there is an additional problem with this approach that renders it inappropriate for current 
purposes. The problem is that the validation of results in terms of their internal logic is, 
in essence, what Spencer (2006: 14) refers to as a “procedural viewpoint” of 
correctness. Spencer (2006: 14), writing about “correct" decisions in law, notes that the 
procedural viewpoint “considers a 'correct' decision to be one which applies the legal 
standards correctly”. Thus if a person committed a crime but there is insufficient 
evidence to prove it, the “correct decision'’ from this perspective is acquittal (Spencer, 
2006: 14). The alternative perspective is the “omniscient viewpoint”, in which “the 
correct decision is the one that would be reached by an impartial and rational observer 
with perfect information (including complete and correct evidence) and complete 
understanding of the law” (Spencer, 2006: 14). From the latter perspective, “If the 
person committed the crime, the correct decision is guilt, regardless of the strength of 
evidence” (Spencer, 2006: 14). Clearly, the latter type of perspective is desirable for 
present purposes, since the most important outcome is knowledge of how and why an 
accident actually occurred (and how recurrence could be prevented), rather than the 
correct application of the accident analysis method. Of course, the correct application 
of the method is also important but essentially only to assist in ensuring that the 
obtained results are as accurate as possible. Assessments of the validity of accident 
analysis results in terms of their internal logic do not necessarily ensure that the correct 
answers (from the omniscient viewpoint) are reached. Rather, this approach leaves
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open the possibility that different people analysing the same accident could produce 
different results, each of which are justifiable (to some degree) on the basis of their own 
internal reasoning. In such cases, the question again arises as to which of these results, 
if any, are actually valid in terms of identifying the particular subset of causes and 
safety recommendations that would be identified by an “impartial and rational observer” 
(Spencer, 2006: 14) with complete information about the accident and a perfect 
understanding of AcciMap analysis.
5.1.2.4 Evaluation of the results against those of experts
An alternative means of identifying the ‘correct’ results in a given circumstance is to 
rely on the judgements of experts. Bolger and Wright (1992: 48, 61) note that the use of 
expert judgements and opinions is highly valuable in circumstances in which 
uncertainty exists as a result of unreliable information, an absence of “usable outcome 
feedback" or the study of behaviour that “has yet to occur, is noisy, or is complex” (i.e. 
in the absence of an appropriate “gold standard”). In such cases, the judgements of 
informed experts may be as close as one can get to the right answers.
As the previous sections have shown, this type of uncertainty is present with respect to 
the validity of AcciMap results. Uncertainty exists regarding whether factors were, in 
fact, causal to an accident and whether recommendations would, in practice, be 
effective if implemented because no reliable, observable data exist on which to base 
answers to these questions (and because the latter question relies on the consideration of 
events that have not yet occurred). Similarly, no objective standard can indicate which 
of the potentially infinite number of causes of an accident and safety recommendations 
that could prevent its recurrence should be included in an AcciMap analysis, since these 
decisions depend on analyst judgement rather than observable facts. For the purposes 
of the current study, then, a possible solution would be to ask expert AcciMap analysts 
to analyse an accident and to use their results as the external standard against which the 
validity of other AcciMap findings could be assessed.
The evaluation of the validity of AcciMap results in terms of the extent to which they 
concur with the results of experts would overcome the problems associated with the 
three options highlighted previously. Firstly, such an approach would not require that 
objective, external criteria be available against which to assess results and would
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therefore negate the problem of these data being unavailable in this instance. This 
approach would also allow the judgements that are required as part of the AcciMap 
analysis process to be incorporated into the results, since the experts’ findings would 
include only those causes and recommendations that are judged to be relevant (i.e. of 
practical significance etc.). It would therefore be possible, by comparing AcciMap 
results against this standard, to determine whether or not those results incorporate all of 
the factors that should be included in an AcciMap analysis of that accident (and no 
factors that should not) . Such an approach would also avoid the problems with 
assessing AcciMap results against results obtained from other accident analysis 
methods, because the expert results would be those that were correct in terms of this 
particular method. In addition, the situation would not arise in which multiple different 
sets of results could all be judged as valid, if this approach were adopted, because it 
assumes that there is a single valid set of results for an AcciMap of a given accident 
(namely, the results produced by the experts), and that results are only valid if they 
concur with this standard.
The assumption underlying this approach is that, in the absence of an appropriate 
objective standard against which to assess the validity of accident analysis results (i.e. in 
the absence of assistance from an unbiased, rational observer with complete 
information), experts are in the best position to judge the appropriate causes and 
recommendations for a given accident. The way in which formal accident analyses are 
received suggests that this assumption is widely considered to be acceptable. The 
judgements of expert accident analysts are relied upon in formal accident analyses in 
practice, with experienced analysts establishing the causes of accidents and proposing 
corrective actions to address those causes. In general, there is little question as to 
whether or not the causes and recommendations identified by accident analysts in 
official accident reports are correct. Rather, it tends to be assumed that this is the case, 
with the findings of such analyses often interpreted as fact.
7 A similar approach was adopted in the assessment of the Human Factors Investigation Tool (HFIT) by 
Gordon, Flin and Meams (2005). In this study, the extent to which the coding of the causes of an incident 
into the HFIT categories by investigators was "‘accurate’' was assessed by comparing their results against 
the “investigation findings” as coded by “the HFIT developer and an original member of the investigation 
team using HFIT” (Gordon, Flin & Mearns, 2005: 158, 160). In this way, it was possible to determine the 
number of times the investigators agreed (i.e. identified the same codes as in the “investigation findings”) 
and disagreed (i.e. did not identify codes that were present in the “investigation findings” or identified 
additional codes that were not present in these findings), allowing an overall level of agreement between 
the investigators’ responses and these findings (i.e. accuracy) to be made (Gordon, Flin & Mearns, 2005: 
160-167).
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The evaluation of AcciMap results against the results of AcciMap experts therefore 
seems the most appropriate approach to adopt for present purposes, given the 
impossibility of assessing validity against any objective standard. A difficulty with this 
solution, however, is that different experts may not necessarily reach the same 
conclusions. As noted above, the outcomes of accident analyses are affected by 
numerous factors relating to the method used, such as the purpose, focus, scope and 
format of the technique. Research on accident analyses indicates, however, that factors 
relating to analysts themselves may also affect the outcomes.
Woodcock (1995) points out, for instance, that when analysts are part of the workplace 
in which the accident occurred, self-serving bias can affect their analyses. She suggests, 
for instance, that supervisors might be inclined to “cover up” causes relating to 
inadequate supervision or training and that senior management might prefer to avoid 
identifying causes that will incur costs to the organisation (Woodcock, 1995: para 4). 
Other forms of analyst bias may also affect the results of analyses. Rasmussen (1990: 
452) suggests, for instance, that people tend to see what they are expecting to find. He 
notes that accident analyses at one point tended to identify technical faults as causes, 
then later focused predominantly on human error and are now moving towards the 
identification of causes relating to management and design (Rasmussen, 1990: 452). 
His implication is that the types of cause that analysts are ‘looking for’ when analysing 
accidents have changed over time, in accordance with developments in theories and 
models of accident causation, and that these changed expectations have influenced the 
types of cause that the analysts have uncovered in their analyses.
Woodcock (1995) suggests that analysts’ understanding of accident causation can also 
affect their analysis of causes, with analysts who consider accidents to be the result of 
careless behaviour, for instance, identifying different causes from those who view 
accidents as indications of undiscovered hazards. Similarly, an analyst’s knowledge 
and experiences of accident prevention can affect the findings of their analyses. 
Johnson (2003: 565) notes, for instance, that analysts are unlikely to propose 
recommendations that they know have been ineffective in similar situations in the past. 
This means, not only that different analysts might produce different safety 
recommendations depending on their knowledge of past events, but also that individual 
analysts might propose different recommendations when addressing similar causes at 
different points in time.
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Rasmussen (1990: 452) argues that analysts also tend to take for granted familiar causes 
that are within their own areas of expertise and to focus, in their explanations of 
accidents, on causes that are unusual or unfamiliar to them. Svenson, Lekberg and 
Johansson (1999: 1563) support this view, suggesting that the “fundamental root 
causes” of accidents are likely to be identified in systems that are outside the analyst's 
field of expertise. They claim that experts with different backgrounds have different 
understandings of system interactions, which affect the findings of their analyses and 
they suggest, for instance, that if a human error occurs within a technical system, human 
factors experts are likely to view the error as an “output error” from the system, while 
engineers will consider it to be an “input error” to the system (Svenson, Lekberg & 
Johansson, 1999: 1562-1563). This variation in perspective, they argue, affects both the 
causal analysis and the recommendations proposed in accident analyses. Safety 
recommendations made by engineers, Lekberg (2000) claims, tend to focus on 
improved training and procedures to minimise operator errors, while those proposed by 
human factors experts involve improving peoples’ working conditions, that is, adapting 
technology to suit people (and not vice versa).
It is clear, then, that for a variety of reasons relating to background, knowledge and 
experience, different analysts may not consistently produce the same findings in their 
accident analyses. Johnson (2003: 341) points out that this variability is not necessarily 
a negative feature because it reflects the analyst’s experience and expertise. It does, 
however, present a problem for the validation of methods for accident analysis in terms 
of expert results since if the ‘correct' causes and recommendations cannot be 
determined objectively, and if experts making these judgements produce different 
findings, how can the right answers be identified?
The literature on expertise and validation studies involving experts suggests that this 
problem can be minimised by considering the insights of multiple experts. The 
rationale behind this approach is that the responses of several experts can be brought 
together to produce a judgement superior to that of a single expert (Rowe, 1992: 155). 
Three approaches have been proposed for combining the findings of multiple experts in 
the attempt to achieve improved results. These are the mathematical, consensual and 
mixed approaches.
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The Mathematical Approach
The mathematical approach to combining expert results involves the “statistical 
aggregation” of the results of multiple experts into a single measure (Rowe, 1992: 158). 
In this approach, the responses of each expert are essentially averaged to produce a 
mean result. Rowe (1992: 157) notes that composite results formed by combining 
results in this way “have frequently been shown to outperform individuals in 
judgemental and forecasting tasks requiring subjective inputs ... both qualitatively and 
quantitatively”. The reason for this improvement in results, he argues, is that random 
errors in the results are “averaged out” during the aggregation process (Rowe, 1992: 
157-158). Where no bias exists within the expert results, this approach has been shown 
empirically to be effective in generating results that are more accurate than those of the 
“most capable” experts in the group (Reagan-Cirincione & Rohrbaugh, 1992: 199). If 
any bias does exist, however, averaging the expert results will result in a mean value 
with less variance than the individual results, but will generally fail to eliminate this 
bias (Rowe, 1992: 158). In such cases (perhaps including accident analysis, given the 
above discussion), Rowe (1992: 158-159) argues for a departure from the mathematical 
approach, suggesting that the results of the “best” individual expert be used rather than 
the group average. An obvious problem with using the results of the “best’ expert, 
however, concerns the precise identification of that expert. Rowe (1992: 160-161) notes 
that the easiest method for judging the best expert is to have the judges rate their own 
expertise or the expertise of one another. Such an approach, however, is fraught with 
problems relating to bias in self-reporting and judgements of others, inconsistent rating 
scales and a reliance on familiarity between experts, for example. An alternative 
approach is to assess the best expert in terms of objective performance measures. 
However, the circumstances in which expert judgements are required are generally 
those in which no external performance criteria are available, thus this option is often 
unavailable (Rowe, 1992: 161). In either case, there is a risk that the selection of the 
best judge will be flawed, leading to final results that are worse than those given by the 
simple average (Rowe, 1992: 159).
The use of the average of the expert results avoids these problems and, as noted above, 
tends to be better than the result of a single expert. However, as the average 
incorporates the full range of results, it will generally produce an inferior result to that 
of the best judge and must, therefore, be recognised as “suboptimal” (Rowe, 1992: 159).
118
An additional shortcoming of this approach is that it does not give the experts an 
opportunity to discuss their results with one another and receive feedback, nor to review 
or revise their results in light of these communications. As Rowe (1992: 155) notes, the 
mathematical model dismisses the experts once they have provided their input, so that 
opportunities for improving the results after submission are not available. Where access 
to multiple experts exists, it seems worthwhile to engage them in an active role in the 
judgement process, in which they can discuss their findings, provide their opinions and 
feedback to one another, and establish a set of agreed-upon results. This interactive 
expert role underlies the consensual approach.
The Consensual Approach
The consensual approach to combining the findings of multiple experts involves a 
process in which experts interact and communicate with one another in a group setting 
to arrive at a '‘consensual judgment” (Rowe, 1992: 164). The idea behind this approach 
is that each of the individuals brings certain information to the group, thus providing the 
group with at least as much information as any of the members have access to. This 
additional information, it is assumed, will assist the group in producing more valid 
findings (Wright & Bolger, 1992: 5). In addition, since the approach involves 
interactions between multiple experts, it is assumed that errors, ambiguities or 
‘"mistaken assumptions” in the experts’ opinions or in the proposed results are likely to 
be noticed and addressed (Reagan-Cirincione & Rohrbaugh, 1992: 182). This process 
of “debiasing” is expected to improve the validity of the results (Rowe, 1992: 156). 
Similarly, it is thought that the active involvement of members in this process may 
improve their motivation and dedication to perform the judgement task properly and to 
“produce the most accurate response possible” (Rowe, 1992: 156-164).
Rowe (1992: 165) notes that empirical studies of expert judgements in a variety of tasks 
and situations generally support this consensual approach in preference to the 
mathematical approach. The increased validity associated with the consensual approach 
appears to stem from the pooling of expert knowledge and the opportunity to correct 
mistakes and “provoke new insights” (Reagan-Cirincione & Rohrbaugh, 1992: 182). 
The research conducted in this area suggests, however, that in complex tasks, the 
performance of the group is again poorer than that of the most capable individuals 
within the group, since groups in this situation generally do not fully utilise the “best”
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information and insight when forming their consensual judgements (Reagan-Cirincione 
& Rohrbaugh, 1992: 183). Proposed explanations for this trend (referred to as '‘process 
loss”) include that the input of “knowledgeable minorities” in these groups may be 
overridden by the social pressures towards conforming to “the majority view”, that the 
results might be over-influenced by the most vocal (rather than the most 
knowledgeable) individuals and under-influenced by those who fear rejection, that the 
motivation of the members to “win” (i.e. to have their own response accepted as the 
group response) might override the motivation to achieve the most valid response and 
that the drive towards achieving a unanimous result might outweigh the motivation to 
appraise all alternative options properly (this is the “groupthink” phenomenon) (Eils & 
John, 1980: 268; Griffin, 1997: 237; Rowe, 1992: 165-166). As a result of these types 
of factor, Rowe (1992: 166) argues, the capacity of the group to produce the optimal 
findings is reduced.
The types of problem that arise in the consensual approach seem, then, to stem from 
deficiencies in the group communication, interaction and decision-making processes 
involved in this approach. One suggestion for addressing this problem has been to 
instruct the groups in an appropriate strategy of communication. Guidelines have been 
developed for this purpose, specifying that group members should be sceptical of initial 
agreement, should view differences of opinion favourably (because this allows a variety 
of ideas to be considered), should avoid changing their opinions for the sole purpose of 
avoiding conflict, should state their opinions “lucidly and logically” rather than arguing 
them at length, should avoid considering the situation in terms of winners and losers and 
should resolve disagreements in terms of information and insight, rather than using 
techniques for quick resolution such as averaging, majority votes or coin-flipping (Hall 
& Watson, 1970: 304). Research has indicated that groups operating with these 
guidelines perform better than those without (Rowe, 1992: 166). An alternative 
solution, however, is to adopt a ‘mixed* approach.
Mixed Approaches
Mixed approaches to combining expert results incorporate components of both of the 
above processes in an attempt to maximise the benefits of each. In mixed approaches, 
the opportunity for group members to interact with one another, to critique suggestions 
and to provide insight and feedback is preserved. However, features of the
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mathematical approach are also adopted in an attempt to reduce process loss. Various 
techniques of this type have been developed, making use of approaches such as the 
independent rating of ideas by experts or anonymous questionnaires (Rowe, 1992). One 
technique, referred to as “estimate-feedback-talk”, begins with the members of the 
group independently working on the task and producing their responses, then has 
members comparing and discussing those results, with every response systematically 
reviewed, and finally involves the group engaging in a structured discussion (using the 
guidelines outlined in the previous section) to come to a consensual judgement 
(Reagan-Cirincione & Rohrbaugh, 1992: 183-184). This technique is similar, therefore, 
to the consensual approaches described above but involves the group members making 
their initial judgements independently, rather than in a group setting. Empirical studies 
have indicated that groups adopting this approach perform significantly better than 
“conventionally interacting groups” (Reagan-Cirincione & Rohrbaugh, 1992: 184).
For the current purpose of producing a set of expert accident analysis findings against 
which other analyses can be assessed, any of the above approaches are possible. In line 
with the mathematical approach, the experts could independently analyse an accident 
and their findings could then be aggregated mathematically in terms of a majority rule, 
for instance, whereby causes are only accepted when they are identified by the majority 
of experts. Research in this area suggests, however, that while mathematical 
aggregation is often sufficient in judgements requiring “little depth of analysis”, such as 
estimating weights or temperatures, the consensual approach is more effective in 
activities involving a deeper level of analysis, such as problem-solving tasks (Rowe, 
1992: 173). The task of identifying the causes of an accident and proposing appropriate 
safety recommendations is clearly in the latter category, in which group discussion and 
interaction during the process of combining results would be beneficial. In this 
instance, such communication would provide an opportunity for flaws in the causal 
logic or missing causes, for instance, to be highlighted and discussed and for the final 
expert results to be adjusted accordingly. My personal experience in this area is that, 
occasionally, an analyst will identify a causal factor that others have overlooked, but 
which those others immediately see is valid and important when it is brought to their 
attention. If the mathematical approach is adopted, the opportunity for others to realise 
their oversight is unavailable, reducing the validity of the combined expert result. It 
seems worthwhile, in this case, to engage the experts in the discussion of the results so 
that opportunities for the provision of feedback, new information and insight exist.
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In the current case, a consensual approach to combining expert results might involve the 
experts coming together and performing an AcciMap analysis as a group, while 
following the guidelines for effective communication outlined earlier. While this 
process, if followed correctly, would assist in allowing the opinions of all experts to be 
incorporated, feedback and insight to be provided and a consensual judgement to be 
made, it may not be ideal in this particular instance owing to the cumulative nature of 
the AcciMap analysis process. AcciMap analyses begin with the identification of the 
outcome and then proceed to uncover the causal factors by examining why that outcome 
occurred. The more remote causes of the accident are uncovered by continuing this 
process of asking why each of the identified causes occurred, and the safety 
recommendations are then developed on the basis of the causes that are uncovered in the 
analysis. During the analysis process, then, the direction of the analyst’s thought is 
guided by the factors that have been identified in the previous stages. For this reason, if 
a cause is overlooked at the initial stage of the analysis, the factors that generated that 
cause may also be missed. Similarly, the way in which the causal factors are conceived 
and phrased, and the way they are linked with other causes in the AcciMap diagram, 
may have the potential to influence the ensuing stages in the analysis. An attempt is 
made in the AcciMap guidelines to counter this trend by instructing analysts to refer to a 
list of the types of causal factor that often play a role in organisational accidents, in 
order to reduce accidental omissions. Nevertheless, the more remote causes, and 
certainly the safety recommendations proposed in the analysis, are likely to be heavily 
influenced by the causal factors identified earlier in the analysis. If the analysis process 
is initially conducted as a group activity, the decisions made in the earlier parts of the 
analysis might guide all members to follow the same lines of reasoning, and so be 
vulnerable to the same mistakes and oversights. A consensual approach when used in 
this instance may, then, limit the diversity of opinions, knowledge and insights that are 
brought to the group discussion, thus preventing the group from considering and 
evaluating all options.
For current purposes, it follows that a mixed approach in which the experts compile 
their results independently and then come together to discuss the findings and form a 
consensual expert judgement (as in the ‘estimate-feedback-talk' approach) seems most 
appropriate. Because the experts would perform the entire analysis independently, their 
thought processes would not necessarily be guided in the same directions and limited in 
the same ways. As such, the review of each set of expert results during the group
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discussion is likely to bring forward a greater diversity of options for consideration, thus 
minimising the chance of overlooking important factors and maximising the opportunity 
to discuss alternative viewpoints. Each expert’s findings would be reviewed by the 
group, allowing all options to be considered equally, and since the experts would have 
thought through the logic of their findings in detail (as part of the analysis process) they 
would be in a good position to present those views to the group. Efforts could then be 
made, incorporating the guidelines proposed in the consensual approach, to discuss the 
findings and produce a consensual result. In the current case, this group result would be 
the standard against which the validity of other findings would be assessed.
Although the approach and the reasons why it was taken were not discussed in their 
paper, Svenson, Lekberg and Johansson (1999: 1567) adopted a similar process to that 
suggested above in their study of the Accident Evolution and Barrier Function (AEB) 
Method. In this study, the three authors independently performed AEB analyses and 
then came together and “adjusted their (small) deviations in results into one normative 
analysis”, the results of which were then defined as the “correct” results, against which 
the findings of subjects’ analyses were compared (Svenson, Lekberg & Johansson, 
1999: 1567). The purpose of this study was not to comment on the validity of the 
method but to examine the effects of the analysts’ professional training on accident 
analysis results (Svenson, Lekberg & Johansson, 1999: 1561). However, this approach 
seems to be the most effective way of identifying the causes of accidents and the most 
appropriate safety recommendations, in the absence of external assessment criteria. It is 
therefore the approach that will be used in the validation study in this research.
It is important to recognise a major limitation associated with this approach, namely that 
the extent to which the experts’ findings would, in fact, concur with those that would be 
produced “by an impartial and rational observer with perfect information” (Spencer, 
2006: 14) can never be known. It is proposed that the findings of experts, compiled in 
the way described above, are as close as we can get to these ‘valid' answers and are thus 
the most appropriate standard against which the validity of AcciMap findings can be 
assessed. However, while the experts’ findings would be treated as valid for the 
purposes of testing validity in this study, it must be remembered that the validity of 
these results cannot be demonstrated.
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5.2 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to establish precisely how the validity of accident analysis 
techniques can be determined. It concluded that the validity of an accident analysis 
method cannot be demonstrated empirically, but that the capacity of such a method to 
do what it is supposed to do can be established through reasoned argument. The 
appropriateness of the AcciMap approach with respect to the purposes for which it is 
intended was argued in this way. It was suggested that the validity of the results 
obtained using an accident analysis method, however, can be determined empirically - 
specifically, by comparing the results with those obtained by experts in the relevant 
method. Such an approach, it was argued, is the most appropriate way of determining 
the validity of accident analysis results, in the absence of any objective means of 
establishing the ‘correct' answers. This is the method that will be applied in the present 
research, with the findings of a number of experimental participants using the AcciMap 
approach compared with the findings of AcciMap experts, to determine whether or not 
the participants’ results are valid. Such an approach, however, requires that a means be 
available for assessing the degree of similarity between two sets of AcciMap results. 
This question also arises when considering how the reliability of accident analysis 
results can be determined and will be discussed in the next chapter.
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6How to Measure Reliability in 
Accident Analysis
Chapter 5 outlined an approach by which the validity of accident analysis results can be 
determined. The approach involves assessing the accuracy of AcciMap findings in 
terms of the extent to which they concur with the results of AcciMap experts. The 
question of precisely how the degree of similarity between the results of participants 
and those of the experts can be assessed, however, remained unanswered. The same 
question arises when considering how to assess the reliability of methods of accident 
analysis since this too requires that a means be available for establishing the extent to 
which different AcciMap results concur. In this case, however, it is not the similarity of 
participants' results and those of experts that is of interest, but the extent to which 
results produced by multiple analysts are in agreement. This chapter considers the 
meaning of reliability in the context of AcciMap analysis, examines the features of 
AcciMap analyses that are potentially variable and which must be taken into account in 
a reliability assessment of the approach and considers how an evaluation of the 
reliability of these features could be made. A method by which different analysts’ 
AcciMap results can be compared and contrasted for reliability-testing purposes (and by 
which analysts’ results can be compared with those of experts for validity-testing 
purposes) is then proposed.
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6.1 Reliability in Accident Analysis
Reliability concerns the consistency or repeatability of a method's results (Kirwan, 
1992: 372). In order to be reliable, methods must produce data that are “independent of 
the measuring event, instrument, or person’* (Kassarjian, 1977: 13). If the method's 
outcomes do not vary as a result of these factors, confidence can be gained that the 
method is “a source of consistent information" (Militello & Hutton, 1998: 1634). 
Reliability is generally achieved, then, by adopting objective, systematic and highly 
structured approaches that are “not open to many different interpretations” and are 
therefore likely to produce consistent results (Kirwan, 1992: 375; Munson, 1999: 9).
Evaluations of the reliability of methods can focus on intra-analyst agreement - the 
extent to which a single analyst using the method produces similar results at different 
times or when studying different cases with similar characteristics. Alternatively, they 
can concentrate on inter-analyst agreement -  the extent to which the outcomes are 
consistent regardless of the analyst (Pounds & Isaac, 2003: 2). Studies into the 
reliability of safety-related analysis techniques, such as those designed to analyse and 
classify human error and human factors issues, tend to take the latter approach, focusing 
on the level of agreement obtained by independent analysts studying the same data (e.g. 
Gordon, Flin & Mearns, 2005; Isaac et al., 2003; Johnson & Holloway, 2003; 
Rouhianien, 1992; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). Such an approach takes less time and 
requires less of the individual analysts than an approach in which one person conducts 
multiple analyses. More significantly, however, it avoids the possibility of analysts’ 
results being influenced by practice effects -  changes that participants can undergo as a 
result of being repeatedly tested (Shaughnessy & Zechmeister, 1994: 212). For these 
practical reasons, reliability in this thesis will focus on inter-analyst, rather than intra­
analyst agreement - specifically on the extent to which different analysts, with access to 
the same data, identify the same causes and produce the same recommendations in their 
AcciMap analyses.
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6.2 Potential Areas of Variability in 
AcciMap Findings
In considering precisely how the degree of similarity between different AcciMap 
analyses can be assessed, it is useful to begin by identifying the features of AcciMap 
results that can potentially vary between analysts and determining which of these 
features need to be taken into account in the current assessment. An understanding of 
the types of variation that a method for comparing results must have the capacity to 
capture serves as a useful guide for evaluating the appropriateness of alternative 
approaches for assessing reliability. Two important and potentially variable factors 
have already been highlighted; the causes identified in an AcciMap and the safety 
recommendations proposed. The latter are presented in a list form, separate from the 
AcciMap diagram, and include the recommended corrective actions and the parties 
responsible for carrying out each action. In order to assess the degree of similarity of 
different analysts’ safety recommendations, then, consideration must be given both to 
whether or not the same corrective actions are proposed, and to whether or not the same 
parties are identified as responsible for implementing the changes. It is necessary that 
these features be considered since, as discussed earlier, important practical implications 
arise if the proposed corrective actions vary from analyst to analyst. Similarly, variation 
in the parties at which those recommendations are directed is significant since the 
recommended actions may not be effective if they are not carried out at the appropriate 
level of the system. Some possible variations relating to these features, however, are 
not significant, such as the specific wording used to describe each recommendation and 
the order in which the recommendations appear in the list. Thus AcciMap results can 
be treated as equivalent even if they differ in these respects, so long as the same 
corrective actions are proposed and these actions are directed at the same parties.
Assessments of the degree of similarity of causal factors identified by different analysts 
are less straightforward than evaluations of safety recommendations, since these factors 
are presented, not in a list form, but within the AcciMap diagram. The diagram displays 
each cause identified by the analyst and can, in this sense, be treated as a list of causes. 
As noted previously, the degree of similarity between the identified causes must be 
taken into account when comparing AcciMaps since future accidents may not be 
prevented if the causes are not identified and addressed correctly. Again, however, the
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precise wording used is not of significance and nor is the way in which these items are 
grouped within the boxes in the AcciMap diagram (as will be discussed below). The 
position of each causal factor within the diagram, however, is of significance as this 
conveys additional information about the location of that factor within the 
sociotechnical system, its relationship(s) with the other causes in the AcciMap and the 
outcome, the degree of causal remoteness it is judged to have and the region of the 
sociotechnical system in which responsibility for the factor is judged to lie. If the 
causes in an AcciMap are compared and contrasted only in list form, the differences 
relating to these other variables are not accounted for (such as when analysts agree on a 
cause, but disagree on which segment of the sociotechnical system has control over that 
factor). In assessing the similarity of AcciMap results, then, it is necessary to compare 
the levels in which the causes are located, as well as the causes themselves. The actual 
position of a causal factor within an AcciMap level, however, is not significant. It 
makes no difference to the meaning of an AcciMap whether a factor is located on the 
left or right of an AcciMap, nor near the top or bottom of a level (so long as the effect(s) 
of that cause are located below, and the cause(s) of that factor are located above, it). 
Thus, the actual level within which a causal factor is located is significant and must be 
taken into account when comparing and contrasting AcciMap results, whereas the 
position of the causes within any level is not.
A method for assessing the similarity of different AcciMap results should also have the 
capacity to compare and contrast the causal relationships depicted in the diagrams. The 
arrows leading towards a cause indicate the factors that contributed to it, while the 
arrows leading aw’ay from a cause show the effects that it had. The arrows and causes in 
an AcciMap illustrate precisely how those factors came together to produce the outcome 
and any variation in how the arrows are arranged therefore alters the meaning of the 
diagram. It is important, for this reason, that assessments of the similarity or difference 
of AcciMap results take the placement of the arrows into consideration.
A method for comparing and contrasting AcciMap results must, therefore, have the 
capacity to assess results in terms of the causes that are identified, the AcciMap levels 
they are identified within, the causal links between the factors, the safety 
recommendations and the parties at which the recommendations are directed. 
Variations of other types are not significant for present purposes and need not be taken 
into account when judging the similarity between AcciMap results.
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Since no other accident analysis technique incorporates all of the variables that must be 
considered in this instance, it is not possible simply to adopt an existing approach for 
comparing accident analysis findings. However, as was the case when considering how 
to assess the validity of accident analysis methods, an examination of how similar 
problems have been approached in other areas assists in identifying an appropriate 
method for assessing reliability in this study.
6.3 Possibilities for Reliability Testing
The reliability assessments that have previously been conducted in accident analysis and 
similar fields highlight a number of approaches for assessing the degree of similarity 
between results produced by different analysts using the same method. In several cases, 
reliability assessments have been based on qualitative observations by the researcher 
about the presumed reliability of the method or about similarities and differences 
between results and the nature of those differences. In other studies, reliability has been 
assessed quantitatively, based on calculations of rates of inter-analyst agreement or 
measures of the similarity of diagram structures. In identifying an appropriate means of 
reliability testing for AcciMap analysis, it is useful to consider the suitability of both 
options for current purposes.
6.3.1 Qualitative Reliability Assessments
In several cases, qualitative assessments of the reliability of accident analysis methods 
have involved researchers making a judgement of the presumed reliability after 
examining a single application of the method. For instance, Munson’s (1999: chapter 4, 
paras 15-18) assessment of accident analysis methods involved five fire-fighters 
viewing an application of a number of methods and then rating the extent to which each 
method was “consistent'’ (i.e., “If someone else were to utilize this method would they 
be able to produce the same results? Is it reliable?”) on a three-point scale. A limitation 
of Munson's approach was that the people judging the reliability of the method had 
never applied it themselves and may not, therefore, have had a thorough understanding 
of the areas of these approaches in which variability was possible. Gordon, Flin and 
Mearns (2005) adopted a similar approach in their assessment of the Human Factors
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Investigation Tool (HFIT) but had investigators who had used the technique make this 
judgement, therefore avoiding this shortcoming. However, their study raises an 
additional question about the appropriateness of this approach since their evaluation 
concluded that the method “would satisfy" the criteria of encouraging “consistent, 
reliable reports”, while the results of the reliability assessment for the technique 
indicated that the level of agreement in the results of the investigators in their study was 
in fact quite low (Gordon, Flin & Mearns, 2005: 160, 164-166). In light of such 
findings, it seems appropriate, when assessing the extent to which different analysts 
using a method produce consistent results, actually to compare and contrast a number of 
analysis results, rather than inferring the method's reliability from a single application.
An additional example of an approach in which results were actually compared is the 
reliability study for the REASON Root Cause Analysis (RCA) method, discussed in the 
previous chapter. The producers of this system claim that the method is “repeatable”, in 
the sense that “two persons, working separately on the same problem (with equal access 
to data) will produce the same results with REASON” (Decision Systems Inc., 2004d). 
According to the Marketing Director of Decision Systems Inc. (personal 
communication, September 2, 2004), this claim is based on their experience and on an 
unpublished marketing study performed in 1996. In this marketing study, two groups of 
subjects - a group of “Gifted and Talented 6th graders” and a group of local city council 
members - were provided with the REASON RCA tool and training and with data about 
municipal problems. Working independently with the same data, each group performed 
a REASON analysis. The findings of this study were that the two groups “discovered 
the same actionable solutions”, that “The wordings were somewhat different, yet the 
actual event-tree models were nearly identical”, that the groups “could Nee’ and agree 
as to what the most effective solution was” and that they agreed about “why the solution 
was best” (personal communication, September 2, 2004). These findings appear to be 
based on judgements made by the researcher(s) running the study, who observed the 
two sets of results and judged that they were the same and the process is therefore 
‘repeatable’. They did not discuss the nature of the observed variation in wording and 
diagram shape but presumably concluded that these differences were not of 
significance.
It is also useful to consider how similar evaluations have been made in fields outside 
accident analysis. Studies of causal mapping techniques, for instance, provide insight
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into how the similarities and differences between diagrams similar to AcciMaps can be 
assessed. Causal maps are “representations of individuals (or groups) beliefs about 
causal relations” (Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995: 306). They consist of nodes (which 
identify factors that are considered relevant to the creator of the map) and arrows 
(indicating influences between nodes) with positive or negative polarity indicating 
whether an increase in one factor is thought to lead to an increase or a decrease in 
another (Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995: 307-308). Numerous studies have been carried 
out to measure the similarities and differences between causal maps - not to assess the 
reliability of the technique itself, but to compare causal maps created by different 
people. Research in this area has revealed ways of assessing the similarity and 
difference between maps quantitatively, which will be discussed below. However, 
causal maps have also been compared and contrasted on the basis of the researcher’s 
observations of the similarities and differences between the diagrams. For instance, 
Markoczy and Goldberg (1995: 324) note that causal maps can be “inspected by eye to 
see if recurrent themes emerge”. Eden, Ackermann and Cropper (1992: 318) note that 
analyses of cause maps can also focus on factors such as the overall shape of maps. 
Such evaluations, like the REASON RCA study, involve judgements made by the 
researcher(s) of the similarities and differences between results produced by different 
people.
6.3.1.1 Applying Qualitative Reliability Measures to 
AcciMaps
Assessments of similarity and difference based on researcher judgement, as performed 
in the above studies, could be adopted in the reliability study of the AcciMap approach. 
As suggested in the previous chapter, for instance, a study could be conducted in which 
a number of participants independently analysed an accident using the AcciMap 
approach. The causes and recommendations and the AcciMap diagrams themselves 
could then be compared and contrasted by eye, and the nature and significance of any 
observed differences discussed. The participants could also be interviewed about their 
analyses, to obtain further insight into any variability in results that might occur. Such 
an approach would allow the trends in the data to be discussed, interpretations about the 
reasons behind any differences to be made and the overall degree of similarity between 
results produced by different participants to be judged. However, this approach would 
be open to the possibility of researcher bias in these judgements (such as inadvertently
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over- or under-emphasising certain differences) and to the possibility that relevant 
variations might be overlooked in the absence of a finer-grained analysis. It would also 
be based on the researcher's subjective judgements about the degree of similarity and 
difference between results, leaving open the possibility that different researchers might 
interpret the results differently. Further, unless the results were reproduced in their 
entirety in the study, readers would have to rely on the researcher’s interpretations about 
the overall degree of similarity between results, as was the case for the REASON RCA 
study, rather than having access to the data for their own consideration. Thus, while 
this would be a valuable approach to adopt in the current study, it would be useful to 
supplement a qualitative evaluation with quantitative data, where possible, in an attempt 
to overcome the shortcomings of an entirely subjective approach. Flick (2002: 267- 
268) points out that combining results obtained from qualitative and quantitative 
approaches in this way provides a “fuller picture” of the issue under study than is gained 
if a single approach is used.
6.3.2 Quantitative Reliability Assessments
Numerous studies involving comparisons of results of safety analysis methods or 
mapping techniques have been based on statistical analyses of results rather than the 
interpretations of the researcher. Many of the quantitative assessments of AcciMap-like 
diagrams are inappropriate for current purposes because they focus entirely on the 
structure of the diagrams, without taking their meanings into consideration. In studies 
of causal maps, for instance, the comparisons of the ‘complexity’ or ‘density’ of 
different maps have been measured based on the number of arrows or nodes in each 
map, the ratios of arrows to nodes and the ratios of observed arrows or nodes to the total 
number of arrows or nodes that are theoretically possible in the map, for instance (Eden, 
Ackermann & Cropper, 1992; Hodgkinson, Maule & Bown, 2004; Markoczy & 
Goldberg, 1995; Svenson, Lekberg & Johansson, 1999). These calculations are 
inappropriate for present purposes because it is not the nodes and arrows that are 
significant in an AcciMap but rather the causal factors and causal relationships. These 
items do not necessarily correspond directly to the nodes and arrows in the diagram. 
For instance, both of the following AcciMap segments indicate that inadequate guard 
training in recognition and action in emergency situations contributed to a situation in 
which the guard failed to apply the emergency brakes.
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Guard failed 
to apply the 
emergency 
brakes
Guard failed 
to apply the 
emergency 
brakes
Inadequate 
guard training 
in action in 
emergency 
situations
Inadequate 
guard training 
in recognition 
of emergency 
situations
Inadequate guard 
training in 
recognition and 
action in 
emergency 
situations
An assessment of AcciMap similarity based entirely on diagram features would find 
these segments to be dissimilar, with different numbers of nodes and arrows, and 
different ratios of arrows to nodes. Such an approach would also treat AcciMaps of 
entirely different accidents as ‘the same’ if they had the same numbers of causes and 
arrows and were arranged in the same way. An assessment that considers the causal 
factors that are identified in the AcciMaps and the causal relationships between them, 
on the other hand, would conclude that the two above segments are essentially the same. 
The latter approach is more appropriate in the current situation, since it is whether or not 
analysts identify the right causes and recommendations (i.e. validity), and whether or 
not different analysts produce the same causes and recommendations (i.e. reliability), 
that is of interest in the current study (owing to the practical implications outlined in 
Chapter 5), rather than whether or not they produce identically shaped diagrams.
Other quantitative approaches to comparing causal maps, however, have taken into 
consideration the extent to which the same nodes are present in different analysts’ 
diagrams. A calculation for “distance ratio”, for instance, has been devised, ranging 
from zero (for identical maps) to one (for maps of maximal difference to one another) 
(Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995: 312). This formula incorporates features such as the 
number of nodes common to different maps, the number of nodes unique to one map, 
the number of nodes possible for a given map, the polarity of the links in the diagram 
and the strength of those relationships (indicated by a numerical value) (Markoczy & 
Goldberg, 1995: 312-313). Unlike the other approaches for comparing causal diagrams, 
then, this approach does take into account the extent to which different maps 
incorporate the same nodes and causal relationships.
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This particular formula is not appropriate for assessing the degree of similarity between 
AcciMaps because it incorporates elements that are not part of the AcciMap approach 
(such as the polarity and strength of the links) and excludes some elements that are 
(such as the levels in which the causes are located and the safety recommendations). 
Unlike AcciMaps, the nodes in the maps on which these formulae are applied are also 
selected from a predefined list of constructs (Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995: 309), so 
assessments of the maximum possible number of constructs are easy to make when 
comparing these causal maps. Such assessments are problematic when assessing 
AcciMaps, as will be discussed below. However, the distance ratio does involve the 
sorts of considerations that, if tailored to focus on the areas relevant for comparing 
AcciMaps, would provide a useful supplement to a qualitative reliability assessment.
What is specifically needed, in the current situation, is a means of quantitatively 
assessing the degree of similarity between different AcciMaps in terms of the five 
variables identified at the beginning of this chapter: the causal factors, the levels at 
which the causes are located, the links between the causes, the safety recommendations 
and the parties at whom those recommendations are directed. Quantitative assessments 
of the similarity of these sorts of variable often focus on rates of inter-analyst
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agreement, usually presented as rates of percentage agreement . While this calculation 
provides a clear indication of the rate of agreement between analysts, its use in 
reliability studies is often criticised for not taking chance agreement into account. 
When reliability studies are conducted for methods that involve the classification of 
items into a number of categories, for instance, there is a certain rate of inter-analyst 
agreement that would be expected to occur as a result of chance alone. Calculations that 
do not take this chance agreement into account may, therefore provide, an inflated 
indication of rates of agreement. For this reason, a number of coefficients of agreement 
have been devised that correct for chance, so that the calculations represent the rate of 
agreement that is observed beyond that which would be expected by chance.
Gordon, Flin and Mearns (2005) adopted a chance-corrected agreement measure in their 
reliability study of the Human Factors Investigation Tool (HFIT). The HFIT is a tool 
for collecting data about four categories of human factors information relevant to 
incidents and accidents, namely the “action errors” that preceded an incident, the error
8 Percentage agreement is calculated by dividing the number of items on which analysts agree by the sum 
of those on which they agree and those on which they disagree, and multiplying by 100.
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recovery mechanisms, issues relating to situation awareness and the underlying 
“threats” from the work environment (Gordon, Flin & Mearns, 2005: 147, 150). The 
tool involves an analyst working through each of these categories and determining 
whether or not predefined sub-categories of each type were present or absent for a given 
accident or incident. For example, the ‘action error’ category incorporates sub­
categories such as omission, communication error and rule violation. The analyst using 
this tool would consider each of these sub-categories and identify which were present 
and which were not, in order to identify the human factors causes of incidents or 
accidents. In their reliability assessment of this tool, Gordon, Flin and Mearns (2005: 
158) arranged for 25 accident investigators to use HFIT to investigate an incident which 
was outlined to them in a one-page accident scenario. Each investigator went through 
the HFIT process and responded ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to each of the sub-categories, depending 
on whether they were or were not considered to be causes of the accident. The 
researchers were then able to determine the number of categories and sub-categories on 
which the investigators agreed and use a chance-corrected measure of inter-analyst 
reliability to calculate the rate of agreement between investigators.
A similar approach was used in the assessment of the reliability of the HERA-JANUS 
technique, an approach for analysing human error in Air Traffic Management. The 
HERA-JANUS approach involves the identification of errors from an incident report 
and the classification of those errors into a taxonomy covering features such as the type 
of error, the contextual conditions and the task type (Isaac et al., 2003). Prior to 
conducting this study, it was noted that if each participant performed a full HERA- 
JANUS analysis, it would not be possible to determine whether any differences in their 
results were attributable to differences in how the errors were classified (in the second 
part of the process) or in the actual identification of the errors to be classified (in the 
first part). It was therefore decided to provide experimental participants with incident 
reports with the errors already identified and to focus on the reliability with which they 
classified those errors (Isaac et al., 2003: 14). As for the HFIT reliability assessment, 
the researchers then calculated the rate of agreement in the categorisation of these errors 
by the participants, beyond that which would be expected by chance.
Calculations of chance-corrected rates of agreement in studies in which analysts 
categorise items into predetermined categories or state whether particular items are 
present or absent are relatively easy to perform. Such calculations simply involve
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counting the number of items on which the analysts agree and disagree, and applying a 
formula for measuring chance-corrected agreement. However, these types of 
calculation cannot always be performed in studies in which the categories are not 
predefined. This perhaps contributed to the decision in the HERA-JANUS study to 
focus on the reliability of the categorisation of predefined errors, rather than the 
identification of errors from the incident report. It is important to note, however, that 
for some techniques, including the AcciMap approach, it is the reliability with which 
analysts identify items that are not predefined, which is of primary interest. The study 
of the reliability of the Critical Decision Method (CDM) by Taynor, Crandall and 
Wiggins (1987) provides insight into how this problem can be addressed.
The CDM is a method for studying “expert decision making in rapidly moving, high 
risk, and high impact situations” (Taynor, Crandall & Wiggins, 1987: 1). It is an 
interview technique which involves asking expert decision-makers to recount an 
incident which involved their decision-making skills. From this account, the 
interviewer identifies specific decision points (defined as “any point during the incident 
where alternative actions were possible") to be further examined and asks a series of 
“probing” questions to uncover the cognitive processes underlying those decisions 
(Taynor, Crandall & Wiggins, 1987: 1-3). In their reliability study of this method, 
Taynor, Crandall and Wiggins (1987: 3) were interested in the reliability with which 
interviewers identified decision points from the interviewee’s account of the incident, 
since the identification of these points “is the underpinning of everything else that 
follows” in the method. They therefore conducted an experiment in which two analysts 
independently identified the decision points from four “verbatim transcripts” of 
previous CDM interviews and the two analysts’ agreement in identifying these points 
was calculated in terms of percentage agreement (Taynor, Crandall & Wiggins, 1987:
3).
The agreement rate in this study was not adjusted for chance. Taynor, Crandall and 
Wiggins (1987: 6) do not discuss this fact, although they did use a chance corrected rate 
of agreement in the next part of their reliability study, involving the classification of 
these decision points into five categories. However, the reason why a chance-corrected 
measure was not used in this part of the study is obvious -  it does not make sense to try 
and adjust figures from this sort of task for chance. In tasks involving the classification 
of items into predefined categories, some degree of agreement between analysts would
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be expected even if each analyst randomly allocated the items into the categories, so it is 
logical to check whether observed rates of agreement exceed these chance levels. 
However, in tasks involving the identification of non-predefined items from a text, such 
as the identification of decision points from a transcript, it is not possible to calculate a 
chance-corrected agreement rate in any meaningful way. Each decision-point in a 
transcript might, for instance, be outlined in a few words in the text, in an entire 
paragraph, or might be implied but not explicitly referred to at all. As such, there is no 
way of determining how many of these items analysts would be expected to agree on by 
chance alone in this sort of task. Further, there is no way to determine the number of 
items that multiple analysts agreed were not present (that is, the number of items that 
both analysts did not identify as decision points). Information of both types is required 
for chance-corrected rates of agreement to be calculated. Calculations of percentage 
agreement, however, only require information about the number of items that the 
analysts agreed on and the total number of items that were identified by either analyst, 
and can therefore be applied in such situations.
6.3.2.1 Applying Quantitative Reliability Measures to
AcciMaps
The quantitative methods for reliability testing described above could be used to assess 
the reliability with which different participants identify causes and safety 
recommendations when using the AcciMap approach, to supplement a qualitative 
assessment based on the researcher’s judgement of the similarities and differences 
between analyses. As suggested above, a study could be conducted in which multiple 
participants independently perform AcciMap analyses of the same accident. The 
reliability with which causes are identified from an accident report could then be 
assessed in the same way as in the CDM reliability study, with the reliability of the 
identification of causes expressed in terms of percentage agreement. The rate of 
agreement in the safety recommendations proposed by different participants could also 
be calculated in this way. For the same reasons as in the CDM study, these calculations 
could not meaningfully be adjusted for chance. In order for these quantitative 
assessments to be made, however, it would be necessary to determine the number of 
causes and recommendations that are shared between AcciMaps and the number that are 
unique to one. A process for comparing and contrasting the causes and 
recommendations in participants’ analyses is therefore required.
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Comparing Causes and Safety Recommendations
The process of judging the number of causes and safety recommendations common to 
two AcciMap analyses is complicated by differences in the wording and formats used to 
identify these items. As indicated previously, different analysts can use different 
language when referring to the same causes and recommendations and can differ with 
respect to whether these items are listed separately or grouped together within boxes in 
the AcciMap or the numbered safety recommendations. Variations may also occur with 
respect to the amount of detail that analysts include in their causes and 
recommendations and the degree to which factors are made explicit or left implicit. As 
a result of these variations, the process of determining the number of causes and 
recommendations common to two analyses is not simply a counting task. Rather, it is 
necessary for judgements to be made regarding whether or not differently-phrased and 
differently-formatted items do, in fact, refer to the same causes or recommendations.
In their research on comparing causal maps, Markoczy and Goldberg (1995: 310) 
suggest that these kinds of problem can be avoided by providing participants with a 
finite “pool of constructs’’ from which to select the nodes for their diagrams. Their 
proposed method involves the researcher creating a list of constructs, so that 
participants can select constructs from this list and it will therefore be clear whether or 
not different participants have identified the same ones. As such, they are dealing with 
“the inevitable coding problem” before the participants construct their causal maps, 
rather than afterwards (Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995: 310). They suggest that, in 
addition to simplifying the judgement of whether or not participants have identified the 
same constructs, this process ensures that all participants are provided with the same 
material. However, they note that the disadvantage is that “it precludes the elicitation of 
novel constructs” by the participants (Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995: 310).
In the types of study that Markoczy and Goldberg are considering, this disadvantage 
may not be of great significance. Their concern, in using a predefined pool of 
constructs, seems to be that certain constructs might inadvertently be excluded from the 
list, consequently preventing participants from being able to incorporate such concepts 
in their maps -  a risk that can be reduced, they suggest, by taking great care when 
initially creating this list of constructs (Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995: 310). In a 
reliability study of AcciMap analyses, however, this approach is problematic for a
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different reason. The issue in this instance is that the AcciMap approach is intended to 
assist analysts in uncovering the causes of an accident from the available data and 
determining appropriate safety recommendations to remedy those causes. It is an 
investigative approach and a reliability assessment of the approach therefore aims to 
assess the reliability with which different analysts can identify these causal factors and 
determine appropriate corrective actions. If these factors were predefined and the 
analysts were asked to select the correct causes and arrange them into an AcciMap 
diagram, the most important part of the approach would not be tested. Rather than 
measuring whether or not the method enables different analysts to uncover the same 
factors and propose recommendations suitable for addressing those causes, this 
approach would measure the extent to which different analysts can select the same 
factors from a list. This type of measurement does not answer the question of interest in 
a reliability study of the AcciMap approach. In order for the right questions to be 
answered, analysts must be able to produce causal factors and safety recommendations 
themselves, as they see appropriate. There is therefore no choice but to deal with the 
issue of non-standard wording after the analysts have produced their analyses.
This course of action has been taken before in comparative studies of accident analysis 
approaches. As noted above, the reliability study of the REASON RCA approach 
required that decisions be made regarding whether or not the differently-worded 
findings of the two groups were the same (personal communication with Marketing 
Director of Decision Systems Inc., September 2, 2004). Ladkin (2005) also performed 
such judgements in his comparison of an AcciMap with a Why-Because Analysis. It is 
important to realise, however, that the task of determining whether or not differently- 
phrased factors are the same sometimes requires a considerable degree of judgement. 
Tadkin’s comparison of analyses can be used to illustrate this fact.
Ladkin’s (2005) study involved the comparison of two causal diagrams: an AcciMap of 
Glenbrook rail accident in 1999 produced by Hopkins (2005) and a Why-Because 
Graph (WBG) of the same accident that was compiled on the basis of Hopkins’ 
AcciMap and the description of the accident in his book, Safety, Culture and Risk 
(Hopkins, 2005). In comparing and contrasting the two approaches, Ladkin wanted to 
determine the number of shared causes between the two diagrams. In some cases, the
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causal factors in the two diagrams were phrased identically9, and could therefore easily 
be judged as 'the same’. In other instances, there were small differences in the wording 
which were probably resolved easily. For instance, Ladkin’s WBG identified 
“Interurban train driver believed that block clear” as a causal factor, while Hopkins7 
AcciMap illustrated “Driver’s belief that track clear” as a cause (Ladkin, 2005: 19-20). 
Although the wording is clearly different, it seems apparent that both analyses are 
referring to the same causal factor and Ladkin (2005: 19) concluded that these factors 
were the same.
Sometimes, however, the wording differs to such a degree that the judgement of 
whether or not the analysts are referring to the same cause is not straightforward. For 
instance, Ladkin (2005: 19-20) judged that the cause “Crash” in the AcciMap was the 
same as the cause “Interurban train collides with Indian Pacific at end of block” in the 
WBG. It is clear that both factors refer to a collision. However, the latter provides 
additional information about the parties involved in the collision and the place in which 
the collision occurred. Such factors are only ‘the same’, then, if one determines that this 
additional information is not an essential component of the factor. He similarly judged 
the cause “Failure to drive with extreme caution” in the AcciMap as equivalent to the 
cause “Interurban train driver proceeded at up to 50 kph, omitting to exercise extreme 
caution” in the WBG (Ladkin, 2005: 19-20), implying that the additional information in 
the latter (namely that it was the Interurban train driver who failed to drive with extreme 
caution and that the train proceeded to 50 kph) is not required to be present in both 
causal factors in order for them to be judged as the same. Clearly, then, the task of 
determining the similarity or difference between differently-phrased factors often 
requires judgement regarding whether or not certain information is relevant and whether 
or not different terms share the same meaning.
In light of the types of judgement that need to be made in these instances, the question 
arises as to whether having one researcher making these decisions, without reference to 
any formal method, would be adequate for the purposes of the current study. The 
decisions of whether or not causes and recommendations are the same would be used to
9 The use of identical language by different analysts is reasonably unlikely in accident analyses since the 
causal factors usually have to be extracted from the accident data and rewritten in the format required for 
the analysis. The identical language in these instances probably owes to the fact that the WBG was 
developed using the information from the AcciMap, so the exact wording may have been copied if it was 
appropriate for the WBG.
140
calculate the proportions of these items that are shared between different participants' 
results. As will be discussed in a later section, these judgements would also be used to 
reduce the causes and recommendations to those that are common to both analyses in a 
pair of diagrams for the purposes comparing and contrasting the links, the categorisation 
of causes into levels and the parties at whom recommendations are directed. Given that 
the entire quantitative assessment of the reliability of the method would therefore be 
based on these initial decisions about whether or not differently-phrased factors do, in 
fact, have the same meaning, it seems important to ensure that these judgements are as 
objective and reliable as possible and that the findings of the reliability study do not 
vary depending which analyst makes these decisions, for instance. Fortunately, the 
same types of issue have arisen in a number of studies involving the objective 
quantification of textual data and a successful solution to this problem, content analysis, 
has been formulated. Content analysis has not, to my knowledge, been used to assist in 
comparing causal diagrams or, in fact, any other form of diagram. However, as 
discussed below, it can be adapted to suit the present problem.
Content Analysis
Content analysis is “a phase of information-processing in which communication content 
is transformed, through objective and systematic application of categorization rules, into 
data that can be summarized and compared*' (Paisley, quoted in Holsti, 1969: 3). 
Broadly, it is a “counting and recording" procedure that allows information about the 
content of a text to be converted into numbers, which can then be analysed statistically 
(Neuman, 2003: 311). Content, in this sense, refers to features such as words, themes, 
ideas, meanings, “or any message that can be communicated", while text refers to 
“anything written, visual, or spoken that serves as a medium for communication“ 
(Neuman, 2003: 310). Texts can therefore include items such as books, documents, 
song lyrics, speeches, advertisements, films and artworks (Neuman, 2003: 310).
Content analysis, as defined above, aims to be an objective, systematic, theoretically 
relevant and quantitative method for analysing the content of texts (Holsti, 1969; 
Kassarjian, 1977). Objective, in this instance, means that the analysis procedure and the 
rules that guide decisions relating to the categorisation of the text are defined so 
explicitly that different analysts applying the same rules to the same data will produce 
similar findings (Holsti, 1969: 3; Kassarjian, 1977: 9). Systematic, in this context,
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means that “the inclusion and exclusion of content or categories is done according to 
consistently applied rules” (Holsti, 1969: 4). This feature is intended to reduce the 
possibility of the coding process (the assignment of the data into content-related 
categories) being affected by researcher bias (in the form of excluding factors that do 
not conform to the researcher’s hypotheses, for instance) (Crittenden & Hill, 1971: 
1073; Kassarjian, 1977: 9). Theoretical relevance means that the data about the content 
is related to the researcher's theory, so that the content analysis is part of the process of 
answering a research question, rather than the final product of the study (Holsti, 1969: 
5). Finally, quantitative, in this context, means that the method allows “measurement of 
the extent of emphasis or omission of any given analytic category” so that the data 
produced are “amenable to statistical methods” (Kassarjian, 1977: 9, 10). These 
characteristics distinguish content analysis from more subjective and non-quantitative 
approaches to analysing meaning, such as literary criticism and critical reading, and 
from endeavours which are objective, systematic and quantitative but which are not 
designed to contribute to theory, such as creating indexes (Holsti, 1969: 4; Kassarjian, 
1977: 9).
Content analysis, then, aims to allow the researcher to uncover the relevant content of a 
text, using a precise and repeatable process, so that it can be analysed quantitatively and 
the content can be compared across texts (Neuman, 2003: 311). This is precisely what 
is needed to compare and contrast AcciMap analyses performed by different 
individuals. In this case, the texts under analysis would be the AcciMap diagrams and 
safety recommendations produced by different analysts. The content that the analysis 
would aim to identify from these texts would be the causal factors and safety 
recommendations that are proposed. The use of an objective, systematic and 
quantitative method, designed for this purpose, would allow the contents of different 
analyses to be determined and compared, and would avoid the possible problems 
involved in having a researcher make these potentially subjective judgements without 
the use of a formal method and to then base a quantitative reliability assessment of the 
method on those judgements.
The process of performing a content analysis involves a series of steps, the first of 
which is to formulate the research question. This is a necessary first step since a 
sensible procedure for analysing the content of the data can only be determined with 
reference to the aims of the study (Holsti, 1969: 94). For the purposes of this part of the
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AcciMap validation study, there would be two research questions. For the reliability­
testing component, the research question would be, on which causal factors and safety 
recommendations do different AcciMap analysts agree and disagree? For the validity­
testing component, the question would be, on which causal factors and safety 
recommendations do AcciMap analysts and the AcciMap experts agree and disagree? 
Answers to these questions would enable quantitative calculations to be made of the 
reliability and validity of analysts’ causes and safety recommendations, and would also 
allow the analyses to be reduced to the common sets of causes and recommendations for 
the purposes of comparing the other variable features of AcciMap analysis (as discussed 
below).
The second step in the content analysis process is to select the sample of data to be 
analysed since, in most studies involving content analysis, the volume of relevant data 
exceeds that which can feasibly be analysed. In the present research, however, the data 
to be analysed would consist only of the analyses that had been performed for the 
purpose of the study and would therefore be sufficiently small to allow the entire set of 
results to be analysed.
The third step in performing a content analysis involves identifying the units of 
measurement. The unit of measurement is the “amount of text" to be assigned into the 
categories during the content analysis procedure, and can consist of units such as single 
words or symbols, phrases, themes in the text (single statements about a given subject), 
characters, books or films (Holsti, 1969: 116; Kassarjian, 1977: 11). Some units of 
measurement are clearly easier to code than others. For instance, the frequency with 
which certain words appear in the text can be determined simply by counting the 
number of times they occur. This type of coding, referred to as manifest coding because 
it focuses on the obvious “visible, surface content" of a text, requires little judgement on 
the part of the coder and is, for that reason, a relatively quick and reliable approach 
(Neuman, 2003: 313). The categorisation of units such as themes, on the other hand, 
requires somewhat more judgement on the part of the coder. Holsti (1969: 118, 136) 
points out that themes do not have “natural boundaries” that make clear when one ends 
and another begins (as words, sentences and paragraphs do), and that the task of 
identifying the number of themes that are present within a given section of text therefore 
involves a judgement on the part of the coder. The decision about whether a theme is 
present or absent in a section of text also requires judgement, because the theme is not
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necessarily obvious on the surface of the text. Rather, the coder may have to consider a 
whole section of the text in order to decide whether or not a theme is present. This type 
of coding, which focuses on the “underlying, implicit meaning" of a text, is referred to 
as latent coding and is generally more time-intensive and less reliable than manifest 
coding (Neuman, 2003: 313). The decision about the appropriate unit of measurement 
for a particular study, however, must be based on the requirements of the research 
question (Holsti, 1969: 118).
In the current study, the units of measurement are determined by the research questions 
outlined above: they are the causal factors and the safety recommendations identified by 
AcciMap analysts. These are the factors which will be categorised (into a series of 
categories described below) in order to determine the causes and recommendations on 
which different analysts agree and disagree. Unfortunately, the adoption of these units 
involves some of the difficulties that apply to the coding of themes. Like themes, causal 
factors and safety recommendations do not necessarily have natural boundaries (since 
several causes can be identified in a single box in an AcciMap, for instance). As such, 
the content analyst would have to make a judgement about the boundaries of each 
causal factor or recommendation, prior to categorising these items. The content analyst 
would also have to judge whether or not particular causes or recommendations are 
present in certain segments of the text, which might be complicated by differences in 
how these items are displayed in terms of their wording, the amount of detail they 
incorporate or the inclusion of additional information, for instance. As a result of these 
factors, coding a document using causes and safety recommendations as the units of 
measurement would probably require significantly more judgement, on the part of the 
coder, than coding for particular words or symbols in the text, and would be likely to 
produce less reliable results because of the subjectivity of these judgements. Neuman 
(2003: 313) suggests, however, that the creation of coding categories with written rules 
to guide judgements about the types of unit to be included in each, as well as coder 
training and practice, can improve the reliability of latent coding in content analysis.
The next step in performing a content analysis is to determine the coding categories for 
the study. These are the categories into which the units of measurement will be 
classified to provide quantitative data about whether or not (and how often) particular 
types of content occur within the text (Holsti, 1969: 95). It is therefore essential that the 
categories reflect the type of content that the study aims to uncover. Holsti (1969: 95)
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suggests a number of general principles for category development, the most important 
of which is that categories “reflect the investigator's research question” so that the 
categorisation of the text will provide insight into the relevant question. Others are that 
categories should be exhaustive, so that every relevant item in the text can be classified 
into a category and mutually exclusive so that no relevant unit of content in the text can 
be classified into more than one category (Holsti, 1969: 99-100).
The aims of the content analysis in the current study would be to determine the causes 
and safety recommendations on which AcciMap analysts and AcciMap experts agree 
and disagree (for the validity study) and on which different analysts agree or disagree 
(for the reliability study). For the validity-testing component of this content analysis, 
then, the coding categories would correspond to the causes and safety recommendations 
identified by the AcciMap experts. Each of the experts’ causes and recommendations 
would represent a distinct coding category, and the causes and recommendations of 
each participant would then be coded into those categories. If the participant were to 
identify a cause or recommendation that the coder judged to be the same as one of the 
experts’ causes or recommendations, the coder would place the participant's item into 
that category, indicating that the expert and participant agreed on that particular item. If 
the participant were to identify an item that was different from any of the experts’ 
causes or recommendations, this would be placed in a category labelled ‘other', which 
would represent all items identified by the participant that were not identified by the 
experts10. The coding categories into which none of the participant's causes or 
recommendations was placed would represent the items that were identified by the 
experts but not the participant. The items in the ‘other’ category (i.e. items identified by 
the participant but not the experts) and the categories which did not contain any of the 
participants’ causes (i.e. items identified by the experts but not the participant) would 
therefore collectively represent the items on which the participants and experts 
disagreed. For the validity-testing component of the content analysis, then, the 
participants’ results would be coded into categories that were determined by the results 
produced by AcciMap experts.
10 The use of an ‘other’ category also ensures that the coding categories are exhaustive, since any item 
that is present in the participant’s analysis can be categorised either into one of the categories representing 
the expert results, or into the ‘other’ category.
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When coding the data for reliability, however, it is the causes and recommendations on 
which different analysts agree and disagree that are of interest. Specifically, for each 
pair of participants' results, the causes and recommendations that were common to both, 
and those that were not, would need to be identified. This information could then be 
used to estimate the reliability with which participants identified these items and to 
determine which items to exclude when comparing the reliability of the other features of 
the analyses. For this part of the study, then, the causes and recommendations identified 
by the experts would be irrelevant and the categories described above inappropriate. 
Instead, the categories for this part of the study would need to be based on the 
participants’ results so that the items that were common to two participants’ analyses 
and the items that were unique to one could be identified (without reference to the 
experts’ results). In this case, the categories could actually be formed during the coding 
procedure. For each pair of participants’ results, the coder could review the causes and 
recommendations and determine whether any of these items were common to both 
analyses. If the coder judged that a cause or recommendation in one participant’s 
analysis was the same as a cause or recommendation in the other participant’s analysis, 
those items would be grouped together. The coder would continue to group items with 
the same meaning together, until the only remaining items were causes and 
recommendations that were identified by one participant, but not the other. Through 
this judgement process, the coding categories would be established, as each set of 
grouped items would represent a category of items judged to have the same meaning. 
Each cause or recommendation that was ungrouped would also represent a category, 
distinct from any other category1'.
The content analysis procedure also involves the construction of written coding rules to 
determine how the data should be categorised (Neuman, 2003: 312). These rules are 
intended to guide decisions about the inclusion or exclusion of items into particular 
categories, improving the reliability of the method and making replication possible 
(Flolsti, 1969: 99; Neuman, 2003: 312). For manifest coding tasks, the coding rules can 
dictate the specific terms, phrases or actions, for instance, to be identified in the text
11 This is similar to the approach outlined by Montgomery and Crittenden (1977) for developing 
categories for coding responses to open-ended questions. In their proposed method, however, the 
categories are developed from a small sample of the responses in order to develop relevant categories into 
which the remaining responses can be coded. For present purposes, the development of categories would 
be repeated during the process of coding each pair of participants’ results, solely in order to determine the 
causes and recommendations that are common to both participants’ results and those that are unique to 
one.
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(Neuman, 2003: 313). In some cases, it is possible to list all of the content units that 
can be placed in each category exhaustively, removing all need for analyst judgement 
during the coding procedure (Holsti, 1969: 99). For latent coding tasks, however, the 
coding rules generally cannot explicitly specify all of the units of content suitable for 
each category. As Holsti (1969: 99) points out, it would probably not be possible to 
specify every combination of words that would signify the presence of a unit such as a 
theme or a concept. In these cases, the coding rules should define a unit precisely “by 
characterizing its major properties” so that coders can use this information when 
judging whether or not a particular unit belongs in that category (Holsti, 1969: 99). The 
latter approach would need to be adopted in the current study, owing to the variety of 
ways in which different causes and recommendations can be phrased and formatted. 
For the validity-testing segment, the coding categories could be defined in terms of the 
important characteristics of each of the expert's causes and recommendations. The 
rules could define each category precisely and specify the components that a unit must 
have in order to be placed in the category. If a pilot study of the coding procedure was 
carried out beforehand, the data from that study could also be used to indicate the types 
of wording that might be used and to provide examples of units that fit into the 
category, as well as units that are similar in some ways but which should not be 
included in the category. These rules would need to be reviewed by the AcciMap 
experts to ensure that they correctly captured the requirements of each category. 
Similar coding rules could not, however, be written for the reliability-testing segment of 
the content analysis. Precise definitions, complete with details of the components that 
are essential in order for another item to be judged the same, would not be available for 
the causes and recommendations identified by the participants. Thus, for the reliability­
testing component, the coder would have to judge whether or not two factors were the 
same without this type of guidance. However, if pilot study data were available, these 
data could be coded, using the process outlined above, so that examples could be 
provided to the coders of the types of item that should, and should not, be categorised 
together. Coders could refer to these data during the coding procedure to assist in 
coding decisions. Nevertheless, the amount of guidance provided to the coder by way 
of coding rules would be less in the reliability assessment than in the validity 
assessment.
By following the procedure described above, a coder would be able to code the content 
of the texts into the relevant coding categories, thereby providing details of the causes
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and recommendations that were common to two AcciMap analyses and those that were 
unique to one. The procedure would be reasonably systematic, in the sense that the 
process for conducting the coding would be clearly outlined and coding rules would be 
specified to provide as much guidance as possible for judgements about the inclusion or 
exclusion of factors into the categories. It would be theoretically relevant, since it 
would provide details of the causes and recommendations that are the same and those 
that are different for each pair of participants and for each participant and the experts (to 
be used in answering the questions of interest in this thesis). It would also be 
quantitative, since the categorisation of the units into the coding categories would 
provide numerical data about the numbers of shared items in AcciMaps produced by 
different participants, and by the participants and the experts, and this information could 
then be analysed further. In order to assess the objectivity of the approach, however, it 
would be necessary to determine whether the findings reflected the content of the texts 
or whether they were, in fact, affected by factors relating to the coder. This information 
can be gained by studying the reliability of the coding procedure itself.
Krippendorff (2004: 214-215) suggests that the reliability of content analysis 
procedures can be assessed in terms of their stability (“the degree to which a process is 
unchanging over time"), their accuracy (“the degree to which a process conforms to its 
specifications and yields what it is designed to yield"), or their reproducibility (“the 
degree to which a process can be replicated by different analysts working under varying 
conditions, at different locations, or using different but functionally equivalent 
measuring instruments"). The first of these options involves having data coded once 
and then coded again by the same coder at a later point in time. This is considered the 
weakest form of reliability test, since the results may depend more on the coder’s 
memory of previous results than the stability of the method (Potter & Levine- 
Donnerstein, 1999: 271). Accuracy is considered the strongest option, but can only be 
used when a standard for comparison can be established. This is possible in manifest 
coding tasks in which the correct number of units for each category can be determined, 
and in some latent coding tasks in which experts can set a standard, based on their 
“superior perspective on the content" (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999: 271). It is 
not possible in the current study, since this is primarily a latent coding task for which 
the ‘correct’ answers are unknown and for which an ‘expert* standard can not justifiably 
be established (since the task of judging whether or not two causes or recommendations 
are the same does not involve any particular type of expertise). Reproducibility
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involves the coding of the same data by multiple coders, so that the degree to which the 
findings are consistent (regardless of the particular coder) can be determined. 
Reproducibility is considered the best option when a standard against which to evaluate 
results cannot be established, as is the case in the current study and for most latent 
coding tasks (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999: 271).
In latent coding tasks, there is, by definition, a degree of interpretation required by the 
coder during the coding process. Thus, establishing that a coding procedure is 
reproducible does not demonstrate objectivity in the sense of indicating that the coding 
procedure involved no subjective judgement on the part of the coders. Rather, 
consistent findings between multiple coders (i.e. reliable coding results) indicate that the 
judgements are inter-subjective -  that the “subjectively derived interpretations” of the 
coders converged and thus that the findings of different coders were consistent (even 
though the method used to produce these findings may not have been entirely objective 
and systematic) (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999: 266). Potter and Levine- 
Donnerstein (1999: 266) suggest that high levels of agreement between coders therefore 
indicate that the “the patterns in the latent content must be fairly robust” and that others 
analysing the same content would be likely to form the same conclusions. Such 
findings are essential in content analysis since, as Neuendorf (2002: 112) notes, “a 
measure is not valuable if it can be conducted only once or only by one particular 
person”.
An additional step that is often taken in the content analysis procedure, then, is to repeat 
the coding process with several coders so that levels of inter-coder agreement can be 
assessed (in the same way as the inter-analyst agreement calculations described earlier 
in the chapter) (Holsti, 1969: 135; Neuendorf, 2002: 51). This process of ensuring 
consistency between coders is clearly necessary in the current study in order to ensure 
that the data on which the quantitative analysis of reliability and validity is based do not 
vary depending on the analyst who collected them. The process for establishing the 
agreement between coders may involve a series of initial “coding rounds” in which a 
portion of the data is coded, the inter-coder reliability is assessed, and modifications are 
made to the coding rules or coding categories if the agreement rates are not sufficiently 
high (Hruschka et al., 2004: 307). The inclusion of coding rounds in the content 
analysis process has been shown to improve inter-coder reliability significantly, as has 
the training of coders prior to the coding activity (Holsti, 1969: 135; Hruschka et al.,
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2004). It would be prudent to incorporate these steps in the current study to ensure that 
the levels of reliability are appropriate before performing the entire coding process. 
This way, if agreement levels are unsatisfactory and cannot be brought to adequate 
levels through revision of the coding rules, time and effort will not have been wasted in 
performing the entire coding procedure. If the coding rules can be revised to improve 
rates of agreement, however, these changes can be made prior to the final coding 
process. Once the coding rules and categories have been finalised, the next step in the 
content analysis procedure is to have a sample (10% or more) of the data coded by two 
or more coders (Neuendorf, 2002: 51). The rate of inter-coder agreement for the 
finalised coding procedure can then be calculated, providing an indication of the 
reliability of the content analysis process.
Hruschka et al. (2004: 321) point out that there is a chance that, if the coding procedure 
involves a series of initial coding rounds, the coders involved in these rounds might 
experience “interpretive convergence” in which their interpretations of the content 
converge as a result of the discussion and modification processes. If this is the case, the 
observed levels of inter-coder agreement may reflect consensus as a result of discussion, 
rather than as a result solely of improved coding rules and definitions (Hruschka et al., 
2004: 321). They therefore suggest an additional step to the content analysis process in 
which additional independent coders also code a section of the data, using the finalised 
coding rules, and their rates of inter-coder agreement are calculated. If their agreement 
levels are similar to the final agreement levels of the original coders, this indicates that 
the high inter-coder reliability observed for the original coders was a result of the 
revisions to the coding procedure, rather than interpretive convergence. If, on the other 
hand, their agreement levels are no higher than the initial agreement levels of the 
original coders, it could be concluded that the observed levels of agreement for the 
original group were affected by interpretive convergence (Hruschka et al., 2004: 321 - 
322). Of course, if the revisions made to the coding rules and categories during the 
coding rounds were useful, one would expect the rates of inter-coder agreement for the 
independent coders to be somewhat higher than the rates obtained by the original coders 
on their first coding attempt because the independent coders would be using a superior 
coding procedure. Thus it would be inappropriate to conclude that interpretive 
convergence did not contribute to the observed high agreement rate on the basis of the 
independent group having a slightly higher rate of agreement than that of the first 
coding attempt by the original coders. Nevertheless, if the inter-coder agreement rates
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for the independent coders are found to be significantly lower than those obtained by 
the original coders in their final stages of coding, this would suggest that the latter rates 
may have been affected by interpretive convergence. The inclusion of this step would 
be necessary in the current study to ensure that the observed reliability levels were not 
inflated as a result of discussions during the coding rounds.
Once the inter-coder reliability has been established (and checks have been made that 
this rate of agreement is also acceptable for coders other than those involved in the 
coding rounds, if necessary), the next step in the content analysis process is to code the 
remaining data, using the finalised coding procedure (Hruschka et al., 2004: 307). In 
content analysis tasks involving the coding of large quantities of texts, the remaining 
data will often be split between coders to reduce the workload of each coder (Neuman, 
2003: 313). When this option is taken, an estimate of coder consistency (based on an 
acceptably high rate of inter-coder agreement) is necessary in order to demonstrate that 
the different coders are likely to code their portions of the data in a similar way, and that 
it is therefore appropriate to split the coding task between them. The next step is to 
produce final coding results for each unit of text (in this case, the final coding results 
will be those assigned by the coder who analysed that segment of text). However, if a 
coder is unsure about how to code a particular unit of text, this item may be discussed 
with the other coder so that a mutual coding decision can be made (Barr, Stimpert & 
Huff, 1992: 22).
Alternatively, the entire set of texts can be coded by multiple coders, with a number of 
inter-coder agreement checks made throughout the coding process to ensure that the 
levels of agreement remain acceptable (Hruschka et ah, 2004: 315). The latter option is 
presumably appropriate when the quantity of texts to be analysed is such that the entire 
set could feasibly be coded by more than one coder, or in cases in which it would be 
beneficial to have every content unit coded by more than one person. If this option is 
taken, the process of assigning a final coding category for each unit of text involves 
consideration of the coding judgements made by each coder for each particular unit. If 
the coders agree in their coding of a unit, the final code for that unit will be the one that 
both coders choose. If they code the same unit differently, however, a decision must be 
made about the final code to assign for that unit. In some cases, the coding decision is 
deferred to the more experienced coder (e.g. Calderwood, Crandall & Klein, 1987: 14). 
Another option is to include only those items that were coded identically by both coders
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(e.g. O'Hare et al., 1994: 1857). However, coder disagreements are usually resolved 
through a process of discussion, in which the coders each describe the rationale behind 
their judgements, so that a consensual decision can be made regarding the final coding 
decision for those items (e.g. Crittenden & Hill, 1971; O'Hare et al., 1994).
In the current study, it seems preferable to have the entire set of data coded by more 
than one coder, both because this could feasibly be achieved for this quantity of data 
and because it would be advantageous to know precisely which units were initially 
disagreed upon by the coders. This knowledge would also allow an inter-coder 
agreement calculation to be made for the coding of the entire set of data, providing an 
accurate measurement of the inter-coder agreement in the coding (rather than a 
calculation based only on a portion of the sample). More importantly, however, it 
would allow every cause or recommendation that was coded differently by the coders to 
be identified and discussed, so that each of the final coding results (to be used in the 
subsequent analysis) would either have been agreed upon by the coders initially or 
would have been agreed upon during discussion. Such an approach seems prudent 
given the subjectivity involved in these coding judgements and the aim of achieving 
data that are as accurate as possible for use in the subsequent analysis.
The result of this content analysis process would be that the number of causes and 
safety recommendations common to two AcciMaps and the number of these items that 
were unique to one could be determined, allowing a quantitative assessment of the 
degree of similarity between different analyses in terms of these factors to be made. 
Such results would be a useful supplement to a qualitative analysis of the similarity 
between different AcciMaps because they would provide a numerical indication of 
agreement in percentage terms and because the data on which these calculations were 
based would not rely on one analyst's interpretations, but on inter-subjectively derived 
results obtained using a replicable procedure. These calculations could be used to 
assess the reliability of the AcciMap approach in terms of the degree to which different 
analysts identified the same causes and safety recommendations, and the validity of the 
approach in terms of the degree to which the causes and recommendations identified by 
participants concurred with those of the AcciMap experts. These results are also 
necessary in order to assess the reliability and validity of the categorisation of causal 
factors into the four AcciMap levels, the allocation of safety recommendations to the 
responsible parties and the placement of causal links in AcciMaps.
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Comparing the Categorisation of Causes into Levels, the Allocation of 
Recommendations to Responsible Parties and the Placement of Causal 
Links
As highlighted previously, the reliability with which participants identify causes and 
safety recommendations in AcciMaps can be calculated in percentage agreement terms 
but cannot be adjusted for chance. The reliability of categorising the causal factors into 
levels in the diagram and classifying the safety recommendations in terms of the party 
responsible for implementing them, on the other hand, could be calculated using a 
chance-corrected agreement measure because there are a finite number of categories (in 
the form of levels and parties at whom recommendations are directed) in which each 
cause or recommendation could be placed. These rates of agreement could take into 
consideration only those causes and recommendations identified by both participants in 
each pair, as identified in the content analysis process described above . This 
restriction is necessary because an assessment of whether or not different analysts agree 
on the level in which a causal factor is located, or the party at which a recommendation 
is directed, can only be made in situations in which both analysts include both causes in
| . . ] 3their AcciMaps . The reliability with which those shared causes and recommendations 
are classified into the relevant categories (that is, the four levels of the AcciMap for the 
causes, and the responsible parties identified in the accident report for the 
recommendations) could then be measured and adjusted to take chance agreement into 
account.
An assessment of the degree of similarity between the causal links in AcciMaps could 
be performed in a similar manner. This assessment would be slightly more complicated 
than comparisons of causal factors and safety recommendations because the causal links 
cannot be considered in isolation: the meaning of a link exists only in relation to the two 
causal factors it connects. In order to assess the degree of similarity between causal 
links in two AcciMaps, then, it would first be necessary to reduce the AcciMaps to the
12 Rates of inter-analyst agreement would be assessed for pairs of results and then averaged across the 
group. For the validity study, each participant’s results would be compared with the expert results and for 
the reliability study, each participant’s results would be compared with every other participant’s results.
13 An effect of this restriction is that two AcciMaps will be considered identical, in terms of the levels in 
which causes are identified and parties at which recommendations are directed, if one incorporates many 
more causes and recommendations than the other, as long as those that it does incorporate are categorised 
in the same way. However, in such a situation, the differences between the two sets of results would be 
evident in the assessments of the similarities between the analysts’ causes and safety recommendations.
In assessing the overall degree of similarity between different AcciMaps, then, it is important to take note 
of the agreement rates of all of the variable parts, so that such differences are not overlooked.
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set of causal factors that are present in both diagrams so that the links between those 
causes could be compared and contrasted. This was the approach taken by Ladkin 
(2005) in his comparison of an AcciMap and a WBG of an incident. Ladkin reduced 
both diagrams to the nodes that he judged to be common to both diagrams, and then 
counted the number of arrows (he refers to them as edges) that were the same and the 
number that were different. His aim in doing so was to isolate these differences for 
discussion purposes, rather than to calculate the degree of similarity between the 
diagrams, so he did not go on to perform a percentage agreement calculation for these 
data. A similar reduction to a common set of causal factors is necessary in the current 
study because an assessment of whether or not different analysts agree that a causal link 
is or is not present between two causal factors (or ‘nodes’ in the diagram) can only be 
made in situations in which both analysts include both nodes in their AcciMaps. Again, 
therefore, this assessment would be restricted to the nodes common to both analyses and 
would not consider links between causes that were not present in both diagrams. 
However, when considered in combination with the rates of agreement in the 
identification of causal factors by the different analysts, this assessment could provide 
an indication of the similarity of the causes identified, as well as the similarity of the 
links placed between the shared causes. Taking into account only the causes common 
to both diagrams, it would be possible to count the number of links on which the 
analysts agree (that is, the number of times they both placed an arrow between the same 
two causes), the number of links that are present in only one of the two diagrams, and 
also the number of links that the analysts agree are not present14. From such 
calculations, it would be possible to determine the rate of agreement in the placement of 
arrows in the diagram, and to adjust this rate to take chance agreement into account. 
This calculation could be taken into consideration, along with the rates of inter-analyst 
agreement for the other variable AcciMap features, to produce an overall quantitative 
assessment of the degree of similarity between AcciMaps. As suggested above, these 
assessments could be used, along with a qualitative assessment, to provide insight into 
the reliability and validity of the AcciMap approach.
14 This number is calculated by subtracting the number of shared links and the links that are unique to one 
diagram from the number of theoretically possible links in an AcciMap. The number of links that are 
theoretically possible depends on the number of shared causes and the arrangement of those causes (since 
a causal factor can only be linked to factors in the same level of an AcciMap or the level(s) below).
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6.4 Conclusions
This chapter, in conjunction with the last, completes the second step in the three-step 
process towards assessing the validity and reliability of the AcciMap approach by 
specifying precisely how these evaluations can be made. These chapters show that such 
assessments cannot be made in an entirely objective way but that, by comparing 
participants’ results with those of experts and with those of one another, both 
qualitatively and using a content analysis process to reduce the subjectivity of the 
judgements involved, the reliability and validity of AcciMap results can be determined. 
Now that the AcciMap approach has been standardised and formalised (complete with 
written instructions for use) and a means by which the validity and reliability of the 
results can be assessed has been determined, it is possible to apply these methods so that 
the extent to which different analysts using this approach in practice produce the same 
results, and the extent to which those results are valid, can be ascertained.
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7Research Methods
The discussion, in the previous chapters, of precisely how the validity and reliability of 
the AcciMap approach can be assessed concluded that the comparison of AcciMap 
results with those of experts could be used to assess the validity of AcciMap findings, 
while the comparison of a number of different analysts’ results could be used to assess 
the reliability of the approach. It was also suggested that interviews with the AcciMap 
analysts and qualitative, as well as quantitative, assessments of their results could 
provide additional insight into the nature and significance of any variations observed in 
AcciMap findings. The application of these methods and the analysis of the results 
enable the questions of interest in this thesis to be addressed, namely, Are AcciMap 
results valid and reliable? and, I f  there is variability in AcciMaps produced by different 
analysts, what is the nature and significance o f this variability? This chapter describes 
the application of these methods in the current study.
In order to assess the validity and reliability of the AcciMap approach in the ways 
discussed in the previous chapters and to address the questions of this thesis, a 
controlled case study method was employed. A case study is an in-depth, detailed 
“empirical enquiry” that describes and analyses a particular phenomenon in “complex 
and comprehensive terms” (Wilson, 1979 cited in Merriam, 1985: 206; Yin, 1984: 23). 
The “case” is the particular phenomenon under study and can include, for instance, a
The Controlled Case Study 
Method
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single person, group, organisation, area, event, decision or process (Yin, 1994: 21-22). 
The case study approach involves a detailed investigation into the case with the aim of 
producing an “intensive, holistic description and analysis of the phenomenon or social 
unit being studied“ (Merriam, 1985: 206; Yin, 1984: 23).
The case of interest for present purposes was the analysis of an accident by a number of 
individuals working independently and using the AcciMap approach. The purpose of 
studying this case was to gain insight into the validity and reliability of AcciMap results 
and to develop a thorough understanding of the factors affecting the observed levels of 
validity and reliability.
Case studies, according to Yin (1984: 23), involve the investigation of “a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident; and multiple sources of evidence are used”. The present 
study was a typical case study in the sense of focusing on a contemporary phenomenon 
-  the application of the AcciMap approach. It was also typical in that information was 
obtained from a variety of sources to assist in gaining a holistic and thorough 
understanding of the case. In this study, a number of accident analyses were assessed 
both qualitatively and quantitatively and participants were also interviewed about their 
findings and the process by which these findings were produced. As will be discussed 
below, a component of the study also involved direct observation of the process by 
which analyses were conducted. This range of methods was used in an attempt to gain 
as much information as possible from the study of this case. In this instance, 
supplementing the analysis of the results with data from interviews and observations 
provided further insight into the validity and reliability of the approach, since the 
participants could explain the reasons behind their decisions, discuss areas of their 
analyses in which multiple courses of action were possible and be observed during the 
process of choosing between these alternatives.
The current study was not, however, a typical case study in terms of Yin's (1984: 23) 
remaining criteria, since the case was not studied within its “real-life context" and the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and its context were, in this case, clear. In the 
present study, it was not possible to analyse the case of interest within its natural 
context since an appropriate case did not exist prior to this research. Although some 
previous AcciMaps had been produced by groups of analysts, there were no existing
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cases in which multiple analysts had separately analysed the same accident using this 
method. It was therefore necessary to arrange for a number of analysts to independently 
analyse a single accident using the AcciMap approach. AcciMap experts also analysed 
the accident. The comparison of the independent analysts’ AcciMaps with those of one 
another, and with those of the experts, could then be used in the assessment of the 
validity and reliability of the approach. The case of interest in this research, then, was 
not studied within a context in which AcciMap analyses might normally occur, but was 
artificially created for the purpose of this research.
In this instance, the necessary separation of the case from the normal context within 
which accident analyses are performed was advantageous, since it permitted a degree of 
control over some contextual factors that are not normally controllable in case study 
research - hence the reference to this study as a controlled case study. Specifically, it 
was possible to provide all participants with the same information, guidelines, materials 
and time limit for conducting their analyses, in an attempt to ensure that differences in 
these areas did not affect the validity and reliability of the participants’ results. In 
addition, it was possible to run the study with novice analysts, who did not have 
accident analysis experience or previous knowledge of accident analysis techniques or 
theories of accident causation, to prevent factors relating to the backgrounds of the 
analysts themselves (as discussed in Chapter 5) from affecting their results. The 
analysts could also be instructed to work independently. The control of these factors, 
which could probably not have been controlled had this research involved the study of a 
case within its natural context, was intended to prevent external factors such as 
differential treatment, expertise or collaboration, from affecting the validity and 
reliability of the analysts’ results.
The advantages of adopting a controlled case study approach in this instance were that it 
enabled the study to be controlled in these respects and allowed a thorough, in-depth 
understanding of the case to be gained by the use of multiple methods of data collection. 
By comparing and contrasting the results produced by the analysts with those of the 
experts and with those of one another, and by gaining insight into whether variations 
occurred and, if so, where and why they occurred (or could potentially have occurred), 
insight into the validity and reliability of the AcciMap approach and the nature and 
significance of any observed variations could be gained.
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There are, however, several criticisms associated with this choice of method. The first 
relates to possible researcher bias in the interpretation of the conclusions from case 
studies. As Shaughnessy and Zechmeister (1994: 304) point out, “In the absence of 
observable measures, the outcome of a case study may be based mainly on the 
‘impressions’ of the observer”. Case study findings based on observations or qualitative 
assessments by the researcher may, for instance, be subject to bias or misinterpretation 
since both rely on the researcher’s subjective interpretations of the phenomenon under 
study. Critics of this approach, and of qualitative research generally, argue that the use 
of such methods produces a “bias toward verification”, meaning that case study 
researchers tend to confirm their “preconceived notions” in their studies because the 
methods they use do not prevent them from doing so (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 81). Of course, 
quantitative methods are also open to subjectivity and verification bias in terms of the 
choice of questions asked, categories adopted and variables for investigation, for 
instance. However, qualitative methods are seen to be more lenient than other methods 
in this respect (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 81-82).
This criticism may be valid to a degree in the current study since the qualitative 
evaluation of the participants’ results, the analysis of their interview data and the 
observations of the processes by which participants arrived at their results will certainly 
be affected by my own subjective interpretations. Such data cannot be analysed and 
understood without such interpretations being made. Yin (1994: 91-92) suggests, 
however, that the use of multiple methods of data collection can assist in gaining a 
“convincing and accurate” interpretation of a case, since the results can be based on the 
“convergence of information from different sources”. Flyvbjerg (2001: 82) points out 
that, rather than leading to unjustified verification of the researchers’ initial hypotheses, 
the intensive examination of the phenomenon of interest in case study research in these 
ways often results in revision or rejection of those hypotheses. In this instance, it will 
also be possible to include the AcciMaps and recommendations produced by the 
participants and experts so that readers will have the opportunity to form their own 
interpretations of the results, if desired15.
The quantitative assessment of the reliability and validity of the participants’ results 
also incorporates subjective judgements, primarily in the decision of whether or not a
15 Recordings of the participants’ interviews are also available on request.
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cause or recommendation in one analysis is the same as that in another. However, the 
quantitative data in this study were derived from intersubjective judgements formed 
during the content analysis process and are therefore less open to the criticisms of 
verification bias than the data obtained from the other methods. The results of the 
quantitative analysis are also provided (in the following chapter) so that readers are not 
forced to rely on my interpretations of these results when drawing conclusions relating 
to the validity and reliability of the AcciMaps analysed in this study.
A second criticism often made of the case study approach is that the findings cannot be 
generalised. This criticism stems from the widespread view that “the extent to which 
one can generalize across persons, settings, and times depends mainly on how 
representative one’s sample is of the persons, settings, and times to which one wishes to 
generalize” (Shaughnessy & Zechmeister, 1994: 336). In order to generalise from a 
study, from this perspective, it is necessary to try to select a sample that is 
representative of the broader population (through random sampling, for instance) and to 
repeat the study with different participants and in different places and times so that the 
“typicality” of the results can be ensured (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 82; Shaughnessy & 
Zechmeister, 1994: 336). For these reasons, single case studies are often considered to 
be useful only as exploratory studies, which should be followed by other studies before 
conclusions are drawn, hence the comment by Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (2000: 41) 
that,
“a case study cannot provide reliable information about the broader class. But it 
is often useful in the preliminary stages of an investigation since it provides 
hypotheses which may be tested systematically with a larger number of cases”.
Flyvbjerg (2001: 74) points out, however, that it is possible to generalise from case 
study findings without conducting multiple studies. This is because case studies are 
usually thought to of as “generalizable to theoretical propositions” rather than to broader 
populations (Yin, 1984: 21). Thus, rather than aiming to establish how frequently 
certain factors occur in a broader population, for instance, case studies are often used to 
test existing propositions or theories to establish whether or not they hold in real-life 
situations (De Vaus, 2001: 223; Flyvbjerg, 2001: 78). Case studies are, for instance, 
ideal for generalising about theories through “falsification" since, it is only necessary to 
observe one case that goes against a theory to show that the theory is “not valid 
generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected” (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 77).
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As Cropley (2002: 64) notes, then, the choice of case should focus not on whether the 
sample selected will allow generalisation to the broader population to be made, but on 
whether or not it has the capacity to provide relevant insight into the questions of 
interest. The case studied in this instance was clearly not a Typical' AcciMap analysis, 
nor was it designed to be. Indeed, it is unclear what a ‘typical’ AcciMap analysis might 
entail, given the distinct variations in formats, purposes and underlying processes of the 
existing varieties of AcciMap, as discussed in Chapter 4. Rather, this case was selected 
(or in fact created) because it has the capacity to shed light upon the questions of this 
research. Specifically, if significant variations are found to exist between AcciMaps 
compiled by different analysts in this case, this will demonstrate that it is possible for 
AcciMap analysts to produce results that differ from those of one another and from 
those of AcciMap experts, thereby falsifying a hypothesis that AcciMap findings are 
entirely valid and reliable. If, on the other hand, significant variations are not observed 
in this case, the hypothesis is supported.
The process of theory-testing in this instance is slightly different from the typical 
process of using a case study to test a theory because the theories tested in this way are 
normally “well-formulated'’ theories, incorporating a set of propositions and details 
about the circumstances in which those propositions are true (Yin, 1984: 47). 
Conversely, the hypothesis of interest in this case - that the use of the AcciMap 
approach produces valid and reliable findings - has never been formally proposed. 
There seems, however, to be an implicit assumption that this is the case, in the sense 
that AcciMap analyses are presented without questions being raised as to whether or not 
the findings are valid and whether or not other analysts would have produced the same 
results. The validity and reliability of the approach has not been addressed in the past 
and analysts are silent on these issues, raising the question of whether or not this 
implicit assumption is, in fact, valid. The same assumption appears to be made of 
numerous other accident analysis techniques, which have also not been validated but 
which continue to be used without such questions being raised. In this instance, then, 
the case study approach is being used to test an implicit assumption, rather than a well- 
established theory. Nevertheless, it may be possible on the basis of the current case 
study, to form generalised conclusions about the correctness of that assumption.
From a positivist perspective, the potential for bias and difficulties with generalisation 
are not the only problems with the methods chosen in this thesis. Also of concern is the
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fact that that the validity of the AcciMap approach will be assessed in terms of the 
results produced by experts, rather than against any objective external criteria, and that 
the assessment of the reliability and validity of the approach will be based on subjective 
judgements of the similarity between participants' results, rather than objective 
measures. In light of these issues, it might be concluded, from a strict positivist 
viewpoint, that there is no legitimate way to assess the validity and reliability of the 
AcciMap approach and that there is, therefore, no point in undertaking an investigation 
into this topic. Bortz (cited in Flick, 2002: 4) would seem to adopt such a view, 
suggesting that researchers should examine whether or not potential research ideas can 
be studied empirically and only proceed with those that can. If an investigation into the 
validity and reliability of the AcciMap approach is avoided for this reason, however, 
there are only two courses of action that can be followed. One is to abandon the method 
altogether because it cannot be shown to be valid and reliable on the basis of an 
objective scientific approach. This option seems rather extreme given that the method 
appears useful, that the counterfactual logic on which it is based is widely accepted and 
that there has been no indication that the approach is not valid or reliable. More 
significantly, however, by this logic, all accident analysis techniques that go beyond the 
level of forensics to uncover the systemic causes of accidents would also have to be 
abandoned, since none has been shown to be valid or reliable in terms of any objective 
external criteria. The other option available, from this standpoint, is to ignore these 
issues and to continue to use the method under the assumption that it produces valid and 
reliable results. Although this option may not have been consciously considered, it 
represents the current situation in the field of accident analysis, in which a variety of 
techniques are used to identify the causes of accidents and propose safety 
recommendations, without ever having been objectively proven to be valid or reliable. 
Neither option seems satisfactory, given that these techniques are necessary for learning 
from organisational accidents and given the practical implications of whether or not 
such techniques are valid and reliable, outlined in Chapter 3.
The alternative option, which is adopted in this thesis, is to follow the approach 
underlying qualitative research and to base decisions regarding the most appropriate 
methods on the research question, rather than the other way around (Flick, 2002: 5). If 
this option is adopted, the aim is not to select methods that will allow the question to be 
studied empirically, but to “design methods so open that they do justice to the 
complexity of the object under study” (Flick, 2002: 5). The approach adopted in the
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current study, then, is to accept that, while the validity and reliability of the AcciMap 
approach cannot be tested in an objective, scientific fashion, it may be possible to 
provide valuable insight into this topic by performing a controlled case study, as 
described above. Such a study would allow the potential variability of the approach to 
be investigated and, if significant differences were found between results produced by 
different analysts, would show that the implicit assumption that the method is valid and 
reliable is in need of modification. Further, a case study approach would enable these 
differences to be investigated in detail, so that the possible implications of any observed 
variations could be considered. Such an investigation would not enable the precise 
levels of validity and reliability of AcciMap analyses in general to be determined. It 
would, however, provide insight about the reliability and validity of the method and the 
nature and significance of any variations in AcciMap analyses, when such insight could 
not otherwise be gained. It was with the intention of contributing potentially significant 
knowledge to an area that could not be studied by other means, that the controlled case 
study in this research was carried out.
The process of conducting this study involved a number of steps, including trialling and 
revising the testing procedure through a number of initial pilot studies, obtaining the 
experts' results and then testing and finalising the process by which the participants' 
results would be compared and contrasted.
7.2 Pilot Studies
The first stage in the case study process was to conduct a number of pilot studies, 
designed to allow the case study materials and procedure to be tested and revised for use 
in the final study. As noted in Chapter 4, this process doubled as the procedure for 
refining the AcciMap guidelines.
7.2.1 Pilot Study 1
Aims
The first pilot study was conducted with the primary aim of ascertaining whether or not 
the AcciMap guidelines were sufficient to allow novice users to construct AcciMaps
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from existing accident reports and to gain feedback about the adequacy of the 
guidelines. It was hoped that this information would enable improvements to be made 
to the guidelines, if necessary, prior to the final study. The secondary aim was to assess 
the appropriateness of the incident report for use in the final study.
Method
A group of 60 undergraduate Sociology of Disaster students from the Australian 
National University were given an option to evaluate the AcciMap guidelines in place 
of their semester essay. Two students chose to take this option. They were provided 
with the first version of the AcciMap guidelines and a 58-page Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau (ATSB) (1998) report into an aircraft incident. The incident report was 
for a turbo-propeller aircraft that stalled during a passenger flight from Albury to 
Melbourne in 1998. This report was chosen because it was judged to be of an 
appropriate length and to be less technically complex than many investigation reports 
(and therefore suitable for novice analysts), and because it contained a sufficient 
number of causal factors to allow a detailed AcciMap to be constructed. The students 
were asked to read the report, to construct an AcciMap of the incident using the 
guidelines and to evaluate the guidelines. They were not given a time limit for this 
activity.
Findings
With respect to the question of whether or not the guidelines were sufficient to allow 
novices to construct AcciMaps, a number of points were observed from this study. 
Firstly, both students were able to construct AcciMaps of the incident using the 
guidelines, with the causes arranged into the levels (largely in terms of their causal 
remoteness) and linked to the outcome at the bottom. However, one student explained 
that s/he had ordered the causes with “more important’' causes at the bottom and “less 
relevant" causes at the top, indicating that the concept of causal remoteness may not 
have been adequately explained in the guidelines. The majority of causes identified by 
both students were causal to the loss of control of the aircraft. However, one participant 
identified the recovery of the aircraft by the pilot as the final outcome, while none of the 
causes illustrated in the AcciMap contributed to this outcome. Both diagrams also 
contained errors in the causal links. One had sound logic in most links, while the other 
had numerous errors, including links between unrelated causes, links in violation of
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temporal logic and links missing where they should have been included. Only one of 
the participants proposed safety recommendations for the accident. This pilot study 
therefore indicated that the guidelines were sufficient to enable novices to perform 
AcciMap analyses to some degree. However, it was clear that the concepts of causal 
remoteness and ‘but for’ logic, as outlined in the guidelines, could be misinterpreted and 
should therefore be refined.
The feedback provided by the students about the adequacy of the guidelines indicated 
that they were sufficient to allow them to construct AcciMap analyses from the incident 
report. The participants also highlighted that there were some areas of repetition in the 
guidelines, and that some parts could be shortened and simplified. One participant 
recommended that future participants be instructed to read the guidelines before the 
accident report, so that they would be aware of the types of factor on which to focus 
while reading the report. It also became evident that large pieces of paper should be 
provided to future participants to avoid the difficulty (relating to a lack of physical 
space) of constructing an AcciMap on an A4 page.
The appropriateness of the incident report used in this study was difficult to assess 
since, while there appeared to be some confusion regarding the accident sequence in 
both participants' AcciMaps, it was unclear whether this represented a 
misunderstanding of the accident report itself or the incorrect application of the method. 
The appropriateness of the report's content therefore remained largely unknown after 
the initial pilot study. There was, however, a suggestion that the incident report may 
have been too long. One participant noted that it contained a considerable amount of 
“unnecessary information” and that s/he read only the “findings” section of the report, 
assuming that all important information would be included in that section. This 
participant consequently failed to identify causal factors located in other sections of the 
report which were identified by the other participant. In the interests of ensuring that all 
relevant information is read by future participants, it seemed that a shorter incident 
report might be more appropriate.
Changes made in light of Pilot Study 1
In light of the findings of this initial study, the explanations of causal remoteness and 
‘but for’ logic were revised and the guidelines were shortened and simplified. In
165
response to the feedback provided by the participants, it was also decided to instruct 
future participants to read the guidelines prior to the accident report and to use a larger 
paper size when constructing their analyses. Finally, the sections of the incident report 
that were irrelevant for AcciMap analysis purposes (such as information about the 
particulars of the aircraft and personnel and sections on injuries, damage and survival, 
that were irrelevant in this case because the aircraft did not crash) were removed to 
reduce the amount of reading for future participants.
7.2.2 Pilot Study 2
Aims
A second pilot study was then conducted with the aims of checking the adequacy of the 
revised AcciMap guidelines and assessing the appropriateness of the reduced incident 
report for use in the final study.
Method
The two participants in this second study were work colleagues known to myself. They 
were provided with the revised AcciMap guidelines and the reduced incident report and 
were asked to read the AcciMap guidelines and then to read the incident report and 
construct an AcciMap of the incident. They were not provided with a time limit for the 
task but were asked to note the amount of time spent on reading the accident report and 
performing the analysis.
Findings
As was the case in the previous study, both participants were able to construct an 
AcciMap of the incident using the guidelines. Both were also able to propose safety 
recommendations reflecting the identified causes. As in the previous study, some links 
between causally linked factors were absent and some links were placed between factors 
that should not have been linked. Discussion with the participants about the placements 
of causal links revealed that these occasionally resulted from mistakes in applying the 
causal logic but were more often the result of confusion about the technical details of 
the incident.
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Again, the feedback received from the participants indicated that the guidelines were 
useful in assisting them to create AcciMaps of the incident but that they were still 
longer and more detailed than required. The participants also reported that the incident 
report was difficult to understand owing to the technical language and discussion of 
unfamiliar aircraft systems. They reported that the portion of the study involving 
reading the incident report took approximately 2 -  2.5 hours, while the sections 
involving reading the guidelines and analysing the incident together took approximately 
2.5 hours.
Changes made in light of Pilot Study 2
In response to the findings of the second pilot study, the AcciMap guidelines were 
significantly reduced and reformatted to simplify and clarify the process. In order to 
address the continuing problem of errors in linking the causal factors, an AcciMap 
practice document was devised (see Appendix B). The practice document, to be given 
to participants after reading the guidelines but before beginning their analyses, was 
designed to test the participants’ understanding of the AcciMap approach. It requires 
them to distinguish between factors that are causes of an accident and those that are not 
(because they are incorrectly phrased, not of practical significance or were not 
necessary in order for the outcome to occur). Participants are also required to 
distinguish correctly linked causal factors from those that are incorrectly linked 
(because intermediate causes are missing, the direction of causality is incorrect or the 
factors are not causally related at all). In addition, the practice document requires 
participants to determine the correct AcciMap level for causes and whether or not 
particular safety recommendations are appropriate. This document was intended to 
ensure that participants understood the causal logic involved in AcciMap construction 
before they applied this logic in their analyses. The correct answers, with relevant 
explanations from the AcciMap guidelines, were also documented so that participants 
could refer to these answers during the analysis phase, if necessary (see Appendix C).
In addition, it was decided in light of the pilot study findings that the incident report, 
although less technically complex than many aviation accident reports, should be 
abandoned in favour of a shorter and less complex report. This would ideally ensure 
that any errors observed in the causal logic of future participants’ AcciMaps would not 
reflect misunderstandings of the report itself. The accident report for the Waterfall train
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crash in 2003 was chosen because, like the ATSB aircraft incident report, it refers to 
numerous causes at all levels of the sociotechnical system. However, the causes of this 
accident are less technical and were therefore judged to be easier for a layperson to 
understand than those of the previous report. This report was also reduced to a two- 
page summary in an attempt to ensure that the amount of time required to read the 
report was appropriate for future studies. The reduced report primarily contained text 
lifted directly from the original report, in an attempt to keep the report true to the 
original, but it was significantly shorter16 (see Appendix D).
7.2.3 Pilot Study 3
Aims
The third and final pilot study was conducted for the purposes of checking that the 
above revisions (relating to the guidelines, accident report and inclusion of the AcciMap 
practice document) were appropriate, determining an acceptable time limit for 
participants in the final study and allowing the method by which the results would be 
analysed to be trialled (the pilot testing of the analysis of results will be discussed in a 
later section).
Method
The two participants in this third study were also work colleagues, but not those who 
had participated in the previous study. They were given the final version of the 
AcciMap guidelines and the practice document and were asked to read the guidelines 
and then complete the practice document. Once finished, they were given the correct 
answers to the practice document and I went through the document with them, 
discussing any problems and clarifying any points of confusion. The participants were 
then given the summarised Waterfall train accident report and asked to analyse the 
accident using the guidelines. The amount of time spent on each part was noted, in 
order for an appropriate time limit for the final study to be established. Finally, 
informal interviews were conducted with each analyst to gain further insight into the
16 The report was also modified so that the train operator, the State Rail Authority (now RailCorp), was 
referred to as RailCorp. This modification was made to avoid confusion among participants about 
whether to treat causes relating to this organisation as organisational or governmental factors.
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appropriateness of the materials and method involved in the study and into the results 
produced by each analyst.
Findings
The results of the third pilot study indicated that the final version of the guidelines was 
largely adequate for present purposes. Both participants were able to complete 
AcciMaps of the accident and lists of safety recommendations, and both indicated that 
the guidelines were clear and concise, with no suggestions for improvement. 
Discussion of their results during the interview indicated that they understood both the 
AcciMap guidelines and the interaction of causal factors described in the accident 
report. An examination of their results, however, indicated that one participant’s 
AcciMap incorporated more causes than were identified in the accident report. In 
discussion with the participant, it became clear that s/he had made inferences about 
other factors which might have contributed to the accident. S/he had also proposed 
safety recommendations to address these additional causes. The AcciMap guidelines 
did not specify whether or not analysts should attempt to infer additional causes from 
those highlighted in the report and were therefore ambiguous in this respect.
Both participants were able to complete the AcciMap practice document, to obtain the 
correct answers and to justify their decisions. The participants also reported that they 
had understood the details of the accident report without difficulty (this was also clear 
from their AcciMaps). The participants took approximately four hours to complete the 
task, excluding breaks, with approximately one hour spent on reading the AcciMap 
guidelines and completing the practice document and the remaining three hours spent 
performing the analysis.
Changes made in light of Pilot Study 3
It was decided on the basis of the third pilot study that the AcciMap practice document 
and the reduced accident report were suitable for use in the final study. A note was 
added to the AcciMap guidelines indicating that only factors that are identified in the 
accident report should be included in the analysis. Once this revision had been made, 
the guidelines were also judged to be appropriate for the final study.
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On the basis of the time taken by the participants in this pilot study, it was decided that 
a time limit of 4.5 hours would be appropriate for use in the final study, to allow future 
participants a little more time than was taken in this case, but to also ensure that 
participants did not spend significantly more time than necessary on the task.
7.3 Expert Results
The pilot studies enabled the materials for the final study to be tested and revised until 
they were judged to be appropriate, and a suitable time limit for the activity to be 
determined. However, before performing the final study, it was also necessary for the 
expert results, against which the participants’ findings would be assessed, to be 
compiled.
An “expert" is “a person who has special skill or knowledge in some particular field" 
(Macquarie Dictionary, 2001: 659). Two AcciMap experts, my supervisors Prof. 
Andrew Hopkins from the Australian National University and Dr. Neelam Naikar from 
the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, were asked to participate in the 
compilation of a set of results to be used in this study and both agreed to participate. 
These individuals were considered to be experts on the basis of their prior experience in 
conducting AcciMap analysis, both having performed and published a number of 
AcciMap analyses and, in doing so, having demonstrated their skills and experience in 
the field as well as their knowledge of the approach and the theories on which it is based 
(see Hopkins, 2000, 2003, 2005; Naikar, Saunders & Hopkins, 2002; Royal Australian 
Air Force, 2001).
The experts were given the final version of the AcciMap guidelines and the reduced
accident report for the Waterfall train crash. In accordance with the method for
compiling expert results outlined in Chapter 5, they were first asked to analyse the 
accident independently so that their separate analyses could be brought to the
subsequent discussion, potentially providing a greater diversity of options for
consideration than would occur if the experts had performed the initial analysis 
together. In the discussion, the experts were encouraged to consider all factors, to 
justify the reasons behind their decisions and to resolve disagreements through 
discussion rather than through methods of quick agreement (such as coin-flipping or
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taking turns in whose judgement is accepted). I also provided the experts with my own 
analysis of the accident and a verbal justification of my findings, so that they could also 
take this information into account in their discussion process. The experts then 
discussed their individual analyses and agreed upon a final analysis to be used in the 
study1 . Differences of opinion were resolved with reference to the guidelines or with 
logical arguments about why one option was more appropriate than another. Through 
this discussion, the experts were able to produce a combined set of results, over a period 
of approximately three hours (the experts’ results are described in the following 
chapter).
7.4 Case Study
Once the materials for use in the case study had been finalised and the expert results 
compiled, it was possible to conduct the case study in which a number of novices 
conducted AcciMap analyses of the same accident so that their results could be assessed 
for validity and reliability.
Participants
The only requirement for the participants in this study was that they had no previous 
accident analysis experience. In order to recruit participants, I sent an email to 33 work 
colleagues from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). The email 
explained that I was seeking participants for a study, outlined the purpose of the study, 
and documented what would be required of the participants. 14 individuals initially 
agreed to participate but owing to factors relating to workload and time commitments, 
only nine were able to participate. The nine participants held undergraduate or honours 
degrees in Psychology, Cognitive Science, Engineering, Physics or Computer Science. 
None had prior knowledge or experience in accident analysis. The participants were 
provided with an information sheet and consent form (see Appendix E) prior to 
participating in the study, in accordance with the “National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Research Involving Humans” (1999).
17 I did not participate in the decision-making regarding the final analysis to be used in the study since my 
prior experience in performing complete AcciMap analyses of complex accidents was not sufficient to 
make me an expert in the field.
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Materials
The participants were given the final version of the AcciMap guidelines and the practice 
document. They were subsequently provided with the AcciMap practice document with 
the answers (and references to the relevant sections of the guidelines) and with the 
reduced accident report for the Waterfall train crash. The participants were also given 
paper on which to record their causes and safety recommendations, a sheet of A2 
cardboard on which to construct the AcciMap and a pack of Post-it notes on which to 
write the causes18.
Procedure
The procedure firstly involved instructing the participants to work independently and 
not to discuss the process or their analyses with anyone else. It was explained that this 
restriction was necessary in order to ensure that an assessment of the reliability of the 
participants' results would not be compromised. The participants were also asked to 
ensure that they did not spend more than 4.5 hours on the task (excluding breaks). 
Participants completed the analysis task in their own offices at times that were 
convenient for them. This was preferable to having all analysts perform the task at the 
same time because it meant that I was available to answer their questions and to bring 
new materials when they had finished one stage of analysis and were ready to go to the 
next.
As in the third pilot study, the participants were initially given only the AcciMap 
guidelines and practice document. They were asked to read the guidelines and complete 
the practice document. Once this was done, I discussed their results with them, asking 
for the reasons behind their answers for each question, whether or not those answers 
were correct. This allowed me to pinpoint problem areas in their understanding of the 
AcciMap guidelines or the logic behind the method, so that I could attempt to correct 
these misunderstandings before the participants began the final analysis. I also provided 
them with the answers to the practice document, which they were able to retain for their 
reference during the subsequent analysis.
18 Computer programs are available for constructing this type of diagram (e.g. Microsoft Visio) but, in the 
interest of avoiding the extra time involved in installing these programs on the participants’ computers 
and teaching the participants to use them, a paper-based approach was considered more appropriate.
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The participants were then given the accident report and materials with which to 
construct the AcciMap, and were asked to analyse the accident using the AcciMap 
guidelines. Once they had completed their analyses, I conducted an individual, informal 
interview with each participant. The participants were first asked to talk me through 
each of the causal chains in the AcciMap. This meant that they had to verbalise the 
connection between each pair of linked causes and often resulted in their justification of 
why they linked the causes as they did. They were also asked about their experiences in 
extracting the causes from the accident report, arranging the causal factors into the 
AcciMap diagram and developing safety recommendations. In addition, they were 
asked if they had difficulty working out how to display any of the causes, or in 
understanding the AcciMap guidelines or the accident report itself. All but one of the 
participants allowed me to record the interviews for future analysis.
Results
The process by which the results from this study were analysed will be outlined below 
and the findings discussed in the following chapter. However, of significance at this 
point was that the AcciMap analyses produced by the different analysts did indeed 
differ in terms of the causes and recommendations identified, the causal links in the 
diagrams, the parties at whom recommendations were directed and the AcciMap levels 
in which particular causes were displayed. The interviews with the participants and the 
qualitative and quantitative analyses of their results provided some insight into the 
nature of these variations. However, it was decided that, in order to gain an in-depth 
understanding of these variations, it would be useful to observe the sorts of 
considerations and decision-making processes involved in the task of carrying out an 
AcciMap analysis. To this end, the case study was extended to include a group analysis 
which would enable such observations to be made.
7.5 Case Study Part 2
The aim of the second part of the case study was to allow further insight to be gained 
into the nature and significance of the observed variability in AcciMap results. It was 
decided that a number of the same analysts involved in the above study would be 
brought together to perform an AcciMap analysis of the same accident as a group, and
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would be observed and recorded as they performed this task. The analysts would be 
provided with their original AcciMaps for their own reference but would not be allowed 
to show their analyses to the other participants. Rather, they would have to engage in a 
process of discussion and group decision-making in order to come up with a single 
AcciMap and set of safety recommendations for the accident. This process was not 
undertaken for the purpose of determining whether AcciMaps performed by a group 
would be more or less valid than those performed by individuals. If this had been the 
aim, it would not have been appropriate to have the same participants perform the group 
analysis since differences in their results may have resulted from improvements owing 
to prior experience and familiarity with the task, or deterioration resulting from “fatigue 
or reduced motivation“ (i.e. practice effects) (Shaughnessy & Zechmeister, 1994: 212) 
as opposed to than their performance as a group. Rather, it was hoped that this situation 
would allow the different options available to the group and the justification behind 
choices to be openly discussed, thereby allowing me, as an observer, to gain insight into 
the range of possibilities considered by the group and the reasons underlying their 
decisions.
Participants
To recruit participants for this study, I sent an email to eight of the nine participants 
involved in the original case study (one was no longer working at DSTO), outlining the 
purpose and details of the second study and asking whether they would like to 
participate. Six responded that they were willing to participate although, due to an 
absence on the day of the study, only five actually took part.
Materials
The participants were provided with the same accident report and guidelines as before, 
and were also given their original AcciMap analyses. They were given markers and had 
access to two whiteboards, one on which to draw the AcciMap diagram and another on 
which to write the causes and safety recommendations.
Procedure
The second part of the case study was conducted in a quiet conference room. The 
participants were given their original AcciMaps and were asked not to show their
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analyses to one another. They were told that the reason for this restriction was that I 
wanted them to discuss the options that were being considered and the reasons why 
certain choices were made over others so that I could access this information. A 
number of instructions incorporating Hall and Watson's (1970: 304) guidelines for 
achieving effective group consensus (outlined in Chapter 5) and several instructions 
developed from research into effective group facilitation (Cropley, 2002: 86; Hunter, 
Bailey & Taylor, 1995) were read to the participants (see Figure 11).
1. AVOID ARGUING AT LENGTH FOR YOUR OWN POSITION -  try to state your 
opinion clearly, concisely, and logically
2. TRY NOT TO FEEL THAT SOMEONE MUST WIN AND SOMEONE MUST LOSE 
IN THE DISCUSSION - if impasses occur, look for solutions that are acceptable to 
both parties
3. AVOID CHANGING YOUR MIND ONLY IN ORDER TO AVOID CONFLICT AND 
REACH AGREEMENT - the aim of the activity is NOT to reach agreement and 
harmony - it is to find the most appropriate solution
4. AVOID CONFLICT-REDUCING TECHNIQUES such as majority votes, averaging, 
bargaining, coin flipping etc., instead of continuing to share relevant knowledge and 
insight
5. VIEW DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AS NATURAL AND HELPFUL - the more 
ideas expressed, the more resources the group has to help them make informed 
decisions
6. VIEW INITIAL AGREEMENT AS SUSPECT - explore the reasons behind apparent 
agreements, making sure that people have arrived at the same solution for the same 
basic reasons (or for complementary reasons) before incorporating such agreement into 
the group decision
Also,
• Try actively to find out what everyone thinks (if necessary by requesting a response 
from each person). Silence does not necessarily mean that someone agrees
• Ensuring that every person is involved also avoids a situation in which the outcome is 
over-influenced by the most dominant or talkative members
• There are no wrong answers here, so don't be afraid to provide your input! The more 
ideas that are considered by the group, the better.
Figure 11 -  Guidelines for Effective Group Decision-Making
These guidelines were originally designed to address factors that contribute to poor 
group decision-making, such as social pressures to conform to the majority view, the
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motivation to ‘win' in discussions (and to not “lose face”) and shifts in group 
motivations towards “reaching agreement" rather than obtaining the most appropriate 
solution (Rowe, 1992: 166). For the purposes of the current study, however, the 
guidelines were employed in an attempt to ensure that all participants were involved in 
the activity so that all options were discussed and all opinions heard, to encourage 
participants to put forward concise and logical justifications for their opinions and to try 
to ensure that the final results were those judged by the group to be the most 
appropriate, rather than the quickest or easiest solutions. Specifically, they were 
adopted so that the differences between the different participants’ results and the 
reasons behind those differences would have to be verbalised, allowing me to 
understand the thought processes behind the variations in the participants’ original 
results. The guidelines were printed on a large sheet of cardboard in the conference 
room and I informed participants that I would draw it to their attention if they appeared 
to be drifting from the guidelines.
The participants were then asked to re-read the accident report and to conduct an 
AcciMap analysis of the accident, as a group. They were given a time limit of three 
hours for this activity. The process therefore echoed the ‘estimate-feedback-talk' 
procedure used by the experts since it, too, involved the participants producing their 
results independently, discussing and comparing their results and finally producing a 
consensual judgement. I observed the group as they performed their analysis and 
recorded the conversation, but did not contribute in any way to the results they 
produced. Beyond specifying that I would highlight apparent deviation from the above 
guidelines, I attempted to restrict my contribution to what Flick (2002: 116) refers to as 
“Formal direction'’ - controlling the agenda and determining the beginning and end of 
the discussion.
Results
Part two of the case study appeared to run as intended, with all group members 
contributing several ideas, providing justifications for their opinions and indicating why 
they did not agree with suggestions proposed by others. They were able to reach 
agreement through discussion (without using the conflict-avoiding techniques 
highlighted above) and produced a final AcciMap and set of recommendations that all 
participants stated they were happy to accept, in approximately two hours. As intended,
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the process by which the participants discussed and chose between the options available 
to them was verbalised, allowing me to gain further insight into some of the types of 
variation that were possible and why those variations existed. Insights gained from 
observing participants during these conversations will be discussed in the results 
chapter.
As will be highlighted in the results section, the process of pooling group ideas and 
discussing the causal relationships between factors allowed the group to reduce the 
number of omissions and logic errors in some areas of their analysis. However, some 
aspects of this group analysis process did not appear to assist the group in achieving the 
best possible outcomes. Specifically, in most cases, the original wording proposed by 
the participant who highlighted a particular cause or safety recommendation was 
adopted by the group, without attention being paid to whether or not this wording was 
clear, specific enough, or in accordance with the AcciMap guidelines. This may have 
resulted from an unwillingness of participants to suggest more appropriate wording for 
an item raised by another group member for reasons of politeness, or to feelings that it 
was the identification of a particular problem that was important, rather than the specific 
wording used to describe it. In other cases, particularly in the formation of safety 
recommendations, a number of different ways of phrasing a particular item would be 
proposed by group members and the group would tend to phrase a recommendation in 
general terms reflecting the problem area suggested by all participants, rather than 
choosing or creating a more specific recommendation. Consequently, some of the 
group's safety recommendations were not as well formed as they were in many of the 
individual participants' AcciMaps. An additional problem was that the safety 
recommendations listed by the group seemed to be generated from the participants' 
original AcciMaps, rather than from the AcciMap they had developed as a group. This 
point was highlighted by one participant and an effort was made to check that the 
recommendations were in accordance with the group AcciMap. However, this checking 
process was not very thorough and the final list of recommendations proposed by the 
group failed to account for one of the causes they had addressed, and also included an 
additional recommendation that reflected a cause that was not in the group AcciMap. In 
general, however, the process taken by the group appeared to follow the guidelines for 
effective decision-making and did encourage them to consider most options so that 
oversights (i.e., causes and recommendations that were present in the experts’ findings
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but had been missed in some participants’ individual analyses) were generally identified 
and addressed.
7.6 Method for Analysis of Results
Once the two-part case study had been carried out, it was possible to begin the analysis 
of the results for the purpose of assessing the validity and reliability of the AcciMap 
approach and examining the nature and significance of variations observed in the 
participants’ analyses. Much of the information to be considered was directly evident 
from the participants' comments during interview and from observations made during 
the group analysis process. However, as highlighted earlier, the analysis of the validity 
and reliability of the participants’ individual AcciMaps required the application of a 
content analysis procedure to allow the causes and safety recommendations identified in 
these analyses to be compared and contrasted.
The content analysis of the participants’ individual results aimed to determine the causal 
factors and safety recommendations on which different AcciMap analysts agreed and 
disagreed (to be used to assess reliability) and those on which the analysts and the 
AcciMap experts agreed and disagreed (to be used to assess validity). The content 
analysis procedure reflected the method outlined in the previous chapter. After the 
questions of interest and the data to be analysed had been determined, the items to be 
coded and the coding categories into which they would be categorised were established. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the items to be coded in this study were the causes and 
safety recommendations identified by each participant. For the validity assessment, the 
categories into which these items would be coded reflected the experts' results, so that 
the number of items on which each participant and the experts agreed and disagreed 
could be determined. For the reliability assessment, on the other hand, the coding 
categories were created during the coding of each pair of participants’ results, so that 
the number of items that were shared and those that were unique to one analysis could 
be ascertained. The next step was to construct written coding rules to determine how 
coders should categorise the data.
The type and degree of guidance required in order to allow the coders to categorise the 
participants’ findings reliably was initially unknown. However, a set of rules was
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written in a first attempt to guide coders in their decisions regarding whether or not two 
items should be judged equivalent (see Appendix F). The rules specified that a 
participant should be judged to have identified the same cause as the experts if they 
identified a cause that means the same thing (whether or not the wording used is 
identical), if they identified a cause that means the same thing but also included 
additional information, if they identified a cause that means the same thing but also 
included another cause in the same box or if they identified multiple causes that, 
together, mean the same thing as the experts’ cause. Participants should be judged as 
having identified half the experts’ cause if they identified part, but not all, of it. 
However, participants should be judged as having not identified the experts’ cause if 
they did not identify a cause that means the same thing, or if the experts’ cause was 
implied in the causes they did identify but was not explicitly identified. Examples of 
each of these types of situation were provided in the coding rules. The same types of 
rule applied to judgements regarding whether or not participants had identified the same 
safety recommendations as the experts, and for identifying whether or not different 
analysts had identified the same causes and recommendations as one another.
Once the initial coding rules had been devised, a series of coding rounds were 
conducted, in which data were coded, rates of inter-coder agreement were calculated 
and coding rules were revised where necessary, until appropriate levels of agreement 
were reached. Two coders took part in these coding rounds and in the final content 
analysis study. I was one of these coders and the other was one of the AcciMap experts 
(Dr. Neelam Naikar), who offered to assist in the coding process.
7.6.1 Coding Round 1
Aims
The first round of coding was conducted in order to allow the coding rules to be applied 
and initial rates of inter-coder agreement to be determined, so that the rules could be 
revised if necessary.
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Method
The data used in this round of coding were those obtained in the third pilot study, rather 
than from the final case study. These data were used so that, if changes to the coding 
process or coding rules were indeed required (as was expected at this point due to the 
lack of knowledge regarding the areas in which guidance would be needed), these could 
be made before the coding of the final results commenced. Each coder was provided 
with the two AcciMap analyses completed in the third pilot study. The participants’ 
AcciMaps had been re-drawn using Microsoft Visio and their safety recommendations 
typed in Microsoft Word so that their results could be printed legibly on A4 pages for 
ease of use. The participants’ original wording, spelling and positioning of factors in 
the diagram was retained. However, numbers were assigned to each of the causes in 
their AcciMaps for reference purposes. In this coding round, the two sets of 
participants’ results were coded only for validity, so that an initial insight into the 
appropriateness of the coding rules could be gained. The coders were given the coding 
rules outlined above and coding sheets on which to record their results. The coding 
sheets displayed the experts’ causes and recommendations in a column on the left. 
Blank columns were provided to the right for each participant's results, so that the coder 
could make a note next to each of the expert causes or recommendations specifying 
whether or not that item had been identified by each participant (and if so, which of the 
numbered causes or recommendations it had been identified in - see Appendix G). A 
note was made of any items that were identified by the participant but not the experts.
The coders independently coded each participant’s results into the categories reflecting 
the expert causes and their rate of inter-coder agreement was then calculated. When 
calculating rates of agreement, coders were considered to be ‘in agreement’ about a 
particular item in only two circumstances, namely if they both judged that the item was 
not identified in a participant’s analysis19 or if they both judged that the item was 
identified in a participant’s analysis and also agreed on the cause or recommendation in 
which that item was identified“ . If the coders disagreed about whether or not an item
19 This type of agreement is henceforth depicted as Al A2, indicating that coders 1 and 2 both judged the 
item as Absent.
■ This type of agreement is depicted as P1P2, indicating that both coders judged the item as Present in a 
particular item in the participant’s analysis.
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was present, or if they disagreed about the particular cause or recommendation in which 
that item was present, they were judged to have disagreed on the coding of that item“ .
Rates of inter-coder agreement, in terms of percentage agreement, were calculated on 
the basis of the numbers of items on which the coders agreed and disagreed““. 
Percentage agreement calculations give a commonsense indication of the proportion of 
agreement observed between analysts but, as discussed earlier, do not take chance 
agreement between analysts into account. The levels of inter-coder agreement in this 
study were therefore also calculated using the kappa coefficient, which indicates “the 
proportion of agreement between raters after accounting for chance” (Stemler, 2001). 
Kappa values can range from 1 to -1, with 1 indicating “perfect agreement”, 0 indicating 
the rate of agreement that would be expected by chance alone and negative values 
indicating that observed rates of agreement are less than would be expected by chance 
(Hruschka et al., 2004: 313). Landis and Koch (1977: 165) suggest that the strength of 
agreement indicated by the kappa value can be interpreted as follows:
K appa V alue Strength o f A greem ent
<0.00 Poor
0.00-0.20 Slight
0.21-0.40 Fair
0.41-0.60 Moderate
0.61-0.80 Substantial
0.81-1.00 Almost Perfect
Others propose slightly different interpretations, although there seems to be a general 
agreement that values above 0.75 or 0.80 represent “excellent” agreement, while those 
above 0.60 indicate “good” agreement (Fleiss, 1981: 218; Hruschka et al., 2004: 313). 
The calculations of inter-coder agreement in these terms allowed a judgement to be 
made regarding whether the rates of inter-coder agreement were satisfactory or whether 
changes to the coding rules were required in order to improve these rates.
21 This type of disagreement is depicted as PlA2 or A 1P2, indicating that coders 1 and 2 disagreed on 
whether or not a given item was present or absent in a particular cause or recommendation in the 
participant’s analysis.
22 Percentage agreement calculations were performed for both the validity and reliability-testing 
components, determined by dividing the number of items on which the coders agreed (AlA2 + P1P2) by 
the total number of agreements and disagreements (Al A2 + PlP2 + PlA2 + AlP2) multiplied by 100.
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Findings
The levels of inter-coder agreement for coding the participants' results were substantial 
for the coding of the causes in this initial study (90.63%, kappa = 0.77), but only fair for 
the coding of the safety recommendations (71.43%, kappa = 0.36). The coders 
experienced difficulty determining whether or not the some items proposed by the 
participants (particularly the safety recommendations) were close enough to those of the 
experts to be treated as equivalent. Uncertainty arose regarding which ‘features' of the 
experts’ items were essential (and must therefore be included in a participant’s cause or 
recommendation in order for that item to be judged as equivalent to the experts’ item) 
and regarding whether the participants’ items had to be exactly the same in meaning, or 
only similar to that of the experts’ in order to be judged as equivalent. The observed 
levels of inter-coder agreement and discussions between the coders indicated that their 
independent decisions regarding how to treat these areas of uncertainty were not always 
consistent and that revisions to the coding rules were indeed necessary in order to 
provide a sufficient level of guidance for the coders.
Changes made in light of Coding Round 1
In light of these findings, the coding rules were extended so that definitions were 
provided for each of the experts’ causes and recommendations, specifying the 
components of each item that were essential (see Appendix H). Where appropriate, the 
definitions also included examples of synonymous wording for the same item and 
examples of items that are similar but should be counted as different from an item, to 
provide further guidance to coders on how to make such judgements. These examples 
were drawn primarily from items identified by the participants in the third pilot study. 
The definitions were given to one of the AcciMap experts involved in the compilation 
of the expert results, so that they could be reviewed to ensure that they accurately 
reflected the causes and recommendations in the expert results.
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7.6.2 Coding Round 2
Aim
A second round of coding was then performed, using the extended coding rules. The 
aim was to establish whether these rules were now adequate to allow satisfactory rates 
of inter-coder agreement to be obtained for validity and reliability.
Method
In this coding round, the AcciMap analyses of three of the participants in the case study 
were coded. The extended coding rules were adopted and the same coding sheet for the 
validity assessment was used as in the first round of coding. However, in this case the 
coders were also provided with a coding sheet for assessing the reliability of 
participants’ results. This sheet simply listed one of the participant’s causes and 
recommendations in one column, and contained adjacent blank columns in which the 
coder could list other participants’ items. If a cause or recommendation from another 
participant’s results was considered equivalent to those of the first participant, the 
former would be listed alongside the latter in the table. If equivalent items were not 
identified, the adjacent cells would be left blank. Any additional items that were 
identified by one participant but not the others would, again, be listed at the bottom of 
that participant’s column so that the items that were common to different analyses, and 
those that were unique to one, were clearly evident.
Each coder then coded the three sets of results for validity by comparing them with the 
experts’ results, and for reliability by comparing the causes and recommendations 
identified in each analysis with those identified in the others. Rates of inter-coder 
agreement were calculated using the method described above.
Findings
The second round of coding revealed further problems with the coding rules and also 
uncovered problems with the coding sheet for the reliability assessment. The observed
183
rates of inter-coder agreement, while generally satisfactory for the coding of the 
causes23, remained unsatisfactory for that of the safety recommendations24.
Discussions between the coders of the items on which they had disagreed revealed that 
the poor rates of agreement were the result of the presence of a number of situations in 
the participants’ analyses that were not covered by the coding rules and for which the 
coders had therefore used unguided judgement. These ambiguities in the coding rules 
included, for instance, whether causes in the participants’ AcciMaps that represented 
extra detail or explanation of another cause should be counted as part of that cause or 
should be treated as an extra cause; whether the coder should take the context into 
account (i.e. the causes to which a cause is linked, or the cause on which a safety 
recommendation was based) when attempting to determine the meaning of an 
ambiguous item; how causes or recommendations that identify the same actions, but 
attribute these to different parties, should be treated; and what to do when parts of the 
accident report are ambiguous, resulting in two participants (or a participant and the 
experts) interpreting causes differently.
With respect to the coding procedure, on the other hand, it became clear that while the 
coding sheet used in the validity coding was suitable, the coding sheet used to code the 
reliability of the results was unsatisfactory. Problems occurred, for instance, when a 
cause identified by one participant was identified in two causes by the other. The 
coding sheet did not have the flexibility required to allow these types of situation to be 
displayed clearly, especially when they occurred several times in the comparison of two 
participants’ results.
2 l The levels inter-coder reliability for the coding of the causes ranged from 82.6 -  88.1% (with 
corresponding kappa values ranging from 0.51 to 0.71) in the validity assessment in which the 3 
participants’ results were compared with the expert results. The levels of inter-coder reliability for the 
coding of the causes ranged from 75.0 -  96.4% (with kappa values ranging from 0.51 to 0.93) in the 
reliability assessment in which the participants’ results were compared with those of one another. In both 
assessments there was one code in which the levels of agreement reached by the coders reflected only 
“moderate’' agreement when adjusted for chance. However, the mean percentage agreement and kappa 
values across the results indicated a “good’’ level of agreement (when adjusted for chance) for the coding 
of causes in both the validity and the reliability assessments.
24 The levels of inter-coder agreement for the safety recommendations ranged from 25.0 to 77.8% (with 
kappa values ranging from 0.04 to 0.53) in the validity assessment and from 62.5 -  80.0% (with kappa 
values ranging from 0.25 to 0.58) for the reliability assessment.
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Changes made in light of Coding Round 2
In light of the remaining inadequacies in the guidelines, it was determined that coding 
rules must be written to address all of the ambiguities identified in this round of coding. 
The coders discussed these problems and decided upon how these situations should be 
treated in future. Rather than specifying each of these new rules generally, and having 
the coders re-code these same data at a later date using the final version of the coding 
rules, it was decided that the analyses of the first three participants would be treated as 
an additional pilot study of the coding procedure. The disadvantage of this decision was 
that the results of the first three participants could not then be included in the 
subsequent quantitative analysis of the results, although they could still be drawn on in 
the qualitative analysis. However, the advantages were that specific examples from 
these participants’ analyses could be incorporated into the coding rules. This would 
provide the coders with more examples of the types of item that should be treated as 
equivalent to, or different from, the experts’ results, as well as explicit examples 
indicating how the types of ambiguity highlighted above should be treated. These 
examples could also be used to provide additional guidance for reliability coding. As 
previously noted, it was not possible to identify strict definitions to be used when 
judging whether or not different participants’ causes or recommendations were the 
same, thus even less guidance was provided for coders when coding for reliability than 
for validity. However, with use of the data from the first three participants’ results, and 
from the previous pilot study, it was possible to construct a table of examples 
identifying different participants’ results that should be treated as equivalent, and those 
which should not, so that the coders could refer to these examples to guide their coding 
decisions. These revisions were made to the coding rules and were, again, presented to 
the AcciMap expert for review.
In view of the problems highlighted during the coding of participants’ results for 
reliability, it was also decided to abandon the reliability coding sheet and to provide 
coders instead with small pieces of paper on which the causes and recommendations of 
each participant were written. When a reliability code was to be performed, the coders 
would be provided with the causes and recommendations from two participants’ results, 
printed in different colours. When coding the results, the coder would simply group 
together items that were judged to have the same meaning, and leave items that were 
unique to one of the participant’s results separate. This procedure would be repeated for
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each pair of participants’ results. This process was intended to prevent problems from 
occurring when one participant listed a cause in one box and the other listed it in two, 
for example, because the latter two causes could simply be grouped with the first (see 
Appendix I).
7.6.3 Content Analysis of Case Study Results
Once these revisions had been made to the coding rules, it was then possible for the two 
coders to begin the final coding of the remaining six participants’ results for validity 
and reliability. Equipped with the extended coding rules, the original coding sheet for 
validity coding and the sets of coloured causes and recommendations for the reliability 
coding, the coders commenced the content analysis of the case study results. Each 
coder performed six validity codes, in which each of the participants’ findings were 
compared with those of the experts to determine the number of the experts' items that 
the participant identified, the number they missed and the number of extra items they 
identified that the experts did not. Each coder also performed 15 reliability codes, in 
which each pair of participants' results was compared, so that the number of items 
common to both and the number unique to one analysis could be determined. Between 
each code, the rates of inter-coder reliability were assessed. Elad these rates been found 
inadequate, further revisions to the coding rules might have been made and additional 
coding rounds been carried out. However, the observed levels of inter-coder agreement, 
calculated in terms of both percentage agreement and the kappa coefficient, were 
acceptable2^ , indicating that the results obtained were, to some degree, independent of 
the particular coder and that it would therefore be expected that other coders with access 
to the same coding rules would probably interpret the data in a similar manner.
After each validity and reliability code had been completed by both coders, the coders 
came together to decide upon the final results to be used in the quantitative analysis.
Mean rates of inter-coder reliability were 98.2% (k=0.79) for the assessment of the validity of causes 
and 92.9% (k=0.93) for the assessment of the validity of the recommendations (the latter kappa value 
excludes one non-meaningful value obtained when the coders agreed that most recommendations were 
present (PP) but did not agree that any were absent (AA). Kappa gives a value of zero if PP or AA have a 
value of zero, even if there is 100% agreement, and is therefore not a meaningful measure of agreement in 
such cases. If this score had been included, the mean kappa value would have been 0.76). The mean 
rates of inter-coder reliability were 87.8% (k=0.68) for the assessment of the reliability of the causes and 
85.1% (k=0.67) for the assessment of the reliability of the recommendations. These kappa values 
represent “substantial” agreement according to the criteria proposed by Landis and Koch (1977: 165) and 
“good” to “excellent” agreement according to Fleiss (1981:218).
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Where both coders initially agreed upon whether a particular item was common to both 
sets of results (either those of two participants or those of one participant and the 
experts) or unique to one, the final code attributed to that item reflected the coders’ 
judgements. In cases where the coders initially disagreed, however, discussion was 
entered into so that a final code could be assigned. The discussion process involved the 
coders’ justifying their coding decisions and then agreeing on the final code to be 
assigned, based on those justifications and often with reference to the coding rules or 
the original accident report. Again, efforts were made by the coders to ensure that the 
reasons behind any disagreements were identified and discussed, and that decisions 
were not made without proper consideration of facts or for reasons other than aiming to 
produce the most accurate final codes. As a result of these discussions, the final data to 
be used in the quantitative analysis of the results were obtained. Many of these 
decisions were straightforward, with one coder drawing the attention of the other to a 
section of the guidelines that indicated the correct code for that item and the other 
realising her oversight, or with one acknowledging that an alternative justification was 
more appropriate. However, it must be noted that on several occasions, the coders felt 
that their own justification for coding items in a certain way and the other coder's 
justification for coding those items differently were both acceptable. This occurred 
particularly in the reliability assessment where different participants used different 
levels of detail in their expressions. An example was where one participant identified 
the cause “A task-linked vigilance control system was not fitted”, while another 
identified the causes “Train not fitted with Task linked vigilance system" and “RailCorp 
did not fit a Task vigilance monitoring system'’, resulting in some uncertainty regarding 
which of these two causes should be coded as equivalent to the first cause (or whether 
both should). In such cases, the coders came to agreement but felt that such decisions 
were arbitrary to a degree. In light of the fact that there was some initial disagreement 
between the coders, and that the choice of the final code in such cases was not always 
obvious, it must be recognised that identical results might not necessarily be produced if 
other coders were to repeat this procedure with the same data and the same discussion 
processes. However, the high rate of initial agreement does indicate that the coders’ 
judgements converged to a high degree and that others would therefore be likely to 
produce similar conclusions.
Since this process had involved two rounds of coding and a number of discussions 
between the coders to resolve coding disagreements, it was not clear whether the
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observed rates of inter-coder agreement did, in fact, reflect the adequacy of the coding 
rules, or whether ‘interpretive convergence' had also contributed to the levels of 
agreement. The final stage of the content analysis procedure therefore involved a ‘test’ 
to determine whether or not an independent coder, who had not participated in these 
coding rounds, could achieve similar levels of inter-coder reliability with the two coders 
as they achieved with one another. If the levels of agreement between this independent 
coder and each of the original coders were similar to the levels of agreement between 
the original coders after their coding rounds and discussions, it could be assumed that 
the observed rates of agreement did indeed reflect the coding rules and coding 
procedure, rather than interpretive convergence among the original coders.
In order to carry out this test, the independent coder was provided with the revised 
coding rules, a coding sheet and an explanation of the coding process. The coder 
undertook several practice codes and then coded a portion of the final results. It was not 
appropriate for this coder to code the entire dataset, since interpretive convergence 
would have been more likely to occur in the later stages of the original coding (after 
numerous discussions had taken place) than at the earlier stages. Rather, the question of 
interest was whether or not the independent coder would agree less with the original 
coders at the end o f their coding process than the original coders agreed with one 
another at that point. If so, this would suggest that the levels of agreement achieved by 
the original coders at the end of the coding process may have been affected by 
interpretive convergence. The third coder was therefore asked to code a portion of the 
data that was randomly selected from the data that had been coded by the original 
coders in the latest part of the original coding procedure (specifically, from the data that 
were coded in the final third of the coding procedure). Neuendorf (2002: 51) suggests 
that a sample of ten percent or more of the original data is sufficient to allow inter-coder 
agreement to be calculated. It was therefore decided that the portion of data coded by 
the third coder would consist of one of the six validity codes (constituting 16.7% of the 
total dataset) and two of the 15 reliability codes (constituting 13.3% of the total dataset).
The results showed that the third coder had the same or higher levels of inter-coder 
agreement with the two original coders than they did with one another on these items, 
for both the validity assessment and the reliability assessment, in terms of the coding of
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both causes and safety recommendations“ . As such, it seems likely that the high rates 
of inter-coder agreement between the original coders reflected the coding rules and 
coding procedure, rather than the convergence of their interpretations during the 
discussions and modifications of the coding rules.
Once the final data had been obtained and the acceptability of the coding process had 
been established in this way, it was possible to make a quantitative assessment of the 
validity and reliability of the approach. A validity score for each of the participants’ 
results was determined by calculating the percentage agreement between each 
participant’s results and those of the experts. These scores could then be averaged 
across participants to provide an overall assessment of validity. Reliability was 
assessed by calculating the percentage agreement between each pair of participants in 
the same way, and averaging this figure across the 15 pairs to gain an overall reliability 
assessment for the study. As discussed in Chapter 6, these figures could not 
meaningfully be adjusted for chance.
Interestingly, it was realised during this coding process that there were instances in 
which the participants had identified causes or recommendations that were not in the 
experts' results, but which were nevertheless not incorrect, in accordance with the 
AcciMap guidelines and accident report. This primarily occurred when the participant 
specified, as a separate cause or recommendation, extra detail that was implicit in the 
experts’ results. This trend was not problematic for the purpose of the reliability 
assessment since participants could be judged to be in agreement if both listed the same 
types of extra detail. In accordance with the coding procedure outlined above, however, 
such factors would be coded as different from those of the experts (and therefore as 
incorrect), for the purpose of the validity assessment. In order to allow this issue to be 
explored further, it was decided that the coders should make a note, in such instances, of 
whether additional causes or recommendations (that were not included in the expert’s
26 For the validity assessment of the item coded, the inter-coder agreement of the original coders was 
88.6% (k=0.56) for the causes and 87.5% for the recommendations. The mean inter-coder agreement 
between the third coder and each of the original coders for this item was 95.0% (k=0.87) for the causes 
and 87.5% for the recommendations. As previously noted, meaningful kappa values could not be 
determined for the recommendations in this case because the value of AA was zero in this instance.
Kappa gives a value of zero if PP or AA have a value of zero, even if there is 100% agreement. For the 
reliability assessment of the two particular items coded, the inter-coder agreement of the original coders 
was 84.5% (k=0.63) for the causes and 88.2% (k=0.74) for the recommendations. The mean inter-coder 
agreement between the third coder and each of the original coders for these items was 86.5% (k=0.68) for 
the causes and 89.4% (k=0.78) for the recommendations.
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results) represented ‘extra detail’ of this sort or were, in fact, incorrect (any 
disagreements between coders on this judgement were, again, resolved through 
discussion). The collection of this extra information would allow this issue to be taken 
into account when considering the levels of validity observed in the participants' results.
7.6.4 Analysis of Levels, Parties and Causal 
Links
The content analysis process described above allowed the numbers of causes and safety 
recommendations common to two analyses and the number unique to one to be 
determined. These data were then used to assess the validity and reliability of the 
placement of causes into the levels in the AcciMap, the attribution of safety 
recommendations to particular parties and the causal links in the participants' diagrams.
The validity of the placement of causes into AcciMap levels was established by 
considering only the causal factors on which the experts and participants agreed. The 
AcciMap level in which the experts placed each cause was compared with the level in 
which each participant placed the equivalent cause. This process allowed the number of 
causes that each participant had placed in the same level as the AcciMap experts, and 
the number that they had placed in different levels, to be determined. These data were 
used to generate percentage agreement scores for the validity of the attribution of causes 
into levels, by dividing the number of items that participants located in the same level as 
the experts by the total number of items identified by both parties. It was also possible 
to adjust these figures for chance using the kappa coefficient, since the number of 
causes that would be expected to be located in each level by chance alone could be 
determined. The reliability of the placement of causes into levels was calculated in the 
same way as above, but by comparing the levels in which different participants located 
the same causes.
The validity and reliability of the attribution of safety recommendations to particular 
parties was calculated in a similar fashion. First, each list of safety recommendations 
was reduced to the set common to both results in the pair. Then the parties at whom 
these recommendations had been directed were compared and percentage agreement 
and kappa calculations were performed.
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Like the analysis of the AcciMap levels, the calculations of the validity and reliability of 
the causal links in the participants' AcciMaps were based only on those factors that 
were common to both analyses in each pair of results. Once the results were restricted 
in this way, the comparison of the causal links simply involved identifying two causes 
that were linked in one diagram and seeing whether or not the equivalent causes in the 
other diagram were also linked.
In order to make this assessment, however, it was sometimes necessary to edit the links 
in the participants' AcciMaps. For instance, the situation often arose in which two 
linked causes had an intermediate cause in one AcciMap and not in another (i.e. one 
AcciMap indicated that A ^ B ^ C  while another did not include node B at all but simply 
showed that A—>C). In the process of reducing each diagram to the set of causes 
common to both, the intermediate cause (B) would be removed from the former 
AcciMap. A decision was therefore required regarding how to treat the causal links in 
light of the removal of intermediate causes. Eden, Ackermann and Cropper (1992: 
319), in their work on the simplification of causal maps, argue that intermediate causes 
in causal chains merely represent detail, and that the former link can therefore be drawn 
as A—>C “with loss of detail only". This was also the approach taken by Ladkin (2005) 
in his comparative study of an AcciMap and a Why-Because Graph. This seemed to be 
a sensible way to deal with the loss of intermediate nodes in this study because it meant 
that the broader similarities between links in different AcciMaps were not overlooked 
simply because one analyst identified an intermediate cause that another did not. Thus, 
after reducing each pair of analyses to include only those causes common to both, the 
links in each AcciMap were edited to adjust for the removal of any intermediate causes.
Alterations to the AcciMaps were also required when different analysts used different 
numbers of boxes to depict the same causal factors. The situation occasionally arose in 
which one participant (or the expert analysts) displayed two causes separately, while 
another grouped these causes into one box (see below for an example).
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AcciMap A AcciMap B
1. Train 
overturned
4. Multiple 
Deaths
5. Extensive 
damage to 
train4. Multiple 
Deaths
5. Extensive 
damage to 
train
2. Train 
collided with 
rock face
3. Train 
overturned 
and collided 
with rock 
face
In such cases, a decision was required regarding how to make the boxes in the two 
diagrams equivalent (for the purposes of comparing the links). The options are either to 
separate cause 3 in AcciMap B into two factors, to make the boxes equivalent to those 
in AcciMap A or to combine causes 1 and 2 in AcciMap A, to make them equivalent to 
cause 3 in AcciMap B. For practical reasons, it was decided that the latter option was 
preferable because, in separating cause 3 in AcciMap B into two causes (call them 3a 
and 3b), ambiguity would arise regarding where the arrows to causes 4 and 5 should be 
placed. The arrows would either have to be duplicated so that causes 3a and 3b were 
both linked to causes 4 and 5 (potentially resulting in the inclusion of more links than 
the original analyst intended), or a judgement would have to be made about where the 
analyst would have drawn the arrows had s/he separated that cause into two (potentially 
resulting in different links from those intended by the original analyst).
The alternative option of combining the two separated causes avoids these problems. 
This approach does have the disadvantage of overlooking some of the variability in the 
causal links. For instance, the following AcciMap segments:
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would all be re-drawn as follows, if this approach were adopted, implying that there is 
no difference between them.
However, this redrawn diagram does illustrate the point, displayed in each of the above 
variations, that causes 4 and 5 would not have occurred had causes 1 and 2 both been 
otherwise. As such, this approach seems preferable to redrawing the links after 
separating one cause into two, thus potentially misinterpreting the AcciMap analyst’s 
intention. In making the boxes in each pair of AcciMaps equivalent for the purpose of 
comparing the causal links, then, multiple boxes were grouped together as one (and the 
arrows leading from the original boxes retained) when the equivalent causes in the other 
AcciMap were depicted in one box.
Once both AcciMaps in a pair had been edited in these ways, it was possible to 
determine the levels of agreement in the placement of the causal links in those 
AcciMaps. By counting the number of times both participants placed an arrow between 
two equivalent causes and the number of times that only one participant placed an arrow 
between two causes, it was possible to calculate percentage agreement figures for the 
validity and reliability of the causal links. Since the number of times that both 
participants did not place an arrow between two equivalent causes could also be 
determined, it was also possible to calculate chance-corrected rates of agreement using 
the kappa coefficient.
7.7 Conclusions
This chapter outlined the methods adopted in the investigation into the reliability and 
validity of the AcciMap approach in this research. It described the application of those 
methods for reliability and validity testing, proposed in the previous chapters, in a 
controlled case study designed to test the assumption of validity and reliability 
associated with the AcciMap approach and to provide insight into the nature and 
significance of any variations in AcciMap findings. Techniques for gaining information 
about this case included a content analysis of the participants’ results, allowing
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quantitative assessments of validity and reliability to be made, and interviews with 
participants, observations of the group activity and a qualitative assessment of the 
participants' results, providing insight into the nature and significance of variations in 
AcciMap results. The next chapter describes the findings of this study.
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8Results
The controlled case study described in the previous chapter was carried out for the 
purpose of investigating the reliability and validity of the AcciMap approach. Of 
particular interest were whether or not the implicit assumption that the AcciMap 
approach is valid and reliable is correct and, if variability in AcciMap results does exist, 
what the nature and significance of that variability is. The data obtained from the 
quantitative assessment of the validity and reliability of the participants' AcciMap 
analyses, the qualitative assessment of the similarities and differences between the 
participants' findings, the interviews with the participants and the observations of their 
discussion during the group AcciMap activity, provide insight into these questions. 
These findings will be described in the present chapter and their significance discussed 
in the next. First, however, the background to the accident studied in this case and the 
AcciMap analysis produced by the experts will be described, in order to familiarise the 
reader with the details of the accident. This background information is useful when 
considering the similarities between the participants' and experts’ results as well as 
those areas in which variability occurred.
8.1 Background to the Accident
The accident analysed in this case study was a train crash that occurred on 31 January 
2003, near Waterfall in New South Wales (NSW), Australia. The four-car passenger 
train, operated by the State Rail Authority of NSW (now RailCorp), was en route from 
Sydney to Port Kembla when it overturned at high speed and collided with rock
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stanchions and a rock face. The driver and six of the 47 passengers on board were 
killed and the train sustained extensive damage (Ministry of Transport, 2005: 5). Under 
direction from the Department of Transport, an investigation into this accident was 
conducted by the Rail Safety Regulator and NSW Police, with assistance from the State 
Rail Authority, the Rail Infrastructure Corporation and several expert consultants 
(Ministry of Transport, 2005: i). The report identified numerous factors that contributed 
to this crash, ranging from the immediate causes to contributory factors at the 
organisational and regulatory levels. A two-page summary of this report was used by 
the experts and participants for the purposes of this study.
8.2 The Experts’ Results
The experts’ AcciMap of this accident, compiled by two AcciMap experts working 
together to produce a combined analysis using the process described in the previous 
chapter, is shown in Figure 12. The causal factors are numbered for reference purposes.
The AcciMap produced by the experts indicates that the train crash analysed in this case 
study was the result of a range of physical, organisational and external causes. The 
bottom of the diagram shows that multiple deaths (1) and extensive damage to the train 
(2) occurred because the train collided with a rock face (3). As can be seen by 
following the arrows upwards, this happened because the train overturned (4) and 
because there was a rock face next to the track (5). The AcciMap indicates that the train 
overturned because it was travelling at a speed too great for the curve in the track (6), 
which occurred as a result of four separate factors.
One was that the driver was incapacitated (7) and was therefore not in control of the 
train. He was incapacitated because he had suffered a heart attack at the controls (8). 
He had a number of heart attack risk factors (9) which probably contributed to this 
occurrence. As can be seen at the Organisational level, the medical standards adopted 
by RailCorp were inadequate (10). As a result, the driver’s heart attack risk factors 
were not identified or addressed.
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External
Organisational
Physical / 
Actor Events, 
Processes & 
Conditions
5. Close proximity 
of rock face
Outcomes
7. Driver 
became 
incapacitated
8 Driver 
suffered heart 
attack
13 Driver was 
overweight
9. Driver had 
heart attack 
risk factors
11. Deadman 
system failed 
to activate
4. Train 
overturned
1. Multiple 
deaths
6. Speed too 
great for curve
2. Extensive 
damage to 
train
3. Collision 
with rock face
14. Guard failed to 
apply emergency 
brake
19. Inadequately 
resourced 
regulator
15. Guard did not 
identify that train 
was out of control
10 RailCorp 
medical standards 
inadequate
17. Inadequate 
RailCorp Safety 
Management System
20. RailCorp failed to 
fit task-linked vigilance 
control system
21. Task-linked vigilance 
control system not 
required by regulator
16. RailCorp did not provide 
effective guard training for 
emergency situations
12. RailCorp failed to address 
known problems with deadman 
system for overweight drivers
18. Inadequate regulatory 
auditing of RailCorp's 
Safety Management 
System
Figure 12 -  The Experts’ AcciMap
Another was that the deadman system (the system designed to apply the emergency 
brakes of a train if the driver becomes incapacitated), did not activate when the driver 
was incapacitated (11). The system did not activate for two reasons. Firstly, as can be 
seen at the Organisational level, RailCorp had not addressed the known problems with 
the deadman system for overweight drivers (12). The problem was that, if a driver
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weighs more than 110 kg, the weight of his or her legs alone can hold the deadman foot 
pedal in the engaged position so the system is not alerted to the driver's incapacitation 
(by the application of too much or too little pressure on the foot pedal) and the 
emergency brakes are consequently not applied. The deadman system was therefore not 
an effective defence against driver incapacitation when drivers exceeded this weight 
limit. Secondly, the driver of this train was overweight (13), weighing 118 kg at the 
time of the accident. These two factors together resulted in the failure of the deadman 
system to activate when the driver became incapacitated. RailCorp's inadequate 
medical standards (10) also contributed to this situation since the driver's weight issues, 
like his heart attack risk factors, were not identified or addressed.
A third cause of the train's excessive speed was that the guard on the train did not apply 
the emergency brake (14) because he did not identify that the train was out of control 
(15). As can be seen at the Organisational level, this probably occurred because 
RailCorp did not provide guards with effective training for emergency situations (16).
These three organisational problems (RailCorp's inadequate medical standards, 
RailCorp's failure to fix the problems with the deadman system and the ineffective 
training provided to RailCorp guards) would probably not have occurred if RailCorp’s 
Safety Management System (SMS) - “a documented and integrated set of procedures" 
designed to “identify, assess and control risks" (Ministry of Transport, 2005: 54) had 
been satisfactory. However, RailCorp’s SMS was inadequate in several respects (17) 
and these organisational problems were not identified, assessed or controlled. 
RailCorp's SMS would probably not have been (or not have remained) inadequate had 
it been properly audited by the Rail Safety Regulator. However, as can be seen at the 
External level, adequate regulatory auditing was not conducted (18) because the 
regulator did not have sufficient resources to perform this function (19).
In addition to these factors, the train’s speed was too great for the curve because 
RailCorp had not fitted a task-linked vigilance control system to this train (20) . Had it 
done so, the emergency brakes would have been applied shortly after the driver became 
incapacitated, and the train would not have travelled too fast for the curve and
27 Task-linked vigilance control systems “are designed to apply the brakes of a train if a driver fails to 
carry out certain tasks or acknowledge the system within a specified period of time” (Ministry of 
Transport, 2005: 36).
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overturned. However, as is evident at the External level, such systems were not 
required to be installed by the regulator (21). Had this system been required, it would 
most probably have been installed on the train involved in this accident.
On the basis of this analysis of the causes of the accident, a number of safety 
recommendations were proposed by the experts. These are listed in Figure 13.
Government
Recommendation 1: The Government should ensure that the Rail Safety Regulator is 
adequately resourced to effectively oversee the NSW train network, particularly with 
respect to auditing operator Safety Management Systems.
Rail Safety Regulator
Recommendation 2: The Rail Safety Regulator should review and improve its capacity 
to effectively audit operator Safety Management Systems.
Recommendation 3: The Rail Safety Regulator should consider mandating task-linked 
vigilance control systems in NSW trains.
RailCorp
Recommendation 4: RailCorp should review and improve its Safety Management 
System so that risks are effectively identified and addressed.
Recommendation 5: RailCorp should review and improve its medical standards, 
particularly with respect to the health of safety-critical personnel.
Recommendation 6: RailCorp should address defects with the Deadman system.
Recommendation 7: RailCorp should ensure that crews are adequately trained for 
emergency situations.
Recommendation 8: RailCorp should consider fitting task-linked vigilance control 
systems to its fleet of trains.
Figure 13 -  The Experts’ Safety Recommendations
The safety recommendations proposed by the experts address each of the organisational 
and external causes in their AcciMap, in accordance with the AcciMap guidelines. 
Recommendation 1 aims to address the inadequate resourcing of the Rail Safety 
Regulator by the government (cause 19). Recommendation 2 aims to address the
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inadequate regulatory auditing of RailCorp’s SMS (cause 18). Recommendation 3 
addresses the lack of requirement for task-linked vigilance control systems in NSW 
trains (cause 21). Recommendation 4 aims to address RailCorp's inadequate SMS 
(cause 17) by requiring RailCorp to re-examine and address the deficiencies in its SMS. 
Recommendations 5, 6 and 7 aim to address the specific SMS inadequacies that allowed 
this accident to occur (causes 10, 12 and 16). Finally, Recommendation 8 reinforces 
Recommendation 3 by requiring RailCorp to consider fitting task-linked vigilance 
control systems to their trains (addressing cause 20). This recommendation aims to 
encourage RailCorp to consider this additional defence against driver incapacitation 
even if a regulatory requirement is not in place.
Now that the experts’ AcciMap results have been described and an account of the 
accident under analysis has been provided, the extent to which the participants' analyses 
concurred with the experts’ findings, and with those of one another, in this study can be 
discussed. The participants’ AcciMap results are included in Appendix J.
8.3 Results of the Quantitative 
Assessment
The quantitative evaluation of the six participants’ AcciMap analyses from the first part 
of the case study allows an initial understanding of the validity and reliability of the 
participants’ results to be gained.
8.3.1 The Results of the Validity Assessment
The results of the validity assessment, obtained by comparing the individual 
participants’ results with those of the experts (using a content analysis process to reduce 
the subjectivity of the judgements) are outlined in Table 1.
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Table 1 -  Validity of the Participants’ AcciMap Analyses
Table 1 indicates that, in this case, none of the participants identified exactly the same 
causes or safety recommendations as the experts. Every participant identified extra 
causes and recommendations that were not present in the expert's analysis (see columns 
7 & 8) and/or failed to include all of the causes and recommendations that were present 
in the experts’ results (see columns 5 & 6). The validity of the participants’ causes, 
with reference to the experts’ results, was reasonably high (mean = 72.91%), with one 
participant achieving a level of 91.30% validity. The validity of the participants’ safety 
recommendations was somewhat poorer, with a mean rate of only 58.87% and with 
scores ranging from as low as 44.44% to a maximum of only 68.75%. Such findings 
cast doubt upon the assumption of AcciMap validity, since no participants in this study 
achieved 100% accurate results, in terms of the causes and safety recommendations they 
identified.
28 This rate of agreement takes into account only the causes that were common to the experts’ and 
participants’ AcciMaps (there were, on average, 18.7 causes common to both). The allocation of causes 
that were not in the experts’ results into AcciMap levels is therefore not reflected in these figures.
29 This rate of agreement takes into account only those safety recommendations that were common to the 
experts’ and participants’ analyses (there were, on average, 5.8 recommendations common to both). The 
validity of the attribution of safety recommendations that were not in the expert’s results to the 
responsible parties is not reflected in these figures.
'° As was the case for the allocation of causes into levels, this rate of agreement takes into account only 
the causes that were common to the experts’ and participants’ AcciMaps. The validity of the causal links 
between causes that were not in the experts’ results is therefore not reflected in these figures.
201
The levels of validity associated with the other variable AcciMap features were higher, 
on average, with some participants obtaining 100% valid results in these areas (see 
columns 1 & 2). The levels of validity in the causal links in the participants' AcciMaps, 
for instance, were highly variable, ranging from 43.48% to 100.00%. Five of the six 
participants failed to illustrate some causal relationships that the experts had identified 
(a mean of 3.7 links per AcciMap were missing) and four of the six inserted causal links 
between factors that were not causally linked in the experts' results (there was a mean 
of 2.7 extra links per AcciMap). The chance-corrected rates of agreement between the 
experts and the participants in causal links ranged from 0.55 -  1.00 (or “moderate” to 
“almost perfect” agreement according to Landis and Koch's (1977: 165) guidelines), 
with a mean value of 0.81. Thus the insertion of causal links between factors in the 
participants' AcciMaps was, on average, considerably more valid than would be 
expected by chance alone. Nevertheless, only one of the six participants depicted 
exactly the same causal relationships in his/her AcciMap as the experts. The rates of 
validity for allocating causes into the AcciMap levels and attributing safety 
recommendations to the relevant parties were also high, with some participants, again, 
obtaining results that were 100% correct (with reference to the experts’ findings) (see 
column 2). The chance-corrected rates of agreement for these items were, on average, 
within the range described by Landis and Koch (1977: 165) as “almost perfect” (see 
column 3).
Overall, these results indicate that, while some participants achieved 100% valid results 
in the areas of categorising their causes into levels, attributing recommendations to the 
responsible parties and inserting causal links between factors in their AcciMaps, this 
was not true for all participants, and no participant achieved entirely valid results in 
terms of the causes and safety recommendations they identified. The initial 
consideration of the results from the controlled case study in this research therefore 
indicates that none of the six participants produced results that were 100% valid (i.e. the 
same as those of the experts), suggesting that the implicit assumption that AcciMap 
results are valid is incorrect or in need of some modification.
As noted in the previous chapter, however, there were instances in this study in which 
certain causes and recommendations in the participants’ analyses were not strictly 
incorrect, in accordance with the accident report or AcciMap guidelines, but were not 
listed in the experts' results. 18 of the 24 causes in the participants’ AcciMaps that
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were not present in the experts' AcciMap were of this sort, as were five of the nine 
safety recommendations identified by the participants but not by the experts. This 
generally occurred when participants specified separately factors that were implied, but 
not explicitly listed, in the experts’ results. There were also instances in the study in 
which the causal links in the participants’ AcciMaps differed from those of the experts 
but were, again, not strictly incorrect. This occurred when the wording used by the 
participants was such that causes could be linked slightly differently from how the 
equivalent causes were linked in the experts’ results, but with a similar meaning being 
conveyed, or when the participants grouped multiple causes in one box and left the 
causal relationships between them implicit. In the above validity assessment, the 'extra 
detail* type causes and recommendations were treated as incorrect extra items and were 
not distinguished from the extra items that were invalid in terms of the AcciMap 
guidelines or accident report. Also, any causal link that differed from those in the 
experts’ AcciMap was considered incorrect in the above assessment. Before drawing 
conclusions about the validity of the approach, it is necessary to consider the validity of 
the participants’ findings when they are not penalised for including items that differ 
from those of the experts for these types of reason. Table 2 shows the results of the 
validity assessment if causes and recommendations of this ‘extra detail’ type are 
omitted, so that participants are treated as obtaining 100% valid results if they identify 
all causes and recommendations proposed by the experts, and include no additional 
causes or recommendations except those of the ‘extra detail’ type. It also shows the 
results obtained if the types of causal link highlighted above, that are not exactly the 
same as the expert’s links but that nevertheless convey essentially the same meaning, 
are omitted from the analysis .
The validity results for the allocation of causes into levels and the attribution of recommendations to 
parties are the same as those in Table 1 because these calculations do not take into account factors that are 
not common to the participants’ and experts’ analyses (including these ‘extra detail’ type factors).
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Table 2 -  Validity of the Participants’ AcciMap Analyses (omitting acceptable 
variations in causal links and ‘extra detail’ type causes and recommendations)
As is evident from Table 2, the validity of the participants' causes, safety 
recommendations and placement of causal links is somewhat higher when items of the 
‘extra detail’ type and acceptable variations in the causal links are not treated as 
incorrect. With these adjustments, one participant achieved 100% validity in the 
identification of causal factors from the accident report. Even with the exclusion of 
these types of causes, recommendations and links from the validity assessment, 
however, it is clear that consistently valid results were not obtained in this study since 
the majority of participants overlooked significant causal factors, safety
recommendations and causal links and/or included in their analyses factors that were not 
present in the experts’ results and which were also incorrect in accordance with the 
AcciMap guidelines or accident report.
Similar trends were observed in the validity assessment of the AcciMap produced by the 
group in the second part of the case study (see Appendix K). Table 3 shows the results 
of the validity assessment of the group AcciMap.
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100.00 1.00 ~ ~
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Table 3 -  Validity of the Group AcciMap Analysis
Table 3 indicates that the causes identified in the group analysis were similar in validity 
to the average individual results, with a small number of oversights and with the 
addition of several causes that were not present in the experts’ results. The validity of 
the safety recommendations proposed by the group was slightly higher than that of the 
average of the individual results, but there were still extra and missing 
recommendations in the group results. The group achieved 100% validity in the 
allocation of causes into AcciMap levels and the attribution of safety recommendations 
to the responsible parties, and had only one causal link different from the experts' 
AcciMap.
As was the case for the individual results, the validity of the group results was higher 
when causes and recommendations of the ‘extra detail' type were omitted from the
T9validity calculations “ (see Table 4).
'2 As before, the results for the allocation of causes into levels and the attribution of recommendations are 
the same as those in Table 3.
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C auses 88.64 ~ 1.5 1.0
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Table 4 -  Validity of the Group AcciMap Analysis (omitting acceptable 
variations in causal links and ‘extra detail’ type causes and recommendations)
Table 4 shows that the group results were higher than the average of the individual 
results in terms of the causes, safety recommendations and causal links when ‘extra 
detail' type causes and recommendations were treated as insignificant and omitted from 
the calculations. However, even with such adjustments, the group did not reach a level 
of 100% validity in these areas. Thus the participants’ results differed from those of the 
experts in significant ways, even in the group task.
8.3.2 The Results of the Reliability Assessment
The reliability assessment of the participants' results similarly indicated levels below 
100%. Table 5 shows the results of the reliability assessment, in which every 
participant's analysis of the accident was compared with that of every other participant 
in order to determine the extent to which results were independent of the particular 
analyst.
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Table 5 -  Reliability of the Participants’ AcciMap Analyses
Table 5 indicates that, in the case studied in this research, no two analysts identified 
exactly the same causes or safety recommendations in their analyses. On average, the 
participants agreed on 69.81% of causal factors, and only 40.77% of safety 
recommendations. The reliability with which the participants allocated causal factors 
into levels was somewhat higher, with one pair of participants agreeing completely on 
their judgements. The reliability with which participants attributed safety 
recommendations to responsible parties was higher still (94.44% on average), with 13 
of the 15 pairs of participants obtaining 100% agreement in their judgements46. The 
reliability with which they placed causal links between the causes in their AcciMaps 
was lower (see column 1), with only one pair of participants reaching 100% agreement.
As for the validity assessment, there were instances in the reliability study in which the 
wording used by the participants meant that slightly different causal links could convey 
essentially the same meanings. For instance, the absence of a task-linked vigilance 
control system in this accident could be depicted as causing the train to continue to
" As for the validity assessment, these rates of agreement take into account only those causes common to 
both AcciMaps in the pair under study (there were, on average, 19.2 causes common to each pair of 
AcciMaps).
'4 As above, this rate of agreement takes into account only the recommendations common to both 
AcciMap analyses under study (there were, on average, only 4.4 recommendations common to each pair 
of analyses).
° As above, this rate of agreement takes into account only those causes common to both AcciMaps in the 
pair under study.
6 These calculations took into account the categorisation of only those items common to both 
participants’ AcciMaps, with items that were coded as half present treated as present for the purpose of 
comparing the categorisation of these items by different participants. For the purposes of this assessment, 
the mean number of causes common to a pair was 19.2 and the mean number of recommendations 
common to a pair was 4.4.
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accelerate in one AcciMap and to exceed the overturning speed for the curve in another. 
As above, an assessment was made of the reliability with this type of variation excluded 
from the analysis .
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3. M ean  
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4. R ange o f  
reliability  
resu lts  
(kappa)
C ausal L inks38 74.37
56.25 - 
100.00
0.83 0 .6 8 -  1.00
Table 6 -  Reliability of the Participants’ AcciMap Analyses 
(omitting acceptable variations in causal links)
Table 6 illustrates that the reliability with which participants identified causal links 
between the causes in their AcciMaps was higher when the acceptable variations in 
links were not treated as differences. Still, however, only one of the 15 combinations of 
pairs of participants agreed completely in their placements of causal links. Thus, the 
overall results of the reliability assessment, like that of the validity assessment, indicate 
that, while identical results were observed between some pairs of participants in some 
areas of their AcciMaps, this was not always the case, and no pair of participants agreed 
entirely on the causes of the accident and the recommendations appropriate for 
addressing those causes.
The above findings indicate that, even after adjusting for acceptable variations, the 
participants' AcciMap results did not consistently concur with those of the experts or 
with those of one another. The findings demonstrate that differences did indeed exist 
between the AcciMaps produced by different analysts in this study, to the extent that no 
two analyses were identical. Before drawing conclusions about the validity and 
reliability of the AcciMap approach, however, it is worth investigating the nature of the 
variations observed in the analysts’ results in this case.
,7 Similar adjustments were not made, in the reliability assessment, for the inclusion or exclusion o f ‘extra 
detail’ type causes and recommendations because differences between participants’ AcciMaps in terms of 
these items were regarded as significant.
8 As above, this rate of agreement takes into account only those causes common to both AcciMaps in the 
pair under study.
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8.4 Results of the Qualitative 
Assessment
The findings of the quantitative assessment of validity and reliability outlined 
previously indicate that the participants’ results were similar to those of the experts and 
to those of one another to a reasonable degree, but that no two sets of results were 
identical. While the AcciMap produced by the group of participants was more valid 
than the average individual result in most ways, this too differed from the experts’ 
results in several respects. It is clear, then, that variations did exist in the AcciMaps 
produced by different analysts. As such, the question of the nature and significance of 
these variations arises. The qualitative analysis of the participants’ results, interviews 
with participants and observations of the group AcciMap activity, provide insight into 
the nature of this variability by indicating the areas in which high levels of validity and 
reliability were observed, as well as the types of variability that occurred (the 
participants’ individual and group results are included in Appendices B and K).
8.4.1 Commonalities
The qualitative examination of the AcciMaps highlighted a number of areas in which 
the participants’ analyses concurred, to a high degree, with those of the experts and 
those of one another. For instance, the overall structures of the AcciMaps produced by 
the nine participants (i.e. the six participants whose results were analysed quantitatively 
and the three initial participants whose results were used to refine the coding rules) were 
similar in several ways to those of the experts and one another. All but one participant 
included a cause relating to inadequate resourcing of the Rail Safety Regulator in the 
External level, linked to the lack of auditing of RailCorp’s SMS. All participants 
identified the lack of regulatory requirement for a task-linked vigilance control system 
in the External level, linked (directly or indirectly) to the absence of such as system in 
one of the levels below. All participants indicated that the absence of this system 
resulted in the train's continued acceleration, exceeding of the curve’s overturning 
speed or derailment (some participants included intermediate causes between these 
factors). All nine participants also identified three other organisational deficiencies, in 
the areas of the deadman system, guard training and medical standards (although some 
participants misinterpreted the problem with the medical standards, stating that it was
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the medical examiner or examination, rather than the standards, that was inadequate). 
Most participants depicted these three deficiencies as the direct or indirect result of the 
inadequate auditing of RailCorp’s SMS. All participants depicted organisational 
inadequacies in medical standards (or examiners or examinations, if they misinterpreted 
that part of the accident report) as resulting directly or indirectly in the driver's heart 
attack or incapacitation. All participants depicted a causal relationship between the 
guard's inadequate training and his failure to recognise that the train was out of control 
and/or apply the emergency brakes. All but one participant also indicated in their 
AcciMaps that the problems with the deadman system, at the Organisational level, 
resulted in the failure of the deadman system to activate (although some, again, inserted 
intermediate causes in their portrayal of this link). In addition, all participants showed 
that these three inadequacies contributed, directly or indirectly, to the train continuing to 
accelerate, exceeding the overturning speed for the curve or derailing. The participants’ 
AcciMaps were therefore broadly similar in shape in the sense that the four ‘strands’ of 
causes (relating to medical inadequacies, deadman system problems, training 
deficiencies and the lack of a task-linked vigilance control system) were present in 
every diagram, stemming from the same sorts of causes at the top of the diagram and 
resulting in the train’s excessive speed or derailment at the bottom. The results of the 
group AcciMap were very similar to those of the experts' in these respects, with each of 
the above commonalities between the participants’ and experts’ results also present in 
the group AcciMap.
Independently of the diagram shapes, similarities also existed in the causes identified by 
the participants. 12 of the 21 causes in the expert diagram were identified by all six of 
the participants whose results were analysed quantitatively, while 19 of the 21 expert 
causes were identified by four or more of the six participants. Only two of the eight 
safety recommendations in the expert list were identified by all six participants, 
although six of the eight recommendations were identified by four or more participants. 
Similar trends were true of the causal links in the participants’ AcciMaps. Five of the 
23 links identified by the experts were present in all six participants’ results (or nine, if 
arrows that are displayed slightly differently but convey essentially the same meaning, 
are treated as the same). However, 20 of the 23 expert links were identified by four 
participants or more (if these acceptable variations of causes are treated as the same).
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High levels of validity and reliability were also observed in the participants’ allocation 
of causal factors into AcciMap levels and the attribution of safety recommendations to 
parties. 16 of the 21 causes identified by the experts were allocated into the correct 
level (in accordance with the experts’ results) by all participants who identified them, 
while 20 of the 21 expert causes were placed in the correct level by all but one of the 
participants who identified them. Similarly, seven of the eight recommendations 
proposed by the experts were attributed to the correct party by all participants who 
included those recommendations in their lists.
The AcciMaps produced by the participants in this case study were therefore similar to 
those of the experts and to those of one another in the sense that the main ‘strands’ of 
causes, incorporating the four types of organisational deficiency involved in this 
accident, were evident in all AcciMaps and the majority of the experts’ causes, 
recommendations and causal links were identified by most participants. These 
similarities are reflected above in the high levels of validity and reliability observed in 
some areas of the quantitative validity and reliability assessment. There were also,
however, several ways in which participants’ analyses differed from those of the experts
and from those of one another.
8.4.2 AcciMap Variations
The in-depth analysis of the participants’ AcciMap analyses, as well as the data 
obtained from the interview and observation components of this controlled case study, 
highlight a number of differences in the AcciMaps produced by different analysts. 
These differences can be grouped into three main areas of variability: variability relating 
to errors, variability relating to misunderstandings and misinterpretations and variability 
relating to the subjectivity of some judgements involved in AcciMap analysis.
8.4.2.1 Variability relating to errors
Some of the observed variations in the participants’ analyses reflected errors in applying 
the AcciMap guidelines, failing to include all relevant factors, and failing to exclude 
irrelevant factors.
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Failure to Apply the AcciMap Guidelines Correctly
A failure to apply the AcciMap guidelines correctly was observed in the categorisation 
of participants' causal factors into the AcciMap levels, with several participants locating 
causes relating to the actual individuals involved in this accident (e.g. that the driver 
was found fit for duty and that the guard failed to identify that the train was out of 
control), in the Organisational level of the AcciMap. The AcciMap guidelines clearly 
specify that activities and conditions relating to the actors involved in the accident are 
part of the Physical/Actor Events, Processes and Conditions level and that the 
Organisational level “should not focus on the particular individuals involved." These 
variations therefore reflect the oversight of certain instructions in the guidelines. These 
items were placed in the correct levels in the group AcciMap.
A similar misapplication of the AcciMap guidelines occurred when a participant 
directed his/her safety recommendations to the wrong parties. As became evident 
during the interview, this participant attributed a correct recommendation to the 
incorrect body because s/he listed the recommendations next to the party they were 
intended to address, rather than the party responsible for carrying them out.
A failure to apply the guidelines correctly was also evident in the incorrect labelling of a 
cause as one that was not of practical significance, but was necessary for making sense 
of the accident, by one participant. This participant identified the acceleration of the 
train to top speed as such a factor but indicated in his/her AcciMap that a number of 
factors contributed to it. The AcciMap guidelines specify that these types of factor 
(depicted as ovals in the AcciMap diagram) are those that cannot conceivably be 
changed because it would not be sensible, plausible or possible to do so. The 
illustration of such a cause as the result of upstream causes that can be addressed 
therefore conflicts with the AcciMap guidelines. The participant highlighted this error 
when describing the causal chains in his/her AcciMap during the interview, suggesting 
that perhaps the upstream causes should have been linked to the train's excessive speed 
for the curve, rather than to this factor. Some errors in the participants' findings, then, 
were simply a result of their failure to pay close attention to the AcciMap guidelines 
while constructing their AcciMaps.
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Failure to Incorporate all Relevant Factors
A more common type of error in the participants’ analyses involved a failure to 
incorporate all relevant factors. Several of the causes in the experts' AcciMap were 
missing from the participants' analyses. For instance, causes relating to the close 
proximity of the rock face, the incapacitation of the driver and the inadequacy of 
RailCorp’s SMS, were missing from half of the participants’ analyses. Other causes, 
including the driver's heart attack risk factors, the guard's failure to identify that the 
train was out of control and the collision of the train with the rock face, were 
overlooked by two of the six participants. In the group AcciMap task, each of these 
factors was raised for consideration by participants in the initial stage of listing the 
causes of the accident and was immediately identified as relevant by all group members 
and subsequently included in the analysis.
In general, these omissions in the participants’ individual analyses were not of great 
consequence since the missing causes were often implicitly evident from the AcciMaps. 
Also, because most of these missing factors were Physical/Actor Events, Processes and 
Conditions-type causes, for which safety recommendations are not written, the omission 
of these causes generally did not affect the participants’ recommendations. An 
exception was the omission of the cause relating to RailCorp’s inadequate SMS, since 
the three participants who failed to incorporate this specific causal factor (because they 
instead identified that the Rail Safety Regulator had failed to identify the deficiencies in 
RailCorp's SMS) also failed to include in their safety recommendations that RailCorp 
should improve its SMS, while the three participants who identified the cause did 
propose this recommendation.
Other safety recommendations were overlooked by participants even when the related 
causes had been identified in their AcciMaps. For instance, a number of participants 
did not recommend that the Rail Safety Regulator should improve its capacity to audit 
operator SMSs effectively despite having identified, in their AcciMaps, that the Rail 
Safety Regulator had not conducted an effective audit of RailCorp’s SMS. There were 
several other instances in which safety recommendations were not written to address 
causes that were identified in the AcciMaps. This also occurred in the group AcciMap 
task, with the group identifying the inadequacy of RailCorp’s SMS as a cause but 
failing to include a recommendation for RailCorp to address this deficiency.
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A number of other causes and safety recommendations were not overlooked completely, 
but were considered to be only partly correct because they did not contain sufficient 
information to be treated as equivalent to the experts' causes and recommendations19. 
This occurred when, for instance, participants recommended that an area of deficiency 
such as RailCorp's SMS should be ‘assessed’ or ‘reviewed' but did not also recommend 
that the problems should be addressed or the situation should be improved. Such 
recommendations may not be sufficient to ensure that such an outcome could not occur 
again, as is required of safety recommendations in accordance with the AcciMap 
guidelines. This point was highlighted by one of the participants during the group 
AcciMap activity when a group recommendation had been made to “review medical 
standards for assessing safety critical personnel”. The participant pointed out that the 
recommendation should specify that the medical standards should also be “improved” 
because the point was that the medical standards needed to be more stringent. This 
change was consequently made to the recommendation, making it equivalent to one in 
the experts' list. In two of the other safety recommendations, however, the group failed 
to include sufficient information to ensure that a similar situation could not occur again 
and were therefore judged as having correctly identified only part of these 
recommendations (see Recommendations l and 8 in Appendix K).
There were also a number of causal links that were missed by multiple participants. For 
instance, the relationship between RailCorp's inadequate SMS and the deadman system 
inadequacies was overlooked by several participants, and one also missed the effects of 
the inadequate SMS on the guard training. The link between the driver’s weight and the 
failure of the deadman system to activate was also overlooked by some participants. As 
was the case for the causal factors, none of these links was missed in the group 
AcciMap because the participants realised these oversights when they were pointed out 
by other group members.
Inclusion of Incorrect Factors
A third type of error-related variation in the participants’ results involved the inclusion 
of factors that should not have been present. This occurred occasionally when 
participants included factors in their AcciMaps that were not causes of the accident at
,9 As noted in the previous chapter, participants were treated as having identified half the cause or 
recommendation on such occasions.
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all, such as the facts that RailCorp was aware of the problems with the deadman system 
or that a task-linked vigilance control system could have reduced the speed of the train. 
One participant realised such a mistake during his/her interview and stated that the 
factor was not actually a cause and should not have been included.
A more common error of this sort, however, was the inclusion of invalid causal links in 
the participants’ AcciMaps. The causal links stemming to and from the non-causal 
factors highlighted above were obviously invalid. However, there were also cases in 
which two causes were linked in the participants’ AcciMaps when they were not, in 
fact, causally related. Interestingly, six of the nine participants in this study inserted a 
causal link between the driver’s heart attack or incapacitation and the failure of the 
deadman system to activate, indicating that the system did not activate because the 
driver was incapacitated. This causal link is not logically correct since the deadman 
system would not have activated (i.e. applied the emergency brakes) whether or not the 
driver was incapacitated. It was not his incapacitation that caused the system not to 
activate but, rather, that the system was deficient for overweight drivers and that this 
driver was overweight. Two participants realised their error while describing this causal 
link in their AcciMaps during their interviews, indicating on reflection that the driver’s 
incapacitation did not actually cause the deadman system to be inactive. The others did 
not realise their error and described this link using the same sorts of language used to 
describe the valid causal links in their diagrams. For instance, some said that the driver 
was incapacitated, which “led to” or “resulted in” the failure of the system to activate. 
Another said that the driver was incapacitated at the controls “and the deadman system 
should have been activated, but it wasn't, so the train kept on travelling too fast around 
the curve.” In these cases, the error seems to represent some confusion, on the part of 
the participants, between causal and temporal relationships in the construction of their 
AcciMaps, with the factors being linked because they are conceptually related and 
because one occurred immediately before the other rather than because the former 
actually caused the latter. For other participants, it seemed that the causal logic was 
simply not thought through in enough detail. For instance, two participants indicated in 
their AcciMaps that the driver's heart attack or incapacitation resulted in the foot pedal 
remaining in the set position and the system therefore failing to activate. The flaw in 
this thinking is uncovered if the causal logic is checked, as required in Step 8 of the 
AcciMap guidelines (on pg. 291), by considering whether the foot pedal would not have 
remained in place had the driver not become incapacitated. If this extra step is taken, it
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becomes clear that, even if the driver had not been incapacitated, the foot pedal would 
have remained in the set position (because, intentionally or unintentionally, his legs 
were holding it there) and the deadman system would therefore not have activated. This 
checking process shows that the driver's incapacitation is not a cause of these latter 
events. Without checking the causal logic in this way, however, such incorrect links 
can appear on the surface to be valid.
A second type of invalid causal link occurred in participants' analyses when they 
depicted two factors as causally related if one or the other resulted in the occurrence of 
a third factor. For instance, one participant inserted a link in his/her AcciMap between 
the deadman system inadequacies and the driver’s weight, and justified this link during 
the interview by saying that if the deadman system had not been inadequate, the driver’s 
weight would not have been a problem and would not have caused the accident.
Weight over 110 
kg could fail to 
activate deadman 
system
(intennediate
cause)
Driver weighed 
118 kg
However, in accordance with this logic, there should also have been an arrow in the 
reverse direction since if the driver had not been overweight, the deadman system 
inadequacies would not have been a problem and would not have contributed to this 
accident. If arrows occur in both directions, however, the causal logic is violated 
because it is not possible to say that one factor caused the other. Clearly, these two 
factors are not causally related at all, but are both causes of a third factor (the failure of 
the deadman system to activate) which probably would not have occurred had either of 
those factors been otherwise. This situation is one in which, because two factors are 
both necessary for an outcome to occur, they are mistakenly assumed to be causally 
connected.
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Another participant included the following causal relationships in his/her AcciMap:
Deadman system 
failed to stop train
Guard did not take 
action to slow the 
train
Train continued 
to accelerate 
until it got to 
117 km/h
S/he explained these links, during the interview, by saying that if the train had not 
continued to accelerate, “the deadman system wouldn't have failed to stop the train 
because it wouldn't have needed to stop the train’' and the guard wouldn't have failed to 
take action to slow the train because he “wouldn’t have had to take the action". The 
logic behind these types of link, then, is that if A had not happened, B would not have 
failed to happen because the circumstances in which B would be required in order to 
prevent the accident from occurring would never have arisen (e.g. the guard would not 
have needed to apply the brake if the train had not been accelerating). However, this is 
not the same as saying that 'Had A not occurred, B would (probably) not have 
occurred', as is required in accordance with the AcciMap guidelines because, in these 
examples, the latter events would have occurred even if the former had not (i.e. the 
deadman system did not activate and the guard did not apply the emergency brakes 
when the train was accelerating, but the deadman system and the guard would also not 
have stopped the train had it not been accelerating). The confusion seems to arise as a 
result of focusing on the latter causes as failures rather than the absence of certain 
actions or events. The deadman system and the guard would not have stopped the train 
whether or not it had been accelerating, but these actions were only failures if the train 
was travelling too fast. As above, this logical error might have been picked up had the 
analyst carefully checked the causal logic by considering, for instance, whether the 
guard would have taken action to slow the train if the train had not continued to 
accelerate. Such checks might have alerted the analyst to conclude that the failure of 
the deadman system to stop the train and the failure of the guard to apply the emergency 
brakes actually resulted in the train’s acceleration, rather than the reverse scenario.
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$.4.2.2 Variability relating to misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations
A number of other variations in the participants’ AcciMaps reflected misunderstandings 
or misinterpretations of the accident report or the responsibilities of organisational and 
regulatory bodies.
Misinterpretation of the Accident Report
Several participants’ analyses contained extra and/or missing causes and safety 
recommendations because they had misunderstood the accident report. As highlighted 
above, for instance, several of the participants misinterpreted RailCorp’s insufficiently 
rigorous medical standards and highlighted instead that the medical examiners or 
examinations were inadequate. In fact, there was nothing in the report to indicate that 
the medical examination was in any way abnormal, nor that the examiner did anything 
other than follow the correct process during the examination. It may be the case that 
participants' interpretations of these events were affected by the fundamental attribution 
error - the common tendency for people to attribute an outcome to personal rather than 
situational factors -  in this case, to the person applying the standards rather than the 
standards themselves (The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology, 1983: 45). Another 
participant misinterpreted the inadequate resourcing of the Rail Safety Regulator and 
indicated instead that “the safety management system was stretched due to lack of 
resources”. This participant also misunderstood the inadequacy of RailCorp's SMS, 
suggesting that the problem was that SMS was not “adhered to”. In all but one of the 
above cases, these misunderstandings also carried across to the participants’ safety 
recommendations, since participants formed recommendations to address those factors 
rather than the correct causes. A misinterpretation during the beginning stages of the 
analysis, then, could result in recommendations for changes to areas that were not 
involved in this accident and may not be in need of improvement.
Misunderstandings of Organisational and Regulatory Processes
Other variations in the participants’ results reflected misunderstandings about the roles 
of the organisation and regulator involved in this accident. For instance, when forming 
safety recommendations to address the inadequate resourcing of the Rail Safety 
Regulator, three of the six participants recommended that the Rail Safety Regulator
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should review, acquire or reallocate its resources, rather than recommending that the 
Government should increase funding to this area. During the discussion on this topic 
during the group AcciMap activity, it was clear that this error simply reflected a lack of 
knowledge regarding the source of regulator funding, with some participants not 
knowing the process by which the regulator could obtain more resources and with one 
suggesting that, as a government agency, the Rail Safety Regulator could simply 
acquire additional government funding on request. Another participant listed the 
absence of a targeted audit of RailCorp’s SMS as an Organisational, rather than 
External cause for a similar reason, namely that s/he didn't know whether the Regulator 
or RailCorp was responsible for auditing the SMS40. Some variability in the 
participants’ results, then, seemed to reflect a lack of knowledge in this area rather than 
a misunderstanding of the accident scenario.
8.4.2.3 Variability Relating to Subjective Judgements
The third and most common type of variability observed in the participants’ AcciMaps 
related to areas of the analysis in which the participants were required to make 
subjective judgements. Observed variations of this type included some already 
introduced, such as those relating to the participants' choice of phrasing, decisions 
regarding whether to group together particular causes or recommendations or list them 
separately and to judgements of the required levels of detail. However, variations of 
this type were also observed with respect to judgements regarding practical significance 
and relevance, the selection of the outcomes, assessments of probability and the 
treatment of ambiguous information.
Phrasing
As is clear from the preceding sections, one type of variability observed in the 
participants’ AcciMap analyses related to their phrasing of causes and safety 
recommendations. Although there were a few instances in which participants used 
exactly the same wording as the experts or as one another to describe a particular cause, 
the vast majority of causes and all of the safety recommendations were phrased slightly 
differently by each analyst. As previously discussed, this non-standard use of wording
40 In fact, both parties would normally have some auditing responsibility. However, the accident report 
referred specifically to regulatory auditing in this instance.
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is not significant in itself since it is the meaning of these items, rather than the way in 
which they are phrased, that is important. In some instances in this study, however, the 
choice of wording affected other parts of the analysis. For instance, several participants 
indicated in their AcciMaps that the driver’s heart attack risk factors were not identified 
at his medical examination and listed this cause in the Organisational level. It seems 
likely that these causes were placed in the Organisational level because the factor was 
phrased as Organisational problem (relating to the medical standards), even though it is, 
in fact, specific to the particular driver involved in this event and should, therefore, have 
been listed in the Physical/Actor Events, Processes and Conditions level. When the 
driver’s risk factors were not phrased in terms of these medical standards (i.e. when the 
cause was phrased as “Driver had a number of heart attack risk factors”), the cause was 
usually placed in the lower level, in accordance with the AcciMap guidelines. In this 
case, the choice of phrasing therefore appeared to influence the level in which the cause 
was located. As was highlighted in relation to the adjustment of the quantitative 
validity and reliability results to adjust for acceptable variations in causal links, the 
precise wording used to identify a cause can also affect the causal links in the diagram, 
since a link between two factors in one AcciMap can convey the same meaning as a link 
between slightly different factors in another, if those items are phrased in a certain way.
Groupings
Variation in the participants’ results also occurred as a result of the number of causes 
identified in each box in the AcciMap and the number of actions proposed in each of the 
listed safety recommendations. For instance, some participants separated the driver’s 
heart attack risk factors and obesity into two boxes, as the experts did, while others 
grouped them together. Similarly, some listed the derailment and the collision of the 
train separately, while others combined them into one box.
The AcciMap guidelines do not specify criteria for determining when items should and 
should not be grouped together, aside from indicating that multiple similar items can be 
combined into a single general cause if appropriate and that each recommendation 
should address a single cause or problem area. As such, there is a degree of subjectivity 
involved in determining when to combine and separate factors. One participant 
commented, during his/her interview that s/he thought that each box should only contain 
one “idea” and should be separated if multiple ideas existed. Another commented that
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s/he had separated some causes, such as the driver's obesity and heart attack risk 
factors, into two boxes in his/her individual AcciMap but later realised that there was no 
need to separate them because it wouldn't “affect anything”. This was the criterion 
used by the group when forming these judgements in the group AcciMap activity. They 
decided that it was appropriate to include two causes in one box if doing so wouldn't 
have any effects, specifically if one cause “followed on" from the other and could 
therefore be written “in the same sentence" or if combining the causes would not affect 
the causal links to and from those factors. For instance, the group initially had the 
driver’s obesity and heart attack risk factors grouped in one box and then decided to 
separate them so that the obesity (but not the heart attack risk factors) could be linked to 
the failure of the deadman system to activate. Similarly, they initially grouped the 
train's derailment and collision with the rock face in one box, but later separated this 
into two boxes because the close proximity of the rock face affected only one of these 
causes.
Again, these variations are not inherently significant because the same meaning can be 
conveyed whether factors are separated or grouped together. In one instance, however, 
the way in which factors were grouped affected the AcciMap level in which a factor 
was located. One participant grouped the cause relating to RailCorp’s insufficiently 
rigorous medical standards in the same box as the driver's heart attack risk factors. This 
grouping affected the validity of the participant’s allocation of causes into levels, since 
the former should have been listed in the Organisational level while the latter belongs in 
the level below. The cause was placed in the Organisational level in the participant’s 
AcciMap, resulting in a situation in which one of the causes in that box was incorrectly 
allocated.
In other instances, the ways in which factors were grouped also affected the safety 
recommendations proposed. One participant grouped RailCorp's failure to address the 
deadman system deficiencies in the same box as its failure to reduce the limitations of 
that system. As a result, the participant proposed a single safety recommendation for 
RailCorp either to address the problem or to install a task-linked vigilance control 
system (to reduce the limitations of the system), rather than recommending that both 
actions be taken. Similarly, participants who split single causes (such as the inadequate 
regulatory auditing of RailCorp’s SMS and the regulatory failure to identify SMS 
deficiencies) into two boxes consequently formed two separate safety recommendations
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to address these causes. Because the guidelines specify that safety recommendations 
should be formed to address each cause that can be changed, controlled or compensated 
for, the number of boxes in Organisational and External levels of the AcciMap can 
affect the number and the nature of the safety recommendations proposed later in the 
analysis.
Detail
An additional type of variability in the participants’ AcciMaps related to the level of 
detail included in the analysis or the extent to which items were made explicit or left 
implicit. The AcciMap guidelines state that the causal links in AcciMaps should be 
self-explanatory and that a factor should be linked to another if the latter is a direct 
result, so that no other factor needs to be inserted between them to explain the link. 
Clearly, this is a matter of judgement, depending upon analysts’ interpretation of how 
much detail is necessary in order to ensure that the meaning is conveyed. From the 
participants’ results, it was evident that they did not consistently agree with the experts 
or with one another on the appropriate level of detail.
Several factors that were present in the experts’ results were only implied in the 
participants’ results, rather than actually listed as causes. For instance, three of the six 
participants whose results were analysed quantitatively did not identify the driver’s 
incapacitation in their AcciMaps, presumably because they felt it was implied from the 
driver’s heart attack. In some cases, the omitted causes were highlighted when the 
participants explained the causal links in their AcciMaps during the interviews. For 
instance, when explaining a link between the guard's failure to identify that the train 
was out of control and the train’s excessive speed, one participant indicated that the 
guard “could have stepped in at any point in the events and stopped the train from going 
too fast”, indicating that s/he felt this intermediate factor was implicit in the causes 
identified. None of these factors was left implicit in the group AcciMap because each 
was accepted by the group as a valid cause when it was raised for consideration by one 
of the group members.
Conversely, several factors that were implied in the experts’ results were made explicit 
by some participants. Several participants highlighted in their AcciMaps, for instance, 
that the train continued to accelerate, that the deadman system could be kept inactive by
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an overweight driver or that the driver failed to slow down for the curve, while such 
factors were left implicit in the experts’ results. The differences in detail between 
participants’ AcciMaps were quite significant in some cases, with some participants 
including up to three intermediate factors between causes that were linked directly by 
others. Many of these intermediate causes were incorporated into the group AcciMap 
when suggested by the participants who had identified them in their individual analyses. 
However, an effort was then made by the group to ensure that all items were necessary 
and one factor was removed from the group AcciMap because it was judged to be 
“covered” by one of the other factors.
Differences relating to levels of ‘explicitness' were also observed with respect to the 
causal links in participants’ AcciMaps, with some participants combining separate 
causes into single boxes and using terms such as ‘and’ or ‘therefore’ to indicate the 
causal relationships between the factors, rather than separating them and making the 
causal relationships explicit with arrows.
Differences in the degree of ‘explicitness’ in AcciMaps are not inherently significant 
because the same meanings can be conveyed with different levels of detail. Such 
variations can, however, affect the safety recommendations proposed since if ‘extra 
detail' type causes are included in the Organisational or External level, additional safety 
recommendations may be proposed to address those causes. For instance, one 
participant included the guard’s inadequate training in critical decision-making in 
his/her AcciMap and also specified an ‘extra detail' type cause that the guard was 
therefore not trained to recognise and stop speeding trains. As a result, the participant 
proposed two safety recommendations which were not significantly different and were 
not both required.
The inclusion of extra detail may also be significant if these extra details are potentially 
misleading. For instance, some participants indicated that, as a result of the failure to 
install a task-linked vigilance control system, the “brakes were not applied after the 
driver failed to carry out certain tasks”, that a “task-linked vigilance control system was 
not activated" or that this system did not slow down the train. Such causes, while 
intended simply to elucidate how the absence of this system resulted in the accident, are 
potentially problematic because they could be interpreted as indicating that such a 
system was present but failed to activate in this situation and is therefore deficient in
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some way. In general, however, the variations arising from the subjectivity of 
judgements regarding the amount of detail required in order to make the causal 
relationships clear resulted in different numbers of causes and different levels of 
description, but did not significantly affect the meanings conveyed by the participants' 
AcciMaps.
Judgements of Relevance and Practical Significance
Variations in the participants’ AcciMaps were also evident with respect to their 
judgements of practical significance and relevance. Firstly, variation was observed 
regarding whether or not participants judged that certain factors were of practical 
significance (i.e. whether or not it was thought that anything could conceivably be done 
about them). Specifically, several participants identified the driver’s obesity as a factor 
that was not of practical significance (and therefore depicted the factor as an oval in the 
AcciMap diagram), while others indicated that his obesity, like his heart attack risk 
factors, resulted from RailCorp's inadequate medical standards (in the sense that had 
these standards been sufficiently rigorous, the driver’s obesity and heart attack risk 
factors would have prevented him from passing his medical examination and these 
factors would therefore have been addressed or the driver would have been prevented 
from working in a safety-critical position). Variation existed, then, in whether 
participants identified this factor as one which could potentially be changed, controlled 
or compensated for, or one which could not, but which was nevertheless required so that 
the AcciMap made sense.
Differences were also observed with respect to judgements of precisely how causal 
factors should be addressed. For instance, one participant recommended that, in 
addition to RailCorp providing more rigorous medical standards and improving guard 
training, the Rail Safety Regulator should specify more rigorous medical standards and 
require rail companies to train guards to identify and respond to emergency situations. 
Two participants also recommended that RailCorp should consider imposing driver 
weight limits. Thus, participants’ results varied, not only in whether or not particular 
items were judged to be of practical significance, but also in how it was proposed that 
these items be addressed.
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Variations also existed regarding decisions about whether or not certain factors, which 
were judged not to be of practical significance, were necessary for making sense of the 
accident (and should therefore be included in the AcciMap). Like decisions regarding 
the level of detail required for explaining chains of causes within AcciMaps, these are a 
matter of judgement, with different analysts not necessarily reaching the same 
conclusions. For instance, several participants included the close proximity of the curve 
to a rock face as a separate cause in their AcciMaps, depicted as an oval because it was 
not of practical significance. Others just referred to this cause in other factors in their 
AcciMaps by indicating, for instance, that the train collided with a rock face next to the 
track. Others did not identify the cause at all, suggesting that they did not consider its 
inclusion necessary for making the accident scenario clear from the AcciMap. In the 
debate, during the group AcciMap activity, of whether or not this factor should be 
included, one participant pointed out that the cause was relevant “because the 
seriousness of the outcome might have been different if it [the train] didn't actually 
slam into the rock face”. The other participants agreed and consequently decided to 
include this cause in the group AcciMap.
The fact that the train was travelling around a curve was also identified in some, but not 
all, participants' AcciMaps. The consideration of this factor during the group AcciMap 
task involved a discussion of whether or not the train would have overturned had it not 
been travelling around a curve. The group ultimately decided that the train would 
probably not have overturned at this point had it not been travelling around a curve and 
that if the train had instead been travelling on a straight track and simply continued to 
accelerate, the guard might have identified the emergency situation and intervened. 
They therefore decided that the fact that the train was travelling around a curve was 
relevant in this case, and that the cause should be included in the group AcciMap.
One participant also identified the overturning speed of the particular curve as a cause in 
his/her individual AcciMap, indicating that had the curve had a higher overturn speed 
(i.e. had the curve not been so sharp), the train would probably not have derailed. This 
participant was not present for the group AcciMap activity and the cause was therefore 
not raised for consideration by the group. However, the fact that this cause was 
identified by only one of the nine participants again highlights that decisions regarding 
relevance and practical significance are judgements, with different people sometimes 
forming different conclusions.
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Selection of Outcomes
Variability in participants’ results also arose with respect to which causal factors were 
placed in the Outcomes level of the AcciMap. In five of the nine AcciMaps in this 
study, the topmost event in the Outcomes level was the derailment of the train. 
However, one AcciMap identified the train's excessive speed as the first of the 
outcomes, another identified the collision, and two identified the deaths and train 
damage as the top-most outcomes. The judgement of which factors were the negative 
outcome(s) of the accident scenario was therefore open to interpretation and was not 
initially agreed upon by all participants. In discussion during the group AcciMap task 
of which factor should be the first in the Outcomes level, however, all participants 
agreed that the derailment should be identified as the first outcome. The participant 
who had identified the excessive speed as the first outcome re-examined the AcciMap 
guidelines and concluded that the train’s excessive speed was in fact a precursor to the 
outcome of the train overturning, rather than the outcome in itself. Similarly, the 
participant who had identified the collision as the first outcome realised that the 
derailment should have been the top-most cause, stating that “once it’s overturned it’s 
gone" and that the subsequent collision, while affecting the amount of damage done, 
was not the accident itself. A participant who had identified only the train damage and 
deaths as outcomes similarly conceded, in hindsight, that “the train overturning is the 
accident'’ and these other factors were consequences of that accident. Therefore, 
although there had been initial disagreement on this point, all participants in the group 
AcciMap activity agreed, after a short discussion, on the cause that should be identified 
as the first outcome in the AcciMap.
Variations also existed in the participants’ original AcciMaps with respect to which 
factor(s) were identified as the final event(s) at the bottom of the diagram. In most 
AcciMaps, the deaths and train damage were listed as the final events, resulting from 
the collision of the train with the rock face. In one AcciMap, however, the collision was 
identified as the final event. Variations existed, then, in whether the ‘accident' was 
conceptualised as the physical crash alone, or as also incorporating the subsequent 
deaths and damages.
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Interpretations of Probability
Differences between participants' results were also evident with respect to the degree to 
which generalisations were made from the accident report, that is, the extent to which 
participants were willing to identify causal relationships which had not been explicitly 
identified in the accident report. Some participants proposed extra causal links in their 
AcciMaps because they generalised about the potential effects of certain causes. For 
instance, one participant identified the Rail Safety Regulator’s inadequate resources as a 
cause of the lack of requirement for a task-linked vigilance control system, stating, in 
interview, that the regulator had insufficient time to “push ... to legislate’' this system. 
Two participants similarly indicated that the inadequate auditing of RailCorp's SMS 
resulted in the lack of requirement for, or installation of, this system. Yet another 
indicated in interview that s/he wasn’t sure whether or not to include this link. These 
were occasions on which participants were more confident that certain factors caused 
others than were the experts and other participants.
There were also occasions in which participants were less confident about causal 
relationships than the experts were. For instance, several participants stated in interview 
that they were uncomfortable claiming that the driver’s heart attack was a result of his 
heart attack risk factors, although they did incorporate this link in their AcciMaps. One 
participant omitted the driver's heart attack from the list of causes altogether because 
s/he felt uncomfortable stating that the driver would not have had a heart attack had his 
risk factors been identified. The group AcciMap activity also included a number of 
discussions about whether or not particular factors could be claimed to be probable 
causes of others. One such debate focused on whether or not the driver’s obesity, as 
well as his heart attack risk factors, contributed to his heart attack. Although some 
participants, like the experts, were not comfortable in forming this link, the group 
decided that the driver’s obesity probably was causal to this event. The group also 
argued at length about whether or not the lack of a task-linked vigilance control system 
did, in fact, result in the train’s excessive speed, with some participants uncomfortable 
in claiming that the accident probably wouldn’t have happened had this system been 
installed. From the discussions, it was clear that these participants were uncomfortable 
with this link because it identified the absence of a system as a cause, rather than the 
failure of a system that was actually present. Thus those participants argued that “we 
don’t know ... for sure” whether or not the accident would have been prevented if that
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system had been present because, even if it had been present, it may not have stopped 
the train. Another participant pointed out, however, that one must assume, in the 
absence of contrary information, that such a system would have operated correctly had 
it been installed, and that the train would therefore have been stopped in this instance. 
The group consequently decided to include this link in their AcciMap.
Ambiguous Information
Finally, variations were observed in the interpretation of the accident report by different 
participants. Despite the efforts highlighted in the previous chapter to choose a simple, 
non-technical accident report to avoid misunderstandings relating to the content of the 
report, there were sections of the report that were interpreted differently by different 
participants. For instance, the report was ambiguous with respect to whether the Rail 
Safety Regulator conducted an inadequate audit of RailCorp’s SMS or in fact failed to 
audit RailCorp’s SMS altogether. Most participants identified the latter cause in their 
AcciMaps, although one pointed out in interview that s/he was not sure which was 
correct. Similarly, the report was unclear with respect to whether or not the driver’s 
obesity was related to RailCorp's inadequate medical standards and whether or not it 
contributed to his heart attack. Of the eight participants who identified these causes, 
four included both links in their AcciMaps while the other four included neither. The 
link between the driver’s heart attack and obesity was debated during the group 
AcciMap activity, with some participants indicating that the driver’s obesity and heart 
attack risk factors both contributed to his heart attack and others noting that “we don't 
know whether the heart attack happened because the driver was obese”. Nevertheless, 
the group decision was that both factors probably contributed to the driver’s heart attack 
and the link was therefore included (this was the only link in the group results that was 
different from those in the experts’ AcciMap). Different interpretations of the accident 
report also arose with respect to causal links between the outcomes of the collision. 
While most participants, like the experts, identified that the collision resulted in the 
fatalities and the extensive train damage, some participants indicated that the collision 
resulted in the damage to the train which, in turn, resulted in the deaths. The report did 
not specify whether it was the derailment, collision or train damage that resulted in 
these deaths (indeed, it is unclear whether the driver died instantly from his heart attack 
or became incapacitated and died later, as a result of the crash) and, again, the sequence 
of events was interpreted differently by different analysts.
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8.5 Conclusions
The qualitative and quantitative analyses of the participants’ individual and group 
AcciMaps indicate that, although the results were similar in many respects, there were 
also a large number of differences in the AcciMaps produced by different analysts. The 
nature of these variations has been discussed, with some relating to errors, some to 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations, and with a large number relating to aspects 
of the AcciMap approach involving subjective judgements. The significance of these 
variations, with reference to the questions of interest in this thesis, can now be 
discussed.
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9Discussion and Conclusions
The aim of this research has been to determine whether or not the AcciMap approach is 
a valid and reliable technique for accident analysis and to examine the nature and 
significance of variations in AcciMap results, if such variations do in fact exist. This 
chapter addresses these aims in light of the results of the controlled case study carried 
out in this research. It begins by discussing the validity and reliability of the approach, 
in light of the case study findings, and considers the nature and significance of the 
observed variations in AcciMap results. The implications of these findings are then 
examined and consideration is given to how these implications might be managed. 
Attention is then directed towards the limitations of the present study and to remaining 
questions that could be addressed in future research. The final section draws the 
conclusions of this thesis.
9.1 An Initial Consideration of 
Validity and Reliability in 
AcciMap Analysis
The main purpose of this thesis was to determine whether or not the AcciMap approach 
is, in fact, valid and reliable, as it is implicitly assumed to be. On the basis of argument, 
it was claimed that the method is appropriate for its intended purposes and is, in this 
sense, valid. The controlled case study was carried out to provide insight into the 
validity and reliability of the results obtained when this approach is used. The case 
study showed that there were broad commonalities between the participants' results and
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areas in which high levels of validity and reliability were achieved. It also showed, 
however, that the participants produced results that were identical neither to those of 
one another nor to those of the experts. A tentative conclusion to be drawn from this 
study, then, is that the implicit assumption that the AcciMap approach is a valid and 
reliable technique for accident analysis is in need of modification in light of the 
existence of a counterexample.
However, firm conclusions about the validity and reliability of AcciMap results cannot 
be drawn until the nature and significance of the observed variations are considered, 
since, if the observed variations in results are not of any consequence, it may be the case 
that AcciMap results are, in fact, valid and reliable in all ways that matter. The second 
question proposed in this thesis must therefore be addressed before the first can be 
answered properly.
9.2 The Nature and Significance of 
AcciMap Variations
The controlled case study showed that differences did indeed exist in the results of 
AcciMaps produced by different analysts. The nature of this variability was described 
in the previous chapter. The significance of these variations has not, however, been 
considered in depth. In order to examine the significance of AcciMap variations, it is 
necessary to determine precisely what ‘significant' means in this context. The criteria 
distinguishing significant AcciMap variations from those that are insignificant have, in 
fact, been implicitly identified in the previous chapters. The first criterion relates to 
whether or not the particular variation affects the meaning that is portrayed by an 
analysis. Recall that some types of AcciMap variation were judged as insignificant and 
excluded from the analysis even before the case study results were assessed, such as 
whether a causal factor is placed on the right or left side of an AcciMap or whether it is 
placed high or low within a particular level. These variations were considered 
insignificant because there is no meaning associated with the horizontal axis in 
AcciMaps, or with the vertical axis within each AcciMap level, so that the particular 
placement of a cause in these respects does not affect an AcciMap’s meaning. Other 
variations were considered potentially insignificant for the same reason and were
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excluded from a portion of the analysis at a later stage. These included causes and 
recommendations of the ‘extra detail’ type, which were made explicit in the 
participants' results but left implicit in those of the experts, and causal links that 
differed from those of the experts (in terms of the precise factors they were inserted 
between or whether they were made explicit or left implicit) but nevertheless conveyed 
essentially the same meaning.
The latter types of variation were, however, considered significant when they could 
potentially alter the practical consequences of an accident analysis, such as when the 
inclusion of ‘extra detail' type causes resulted in the formulation of additional and 
unnecessary safety recommendations. Thus the second criterion distinguishing 
significant from insignificant variations was whether or not those variations would 
potentially alter the outcomes of an analysis in terms of the safety actions implemented 
after the accident, for instance. AcciMap variations are considered to be ‘significant’, 
then, only when they change the meaning that is portrayed by an analysis and/or when 
they alter the outcomes that would result from the analysis in practice. Of interest when 
considering the validity and reliability of AcciMap results is whether or not the 
participants' results differ from those of the experts and from those of one another in 
any significant respects.
In the following section, consideration is given to whether the types of variability 
observed in the case study are significant or insignificant in these terms. However, it is 
also useful to examine AcciMap variations in light of another matter, namely whether 
these variations are potentially avoidable or if they are largely unavoidable^ . The 
decisions of whether or not variations are significant and inevitable are somewhat 
subjective and uncertain. However, consideration of both issues is important with 
respect to determining the validity and reliability (or otherwise) of the approach, since, 
if all AcciMap variations are insignificant and/or avoidable, it may be the case that the 
approach could indeed be valid and reliable, in all significant ways, if the required 
alterations were made. If, however, variations exist that are significant and that also 
cannot be eliminated, it must be concluded that AcciMap results are not always (and 
cannot be expected to be) valid and reliable, and the implications of this finding must be
41 ‘Unavoidable’ in this sense does not mean that it is impossible for analysts to reach consensus but, 
rather, that it cannot be ensured that analysts working independently will produce identical results.
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considered. In order to determine which scenario represents the true situation, the types 
of variation observed in the case study are examined in terms of these two criteria.
9.2.1 Insignificant and Potentially Avoidable 
Variations
One type of variation highlighted in the case study is of little concern with respect to the 
validity and reliability of the approach, since it is both insignificant and potentially 
avoidable. This is the occasional grouping of linked causal factors within a single box 
in the AcciMap, with the causal relationships specified by use of words such as ‘and' or 
‘therefore’. This type of variation is not significant because the same meaning is 
portrayed whether the causal link is depicted as an arrow or indicated in words. 
However, if one wanted to avoid this type of variation, this could be done with the 
addition of a specification in the guidelines that causes should be split into separate 
boxes in such circumstances, with the causal relationships depicted only as arrows. 
This instruction could be reinforced by prohibiting the use of terms indicative of causal 
relationships, such as ‘therefore’, ‘as a result' and ‘consequently’, and requiring that 
analysts check that their use of words such as ‘and', ‘then’ and ‘subsequently’ do not 
imply such relationships.
9.2.2 Significant and Potentially Avoidable 
Variations
A more common class of AcciMap variation observed in the case study includes those 
variations that are significant, but also potentially avoidable. Variations relating to the 
incorrect application of the AcciMap approach (such as the incorrect allocation of 
causes into AcciMap levels and safety recommendations to responsible parties) are 
significant in terms of both the meaning conveyed by an analysis and its practical 
implications, because they mean that different bodies within the system are depicted as 
responsible for the causes and that safety recommendations can be directed at 
inappropriate parties. Similarly, variations relating to the inclusion of factors that are 
not causes, and the inclusion of causal links between factors that are not causally 
related, are significant because they affect the meaning conveyed in the analyses and 
can also potentially result in the formulation of unnecessary safety recommendations.
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Variations relating to misunderstandings of organisational and regulatory processes are 
significant for similar reasons, namely that they can result in inappropriate safety 
recommendations or appropriate recommendations directed towards parties that do not 
have the capacity or responsibility to address them. None of the above variations, 
however, is inevitable, since all could probably be avoided by increasing the amount of 
training provided to the analysts or by having experienced AcciMap analysts, rather 
than novices, perform the analyses. These variations appear to reflect somewhat 
obvious mistakes that experienced analysts would probably not make, rather than areas 
of inherent variability within the approach.
Another significant variation is the failure on the part of some participants to include 
sufficient information in their causal factors and safety recommendations. This type of 
variation is significant both because it can result in ambiguity of meaning and because it 
can give rise to safety recommendations that are not specific enough to ensure that the 
problem areas would actually be addressed. Again, this type of variation is not 
necessarily inevitable as it could perhaps be avoided with the inclusion of additional 
guidance in the AcciMap guidelines on the appropriate degree of specificity for these 
items, or by increasing analyst training or using more experienced analysts.
As will be discussed below, variability in the ways in which causal factors and 
recommendations are grouped is usually insignificant. However, as noted previously, 
there was one instance in the case study where two causes that should have been placed 
in different levels of the AcciMap were combined within a single box, resulting in one 
of these factors being incorrectly placed. Such a situation potentially affects the 
meaning portrayed by an AcciMap, since the level within which a cause is placed 
indicates the part of the sociotechnical system with the potential to control that factor. 
As above, however, this type of variability could potentially be avoided through the 
revision of the AcciMap guidelines, this time instructing analysts not to group together 
factors that belong in different AcciMap levels.
Similarly, variation resulting from the inclusion of different levels of detail is normally 
insignificant. However, such variations are significant when a reduction in detail results 
in the omission of a relevant factor. This occurred in the case study when analysts 
identified, as a cause of the accident, the fact that the deficiencies in RailCorp's SMS 
were not identified, but failed also to point out that RailCorp's SMS was deficient.
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Discussion of these factors in the group AcciMap activity indicated that participants felt 
that the difference was one of phrasing and that either form was appropriate since both 
highlighted the SMS deficiencies. This variation is, however, significant since the 
factors represent different deficiencies which should be addressed by different parties 
(the inadequate auditing of the SMS should be addressed by the regulator, while the 
inadequate SMS is RailCorp's responsibility). Again, this form of variation could 
probably be avoided if guideline revisions were made specifying the importance of 
explicitly identifying every area of deficiency that contributed to an accident, even when 
such deficiencies are implicitly identified in the AcciMap
The above types of variation, while potentially significant with respect to the meanings 
and practical outcomes of AcciMap analyses, seem to reflect the use of novice analysts 
(with minimal training) in the current study and areas of the guidelines that could 
benefit from further revision, rather than inherent variability within the AcciMap 
approach. Of course, further studies would be required in order to determine whether 
these types of variation would indeed be eliminated if these changes were made. 
However, it appears likely that these variations are potentially avoidable.
9.2.3 Insignificant and Unavoidable Variations
Several other types of AcciMap variation are probably not avoidable (at least without 
negatively affecting the analysis process) but are not significant. Variability in 
phrasing, for example, is unavoidable without predefining the wording that can be used 
and thereby potentially limiting the causes and recommendations that can be identified 
in an analysis. Without such restrictions, it is not possible to eliminate variation in 
wording since the same concept can be phrased in a variety of ways and, as was 
highlighted in this study, different analysts rarely use precisely the same words to 
identify a cause or recommendation. However, while this variability presents problems 
with respect to assessing the degree of similarity between AcciMaps, it affects neither 
the meanings conveyed nor the actions taken after an analysis, and is thus insignificant 
in these respects.
Similarly, variations in the ways in which factors are grouped cannot be avoided 
without affecting the analysis process negatively. Such decisions are matters of 
judgement, with different analysts not necessarily agreeing. This type of variation
235
could potentially be avoided by encouraging analysts to include only one factor per 
AcciMap box, by instructing them to separate causes wherever possible and to check 
their use of words such as wand' and ‘as well as’ to ensure that factors that could be 
separated have not been grouped together, for instance. However, this sort of guidance 
might conflict with the instruction in the AcciMap guidelines to combine causal factors 
where possible to simplify the diagram and to assist in the identification of general 
problem areas. However, unless the specific way in which factors are grouped results in 
the incorrect placement of causes within AcciMap levels, in the way highlighted above, 
this type of variation is not significant and therefore does not need to be eliminated.
Variations in the level of detail included in an analysis seem also to be unavoidable, 
since such decisions rely on the analyst’s subjective judgement of how much 
information is needed to form a direct link that others will be able to follow. As the 
case study showed, analysts can differ greatly in these judgements. Again, however, 
such variations are largely insignificant in AcciMap analysis since the same information 
can be conveyed at different levels of abstraction and the same safety actions can be 
taken whether recommendations are specified simply or in detail. Of course, these 
variations are significant where additional detail results in the inclusion of factors that 
should not be present (e.g. non-causes or unnecessary safety recommendations), or if 
they result in the failure to incorporate relevant causes or recommendations, as 
highlighted above. Where differences in detail do not result in these additional 
variations, however, they are largely insignificant.
The above types of variation, then, can probably not be eliminated entirely from 
AcciMap analyses. However, since they are of no significance, they need not be 
eliminated and can instead be treated as acceptable variations within the method. If all 
AcciMap variations were acceptable in these ways, or were not acceptable but could be 
avoided with changes to the analysis process, the AcciMap approach could be 
concluded to have the potential to be valid and reliable in terms of enabling different 
analysts to produce results that are the same as those of one another and to those of 
AcciMap experts, in all w>ays that matter. However, as will be seen below, not all of the 
types of variation arising in AcciMap results are of this type.
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9.2.4 Significant and Unavoidable Variations
The case study in this research highlighted several kinds of variation that are both 
significant and largely unavoidable. The existence of such factors is of critical 
importance with respect to the validity and reliability of AcciMap analyses because it 
means that there are some kinds of AcciMap variation that affect the meanings 
portrayed by analyses and/or the practical consequences of analyses, but which cannot 
be eliminated. Some significant forms of variation observed in the case study may, in 
fact, be reducible to the extent that they would occur infrequently, but not to the degree 
that they could be eliminated completely. Others appear to be both irreducible and 
unavoidable, representing areas of inherent variability within the AcciMap approach. 
These will be discussed separately before their implications are considered.
9.2.4.1 Potentially Reducible Variations
Accidental Omission of Relevant Factors
One significant, but potentially reducible, type of AcciMap variation observed in this 
study related to accidental omissions, that is, the analyst's failure to include all relevant 
causes, safety recommendations and causal links in an analysis, simply as a result of 
failing to conceive of these factors or links. Such variations are significant in terms of 
the meaning portrayed by an analysis, since omissions result in an incomplete account 
of the accident, and in terms of the practical outcomes of such analyses since if, for 
instance, important safety recommendations are absent from an analysis, the necessary 
corrections will not be made.
The occurrence of omissions in AcciMap analysis may be reducible to a degree. For 
instance, guideline revision specifying the importance of ensuring that causes and safety 
recommendations are phrased in sufficient detail to make clear what went wrong (so 
that the relevant problems would be corrected) may reduce instances in which analysts 
overlook, or only partly identify, factors because they do not include enough 
information. Also, increasing the amount of accident data and time available to analysts 
might assist in the identification of relevant items that they may otherwise have missed. 
The omission of such factors may also be reducible by allowing analysts to work in 
teams, since the pooling of ideas may enable factors that were overlooked by one
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analyst to be pointed out by another. There was some indication in the group AcciMap 
activity that this can occur, with participants seeming to realise oversights in their 
individual AcciMaps when these factors were highlighted by others. Finally, the use of 
experienced analysts, rather than novices, is likely to reduce such omissions as analysts 
with experience in the types of recommendation that are feasible, practical and 
effective, and those that are not, are more likely to identify the safety recommendations 
that are appropriate to address a given accident.
It seems unlikely, however, that any measure could eliminate the chance of analysts 
occasionally overlooking relevant factors. The identification of relevant causal factors 
is not always straightforward. It sometimes involves making deductions from 
incomplete data or identifying absent factors that, had they been present, would have 
prevented the accident from occurring. Similarly, the identification of all appropriate 
safety recommendations requires that the analyst has correctly identified the problem 
areas in the first part of the analysis and then identifies corrective actions that are 
suitable for addressing those factors, while the inclusion of all relevant causal 
connections requires that the analyst recognises all causal relationships between the 
identified factors. In each of these areas, omissions are possible as a result of analysts 
failing to recognise the contribution of some causes, to think of how problems could be 
dealt with or to realise the relationship between factors. Thus, as Fischhoff, Slovic and 
Lichtenstein (1978: 333) have suggested can occur in fault tree analysis42, omissions 
can simply occur because “the designer lacks the appropriate knowledge or 
imagination'’. While changes to the analysis process, such as additional time and more 
detailed accident information, may assist analysts to realise their oversights, they are 
unlikely to prevent omissions from ever occurring. Similarly, the opportunity to work 
as a group may result in the recognition and rectification of oversights but cannot 
guarantee that all omissions will be identified, since it is always possible that certain 
factors will be overlooked by all members. Thus, while AcciMap variations relating to 
omissions may be reducible to a degree, it is unlikely that any changes could completely 
eliminate this type of variation.
42 Fault tree analysis involves the arrangement of “potential sources of trouble” into a tree-shaped 
diagram to assist in system design and risk analysis, for example (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1978: 
330).
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Misunderstandings of Accident Data
A second type of significant variation highlighted in the case study concerned analysts’ 
misunderstandings of the accident data. This occurred, for instance, when analysts 
identified RailCorp's medical examiners as inadequate, rather than its medical 
standards, as specified in the accident report. This type of misunderstanding is 
obviously significant with respect to the meaning portrayed by an analysis because it 
results in an incorrect depiction of the factors contributing to an accident. It is also 
significant for practical reasons, since it could result in causal factors that should be 
identified and addressed being overlooked, while factors that were not causal to an 
accident are addressed unnecessarily.
This type of variation may also be reducible to a degree by allowing analysts access to 
additional data so that they can develop a more comprehensive understanding of the 
accident and perhaps, again, by allowing them to work in groups so that 
misunderstandings can be discussed and resolved. The use of analysts with extensive 
knowledge and experience of the relevant domain, rather than novice participants, 
would probably also reduce the likelihood of such misunderstandings. In addition, the 
inclusion in the AcciMap guidelines of a section highlighting the importance of 
obtaining a precise understanding of the causes of an accident and ensuring that the 
wording used in the analysis reflects those factors exactly and unambiguously may 
assist in reducing this variability, since it is possible that some of the misinterpretation 
evident in this case study may have been avoided if analysts had paid more attention to 
these areas. It seems unlikely, however, that the situation in which analysts 
occasionally misunderstand accident data could ever be eliminated entirely. The 
process of identifying causal factors from accident data necessarily involves the sorting 
through and interpretation of those data by the analyst and the possibility of occasional 
human error remains.
Interpretations of Ambiguous Data
Variability in AcciMap findings stemming from the ambiguity of accident data itself is 
also, to a large degree, significant and unavoidable. Unlike variability relating to 
oversight and misunderstandings, which are unavoidable because the potential for 
human error cannot be eliminated, variations of this sort are largely inevitable simply 
because differences in the interpretation of data are possible when ambiguity exists, and
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accident data are often ambiguous. This ambiguity may occur, for instance, when the 
wording used is unclear and the meaning must be inferred by the analyst, when the 
information is open to several interpretations or when analysts have to deduce the facts 
from incomplete information. Such ambiguity was evident in the accident report used 
in this study regarding information such as whether the auditing of RailCorp's SMS was 
performed inadequately or not at all, and whether or not the driver’s obesity was related 
to RailCorp’s inadequate medical standards. Different analysts can form different 
conclusions in such circumstances, potentially affecting both the meaning portrayed by 
their analyses and the safety recommendations proposed. One might expect that 
AcciMap variations of this type could be reduced if analysts had access to all of the 
existing data about an accident, so that areas of ambiguity in one section could be 
clarified with reference to information from other areas. However, this would require 
that areas of ambiguity were recognised as such (to prompt resolution of the ambiguity), 
which may not always be the case. The group AcciMap activity in the current research 
revealed, for instance, that participants generally did not realise that parts of the 
accident report were ambiguous until interpretations different from their own (but 
equally plausible in accordance with the report) were proposed by other group 
members. However, even where areas of ambiguity in the accident data are recognised 
(perhaps assisted by use of a group approach) these may not necessarily be resolved 
with reference to additional accident data. Accident information often contains areas of 
uncertainty and incompleteness (and sometimes even conflicting information) as a 
result of the retrospective and deductive nature of accident investigation and, where 
such ambiguity exists, the opportunity for different interpretations of the data remains. 
Thus, while variability stemming from ambiguous accident data might be reduced by 
providing analysts with access to additional information and with the use of a team 
approach (to increase the likelihood that areas of ambiguity are recognised), the inherent 
ambiguity of some types of accident data means that room for different interpretations 
of the facts by different analysts cannot always be eliminated.
Selection of Outcomes
An additional type of variation observed in the case study concerned the selection of the 
factors located in the ‘Outcomes’ level of the AcciMap. Variations of this sort are not 
significant with respect to practical consequences but are crucial in terms of the 
meaning portrayed by an analysis, since the factors identified as outcomes in the
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diagram indicate what the accident entailed as well as what the AcciMap seeks to 
analyse and prevent from recurring. Variation of this sort occurs because the decision 
as to which factors constitute the ‘negative outcomes’ in an accident is a matter of 
judgement. Different analysts may not agree on the choice of outcomes, as was clear in 
the case study where some participants identified the derailment and collision of the 
train as the top-most outcome in their AcciMaps, while others identified the deaths and 
damages as the only outcomes.
Precise specification (for the purpose of attempting to reduce this type of variation) of 
the types of factor that should be identified as the outcomes cannot be provided without 
further complicating the issue and reducing the general applicability of the AcciMap 
approach. Consider, for instance, if analysts were instructed to identify the negative 
outcome (the accident itself), based on the type of definition outlined in Chapter 2 (i.e., 
an event that takes place within a complex sociotechnical system, which has multiple 
systemic causes and which results in damages to people, objects, the environment or the 
system). Attempts to define the critical event in this way are likely to run into the same 
problem as highlighted by Rasmussen and Svedung (1997: 14) when the accident is 
defined in terms of the “release of the hazard'’ the system is designed to control. The 
problem is that there is often more than one event that fits this description (Rasmussen 
& Svedung, 1997: 14). In Rasmussen and Svedung’s (1997: 14) example of an accident 
involving the loss of control over a vehicle carrying dangerous goods, the loss of control 
of the vehicle could be identified as the accident or critical event (in accordance with 
the definition proposed in Chapter 2), since it had multiple systemic causes and resulted 
in damages to the vehicle and the loss of containment of goods, with subsequent 
environmental consequences. Alternatively, the loss of containment could be identified 
as the critical event, since it too had multiple systemic causes and resulted in 
environmental damages. However, any efforts toward reducing this ambiguity by 
listing the types of event that should be identified as the critical events (e.g. collisions, 
explosions, fires or the release of dangerous substances) will not provide guidance for 
the identification of outcomes in domains in which such analyses have not previously 
been used, and are also problematic in accidents involving more than one of these 
events (such as aircraft crashes involving a subsequent fire or accidents in which the 
release of dangerous substances causes an explosion).
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Variations in the selection of outcomes by different analysts could be reduced to a 
degree if it was specified, for instance, that the event judged to constitute the accident or 
incident should be located as the top-most event in the outcomes level, with any deaths, 
injuries or damages resulting from the event located below. Such measures might 
reduce the likelihood of analysts identifying the consequences of the accident, rather 
than the accident itself as outcomes, or from identifying precursors to the accident in 
the Outcomes level. However, the decision of precisely which event(s) in an AcciMap 
represent(s) the accident must be left to the analyst's judgement. Different analysts will 
often reach the same conclusions, since there are a limited number of factors that could 
sensibly be identified as the outcomes of an analysis. However, since there may be 
more than one plausible option and since the selection of outcomes relies on analyst 
intuition, variation in the precise events identified as the outcomes by different analysts 
probably cannot be avoided entirely.
9.2.4.2 Irreducible Variations
Several other significant variations in AcciMap results appear to be entirely irreducible. 
These relate to areas of the analyses in which decisions are a matter of analyst 
judgement and cannot be made by following a set of instructions which lead 
automatically to the correct answers. As the case study indicated, analysts do not 
necessarily reach the same conclusions in such circumstances.
Judgements of Practical Significance
One such type of variation related to analysts’ judgements of whether or not particular 
items in an AcciMap were of practical significance, that is, whether or not it was judged 
that anything could conceivably be done to address them. This kind of variation was 
observed in the case study when some participants identified the driver’s obesity as a 
‘fixed’ condition that was not of practical significance, while others considered this 
factor to be related to RailCorp’s insufficiently stringent medical standards, which could 
be improved. Variations of this kind are significant, both in terms of the meaning 
portrayed by an analysis (since the former indicates that this was an unavoidable factor 
while the latter highlights it as the result of other factors that could be addressed), and in 
terms of the corrective actions proposed (since safety recommendations will only be 
made to address causal factors that are judged to be correctable).
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Such variations cannot, however, be avoided entirely since the decision as to whether or 
not a factor is of practical significance cannot be determined without human reasoning 
and judgement. It requires that decisions be made regarding whether or not a factor is 
correctable at all and also whether the corrective actions under consideration are 
sensible and practical to implement. The former depends upon the analyst’s capacity to 
conceive of and evaluate appropriate solutions, which may be affected by factors such 
as his or her imaginativeness and problem-solving skills as well as his or her knowledge 
of how similar situations have been addressed in the past and the effectiveness of those 
solutions. Similarly, judgements of the appropriateness of potential corrective actions 
involve numerous considerations relating to whether the implementation of the 
recommendation would be feasible, what the implementation would involve, whether it 
would address both the specific problem and other similar problems that might arise in 
the future, as well as what the positive and negative consequences might be. 
Judgements of practical significance cannot be made without such considerations, yet 
these considerations are not always straightforward and different analysts may not form 
the same conclusions. For example, the group AcciMap activity involved a lengthy 
discussion regarding whether or not factors such as the curve in the track and the rock 
face next to the track were of practical significance, with the different participants 
initially having different ideas both of how these problems could be addressed and 
whether or not the proposed solutions were appropriate.
Judgements of Appropriate Safety Recommendations
A related and similarly unavoidable form of variation concerned precisely how causal 
factors were addressed. As was evident in the case study, different analysts did not 
always propose the same safety recommendations to address a particular deficiency. 
For instance, some analysts proposed multiple recommendations to address deficiencies 
that others had addressed with single recommendations. Such variations are obviously 
significant in terms of the practical outcomes of an analysis because they affect the 
corrective actions implemented after an accident. As highlighted in Chapter 4, 
however, there is no structured process to allow safety recommendations to be 
developed in an automatic or unthinking manner. The determination of the most 
appropriate solutions depends on the problems uncovered in the analysis and, while 
information may be available about how some factors have been addressed in the past 
(and the effectiveness of those solutions), no information exists about how those causes
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should be addressed in different circumstances or how causes that have never before 
been identified should be addressed. The selection of the most appropriate solutions for 
the precise problems uncovered in an analysis must necessarily be left to human 
judgement, permitting the possibility for analysts to form different conclusions.
Judgements of Relevance
Another form of significant and inevitable variation involved judgements about whether 
or not factors that were not of practical significance should nevertheless be included so 
that a complete and coherent analysis was produced. Such judgements were made in 
the case study regarding the inclusion of factors such as the close proximity of the rock 
face, the curve in the track and the curve's overturning speed. Variations of this kind 
are significant with respect to the meaning portrayed by an analysis because they affect 
the degree of contextual detail that the analysis provides and may also affect the 
capacity of an AcciMap to explain how and why an accident occurred.
Once again, such variations cannot be entirely avoided because the judgement of 
whether or not a factor must be included so that an AcciMap makes sense is highly 
subjective. Such decisions reflect what Morgan and Henrion (1990: 30-31), in their 
discussion of quantitative policy analysis, refer to as “Setting the Boundaries'” -  
determining what should be included in an analysis and what should be treated as 
“exogenous, that is, as external to the problem'’ from the apparently “seamless” 
connections between the relevant problems and the “broader world”. As was evident 
from the case study, different analysts set these boundaries at different points, with 
some highlighting as relevant factors that others judged to be external to the problem. 
In the group AcciMap activity, the decision as to whether or not a factor was necessary 
for making sense of the accident was based on the group’s judgement of whether or not 
the outcome would have been different had that particular factor been otherwise. Thus, 
when considering the relevance or otherwise of the curve in the track, the group 
discussed whether the train would have derailed if the track had been straight. Some 
suggested that an accident would have occurred anyway, since the train would probably 
have derailed on a straight track had it been travelling fast enough. Others suggested 
that the curve was relevant because the train would not have overturned at this particular 
point had the track been straight, and also because the guard would probably have 
intervened if the train had continued to accelerate. In the absence of knowledge of what
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actually would have occurred had certain factors been otherwise, such judgements are 
necessarily subjective, with room for analysts to form different conclusions.
Judgements of Probability
A final form of significant and unavoidable variation concerned judgements of whether 
certain factors were probably causal to other factors (and to the accident itself). The 
case study results indicated significant variation between analysts in the degree to which 
they were comfortable stating that certain factors (probably) caused others. Some 
participants inferred that factors highlighted in the accident report were probably causal 
to others even when these relationships were not explicitly stated, thus inserting causal 
links between factors that were not linked in most other analyses. Others did not insert 
links between factors that most others did link (such as the driver's heart attack risk 
factors and his heart attack) because they were not comfortable to claim that the latter 
would probably not have occurred had the former been otherwise. Variations of this 
type are significant in terms of the meaning portrayed in an AcciMap because they alter 
the depiction of how the causal factors produced the accident. Variations in judgements 
of probability could also result in the omission of relevant factors, if analysts judge that 
such factors cannot be depicted as causes of the outcome(s) and therefore exclude them 
from the analysis. This situation almost occurred in the current study, where one 
analyst stated that s/he was uncomfortable claiming that the train would probably not 
have derailed had a task-linked vigilance control system been installed, and was 
therefore undecided on whether the absence of this system (and the lack of regulatory 
requirement for it) should have been included in the AcciMap at all. Such variations 
therefore also have the potential to affect the corrective actions taken after an accident, 
since if relevant factors are excluded from the analysis, safety recommendations will not 
be formed to address them.
Again, however, this type of variation is unavoidable. As highlighted in Chapter 5 one 
can never determine, on the basis of objective, observable facts, whether or not an 
outcome would actually have occurred had certain factors been otherwise. Such 
decisions must necessarily be based on the analyst's judgement of whether or not this 
was probably the case and, as is clear from the current study, different analysts do not 
always agree. Firstly, analysts may differ on what they perceive the term 'probable' to 
mean. Laswad and Mak (1997: 19-21) have highlighted that verbal definitions of the
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term “probable” differ considerably from person to person and that people's numerical 
interpretation of this term was the most variable (mean = 65%, Std. Dev. = 16.19%) of 
the 20 probability phrases assessed in their study (ranging from terms such as “remote” 
to “virtually certain”).
Analysts' judgements of whether or not it can be said that factor A would probably not 
have occurred had factor B been otherwise could therefore potentially differ depending 
upon the level of likelihood they interpret the term ‘probably’ to reflect. Some accident 
analysis guidelines attempt to overcome this potential area of variability by defining the 
term numerically. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Safety Investigation 
Guidelines (2005: 32), for instance, indicate that conclusions can be considered 
“probable” if they are judged to have a “70 per cent or more likelihood of being 
correct". Although the specification of probability in numerical terms has the advantage 
of ensuring that users ascribe the same meaning to the term, determining the precise 
numerical value that should be applied is difficult. While the above guidelines suggest 
a cut-off of 70 percent likelihood (or above), other guidelines suggest different values. 
For instance, NASA's (2003: 19) Root Cause Analysis instructions indicate that a 
causal factor can be considered as “probable" and included in the analysis when there is 
“more evidence for it than against it” (NASA, 2003: 19), indicating that a likelihood 
higher than 50 percent is sufficient. Other guidelines, such as Paul-Stüve’s “Practical 
Guide to the Why-Because Analysis Method” (2005: 1, 5) do not incorporate a 
probability clause at all. Rather, it seems that an analyst using this method must judge 
whether or not A would have occurred had B been otherwise, and to consider B to be 
causal to A only when this is certainly the case. The last approach is problematic since, 
as highlighted in the ATSB guidelines (2005: 14), the only conclusions of this type that 
can be made with certainty in accident analysis regard those causes “most closely 
connected to the occurrence in terms of time and/or physical proximity”. A rule 
excluding factors about which the analyst is not completely certain therefore severely 
limits the scope of the analysis and would prevent remote causes (including the 
systemic factors which AcciMaps seek to identify) from being incorporated into such 
analyses. However, while it seems clear that ‘probable’ does indeed refer to a 
likelihood of greater than 50 percent, the question of precisely what numerical value 
should be applied to the term is difficult to answer. The 70 percent cut-off is 
appropriate in the sense that it seems to approximate the numerical value that people 
typically ascribe to the term (ATSB, 2005: 31). However, the use of such a rule
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suggests that analysts are able to distinguish conclusions about which they are 70 
percent (or more) certain from those that they are not. Research suggests that, in 
making judgements of confidence, people are able to distinguish less between categories 
in the middle of a scale than categories at the ends, reflecting a perception “that they 
'know what they know' and ‘know what they don't know,’ with less perceived 
discriminability in the middle of the scale'’ (Browne, Curley & Benson, 1999: 147). 
The ATSB guidelines (2005: 31-32) acknowledge this difficulty, suggesting that, for 
particularly hard decisions, it may be more appropriate to assess likelihood in terms of 
greater or less than 50 percent, even though it is “more useful” to conceive of the term 
“probable'’ as referring to a much higher likelihood. However, if analysts are instructed 
to incorporate into the analysis all conclusions about which they are more than 50 
percent certain (to reduce the difficulty of the analysts’ judgements), the risk of analysts 
including factors or links that should not be present may increase simply because they 
are including factors about which they are not very certain.
However, even if an appropriate numerical value could be ascribed to the term, 
variation in analysts' judgements of probability could still occur for a second reason, 
namely because of differences in how likely various analysts judge it to be that one 
factor was, in fact, causal to another. Even if two analysts use the term to refer to 
precisely the same level of confidence, it is possible that one analyst may be highly 
confident that a particular sequence of causes and effects occurred, while the other 
might consider it unlikely. Such variation again relates to the subjective judgement 
involved in forming these conclusions. As Wells, Taylor and Turtle (1987: 421) note, 
the process of determining the causes of an outcome using counterfactual logic involves 
“mentally undoing that outcome by mutating events in the causal scenario and thereby 
allowing for the mental simulation of new outcomes”. This is an imaginative process, 
requiring analysts to consider what the subsequent events would have been in those 
alternative situations (Wells, Taylor & Turtle, 1987: 422). In many cases, the causal 
relationships between factors are so clear that different analysts would almost certainly 
agree in their conclusions. In the current study, for instance, there was no disagreement 
among participants as to whether or not the train’s derailment and collision with the 
rock face resulted in the extensive damage to the train. While forming this conclusion 
does require mental simulation of what would have happened had certain factors been 
different, the causal relationship is so straightforward that analysts would be unlikely to 
form different conclusions. In other instances, however, causal relationships are less
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clear and different conclusions may be reached. This might occur if people differ in 
their mental simulations of how things could have been different, such as when they 
take different factors into consideration or differ in their visualisations of how the 
events would have unfolded had certain factors been altered. For instance, some 
participants in the current study envisaged that if RailCorp’s SMS had been audited 
adequately, a task-linked vigilance control system would probably have been installed, 
while others predicted that this change would have resulted in several other 
improvements, but not to the installation of this system. Variations in analysts’ 
conclusions might alternatively occur when they take the same factors into account and 
form the same conclusions about the outcomes of those changes, but differ in their 
judgements of the likelihood of those outcomes. This might occur when a particular 
conclusion is near the boundary between what analysts judge to be probable and what 
they judge to be improbable (i.e., when it is not obviously true or untrue). In such 
cases, a slight difference in judgement can result in the conclusion being accepted and 
included in one analyst’s AcciMap and rejected and excluded in another’s, as may have 
been the case in the current study where some analysts judged that the driver would 
probably have had a heart attack even if he had not been obese, while others disagreed. 
Alternatively, a given scenario may simply seem more likely to one person than 
another.
9.2.5 Conclusions regarding the Nature and 
Significance of AcciMap Variations
The above sections discussed how several types of variation that can occur within 
AcciMap analysis are significant with respect to the meanings portrayed or the 
corrective actions proposed, while others are not. Most variations that are not 
significant in these respects are unavoidable but can simply be considered acceptable 
variations in AcciMap results. Of greater interest for present purposes are those 
variations that are significant in these ways. The above discussion concluded that some 
of the significant variations possible in AcciMap analysis could potentially be reduced 
if alterations were made to the analysis process, such as revisions to the guidelines, 
increasing analyst training, using experienced analysts rather than novices, increasing 
the amount of data available to analysts or allowing analysts to work together in teams. 
However, it also highlighted several significant forms of variation that cannot be 
eliminated. Some such variations concern areas of the analysis in which the potential
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for human error or differences in interpretations of data exist, giving rise to occasional 
unavoidable variation. Other significant and unavoidable variations relate to parts of 
the analysis in which conclusions are necessarily based on the analyst’s subjective 
judgements, which may differ from those of other analysts. The existence of such 
variations is of critical importance with respect to the validity and reliability of the 
AcciMap approach because it means that different analysts will, at least sometimes, 
produce results that differ in significant ways from those of one another and from those 
of AcciMap experts.
9.3 Validity and Reliability in 
AcciMap Analysis Revisited
The controlled case study carried out in this research was intended to provide insight 
into the accuracy of the implicit assumption that AcciMap findings are valid and 
reliable. It was proposed that if the analysts in this study produced AcciMap results that 
were the same as those of one another and the AcciMap experts, or which differed only 
in ways that were insignificant or avoidable, this would give weight to the implicit 
assumption that the approach is valid and reliable. If, however, the results of AcciMap 
analyses produced by participants in this case differed from those of one another and 
from those of the experts in ways that were significant (and which were also 
unavoidable), this would demonstrate that AcciMap analyses are not consistently valid 
and reliable, thus falsifying the contrary assumption. Significant variations were indeed 
observed in the results of analysts in this case and examination of these variations 
revealed that, although some could potentially be eliminated with changes to the 
analysis process, others represent areas of inherent variability within the method and 
cannot be avoided. The existence of such variations in this case confirms that different 
people analysing the same accident using this approach can produce results that differ in 
ways that are significant and that cannot be avoided, from those of other analysts and 
from those of AcciMap experts. By counterexample, this case therefore falsifies the 
implicit assumption that the AcciMap approach is reliable -  that different people 
analysing the same accident with this technique will produce the same results. Of 
course, this is not to say that the findings obtained from the use of this technique are 
entirely unreliable. The case study showed that there was in fact a great deal of
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similarity between the AcciMap results produced by different participants in this study. 
It does demonstrate, however, that different analysts using this method do not 
consistently produce the same results, or even results that are the same in all ways that 
matter, and that the assumption to the contrary is therefore in need of modification.
The conclusions that can be drawn from the current study about the method’s validity, 
on the other hand, are less straightforward. The results produced by the participants in 
this study certainly differed from those of the experts in significant ways, many of 
which were concluded to be unavoidable. This particular case demonstrates by 
counterexample, then, that the AcciMap approach is not always valid in terms of 
ensuring that analysts produce the same results as AcciMap experts (or results that are 
equivalent in all significant ways). However, on examination of the nature of the 
variations observed in this study, it was evident that on some occasions the participants’ 
results, although different from those of the experts in significant ways, may not have 
been invalid. This occurred when participants identified additional safety 
recommendations that, although absent from the experts' results, were not inappropriate 
for the given accident scenario (as judged by myself and one of the AcciMap experts), 
such as that the Rail Safety Regulator should specify medical standards for all safety- 
critical rail personnel to meet. It also occurred when participants identified different 
causal links from those of the experts in areas in which the true situation was quite 
unclear, such as when they added an additional link indicating that a task-linked 
vigilance control system would probably have been fitted had the auditing of RailCorp’s 
SMS been adequate (because the requirement for such a system would probably have 
been identified and addressed) or when they omitted links such as the one indicating 
that the collision with the rock face resulted in multiple deaths (and highlighted instead 
that the deaths resulted from the damage to the train).
The existence of such factors does not indicate that any additional links or 
recommendations in an AcciMap are valid, nor that any causal links can be removed 
without affecting the validity of the analysis. Clearly, safety recommendations that are 
inappropriate, that would be ineffective, or that would expend resources that could 
better be spent addressing different problems, are invalid, as are causal links between 
factors that are obviously not causally related and the absence of links between factors 
that obviously are. However, the above variations do suggest that some AcciMap 
results that vary from those of the experts in significant ways may also be valid. This is
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not to say that there are numerous different sets of AcciMap results that are valid for a 
given accident, since there are clearly certain causes, links and safety recommendations 
that must be identified in an AcciMap analysis of an accident in order to represent how 
and why it occurred and how similar events can be prevented in the future. As indicated 
above, there are also items that are not relevant or appropriate and must not be 
incorporated into such an analysis. However, in light of the above types of variation, it 
appears that it may be possible for analysts to deviate slightly from the experts’ results 
while still including all factors that should be included in an analysis and excluding all 
those that should not. The above situation indicates that this may be the case when 
AcciMap results incorporate safety recommendations that are beyond those that must be 
present, but which are appropriate and complementary to the experts’ results, and are 
therefore not within the realm of factors that would be judged as necessary to exclude. 
It may also occur in areas of the analysis where the true scenario is so unclear that it is 
plausible both that a particular factor was causal to another, and that it was not. 
Possible variations of these types are presumably quite limited, given that there are 
probably not many safety recommendations in addition to those identified by the 
experts that would be judged to be appropriate for a given accident and because many of 
the causal relationships in an accident are quite clear. Nevertheless, consideration of 
these variations indicates that analyses that approximate the experts’ results but differ in 
these respects may also be valid, or at least, are not clearly invalid.
If all of the significant variations observed in the present case were of this kind, it might 
be inappropriate to conclude that the existence of variations between participants’ 
results and those of the experts in this case demonstrates that AcciMap results are not 
always valid and thus falsifies the assumption to the contrary. However, other types of 
significant and unavoidable variation were observed in the current study. For instance, 
omissions of causes that should have been included in the analysis were evident, 
resulting from analyst oversight, misinterpretation of the accident report or judgements 
that factors were either irrelevant or probably not causal to others, while the experts 
were confident that they were (such as that the driver’s heart attack risk factors probably 
contributed to his heart attack and that the close proximity of the rock face was relevant 
to understanding the accident). The omission of important safety recommendations was 
also evident, resulting from oversight or because the causal factors that such 
recommendations were designed to address were absent from the participants’ 
AcciMaps. Similarly, relevant causal links were omitted from analyses because
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participants failed to realise the connections or because they judged them to be 
improbable when the experts thought otherwise. In addition to the omission of factors 
that should have been included, the present case highlighted the inclusion of items that 
should clearly not have been incorporated, such as the inclusion of factors that were not 
causal to the accident because the analyst had misunderstood the nature of those causes 
from accident report and the inclusion of safety recommendations that were designed to 
address these incorrectly identified causes (and that were therefore unnecessary and 
potentially detrimental to safety in terms of drawing resources away from areas where 
corrective actions were required). In light of the existence, in the present case, of 
variations from the experts' results that are significant, unavoidable and that are beyond 
those differences that can arguably be treated as valid variations on the experts' results, 
it now seems appropriate to recognise this particular case as a demonstration that the 
AcciMap approach does not always produce valid results. Again, this is not to say that 
AcciMap results are entirely invalid. If the insignificant variations in the current study 
(relating to differences in detail, groupings and wording), the variations stemming from 
the process adopted in this study (i.e. the use of inexperienced analysts working 
independently with limited time, accident data and domain knowledge) and the 
variations reflecting areas of the guidelines that could benefit from further revision were 
all excluded from consideration, the participants’ findings would probably be very 
similar to those of the experts. However, the existence in the present case of variations 
beyond these types demonstrates that analysts using this approach can, in practice, 
produce non-valid findings. Thus the tentative conclusion highlighted at the beginning 
of this chapter -  that the implicit assumption that AcciMap analyses are valid and 
reliable is in need of modification in light of the existence of a counterexample -  can 
now be confirmed.
As discussed in Chapter 7, it is inappropriate to claim that the results observed in this 
study are likely to apply to AcciMap analyses generally, since this case was not 
representative of the broader class of AcciMap analyses and the study was not 
replicated to ensure that the observed results were not unique to this particular situation. 
Rather, the results of the present study are generalisable to the theoretical proposition of 
interest in this research, in that they demonstrate that invalid and unreliable findings can 
be obtained when this technique is used and that the implicit assumption that AcciMap 
findings are valid and reliable is therefore incorrect.
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In considering the generalisability of the results of this study, however, it is notable that 
in addition to demonstrating that significant differences are possible between different 
people’s AcciMap analyses of the same accident, the present case study provides an 
indication of why these variations occur, namely because there are several areas of the 
AcciMap analysis process that rely entirely on subjective analyst judgement and 
because there are other areas in which the potential exists for analysts to interpret the 
data differently or inadvertently to exclude relevant factors. Redmill (2001: 1, 13, 30) 
suggests that when forms of analysis requiring subjective analyst judgement are 
adopted, different analysts are unlikely to produce the same results and that where 
analyses require “human thought and human probing'’ into a problem, “something is 
always likely to be missed and some things may be wrongly judged”. Thus, although 
the current study identifies only one instance of AcciMap unreliability and invalidity, 
the revelation, during this research, of the inherent subjectivity and room for variability 
within the method indicates that variations of this type are unlikely to be unique to this 
case.
Interestingly, many of the features of the AcciMap approach that appeared to contribute 
to the instances of unreliability and invalidity observed in the current case are in fact 
common to other techniques for identifying the systemic causes of organisational 
accidents. For instance, all techniques of this kind involve the interpretation of data by 
analysts and are also, therefore, presumably open to the possibilities of analysts 
misinterpreting the accident data and interpreting ambiguous data differently. 
Similarly, the possibility of analysts producing different safety recommendations is 
probably not unique to this approach since other techniques also rely on analysts’ 
intuition for determining the most appropriate recommendations (Benner, 1980). For 
instance, the ICAM guidelines indicate that, for each causal factor, analysts should 
propose a “written statement of action” which would either reduce the chance of that 
factor occurring or limit its consequences (BFIP, 2000: 31). As is the case for AcciMap 
analysis, the choice of precisely what action should be taken to address each cause is 
left to the analyst’s judgement. Numerous techniques of this sort also require that the 
analyst identify the causes of an accident or incident using the same kind of 
counterfactual logic as employed in AcciMap analysis. As such, the possibility for 
analysts to disagree with one another (and with experts) in their judgements of whether 
or not certain factors were causal to others may also exist for other techniques. 
Similarly, a number of these methods define the final outcome to be analysed in terms
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that would probably allow as much variation as is possible in AcciMap analysis. For 
instance, NASA's (2003: 11) Root Cause Analysis instructions state that the analyst 
should “Describe the undesired outcome" (e.g. “relief valve failed" and “employee 
broke his arm"), while the ICAM guidelines instruct analysts to commence the analysis 
witth the “incident event" (BHP, 2000: 10) but provide no guidance as to how this event 
be recognised. Thus the possibility for disagreements between analysts on the particular 
factors identified as outcomes is unlikely to be unique to AcciMap analysis. It seems 
theoretically possible, then, that other systemic accident analysis methods may also 
have the potential to allow some of the types of variability in results that were observed 
in this study.
9.4 The Future of AcciMap Analysis
The above sections concluded that AcciMap analyses are not always valid and reliable, 
based on the existence of a counterexample. Consideration must now be given to the 
implications of this finding and to the future of AcciMap analysis in light of these 
implications. The implications of such a finding have been highlighted throughout this 
research, since they provided the motivation for performing the current study. If an 
AcciMap analysis does not correctly identify the causes of an organisational accident, a 
thorough understanding of how and why it occurred and how similar occurrences might 
be averted in the future may not be achieved. If relevant causes or safety 
recommendations are missing from an analysis, those problems will not be addressed 
and the system will remain vulnerable to future accidents. If irrelevant causes or safety 
recommendations are included in analyses, on the other hand, corrective efforts may be 
directed to areas of the system that do not require attention, potentially shifting 
resources away from areas that do. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the validity, or 
otherwise, of AcciMap findings therefore affects the future safety of the system, the 
capacity to learn from accidents, the time and resources of those responsible for 
implementing the proposed safety recommendations and the emotional wellbeing of 
those involved in the lead-up to the accident as well as the victims and their friends and 
relatives. The finding in the current study that different analysts can produce different 
AcciMap results (and that those results are not always valid) is thus highly significant in 
practical terms, since it indicates that the negative consequences highlighted above may 
indeed occur when AcciMap analyses are used in practice.
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In light of the conclusion that AcciMap analyses may not always be entirely valid and 
reliable and the significant practical implications of this finding, the future of the 
AcciMap approach must be considered. It appears that there are two possible courses of 
action from this point. The first is to recommend against the use of the method because 
it does not always produce completely valid and reliable results. Such a solution is 
problematic in light of the sources of variability within AcciMap findings. As 
suggested above, many of the significant and unavoidable AcciMap variations observed 
in the current study resulted from the areas of the analysis involving the interpretation 
of accident data by the analysts and areas involving analyst judgement of whether 
certain factors would have occurred had others been different and what the most 
appropriate courses of corrective action would be. Yet it is not possible to perform 
systemic accident analyses without these interpretations and judgements. The goal of 
identifying the systemic causes of an organisational accident and determining how they 
interacted to result in the accident can only be achieved if the accident data are taken 
into consideration and sense is made of how the events and conditions came about, how 
they affected one another and what the resulting scenario would have been had certain 
events and conditions been otherwise. Similarly, the aim of determining appropriate 
changes to prevent recurrence of similar scenarios in the future can only be achieved if 
consideration is given to how each particular factor could be addressed and to the 
feasibility and effectiveness of the possible corrective actions. If the AcciMap approach 
(and other techniques requiring the same sorts of interpretation and judgement) were 
abandoned owing to the possibility of variable results, accident analyses would be 
restricted to those which identify and address only the most immediate, physical causes 
of accidents. Such a restriction may indeed eliminate invalidity and unreliability in 
analysis results, since only those findings that do not require analyst judgement or 
interpretation (or that require these to such a small degree that analysts would always 
form the same conclusions) would be included. However, the use of such limited 
analyses would result in some of the same problems as an invalid or unreliable systemic 
approach, namely that a comprehensive understanding of how and why the accident 
occurred would not be gained and that relevant factors would be overlooked and 
consequently not addressed, leaving the system vulnerable to future accidents. In 
addition, being limited to the most direct causes, such an approach would not encourage 
the sorts of high-level corrective action that can have a broad and long-lasting 
preventative effect on the system. The use of the AcciMap approach, even if it does 
occasionally result in the omission of relevant factors, the inclusion of irrelevant factors
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and differences of judgement between analysts is likely, in my view, to improve system 
safety and prevent future accidents significantly more than the use of analysis 
approaches that are valid and reliable, but which do not identify and address the 
systemic causes of organisational accidents (if such approaches were to exist).
The proposed solution to managing the implications of the revelation that AcciMap 
analyses are not always valid and reliable is therefore not to abandon the technique. 
Rather, it is proposed that two courses of action be followed. The first involves taking 
steps, where possible, to improve the reliability and validity of AcciMap results. The 
current study highlighted a number of ways in which this might be achieved. For 
instance, specific analyst training and practice in performing AcciMap analyses might 
help to reduce analyst errors in the application of the technique. Providing analysts with 
training relating to the organisations being studied and the general principles and 
practice of accident analysis, or ensuring that the individuals chosen to perform these 
analyses have prior experience and understanding in these areas, may also improve 
AcciMap findings. For instance, detailed knowledge of the workings of the relevant 
organisations, of how governmental and regulatory influences affect those operations, 
and of the kinds of corrective action that have (and have not) been practical and 
effective in dealing with safety issues in the past, would assist analysts to produce 
coherent and informed results. Ensuring that analysts are given access to all of the 
available accident data, have the opportunity to ask questions and seek further 
information when required, and are provided with sufficient time to develop and revise 
their analyses, may also improve the completeness of their findings. Finally, 
encouraging analysts to work in teams so that they can benefit from the variety of ideas, 
justifications, knowledge and expertise brought to the analysis, as well as having the 
opportunity to discuss and debate the conclusions, is also likely to promote the 
achievement of comprehensive, considered and logically sound results. Such steps may 
be of use in reducing or eliminating the avoidable variations in AcciMap findings.
The second suggested course of action, to be taken in conjunction with the first, aims to 
address the types of significant and unavoidable variation that the current study has 
shown can occur in AcciMap analyses. It is now evident that, as a result of the potential 
for error and misunderstanding and the requirement for human interpretation and 
judgement within this approach, AcciMap analysts do not necessarily produce findings 
that are entirely valid or the same as those produced by others analysing the same
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accident with access to the same information. It is proposed that this possibility must be 
acknowledged and the conceptualisation of the approach adjusted accordingly. 
Specifically, it must be recognised that, when examining an AcciMap analysis of an 
accident, we cannot be confident that all factors that did, in reality, lead to the accident 
(and are of practical significance or necessary for making sense of the accident) have 
been identified or that all of the appropriate safety recommendations that would (if 
implemented) prevent a similar occurrence in the future have been included. Similarly, 
we cannot be entirely confident that misinterpretations have not occurred, that the 
analysis does not include additional items that should not be present or that the same 
findings would have been produced had a different analyst performed the analysis. 
When considering AcciMap findings, then, it must be recognised that the results do not 
necessarily represent the true scenario as it occurred and the set of corrective actions 
that would be most appropriate for preventing future accidents, but rather an analyst’s 
interpretations and judgements of what happened and how it could best be prevented 
from recurring (which may differ from those of other analysts). This is not to suggest 
that all AcciMap analyses are invalid and that their results should be dismissed. It 
remains possible that most AcciMap analysis results are valid and reliable, at least in the 
ways that matter. However, in light of the knowledge that AcciMap results are not 
always valid and reliable, it is important that this possibility is recognised and that 
AcciMap results are understood as incorporating subjective judgements and 
interpretations, and potentially being affected by errors and misunderstandings.
It is also proposed that the AcciMap process be modified so that the judgements and 
decisions underlying the findings are made explicit. It is proposed that the rationale 
behind the analyst’s decisions and judgements and the analyst’s degree of certainty in 
the conclusions should be made transparent so that others can assess AcciMap findings 
with knowledge of these factors. Specifically, it is proposed that justifications for why 
factors were identified as causes, why factors were judged to be causally related, how 
probable these conclusions are to be true and why particular safety recommendations 
were chosen, should be included in the analysis. In addition, justifications should be 
provided for why causal links and safety recommendations, that were considered by the 
analyst(s) but not included in their analyses, were excluded. These justifications should 
be documented during the analysis and presented alongside final AcciMap results so 
that others considering the results will have access to the information necessary for 
judging the soundness and certainty of the conclusions.
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The increased transparency of the AcciMap process in this way would assist in allowing 
AcciMap findings to be assessed appropriately. Firstly, such documentation would 
allow others to understand the process by which the findings were obtained. 
Documentation identifying how the conclusions were drawn and the location of 
evidence in support of those conclusions (or the justification behind assumptions that 
were made in the absence of evidence) would help readers to follow the process by 
which the results were obtained, thus permitting them to review the judgements in light 
of the underlying facts. Documentation of why particular causal relationships or safety 
recommendations were intentionally omitted, on the other hand, would allow readers to 
understand the reasons behind these exclusions and also, as Johnson (2003: 539) has 
suggested, to distinguish purposeful omissions from unintentional oversights. Again, 
such documentation would provide readers with the opportunity to make an informed 
evaluation of the analyst’s decisions. A record of how likely the analyst judges the 
conclusions drawn to be would provide readers with the information required to 
distinguish causes and causal relationships about which the analyst was relatively sure 
from the tenuous conclusions about which s/he was not, where this would not otherwise 
be possible. Documentation of the relative certainty or uncertainty of the analyst's 
judgements would therefore help readers to recognise the areas of the analysis in which 
other conclusions might be equally plausible and to consider those alternative 
conclusions.
The proposed documentation of the judgements and decisions involved in AcciMap 
analyses is not aimed towards attempting to demonstrate the validity of the conclusions 
drawn in an analysis by collecting supporting evidence, as some analysts have done 
(e.g. Zotov, 2005). Nor is the aim to make the underlying reasoning transparent to 
specialist analysts, who can then assess and “improve the quality” of the arguments, as 
Johnson (2000) has proposed (although this would be an additional benefit of adopting 
such an approach). Rather, the primary purpose of making the analysis process 
transparent is simply to provide those assessing AcciMap findings with a realistic 
understanding of the reasoning underlying the conclusions and the analysts’ degree of 
certainty in those conclusions. For this reason, evidence that contradicts the 
conclusions must be documented along with supporting evidence (to provide a 
comprehensive and unbiased description of the facts underlying the conclusions drawn) 
and the documentation process must enable all readers, not just specialists, to 
understand and evaluate the reasoning behind analysis results.
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Of course, such an approach has several advantages in addition to promoting this goal. 
As suggested above, the documentation of the analysis process would allow the 
decisions and judgements to be examined by other people and revisions made on the 
basis of their comments. Thorough documentation of the process by which conclusions 
were formed may also assist AcciMap analysts in several ways. For instance, this 
documentation may help analysts to keep track of the reasons behind their decisions and 
the location of the relevant data so that this information is available if those decisions 
are revisited in light of new information or if, at later stages, analysts cannot recall the 
reasons for their earlier decisions. Documentation of this sort may also help analysts to 
use consistent criteria in forming judgements throughout their analyses, since their 
justifications would be documented and available for comparison. This might help to 
avoid the problem, highlighted by Morgan and Henrion (1990: 29) in their discussion of 
policy analysis, of analysts unintentionally adopting different criteria in different parts 
of their analyses and therefore producing inconsistent results. In addition, the 
requirement for formal and thorough documentation of their analyses may help analysts 
to ensure that their assumptions, judgements and decisions are, in fact, sound and 
justifiable. As Johnson (2003: 344) points out, the requirement for analysts to 
document their analysis processes may prevent them from forming unwarranted 
conclusions or terminating their analyses before all relevant factors have been 
identified.
There are also, however, a number of disadvantages associated with increasing the 
documentation and transparency of AcciMap analyses. The alteration of the analysis 
process to include documentation of all judgements and decisions would clearly require 
more time and work from analysts, since reasoning processes which were previously 
performed informally in the analyst's mind must now be formulated explicitly and 
documented in a way that others can follow. In addition, as Otway and von Winterfeldt 
(1992: 92) suggest, while “Openness, transparent logic, and extensive documentation" 
make judgements easier to defend, they also make judgements easier to critique, since 
the process “shows the vulnerabilities of the analysis and highlights areas where 
knowledge and understanding are poor”. The documentation of the assumptions 
involved in performing accident analyses and the uncertainty of particular judgements 
may, therefore, provide those with an interest in disputing analysis findings with an 
easier way to do so than would otherwise be possible, perhaps affecting the level of 
authority associated with such findings. However, in light of the revelation that
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AcciMap results are not always entirely valid and reliable, it seems inappropriate to hide 
the judgements, assumptions and uncertainties that produce variations in AcciMap 
results. To do so would essentially present the findings as though they were certain and 
indisputable, which, while saving time and effort, may not reflect the true situation. 
Rather, it is proposed that AcciMap findings must be presented with accompanying 
documentation regarding these factors so that the results can be accepted with neither 
more nor less confidence than is justified.
Consideration must be given, then, to precisely how this documentation process could 
be carried out. Since the aim is to make analysts’ thought processes and the reasoning 
behind their judgements explicit, it makes sense that this documentation is done as part 
of the analysis process, at the same time those judgements are made, rather than as a 
separate step of the analysis. For instance, analysts could be asked to document the 
reasons for the inclusion or exclusion of causal factors and links in their AcciMaps and 
the location of relevant evidence while they are making those decisions and constructing 
the AcciMap diagram. As suggested above, this might assist analysts to keep track of 
the reasons behind their previous decisions and judgements and to think clearly through 
each step in the analysis.
A decision must also be made regarding how such documentation should be formatted 
and arranged. The written examples of accident analyses and the literature concerning 
accident report-writing suggest a number of ways in which the nature and justification 
of the conclusions might be documented. For instance, AcciMap analyses performed by 
Hopkins (e.g. 2000, 2005) are accompanied by written documentation, in the form of 
prose, explaining the causes and causal relationships depicted in his diagrams. 
Similarly, Ladkin’s Why-Because Analyses often include written justifications of the 
causal links depicted in his graphs (e.g. Ladkin, 2005; Ladkin & Loer, 1999). In both 
cases, the written documentation serves to explain and justify the causes and causal 
relationships included in the diagrams (while describing how and why the particular 
event occurred), and the underlying reasoning and supporting evidence are therefore 
often included. For present purposes, however, the aim is also to make the underlying 
judgements and assumptions, as well as uncertainty, missing data and contradictory 
evidence readily accessible to readers. The justifications provided by Hopkins and 
Ladkin occasionally do provide such information, by indicating when assumptions have 
been made and why some factors were excluded from the analysis, for instance.
260
However, such considerations are not systematically made for every part of the 
analyses, and the evidence opposing the conclusions and the location of all relevant 
evidence are rarely documented (indeed, the textual arguments would be difficult to 
follow if such information were included). In addition, the part of the text associated 
with each segment of the diagram is not always easy to locate if the documentation is 
formatted in this way, preventing readers from having ready access to the information 
required to assess those conclusions.
An alternative means of making these justifications explicit (this time focusing on the 
conclusions of accident investigation reports) is the Conclusion, Analy sis and Evidence 
(CAE) diagram, proposed by Johnson (2000, 2003) (see Figure 14). The conclusions of 
an accident report are depicted as nodes in these diagrams (labelled “C” for 
“conclusion''), with each node containing a direct quote from the report. The “lines of 
analysis” (A) supporting each conclusion are written in nodes linked to the conclusion, 
and the items of evidence (E) supporting each line of analysis are linked to those nodes, 
with reference to the location of these items in the accident report.
X: Broekhoven failed to make a visual 
observation of the Ynutos because 
of the number of people on the bridge. 
(Clause 28) [Conclusion 5]
C: Broekhoven failed to 
mamtain an adequate watch. 
(Clause 25) [Conclusion 1]
E: there were seven other people 
on the bridge at 20:37hrs 
(Clause 38) [Paragraph 41]
V: Broekhoven didn't detect the Ymitos 
using ARPA because radar was used for 
navigation and not collision avoidance 
(Clause 26) [Paragraph 39]
E: Broekhoven and Valdhoen were 
both preoccupied with navigation 
tasks from 2030 to 2036hrs. 
(Clause 15) [Paragraph 39]
Figure 14 -  Conclusion, Analysis and Evidence Diagram 
(Johnson, 2000: 183)
CAE diagrams also include analyses and evidence that are at odds with the conclusions 
drawn (connected to the conclusions with a dotted line), thereby providing an indication 
of the arguments both for and against the conclusions drawn in an accident report 
(Johnson, 1999, 2003: 307) (see Figure 15).
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E 11.1.2: Th« U6I «mploy»«!.., k>cat»d 
(h« ähutoff valve,near lltfca St reel, 
and, about 7 :15, clo$«d it [Page 5].
A1 2 1
E l 2 1.2
E 1.211
E 1.11,1 According to  th« U6I's 
records, the forem an's call was 
answered a t 64 8  pm by U 6I's 
Central <Sa* Control at heading, 
Pennsylvania, [page 3],
Cl: contributing to  the
severity of the accident 
was the absence of a gas 
detector, wh ich couH have 
alerted the fire 
department and residents 
promptly when escaping 
gas entered the building, 
[page 48]
A IM  Any detector could only 
have provided a warning to the Fire 
S«rvice two minutes bef ore the 
Foreman actually rang U(?I This 
would not have provided enough 
time to prevent the explosion given 
that It took 27 mfoutes to shut­
down the supply
Al l: Had there been a gas 
detector in the room in which the 
service line entered...the fire 
department would have had time to 
oommjnicate with the U(SI. which 
might have been oble to close the 
gas Ihe valve soon after the 
separation occurred, thus 
preventing the Occident [page 38]
Figure 15 -  CAE Diagram with Counter Arguments 
(Johnson, 2003: 308)
This form of documentation is advantageous in terms of ensuring that systematic 
records are maintained of the reasoning behind the conclusions drawn and the evidence 
supporting and opposing those conclusions. However, such diagrams clearly become 
unwieldy when conclusions are supported and opposed by multiple lines of analysis 
which are, in turn, supported and opposed by multiple items of evidence (hence the 
necessity to abbreviate the diagrams, as has been done for the first line of analysis in 
Figure 15). The lines of analysis and supporting evidence for each box in an AcciMap 
could not be incorporated into the AcciMap diagram without making the diagram 
excessively large and complex. In addition, while CAE diagrams document the 
evidence supporting and opposing each line of analysis, they do not provide an 
indication of the analyst’s certainty of those conclusions. One might think that the level 
of certainty of a conclusion would be clear from the evidence. However, as indicated in 
the ATSB Safety Investigation Guidelines (2005: 96), the evaluation of such 
conclusions does not simply involve counting the number of items of evidence for and 
against the conclusion. The “overall pattern of supporting and non-supporting evidence, 
and the strength of the various pieces of evidence'’ are part of this judgement (ATSB, 
2005: 96).
The ATSB guidelines (2005) suggest a more detailed approach, in which “Conclusion- 
evidence tables” are constructed to support each of the key conclusions of an accident 
investigation. Each table incorporates a description of the conclusion, the evidence for
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and against the existence of that conclusion, the evidence for and against the influence 
of that factor on the final outcome (or other factors), comments and clarifications about 
the evidence and links to the location of relevant sources of information, among other 
items. Such tables probably contain more information than is required for present 
purposes, since they are designed to be generated during the investigation stage of an 
analysis (before the analysis section begins) to ensure that the investigation findings are 
sound (ATSB, 2005: 95). They are not intended to provide readers with an 
understanding of the reasoning behind the conclusions but rather to help analysts to 
produce sound conclusions, and these tables therefore document each item of evidence 
and the associated comments in detail. For present purposes, it would probably suffice 
to provide a justification for each decision which indicates any assumptions made, states 
how probable the analyst judges it to be that the conclusion is true and outlines the 
supporting and opposing evidence (with reference details). Unlike the CAE diagrams 
and conclusion-evidence tables, however, this documentation would also elucidate why 
some causal links were considered but then rejected by the analyst(s). The 
documentation would also explain why the particular recommendations were chosen, 
that is, what they were intended to achieve, why they were judged to be appropriate for 
those purposes and why they were chosen in preference to other possible 
recommendations.
None of the above documentation approaches is entirely appropriate for present 
purposes. However, a process adopting elements of these approaches may be suitable 
for providing readers with access to the information required to judge AcciMap findings 
appropriately. It is proposed that such documentation could be performed by cross- 
referencing the AcciMap diagram with an accompanying document containing the 
justification for the inclusion of each item (see Figures 1643 and 17). Specifically, each 
cause and causal connection in an AcciMap could contain a reference to a section of the 
accompanying document outlining the reasoning behind the judgement, the relevant 
evidence and its location, and the analyst’s degree of certainty in the judgement. In 
light of the difficulties associated with making probability judgements, highlighted 
earlier in this chapter, analysts would be required only to judge whether conclusions 
were highly probable or more probable than not. Conclusions would be labelled as 
highly probable when the analyst is relatively certain that they are true, as was the case
43 Figure 16 is the Experts’ AcciMap from Figure 12, with the accompanying notations added for 
illustrative purposes.
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for most conclusions in the experts’ results (e.g. 8 and 8a below). Conclusions would 
be labelled as more probable than not, on the other hand, when the analyst is not 
certain, but judges that they are probably true (and when it is also plausible that they are 
not true - e.g. 3a below). Analysts could document the reasons for including each item 
as they construct the AcciMap diagram, thereby recording their thought processes as 
they proceed and ensuring that they have taken the available evidence into due 
consideration, while also making this information available to others. They could also 
be asked to document reasons for excluding causal relationships from the analysis, and 
could indicate areas in which this has occurred with dotted arrows in the AcciMap 
diagram (see 13a below). In this context, a dotted arrow between two factors would 
indicate that the existence of a causal relationship was considered possible but rejected 
as improbable and therefore listed as such. The addition of these dotted lines to the 
AcciMap diagram would assist readers in identifying the points at which additional 
causal relationships had been considered, so that they could have the opportunity to 
examine these alternative possibilities themselves, and could also distinguish intentional 
omissions from unintentional omissions (i.e. those where the analyst failed to consider 
the causal relationship at all).
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Figure 16 -  The Experts’ AcciMap with References
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3a The train’s collision with the rock face caused multiple deaths
R e a s o n i n g T h i s  w a s  c o n s id e r e d  to  b e  m o r e  p r o b a b le  th a n  n o t  b e c a u s e  m o s t  o f  th e  d e a th s  
a p p e a r e d  to  r e s u l t  f r o m  p a s s e n g e r s  b e i n g  e j e c te d  f ro m  th e  t r a in  o n  im p a c t .  
H o w e v e r ,  it is a l s o  p l a u s ib l e  th a t  t h e s e  d e a th s  (o r  a t  le as t  s o m e  o f  th e s e  
d e a th s )  r e s u l t e d  f ro m  th e  t r a in  d a m a g e  r a th e r  th a n  th e  c o l l i s io n  itse lf ,  as  o n e  o f  
t h e  p a s s e n g e r  f a ta l i t i e s  a p p e a r e d  to  r e s u l t  f ro m  th e  d a m a g e  to  th e  t ra in .
E v id e n c e + T h e  d r iv e r  a n d  s ix  p a s s e n g e r s  w e r e  e j e c te d  f ro m  th e  t ra in  d u r in g  th e  a c c id e n t  
s e q u e n c e  a n d  all  b u t  o n e  o f  t h o s e  e j e c te d  r e c e iv e d  fa ta l  in ju r ie s  (p .  4 5 ) .
+ A c c o r d i n g  to  th e  f in i te  e l e m e n t  a n a ly s i s  c r a s h  s im u la t io n ,  t h e  p a s s e n g e r s  a n d  
c r e w  w e r e  s u b je c t e d  to  a  m a x i m u m  d e c e l e r a t i o n  fo rc e  o f  7 g  d u r in g  th e  
o v e r tu r n  a n d  im p a c t  w i th  th e  cu t t in g .  T h i s  w a s  a  s u r v iv a b le  r a te  o f  
d e c e l e r a t i o n  (p . 4 5 ) .
- O n e  f a ta l ly  in ju r e d  p a s s e n g e r  w a s  r e ta in e d  in th e  w r e c k a g e  o f  th e  f i rs t  c a r r i a g e  
u p p e r  d e c k  (p . 4 5 ) .
8 Driver suffered a heart attack
R e a s o n i n g T h i s  w a s  c o n s id e r e d  to  b e  h ig h ly  p r o b a b le  b a s e d  o n  p o s t  m o r t e m  e v id e n c e .
E v id e n c e + P o s t  m o r t e m  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  d r iv e r  id e n t i f ie d  th a t  h e  h ad  s e v e r e  
a th e r o s c l e r o t i c  o c c lu s i o n  o f  th e  le f t  a n t e r io r  d e s c e n d in g  c o r o n a r y  a r te ry ,  
w h ic h  p o s e d  a h ig h  r isk  o f  a  m a j o r  c a r d ia c  e v e n t  (p .  2 4 ) .  T h e  c a u s e  o f  d e a th  
w a s  g iv e n  b y  th e  f o r e n s ic  p a t h o lo g i s t  a s  b ra in  s te m  d i s r u p t io n  in a s s o c ia t io n  
w i th  c o r o n a r y  a r t e ry  d is e a s e  (p . 2 1 ) .
+ T h e  c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  d r i v e r ’s b lo o d  a n d  its la ck  o f  d is t r ib u t io n  in d ic a te d  th a t  
th e r e  m ig h t  h a v e  b e e n  n o  c i r c u la t io n  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  im p a c t  (p .  2 2 )  ( i n d ic a t in g  
th a t  h is  c i r c u la t io n  h a d  s to p p e d  p r io r  to ,  a n d  th e r e f o r e  n o t  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f ,  th e  
c o l l i s io n ) .
8a Driver’s heart attack was causal to his incapacitation
R e a s o n i n g T h i s  w a s  c o n s id e r e d  to  b e  h ig h ly  p r o b a b le  b a s e d  o n  th e  a s s u m p t io n  th a t  th e  
d r i v e r ’s in c a p a c i t a t io n  r e s u l t e d  f ro m  h is  h ea r t  a t t a c k  an d  o n  th e  m e d ic a l  
e v i d e n c e  th a t  th e  i n c a p a c i t a t io n  w a s  p r o b a b ly  n o t  th e  r e s u l t  o f  o th e r  f a c to rs ,  
s u c h  as  f a t ig u e .
E v id e n c e + T h e  in v e s t ig a t io n  j u d g e d  it to  b e  h ig h ly  p r o b a b le  th a t  th e  d r iv e r  w a s  
in c a p a c i t a te d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  a  p r e - e x i s t i n g  m e d ic a l  c o n d i t io n  (p . 5), p o s s ib ly  
r e la te d  to  h is  c a r d ia c  f u n c t io n  (p . 6 8 ) .  H is  m e d ic a l  c o n d i t io n  w a s  d e s c r ib e d  as  
"‘p o te n t i a l ly  in c a p a c i t a t i n g ” (p . 70) .
T h e  d r iv e r  w a s  l ik e ly  a f f e c te d  b y  f a t i g u e  r e s u l t in g  f ro m  c i r c a d ia n  d is ru p t io n  
(p . 7 0 ) .  H y p o v ig i l a n c e  ( d im in i s h e d  v ig i l a n c e )  a n d  m ic r o s l e e p  e p i s o d e s  w e r e  
c o n s id e r e d  as  p o s s i b l e  c a u s e s  o f  h is  in c a p a c i t a t io n .  H o w e v e r ,  th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  
a  s e v e r e  a th e r o s c l e r o t i c  o c c lu s i o n  o f  th e  d r i v e r ’s le ft  a n t e r io r  d e s c e n d in g  
c o r o n a r y  a r t e ry  a n d  th e  p o s s ib le  a b s e n c e  o f  c i r c u la t io n  in d ic a t e  th a t  th e  d r iv e r  
w a s  p r o b a b ly  m e d ic a l ly  in c a p a c i t a te d  a t  th e  t im e  o f  im p a c t  (p .  2 4 )  ( r a th e r  th a n  
a s le e p ) .
13a Driver’s weight was causal to his heart attack
R e a s o n i n g T h i s  l in k  w a s  j u d g e d  im p r o b a b le  b a s e d  o n  th e  r e a s o n in g  th a t ,  in l ig h t  o f  th e  
d r i v e r ’s n u m e r o u s  o th e r  p o s i t iv e  c a r d ia c  r isk  f a c to r s  ( s e e  9 ) ,  it c a n n o t  be  
c o n c lu d e d  th a t  h is  h e a r t  a t t a c k  w o u l d  p r o b a b ly  n o t  h a v e  o c c u r r e d  i f  h e  h a d  n o t  
b e e n  o v e r w e ig h t .
E v id e n c e + T h e  d r iv e r  s u f fe re d  f ro m  o b e s i ty ,  w h ic h  is a  p o s i t iv e  c a r d ia c  r isk  f ac to r .
Figure 17 -  Example of the Corresponding AcciMap Documentation
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Such documentation would make the rationale behind each conclusion easy for readers 
to locate, as the accompanying justifications would be listed in numerical order to 
match the causes in the AcciMap results. In addition, readers could have the choice of 
referring to the accompanying documentation if required, but could also ignore the 
notations if they did not want to access the reasoning and justifications behind the 
findings. Similar documentation could be provided for the safety recommendations, 
with footnotes corresponding to the relevant section of the accompanying document, as 
in Figure 1844.
Recommendation 5: ...
Recommendation 6: RailCorp should address defects with the Deadman system6. 
Recommendation 7: ...
0 This recommendation aims to ensure that RailCorp addresses the deficiencies with the deadman system 
that prevent it from being an adequate defence against driver incapacitation for drivers weighing 110 kg 
or more. It was considered necessary to make this specific recommendation in addition to the general 
recommendation for RailCorp to review and improve its safety management system in order to ensure 
that this particular deficiency is addressed. This recommendation was considered preferable to 
addressing this problem by imposing driver weight limits on trains fitted with the deadman system 
because it aims to focus on altering the system so that it will work for any driver, rather than on requiring 
that drivers adjust to suit the limitations of the system.
Figure 18 -  Example of Safety Recommendation Documentation
The inclusion of such documentation would enable readers to follow the reasoning 
underlying the AcciMap findings, to assess for themselves the data on which these 
findings were based and to understand the analyst’s degree of certainty in those 
conclusions. Such a process would not eliminate the potential for different analysts to 
disagree with one another (and with experts) in their findings (although the requirement 
to document thoroughly their justifications may help to ensure the soundness of those 
justifications). Flowever, the documentation process would make explicit the 
judgements, assumptions and decisions underlying AcciMap findings, thereby 
providing readers with the data required to judge the soundness of those findings. It is 
proposed that this documentation, along with the recognition that AcciMap findings are
44 Figure 18 is a section taken from the Experts’ Safety Recommendations in Figure 13, with the 
accompanying notations added for illustrative purposes.
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not necessarily valid and reliable, would allow AcciMap results to be used with full 
acknowledgement of the limitations of the approach.
The above sections have discussed the nature and significance of the observed 
variations in AcciMap findings, considered the implications of these findings for 
AcciMap analysis and outlined steps that could be taken to manage these implications. 
However, before drawing the final conclusions of this research, it is necessary to 
consider the limitations of the present study, how these limitations may have affected 
the results obtained and areas of possible future work.
9.5 Limitations and Future Research
There are several limitations that should be considered when discussing the results of 
the present research. Firstly, the findings of this research are based on the analysis of a 
small number of participants’ results (specifically, nine participants for the qualitative 
assessment and six for the quantitative assessment). A larger sample size would have 
been preferable for gaining a comprehensive understanding of the extent to which, and 
the ways in which, different analysts’ AcciMaps can differ, but could not be obtained in 
this instance because many of the potential participants were unavailable for the study 
and a number of others were ineligible, having participated in the pilot studies. The 
limited sample size may mean that there are additional areas in which variations in 
AcciMap results can occur, but which were not evident in these particular results and 
were therefore not identified and accounted for in the findings of this study. The above 
discussion of the nature and significance of AcciMap variations should therefore be 
qualified as highlighting variations that have been observed, but not necessarily 
identifying all variations that might occur in when this technique is used. The sample 
was sufficient, however, to show that significant and unavoidable variations can occur 
in the findings of different AcciMap analysts, and therefore to provide valuable insight 
into the correctness of the assumption that such analyses are valid and reliable.
A second limitation relates to the generalisability of the results. The case studied in this 
research was selected (or in fact created) because it had the capacity to provide insight 
into the assumption that AcciMap findings are valid and reliable. The case was 
appropriate for this purpose because it could be controlled to prevent external factors,
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such as expertise and collaboration, from affecting the validity and reliability of the 
participants’ results. However, the fact that the case was controlled in these ways meant 
that it was not representative of the broader class of AcciMap analyses. Thus, while the 
study of this case does enable us to show that AcciMap results are not always valid and 
reliable (and to conclude that the assumption to the contrary is therefore incorrect), it 
does not indicate the extent to which this is true for AcciMap analyses generally. Now 
that the possibility of invalid and unreliable AcciMap findings has been established, an 
interesting area of future work would therefore be to examine the extent to which this 
occurs in more typical AcciMap analyses. As highlighted earlier, the selection of a 
‘typical' AcciMap is problematic since the current examples of AcciMap analyses vary 
in many respects. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to examine the reliability and 
validity of AcciMap analyses in which the analysts were not inexperienced novices and 
in which the analysts had access to all relevant accident information, were allowed to 
consult others during the analysis process or perhaps work as teams and did not have 
such severe time limitations. Additional research in this area would be useful for 
establishing whether the types of variation observed in the current study occur only 
occasionally, or in fact occur in most analyses.
There were several other limitations associated with the controls used in the current 
study. For instance, novice analysts were used in an attempt to ensure that the factors 
relating to the analysts' previous experience and knowledge (which other research has 
indicated can affect analysis findings) would not affect their AcciMap results. 
However, the discussion of the inevitability of AcciMap variations in this chapter 
indicated that many of the variations observed in this study might have been a result (at 
least in part) of the use of inexperienced analysts in this study. This is particularly true 
for variations in safety recommendations, since experience in the types of corrective 
action that are feasible and effective, and those that are not, may be necessary to enable 
analysts to produce appropriate recommendations. Without knowledge of the validity 
and reliability of experienced analysts’ findings, the effects of the participants’ 
inexperience (and an understanding of what the results would have been had novices not 
been used) can only be inferred. Future research on AcciMap validity and reliability 
using experienced analysts would allow further insight to be gained into whether these 
types of variation are, in fact, related to inexperience or whether the findings of 
experienced analysts could also vary in these ways.
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The results of the current study may also have been affected by the restriction on the 
analysts to work alone. This restriction was necessary because the question of interest 
with respect to the reliability assessment was whether or not different analysts 
independently performing AcciMap analyses with access to the same information would 
produce the same AcciMap results45. Thus collaboration and interaction between the 
participants during the initial study could not be permitted. Again, however, this 
limitation may have contributed to some of the variations observed in this study. For 
example, instances in which analysts misunderstood the accident report might have 
been identified by other analysts, and the mistakes resolved, had the process adopted in 
this study allowed for such interactions. Similarly, the accidental omission of factors 
may have been reduced if analysts had been able to work in collaboration in the initial 
case study, as they were in the group AcciMap activity. However, conclusions about 
reductions in the accidental omission of relevant causes and safety recommendations 
when analysts work in groups rather than individually cannot be drawn from the current 
study because the observed decrease in omissions may have resulted from other factors, 
such as the participants having already performed the analysis once and thus having 
additional time to think about the problem and the opportunity to reflect on their 
original results. Thus further research would be required in order to determine whether 
reductions in such omissions are related to the interaction between analysts or to other 
factors. Further research could also be conducted to determine whether an ‘estimate- 
feedback-talk' style approach (i.e. where analysts first perform their analyses 
independently, then engage in a discussion of their results and finally work together to 
produce a consensual result) should be recommended as a way to improve the validity 
of AcciMap results. Such an approach appeared to be successful in this respect in the 
current study as the group's findings were closer to those of the experts than the 
findings of the participants when they worked independently (on average). However, it 
would be necessary to investigate whether or not such an approach produces improved 
results generally (and not just in this particular case) before making such a 
recommendation.
The time restriction and the limited accident data provided to the participants were 
necessary controls in the current study but, again, may have affected the results
45 It would also have been possible to have a number of groups independently analyse the same accident, 
and to compare and contrast the results of each group in the reliability assessment. However, such a 
study would have required considerably more participants and was not feasible in the current research for 
this reason.
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obtained. The use of a two-page, simplified accident report was deemed necessary to 
try to ensure that analysts’ AcciMap findings did not differ as a result of their 
misunderstanding the data or having insufficient opportunity to study it thoroughly. 
The analysts were also given a time limit, primarily to ensure that none was advantaged 
over others in this respect. However, it is possible that the restrictions on the time and 
information available to the analysts contributed to the accidental omission of relevant 
factors in their AcciMaps, since these might have been identified had the analysts had 
access to more data about the accident scenario and more time to consider those data. It 
is similarly possible that occasions on which the analysts misunderstood the accident 
report would have been fewer had they been able to examine the accident information in 
greater depth rather than inferring the meaning from the available data. In addition, 
variations relating to the ambiguity of accident information may have been more 
common in the current study than would normally be the case, since analysts were not 
able to cross-check this report against other sources of information to resolve areas of 
uncertainty. It is also possible, however, that the length and simplicity of the accident 
data used in this study resulted in less variation than would normally occur, since the 
report given to the analysts was simple (so different analysts were unlikely to differ 
significantly in their understanding of how the causes interacted to result in the 
accident) and coherent and complete (so variations in participants’ results stemming 
from conflicting or missing accident information were largely avoided). It was also 
short, reducing the likelihood of analysts overlooking factors because they had not 
considered all the relevant information. The types and extent of variation in AcciMap 
findings that would occur if analysts were not limited in these ways can only be 
inferred. Additional research into the validity and reliability of AcciMap analyses 
performed without these constraints would be required in order for conclusions on these 
topics to be drawn.
The findings of this research also raise a number of new questions that could be 
addressed in future work in this area. For instance, after the examination of the nature 
and significance of the AcciMap variations observed in this case, it was proposed that 
some of the types of variation observed in this study might also be relevant in other 
accident analysis methods involving similar logic or processes. The examination of 
whether this is indeed the case would be an additional area of interesting future 
research. Other accident analysis techniques could be evaluated for validity and 
reliability using the methods by which the AcciMap approach was assessed in this
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research, so that insight could be gained into whether the results of such techniques 
should also be qualified as being potentially invalid and unreliable.
The findings of the study also highlighted a number of areas in which the AcciMap 
guidelines could be revised further in an attempt to reduce some types of variation in 
AcciMap findings. Possible future work on the guidelines could involve considering 
the value of such alterations, making the changes that are judged to be necessary and 
assessing the effects of those changes on AcciMap analyses. The guidelines could also 
be altered to include detailed instructions on the documentation of the analysis process, 
in the way recommended earlier in this chapter, and trialled in order to ascertain the 
feasibility and usefulness of such a procedure. In addition, the AcciMap process could 
be revised so that the factors identified and addressed in the analysis are not just those 
that were causal to an accident, but also other ‘unsafe’ factors that become apparent, as 
a number of analysts have recommended (e.g. Benner, 1992; Johnson, 2003; Weiss et 
al., 2001). Consideration would have to be given to how such factors could be 
incorporated into the analysis (such as whether they should be included in the AcciMap 
diagram in some way or highlighted separately). The suitability of the AcciMap 
guidelines would have to be re-examined if such alterations were made.
To date, AcciMap analyses have primarily been used to analyse accidents by accessing 
information from accident reports and the AcciMap guidelines developed in this 
research instruct analysts in how this should be done. However, future work in this area 
could also explore the possibility of using the AcciMap approach during the initial 
accident investigation stage, that is, during the process of examining the accident scene, 
forensic analyses, witness statements, interview data, company records and data 
recording devices, for instance, to determine how and why an accident occurred. If this 
extension were considered appropriate, several additions would need to be made to the 
AcciMap guidelines, instructing analysts in processes such as collecting and sorting 
through the raw data, assessing the soundness of those data (as well as identifying areas 
of missing information and resolving apparent contradictions), piecing together how and 
why the events leading up to the accident occurred (perhaps making use of a timeline), 
continuing to ask how and why-Xy^Q questions for each of the relevant events and 
conditions uncovered and documenting the entire process. Guidance would need to be 
given on how to draft and revise the AcciMap diagram during the iterative investigation 
process (such as how to handle causal factors that appear relevant but for which direct
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causal chains to the outcome have not yet been established). In addition, further 
instruction would need to be provided on the documentation of the investigation, since 
all positive and negative evidence for potentially significant factors would have to be 
recorded so that their relevance could be reconsidered as additional information came to 
light. The extension of the AcciMap approach for use as an investigation tool would 
require significant changes and additional testing, but may be a useful area of future 
research.
A final area in which future research might be valuable is with regard to the attribution 
of weightings to safety recommendations. As Johnson (2003: 596) notes, it is not 
always clear ‘'how best to allocate finite resources to support the implementation of all 
of the diverse recommendations that might be made by investigators”. An indication of 
the relative importance of the implementation of each safety recommendation would 
assist in making such decisions. However, the development of an appropriate system 
for developing these weightings is not necessarily straightforward. The REASON RCA 
technique incorporates an “objective quantification standard'* that allows corrective 
actions to be weighted for importance so that '‘managers can determine benefits before 
allocating resources” (Decision Systems Inc, 2004c, para 13). However, the decision of 
which causes are most in need of rectification is based on the number of causes in the 
causal tree that are eliminated if a certain factor is addressed. For instance, the 
REASON software will determine that eliminating one ‘root cause' eliminates 25 of the 
causes in the diagram, while eliminating another eliminates only ten, and thus concludes 
that the rectification of the former is of greater importance than that of the latter 
(Decision Systems Inc, 2003). Such an approach for allocating weightings to corrective 
actions is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, the calculation of the 
importance of each ‘root cause’ is based on the number of nodes in the diagram that are 
depicted as causally related to that factor. However, as the current study indicates, 
analysts can (and often do) depict essentially the same causal relationships in a causal 
diagram using different groupings and different levels of detail, both of which affect the 
number of nodes in the diagram. Consequently, the cause ‘RailCorp medical standards 
inadequate’ would be weighted by the REASON system as being in greater need of 
rectification if it were depicted as below (left) than below (right) even though the effects 
of that factor are the same in both cases.
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RailCorp
medical
standards
inadequate
Driver
suffered from 
obesity and 
heart attack 
risk factors
Driver was 
obese
Driver had 
heart attack 
risk factors
RailCorp
medical
standards
inadequate
Similarly, the cause “RailCorp failed to address known problems with the deadman 
system" would be weighted as having higher importance if it were depicted as below 
(left) than below (right).
Deadman 
system failed 
to activate
Deadman system 
was ineffective for 
overweight drivers
RailCorp failed to address 
known problems with 
deadman system for 
overweight drivers
Thus, while such an approach is indeed objective and repeatable, the weightings 
ascribed to each corrective action are likely to be heavily affected by the analyst's 
judgements of the amount of detail required to explain the causal links in the diagram 
and the most appropriate way of grouping those factors. In addition, this approach 
treats each cause as equally necessary to address, so that a corrective action that 
eliminates three downstream causes will be viewed as three times as important as 
another that eliminates only one. It does not take into consideration the fact that some 
causes are much more critical than others and that it may be more conducive to the 
future safety of the system to address one particularly critical factor than several that are 
less critical. Clearly, then, it is inappropriate to weight safety recommendations using
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an approach such as this, which does not take into consideration the actual effects that 
each recommendation might have and the relative benefits of these effects in terms of 
improving system safety.
There are a number of other factors that may also be taken into consideration when 
forming such judgements, such as the cost and ease associated with the implementation 
of such recommendations and the likelihood that they would be effective in preventing 
future accidents (Benner, 1992; Dekker, 2001). It is clearly important, then, that the 
attribution of weightings to safety recommendations be made on the basis of careful 
consideration of all such factors, rather than being generated automatically from the 
causal analysis. A useful area of future research, then, would involve determining how 
such judgements can best be made. Consideration could be given to whether such 
conclusions should be based on the analyst’s intuitive judgement or whether instructions 
could be provided (in the AcciMap guidelines) for how analysts should form such 
judgements. Attention could also be paid to how these decisions should be documented 
so that others can consider the reasoning behind the weightings. The validity and 
reliability of the weightings ascribed to each corrective action could also be examined.
There are, therefore, a number of areas in which additional research could be 
undertaken to allow the extent to which AcciMap analyses, in general, are valid and 
reliable to be ascertained, to address new questions arising from this research or to 
further enhance and broaden the scope of the AcciMap approach. The present research 
provides a context for such future research by permitting conclusions to be drawn 
regarding areas of fundamental interest with respect to the AcciMap approach -  the 
validity and reliability of the approach and the nature and significance of the variations 
that can occur in AcciMap findings.
9.6 Conclusions
This thesis aimed to determine whether or not the AcciMap approach is a valid and 
reliible technique for analysing organisational accidents and to examine the nature and 
sigrificance of variations in AcciMap findings, if such variations do occur. In 
addressing this aim, it was judged necessary to consider both the validity of the method 
itself and the validity and reliability of the results obtained when the method is used.
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The assessment of the former required that consideration be given to the intended 
outcomes of AcciMap analyses and to whether the characteristics of the method are 
conducive to allowing these outcomes to be achieved. This examination allowed the 
conclusion to be drawn, on the basis of argument, that the approach is indeed 
appropriate for the purposes for which it is intended and is, in this sense, valid. The 
controlled case study conducted to develop insight into the validity and reliability of 
AcciMap results, on the other hand, revealed that different analysts analysing the same 
accident using this approach in fact produced findings that differed from those of one 
another and from AcciMap experts and, moreover, that some of the observed 
differences were both significant (with respect to the meaning portrayed by an analysis 
or the practical outcomes of the analysis) and arguably unavoidable. Although the 
analysts' results were also similar in many respects, the existence of such variations in 
this case demonstrates by counterexample that AcciMap findings are not always 
completely valid and reliable.
Investigation into the observed variations revealed that the AcciMap approach is 
potentially open to human error and differences of interpretation, and also requires that 
analysts make a number of subjective judgements, all of which provide the opportunity 
for variations in AcciMap results and yet cannot be avoided in this form of analysis. In 
light of the revelation of the inherent subjectivity and opportunity for variability within 
the approach, it was suggested that variability of these kinds may not be unique to the 
particular case studied in this research and could potentially occur in other AcciMap 
analyses.
The implications of the finding that AcciMap results are not always completely valid 
and reliable are significant. Such findings demonstrate that AcciMap analyses may not 
always correctly identify the causes of organisational accidents and therefore may not 
provide an accurate account of how and why such accidents occurred. In addition, 
AcciMap analyses may not consistently identify the most appropriate safety 
recommendations for preventing similar accidents from recurring. In considering the 
future of AcciMap analysis in light of these implications, however, it was noted that all 
systemic accident analyses necessarily involve the types of judgement and interpretation 
that resulted in the variability observed in this study, and that restricting methods of 
accident analysis to those that do not have the potential for such variations would 
prevent the systemic causes of accidents from being identified and addressed.
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Consequently, it was proposed that AcciMap analysts and those considering AcciMap 
findings must acknowledge that the approach does, in fact, entail subjectivity, 
interpretation and judgement and that the results may not, therefore, be entirely valid 
and reliable. Further to this, it was suggested that each of the judgements and decisions 
underlying an AcciMap analysis should be documented, so that others can consider this 
information when judging the appropriateness of the findings. Such steps would 
preserve the benefits of the AcciMap approach in highlighting how factors throughout 
the system interacted to produce an organisational accident and in identifying areas in 
which effective corrective actions could be taken to prevent recurrence, while also 
ensuring that the limitations of the approach are properly taken into account.
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Appendix A -  AcciMap Guidelines
BACKGROUND TO ACCIMAP ANALYSIS
An AcciMap is a method for analysing the causes of accidents. It arranges the various 
causes of an accident into a tree diagram, with the negative outcome(s) (the accident 
itself) at the bottom and the causes of that accident branching upward. The approach is 
useful for:
• identifying the broad range of factors that contributed to an accident
• illustrating how those factors combined to result in the accident
• indicating problem areas that should be addressed to prevent similar accidents 
from occurring in the future.
A Sample AcciMap
Figure i is an example of an AcciMap analysis of an aircraft incident that occurred 
during a passenger flight from Albury to Melbourne in 199846. In this incident, the 
Saab 340A turbo-propeller aircraft was flying in icing conditions and had accumulated a 
deposit of ice on the wings (ice alters the shape of the wings and reduces their lifting 
capacity, causing aircraft to stall at a higher speed than would otherwise occur). The 
crew underestimated the amount of ice on the wings and did not activate the de-icing 
systems. On approach to Melbourne, the crew slowed the aircraft and mistakenly 
allowed the speed to drop below the target speed for flight in icing conditions. Shortly 
afterwards, the aircraft suffered an aerodynamic stall. The aircraft lost 2,300 feet of 
altitude before the crew regained control, approximately 10 seconds later. The crew 
was not provided with an automated stall warning prior to the stall. The only person 
injured was the flight attendant, who suffered bruising to her back while trying to regain 
her seat. Had this event taken place closer to the terrain, the outcome would probably 
have been catastrophic and involved loss of life.
The Sample AcciMap of this incident will be used to illustrate the different features of 
AcciMap analysis. The terms ‘accident’ and ‘incident’ will be used interchangeably in 
this document.
1. The Outcomes
The negative outcome(s) (the accident itself) are located in the bottom level of the 
AcciMap, with the causes of the accident branching upward.
2. The Causes
AcciMaps aim to identify all the causes (or contributing factors) of an accident. These 
are the factors which were necessary in order for the accident to happen. A factor
46 Details of this incident have been simplified and modified for the purposes of the example. The full 
details of this incident are available at
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/1998/AAIR/pdf/aairl99805068 001.pdf 
(ATSB, 1998).
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should only be included in an AcciMap if it is possible to say, ‘had this factor not 
occurred, the accident would (probably) not have occurred'47. The causes are displayed 
as boxes in the AcciMap.
3. Levels of the AcciMap
The causes in an AcciMap are arranged in terms of their causal remoteness to the 
outcome(s), with the most immediate causes near the bottom and more remote causes 
towards the top. As can be seen in the Sample AcciMap in Figure i, the causes are 
organised into four levels of causal remoteness. The accident itself is located in the 
‘Outcomes’ level. The Physical/Actor Events, Processes & Conditions that 
immediately contributed to it are arranged in the level above. The next highest level 
includes causes relating to the Organisation(s) involved. The most causally remote 
level incorporates factors external to the organisation(s), including societal, 
governmental and regulatory causes. In this way, AcciMaps show how a broad range of 
factors contributed to the outcome(s), rather than focusing solely on the failures that led 
directly to the accident.
4. Causal Links
As is evident in Figure i, the factors in an AcciMap are linked with arrows to illustrate 
the causal relationships between them. An arrow drawn from one factor to another 
indicates that:
i) the first factor caused the second (i.e. had the first not occurred, the second 
would [probably] not have occurred either); and
ii) the second factor was a direct result of the first (i.e. no other factor needs to be 
inserted between these factors to explain the link between the first and second).
This means that readers can understand why a factor in an AcciMap occurred by 
following the arrows upwards in the diagram to see the factors that contributed to it. 
They can also understand how the factor contributed to the negative outcome(s) at the 
bottom by following the arrows downwards in the diagram to see the effects that it 
produced.
By examining the chains of causes in an AcciMap, then, it is possible to understand the 
sequence of events and conditions that produced the accident and to show that, had any 
one factor been otherwise, the accident would most likely have been prevented. By 
following the chain of causes shaded in yellow in Figure i, for instance, it is clear that 
the aircraft lost 2,300 ft of altitude and caused the flight attendant to suffer back injuries 
because it stalled. One reason why the aircraft stalled was that the crew was not 
provided with an automated stall warning (and was therefore not prompted to take 
action to prevent the stall from occurring). The reason for the lack of stall warning was, 
in part, due to the fact that an advanced stall warning system, capable of detecting an 
impending stall in these conditions, had not been installed. Following the arrows up, it 
is evident that one reason why an advanced stall warning system was not installed was 
that such a system was not required by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).
The likely reason for this factor was that the aircraft was certified in Australia without
47 The word ‘probably’ is added because we cannot say with complete certainty that had a factor not 
occurred, the accident (or another factor) would not have taken place. We can only make a judgement 
about whether or not we think this is likely to be the case (Hopkins, 2000: 125).
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adequate testing. Had the stall warning system been tested, CASA would probably have 
required that the advanced stall warning system be installed (as Canada did during its 
certification of this aircraft).
By following each of the causal chains up from the accident in this way, it is possible to 
develop an understanding of how each of the factors came about and how they 
combined to produce the final outcomes.
It should be noted that there are a potentially infinite number of causes for any event.
As Reason (1997: 15) points out, any causal chain could, in theory, be extended back to 
the Big Bang. However, for the purposes of accident investigation only two types of 
cause are included:
1) Causes of practical significance. These are causes that something could 
conceivably be done about (Hopkins, 2000: 22). Note that the Sample AcciMap 
does not show, for instance that ‘had the plane been scheduled to depart on a 
different day...’ or ‘had the passengers been travelling by bus...’ the incident 
would not have occurred. These causes are not of practical significance - no 
sensible actions can conceivably be taken to address these sorts of cause
2) Causes that are not of practical significance, but that are necessary for making 
sense of why the accident occurred. These causes (depicted as ovals) are only 
included if the AcciMap does not make sense without them. The cause ‘Aircraft 
flying in cloud' is included in the Sample AcciMap for this reason. There is not 
much that can conceivably be done about it (since flight in cloud is not 
inherently dangerous and cannot always be avoided). However, it is necessary 
to include this cause in order for readers to understand why the flight crew could 
not see the wings clearly and hence their misinterpretation of the amount of ice 
that was present. This category of cause includes factors that contributed to the 
negative outcome(s) but cannot conceivably be changed either because it would 
not be sensible, or would not be plausible or possible, to do so. Causes relating 
to environmental conditions, physical surroundings and ongoing social, political 
or economic conditions may fit into this category
5. Safety Recommendations
Once the AcciMap diagram has been completed, with the relevant causes identified at 
each level, a list of safety recommendations can be created. Safety recommendations 
are actions that are proposed to ensure that such an outcome could not occur again. A 
list of recommendations from the Sample AcciMap is shown in Figure ii. They are 
grouped in terms of the party responsible for carrying out the proposed action.
The types of recommendation made depend on the causes in the AcciMap.
• Some causes can be rectified directly. For instance, the lack of an advanced stall 
warning system to provide flight crews with an automated warning prior to stall 
can be rectified directly by recommending that Kendell Airlines consider 
installing such a system in this type of aircraft (Recommendation 9)
• Some causes cannot be rectified directly, but recommendations can be made to 
prevent their occurrence. For instance, the cause “Crew misinterpreted pre-stall 
buffet as propeller imbalance' cannot be dealt with directly, but 
recommendations can be made to improve flight crew training in the
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identification of pre-stall indications so that this situation will be less likely to 
recur in the future (Recommendation 8)
• Other causes cannot be prevented at all (i.e. those depicted as ovals), but efforts 
can be made to compensate for their effects, where appropriate. For instance, 
the cause ‘Aircraft flying in cloud’ cannot reasonably be prevented. However, 
the reduction in the flight crew’s visibility of the ice on the wings that occurred 
as a result of this factor can be compensated for by, for instance, installing an 
ice-detection system (Recommendation 10).
Note that there are no recommendations specific to the actual individuals involved in 
the incident. For instance, there are no recommendations to punish or dismiss the flight 
crew for failing to activate the de-icing systems during the flight. This is because other 
flight crews in the same situation (i.e. operating without an ice-detection system, being 
unable to see the ice on the wings, and having not been trained adequately in safe 
operation in icing conditions) may easily have made the same mistake. Therefore, 
rather than aiming to change the behaviour of the particular individuals involved, safety 
recommendations should address the inadequacies that allowed this situation to occur at 
all, so that any individual in a similar situation will be prevented from making this type 
of error.
INSTRUCTIONS
STEP 1 -  Create a blank AcciMap format on which to arrange the causes:
• Take the large piece of paper provided and write the headings of the four levels 
down the left-hand side of the page, leaving as much room as possible between 
each heading
• Draw horizontal lines to separate each level (as in Figure i).
STEP 2 -  Identify the outcome(s):
• From the accident report, identify the negative outcome(s) to be analysed
• Write the outcome(s) on a Post-it note and stick it in the ‘Outcomes’ level of the 
AcciMap.
STEP 3 -  Identify the causal factors from the report:
• On a separate page, make a list (using dot points) of all causes in the accident 
report, that is, all factors for which you can say ‘had this been otherwise, the 
accident would (probably) not have occurred’. If you are unsure as to whether 
or not a factor is a cause, include it in the list -  it can always be eliminated at a 
later stage.
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STEP 4 -  Identify the appropriate AcciMap level for each cause:
• Next to each cause, write down the name of the AcciMap level in which it 
belongs. Refer to Figure iii to determine the correct level. The first column in 
Figure iii defines the levels of an AcciMap and the second lists the sorts of cause 
that belong in each level.
STEP 5 - Prepare the causes:
• Write each identified cause onto a Post-it note, making sure that you:
o keep it brief
o use wording that makes clear how things might have been different, i.e., 
don’t just say ‘training’ or ‘operator actions’ -  say ‘inadequate training' 
or ‘operator failed to monitor temperature’, so that it is clear what went 
wrong
o use wording that suits the level that the cause is located in:
■ Causes at the Physical/Actor Events, Processes & Conditions
level should be phrased in terms of the actual errors, failures, 
conditions and events that led to the accident (e.g. ‘life raft 
failed to inflate’ or ‘pilot failed to adjust heading')
■ Causes at the Organisational level and above should not focus 
on the particular individuals involved (e.g. say ‘inadequate staff 
training’, not ‘Pete Smith had not been adequately trained’)
• Place each of these Post-it notes (causes) into its appropriate level in the 
AcciMap
• If you have identified any causes which are not of practical significance, but 
which need to be included so that the AcciMap makes sense, draw an oval 
around these factors to distinguish them from the other causes.
STEP 6 - Draw in the causal links:
• Rearrange the Post-it notes in the AcciMap so that the causes lie directly above 
their effects (whether the effects are in the same level or in the level(s) below)
• In pencil, draw the causal links between each cause and its effect, using 
downward arrows, so that each cause is clearly linked to its effect below. 
However, before drawing an arrow, ensure that the following criteria are met:
i) Had A not occurred, B would (probably) not have 
------t----  occurred either
▼^ ii) B is a direct result of A; no other factor needs to
-----------  be inserted between them
If one cause does not obviously lead on to the next, leave a space where the 
missing information can be inserted later.
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Be sure to include as many (but only as many) factors as are necessary so that 
someone reading your AcciMap will be able to understand the sequence of 
events and conditions without difficulty.
There is no limit to the number of causes to be included in any causal chain, and 
there may be multiple linked causes within the same level of the AcciMap:
Organisational
Cause A
Cause B
Cause C
Causes don't have to be linked to effects in the same level or in the level 
immediately below -  they may be linked to factors several levels below:
Some causes may be linked with more than one effect. Conversely, several 
causes may be linked to one common effect. This means that no cause ever 
needs to be listed more than once in an AcciMap.
ExternalExternal
Cause B
Cause DCause B Cause C
Cause A
Cause D
Cause A Cause C
STEP 7 - Fill in the gaps:
At this point, there may be gaps left in the causal chains where information is missing. 
These must be filled so that the causal chains are unbroken from the earliest identified 
causes in each chain, all the way down to the outcome(s), and so that every cause 
relevant to the accident is included in the AcciMap.
283
• In order to uncover any missing causes, look at each cause on the AcciMap and 
ask why it occurred -
o Your AcciMap must include all factors which caused its occurrence or 
which failed to prevent it from occurring 
o Refer to Figure iii for help at this point. Figure iii is not an exhaustive 
list but it will serve as a guide to the types of causal factor that may be 
relevant
NB: Only include factors that are identified in the accident report.
• Aim to follow each causal chain as far as possible. Each chain should extend at 
least to the Organisational level (with the exception of the oval-shaped causes).
STEP 8 - Check the causal logic:
• Go through each cause in the diagram and make sure that:
o had it not occurred, the factor(s) it is linked to (and the accident itself) 
would probably not have occurred
• Go through each causal chain in the diagram and make sure that:
o anyone reading the AcciMap will have no difficulty in making sense of 
the sequence of events
o all of the arrows are facing downwards, towards the outcome(s)
o no cause is listed more than once. If you have two or more similar 
causes, see if they can sensibly be combined into one more general 
cause. For instance, the following causes:
Crew did not notice 
changes in handling 
characteristics prior 
to stall
Crew misinterpreted 
pre-stall buffet as 
propeller imbalance
Crew not 
sufficiently 
concerned about ice 
build-up on wings
Inadequate crew 
training in 
monitoring of 
changes in handling 
characteristics 
during operations in 
icing conditions
Inadequate crew 
training in 
assessment of 
aircraft buffeting in 
icing conditions
Inadequate crew 
training in hazards 
associated with ice 
build-up during 
operations in icing 
conditions
can be combined as follows (as they are in the Sample AcciMap), to 
simplify the diagram and to highlight that crew training in safe operation 
in icing conditions was inadequate with respect to numerous factors, and 
is therefore a problem area that should be addressed.
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Inadequate crew 
training in safe 
operation in icing 
conditions
Crew not 
sufficiently 
concerned about ice 
build-up on wings
Crew misinterpreted 
pre-stall buffet as 
propeller imbalance
Crew did not notice 
changes in handling 
characteristics prior 
to stall
STEP 9 - Formulate Safety Recommendations:
• Go through each of the causal factors in your AcciMap and identify those which 
could potentially be changed, controlled or compensated for so that a similar 
outcome could not occur again
• Bearing in mind that safety recommendations must be practical to implement,
1) Formulate safety recommendations that identify what specifically 
should be done to change, control or compensate for each cause
2) Consider whether or not there is a more general problem area that 
should also be addressed (e.g. if there are one or more problems 
relating to a certain part of a manual, it is beneficial to recommend 
that the manual be reviewed, as well as the particular problem parts, 
to ensure that the entire manual is adequate)
3) Identify who should make these changes, noting that the party 
responsible for making the changes might be different for the specific 
and general recommendations
NB. Recommendations should aim to prevent similar accidents from occurring 
regardless o f the individuals involved or the particular circumstances (this is 
why the recommendations in Figure ii address all flight crews and all Saab 340 
aircraft, not just those involved in the incident)
• Compile a list of these recommendations, grouped according to the parties 
responsible for carrying out the actions (as in Figure ii). Each recommendation 
should be numbered and should identify the party responsible for making the 
change
• Finally, check that every cause you identified in the first part of Step 9 has been 
addressed by one or more recommendation, if appropriate.
NB. Not all recommendations will necessarily be accepted by those responsible 
for implementing them. Taken together there may be some redundancy and 
cost-effectiveness and alternative solutions may be taken into consideration. 
These are not matters which the AcciMap analyst needs to address.
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Figure i: Sample AcciMap of Stall-without-warning Incident
External
Organisational
Physical/
Actor Aircraft 
flying in 
cloud
Processes & 
Conditions
'Aircraft flyingx 
in icing
, conditions ,
Outcomes
Ice on wings
Crew failed 
to monitor 
aircraft 
speed
Crew misjudged 
amount of ice on wings
Aircraft lost 2,300 
feet of altitude
Crew did not activate 
wing de-icing systems
Aircraft suffered an 
aerodynamic stall
Ice-detection 
systems not 
required by 
CASA
Flight attendant injured 
during fall
Leading edges 
of wings not 
clearly visible 
from cockpit
Crew were not 
provided with 
an automated 
stall warning
No ice-detection system 
installed on wings
Aircraft certified in 
Australia without 
adequate testing
Advanced stall 
warning system not 
installed
CASA requires 
full bank 
autopilot mode 
in holding 
patterns
Advanced stall 
warning system 
not required by 
CASA
Crew not sufficiently 
concerned about ice 
build-up on wings
Crew
misinterpreted 
pre-stall buffet 
as a propeller 
imbalance
Aircraft speed dropped 
below target speed for icing 
conditions
Crew Resource 
Management 
training not 
required by 
CASA
Crew did not 
notice pre-stall 
changes in 
aircraft pitch and 
trim
Inadequate crew training 
in Crew Resource 
Management
Inadequate crew training 
in safe operation in icing 
conditions
Inadequate 
consideration by 
CASA of effects of 
full bank autopilot 
mode in icing 
conditions
CASA did not 
inform operators of 
previous incidents 
involving stall- 
without-warning in 
icing conditions
Autopilot was 
engaged and set to 
full bank mode 
(against 
manufacturer 
suggestion)
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Figure ii: Safety Recommendations from Sample AcciMap
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)
Recommendation 1: CASA should require Australian airlines to train their flight crews 
in Crew Resource Management.
Recommendation 2: CASA should review the effects of the use of full bank autopilot 
mode during flight in icing conditions and should adjust autopilot requirements 
accordingly.
Recommendation 3: CASA should create and maintain communication processes by 
which airlines can be made aware of incidents that may be relevant to the safety of their 
operations.
Recommendation 4: CASA should review and improve its standard of testing during 
aircraft certification, particularly with respect to certification of aircraft for operation in 
icing conditions.
Recommendation 5: CASA should consider mandating an advanced stall warning 
system in Saab 340 turbo-propeller aircraft (and other similar aircraft that are certified 
to operate in icing conditions) to ensure that stalling cannot occur without unambiguous 
and timely warning being provided to the flight crew.
Recommendation 6: CASA should consider mandating ice-detection systems in Saab 
340 turbo-propeller aircraft (and other similar aircraft that are certified to operate in 
icing conditions) to ensure that flight crew can accurately assess ice build-up on the 
wings.
Kendell Airlines
Recommendation 7: Kendell Airlines should review and improve the Crew Resource 
Management training provided to flight crews, with particular attention to speed 
monitoring.
Recommendation 8: Kendell Airlines should review and improve its training of flight 
crew in the safe operation of turbo-propeller aircraft in icing conditions to ensure their 
awareness of pre-stall indications and conditions conducive to stalling.
Recommendation 9: Kendell Airlines should consider installing advanced stall warning 
systems in its Saab 340 turbo-propeller aircraft to ensure that stalling cannot occur 
without unambiguous and timely warning being provided to the flight crew.
Recommendation 10: Kendell Airlines should consider installing ice-detection systems 
in its Saab 340 turbo-propeller aircraft to ensure that flight crew can accurately measure 
ice build-up on the wings.
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Figure iii: Level Definitions and Examples^
t-a 73
X * 11
8 1
y  -a c- g §
?  8 ?  ?
2  5 c
§ E 2 -3
g 1 1 = =
P .S s i. 8
4X This list of examples includes causal factors highlighted in accident analyses and literature by several 
analysts (Hopkins, 2000; Kletz, 2001; Naikar, Saunders & Hopkins, 2002; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; 
Reason, 1997; Royal Australian Air Force, 2001; Snook, 2000; Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006; Woo & 
Vicente, 2003) as well as additional factors 1 have come across while reading accident reports and 
performing accident analyses.
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Appendix B -  AcciMap Guidelines 
Practice Document
Consider the foilowing scenario:
Shortly before 9:20 pm on 3 February 2003, a driverless empty suburban train, 
numbered as 5264, rolled away from Broadmeadows Station and subsequently ran 
downhill for 17 kilometres to Spencer Street Station. At about 9:30 pm, the train 
collided with a stationary Train at Spencer Street Station. The estimated speed at 
impact was 75kph and both trains were derailed as a result of the impact.
The investigation found that Train 5264 rolled away from Broadmeadows Station 
because the driver failed to apply the park brake when he departed the train to use the 
station amenities. It found that the Bayside Trains procedures do not specify that the 
park brake should be applied before drivers depart their trains. The investigation also 
found that Train 5264 had not been fitted with an automatic park brake (to activate 
during train movement if the controls are unattended) and was not required by the 
Victorian Regulator to have such a device fitted. A number of remedial safety actions 
are underway to address these issues49.
1) Should the following be included as causes in an AcciMap of this accident? 
(circle yes or no)
Driver failed to 
apply the park brake YES/NO
Broadmeadows Station 
is 17 km from Spencer 
St Station
Automatic park 
brake regulations YES/NO Remedial safety actions 
are underway
Train rolled 
downhill towards 
Spencer St Station
YES/NO
Failure to install 
automatic park brake
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
49 This is a simplified and modified summary the Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s (2003) 
Investigation Report (No 2003/001) entitled “Runaway of Suburban Electric Passenger Train 5264 and 
collision with Diesel Locomotive Hauled Passenger Train 8141”. It has been modified to be useful for 
the purposes of this practice paper and does not provide an accurate description of the accident. The full 
report is available at:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation reports/2003/RAIR/rair2003001 .aspx
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2) In which level of the AcciMap should the following causes be placed? (see 
Figure iii)
N o  p ro c e d u re  fo r  d r iv e r T ra in  ro lle d  d o w n h ill
to  a p p ly  p a rk  b ra k e to w a rd s  S p e n c e r  St
b e fo re  d e p a r t in g  tra in S ta tio n
A u to m a tic  p a rk  b ra k e F a ilu re  to  in s ta ll
n o t re q u ire d  by  re g u la to r a u to m a tic  p a rk  b ra k e
3) Which of the following links should be included in an AcciMap of this accident? 
(circle yes or no)
YES /NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES /NO
YES/ NO
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4) Which of the following would be appropriate recommendations to make after 
this accident? (circle yes or no)
a) Bayside Trains should amend procedures for safe departure o f trains so 
that drivers are required to apply the park brake before leaving their 
controls
YES/NO
b) Bayside Trains should relieve the driver o f Train 5264 o f duty
YES/NO
c) Bayside trains should prohibit drivers from stopping at Broadmeadows 
Station
YES/NO
d) Bayside Trains should fit automatic park brake systems to all of its 
suburban trains
YES/NO
e) The Victorian Regulator should ensure that all stations are on the same 
altitude so that unattended trains will not be influenced by gravity
YES/NO
f) The Victorian Regulator should consider requiring train companies to fit 
automatic park brake systems to all Victorian suburban trains
YES/NO
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Appendix C -  AcciMap Guidelines 
Practice Document (with Answers)
Consider the following scenario:
Shortly before 9:20 pm on 3 February 2003, a driverless empty suburban train, 
numbered as 5264, rolled away from Broadmeadows Station and subsequently ran 
downhill for 17 kilometres to Spencer Street Station. At about 9:30 pm, the train 
collided with a stationary Train at Spencer Street Station. The estimated speed at 
impact was 75kph and both trains were derailed as a result of the impact.
The investigation found that Train 5264 rolled away from Broadmeadows Station 
because the driver failed to apply the park brake when he departed the train to use the 
station amenities. It found that the Bayside Trains procedures do not specify that the 
park brake should be applied before drivers depart their trains. The investigation also 
found that Train 5264 had not been fitted with an automatic park brake (to activate 
during train movement if the controls are unattended) and was not required by the 
Victorian Regulator to have such a device fitted. A number of remedial safety actions 
are underway to address these issues'^0.
1) Should the following be included as causes in an AcciMap of this accident? 
(circle yes or no)
See Section 4 of the guidelines. This one is neither 1) of 
practical significance (because nothing can conceivably 
be done about it) nor 2) necessary for making sense of 
the accident, so should not be included.
Driver failed to 
apply the park brake (^YES))NO
Broadmeadows Station 
is 17 km from Spencer 
St Station
Automatic park 
brake regulations ye^7 noA Remedial safety actions 
are underway\
Train rolled 
downhill towards 
Spencer St Station
\
(^YES^NO J Failure to install automatic park brake
YES/NO
Step 5 of the guidelines says you should use 
wording that makes clear how things could 
have been different. So this one should say 
‘Automatic part brake not required by 
regulator’, because then it shows what could 
have been different.
(^YES^NO
Section 2 of the guidelines says causes are ‘factors 
that were necessary in order for the accident to 
happen’. This one is not a cause because if it hadn’t 
happened, the accident would still have occurred.
50 This is a simplified and modified summary the Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s (2003) 
Investigation Report (No 2003/001) entitled “Runaway of Suburban Electric Passenger Train 5264 and 
collision with Diesel Locomotive Hauled Passenger Train 8141”. It has been modified to be useful for 
the purposes of this practice paper and does not provide an accurate description of the accident. The full 
report is available at:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation reports/2003/RAIR/rair2003001 .aspx
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2) In which level of the AcciMap should the following causes be placed? (see 
Figure iii)
See Fig iii in the 
guidelines -  ‘absent 
procedures’ go in the 
Organisational level.
See Fig iii in the guidelines 
-  ‘physical sequence of 
events’ goes in the 
Physical/Actor ... level.
No procedure for driver 
to apply park brake 
before departing train N O R G
Train rolled downhill 
towards Spencer St 
Station P /A  events.
Automatic park brake Failure to install
not required by regulator R X T  \ automatic park brake O R G
See Fig iii in the guidelines -  ‘inadequate 
regulations’ go in the External level 
because they are beyond the control o f the 
organisation(s) involved.
See Fig iii in the guidelines -  
‘absent system defences’ go 
in the Organisational level.
3) Which of the following links should be included in an AcciMap of this accident?
(circle yes or no) See Step 6 of the 
guidelines. The 
second is not a 
direct cause of
(yYEs))NO
These are the wrong 
way around. The first 
occurred as a result 
of the second, not 
vice versa.
These two are not 
causally linked at 
all. You can’t say 
that had the first 
not occurred, the 
second would not 
have occurred.
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4) Which of the following would be appropriate recommendations to make after 
this accident? (circle yes or no)
a) Bayside Trains should amend procedures for safe departure o f trains so 
that drivers are required to apply the park brake before leaving their 
controls
b) Bayside Trains should relieve the driver o f Train 5264 o f duty.
Step 9 of the guidelines says ‘recommendations should aim to prevent similar accidents 
from occurring regardless of the individuals involved'. This recommendation is not 
appropriate because it would not prevent other drivers from making a similar mistake ii 
the same situation.
Section 5 of the guidelines says ‘Safety recommendations are actions that are proposed tc 
ensure that such an outcome could not occur again’ and Section 9 says ‘recommendation: 
should aim to prevent similar accidents from occurring regardless of...the particular 
circumstances’. Prohibiting drivers from stopping at this stop won’t prevent similar 
accidents in the future because the accident could have happened anywhere.
d) Bayside Trains should fit automatic park brake systems to all o f its 
suburban trains.
e) The Victorian Regulator should ensure that all stations are on the same 
altitude so that unattended trains will not be influenced by gravity.
f) The Victorian Regulator should consider requiring train companies to fit 
automatic park brake systems to all Victorian suburban trains.
c) Bayside trains should prohibit drivers from stopping at Broadmeadows 
Station.
Section 9 of the guidelines says that ‘safety recommendatior 
must be practical to implement’. This one is not!
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Appendix D -  Accident Report
Summary of Railway Investigation Report into the Rail 
Accident at Waterfall NSW on 31 January 2003.
At approximately 0714 on 31 January 2003, RailCorp passenger train service C311, 
travelling from Sydney to Port Kembla, overturned at high speed approximately 2 km 
south of Waterfall NSW. The overturned train then collided with a rock face next to the 
track. The train was carrying a driver and guard, both of whom had conducted the same 
run on the previous day, and 47 passengers. As a result of the accident, the driver and 
six passengers were killed. The four-car train was extensively damaged.
The driver was a 53-year-old male who began work in the rail industry in 1965 and had 
nearly 27 years of driving experience. His history of employment indicated that he was 
a generally reliable employee and a proficient and conservative train driver.
Post-accident medical evidence indicated a high probability that the driver was 
incapacitated at the controls as the result of a coronary heart attack, shortly after 
departing Waterfall Station. The train then continued to accelerate, to full speed, and 
overturned on a curve while travelling at approximately 117 km/h (the overturning 
speed for the curve was approximately 110 km/h).
The driver suffered from obesity and a number of heart attack risk factors that were not 
identified in his periodic medical examination. His last medical examination, conducted 
by a RailCorp-appointed general practitioner, had found him to be fit for duty according 
to the RailCorp medical standards. The investigation identified that the standards 
RailCorp medical examiners used were not sufficiently rigorous to ensure that health 
problems among safety-critical personnel were identified and addressed. It was likely 
that there were other drivers at RailCorp presenting a similarly high risk profile.
One of the defences installed in RailCorp trains to stop the train should the driver 
become incapacitated, was the deadman system. This system was designed to apply the 
emergency braking on the train in the event of the driver becoming incapacitated or 
leaving the controls in an emergency. A component of this system was the deadman 
foot pedal, which relied on the driver placing either or both feet on the pedal to hold it 
in the central engaged position. Too much or too little pressure would trigger 
emergency braking.
The investigation showed that the deadman system did not activate when C31 l's  driver 
became incapacitated. The investigation found that a person weighing more than 110 
kg slumped at the driving desk could hold the deadman foot pedal in the set position by 
the weight of his or her legs alone. Since the driver of C311 weighed approximately 
118 kg at the time of the accident, it is probable that, after becoming incapacitated, the 
weight of his legs caused the deadman pedal to remain suppressed and prevent brake 
application. RailCorp had known for more than 14 years that the deadman system could 
be inadvertently circumvented when a driver of a certain weight was incapacitated, 
however this problem remained uncorrected at the time of the accident.
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The time interval between the application of full power and the train overturning was in 
the order of 70 seconds. A task-linked vigilance control system could have applied the 
brakes and reduced the train speed by at least 10 km/hr in this time. Task-linked 
vigilance control systems are designed to apply the brakes of a train if a driver fails to 
carry out certain tasks within a specified period of time. RailCorp had not fitted, and 
was not required to fit, task-linked vigilance control systems to this fleet of trains and 
thus such a system was not available to mitigate for the limitations in the deadman 
system.
The guard onboard C311 was a 39-year-old male who had completed 21 years of 
continuous service with RailCorp. As a member of the crew operating C311 on 31 
January 2003, he had the opportunity to prevent this accident by taking action to slow 
the train before it negotiated the curve. However, he did not identify that the train was 
out of control and made no attempt to apply the emergency brake.
RailCorp considered guards to be part of the protection built into train operations to 
control the risk of driver incapacitation. However, there was no evidence to indicate 
that the guards’ training program provided them with critical decision-making skills for 
ensuring they would reliably interpret an emergency situation and react appropriately. 
The skills to recognise a speeding train and initiate the appropriate action to stop the 
train did not appear in the guards’ training.
RailCorp had a safety management system in place, developed on the basis of various 
legislative requirements and Australian Standards. A safety management system is a 
documented and integrated set of procedures designed to identify, assess and control 
risks. RailCorp’s safety management system incorporated elements relating to hazard 
identification, reporting and control, risk assessment, employee fitness for work, and 
personnel selection, training and competence, among others.
The investigation discovered no evidence indicating that the Rail Safety Regulator 
conducted a targeted audit of RailCorp's safety management system. The audit and 
investigation sections of the Rail Safety Regulator, which were responsible for 
assessment of the RailCorp safety management system, were stretched due to a lack of 
resources. The investigation highlighted that the Rail Safety Regulator had been 
inadequately resourced to oversee the NSW train network effectively and had not 
identified the deficiencies in RailCorp-'s safety management system.
296
Appendix E -  Project Information Sheet
and Consent Form
Title of Study:
An Investigation into the Reliability and Validity of the AcciMap Approach.
The purpose of this research is to establish the reliability and validity of a technique for 
accident analysis, referred to as the AcciMap approach. This technique involves the 
construction of causal diagrams to identify the organisational causes of accidents. This 
approach has been successfully used to analyse several accidents. However, the extent 
to which the technique produces valid and reliable results has not previously been 
addressed. The purpose of this research is to gain insight into the reliability and validity 
of the method by determining the degree of similarity, and the nature and significance 
of any differences, between results produced independently by different analysts using 
this technique and results produced by AcciMap experts.
If you choose to participate in this study, you will be asked to read a brief accident 
report and some literature about the AcciMap approach. Using this information, you 
will be asked to perform an AcciMap analysis of the accident. You will be given a time 
limit of approximately 4.5 hours to complete this task.
After completing the task, you will be interviewed about how and why you performed 
the analysis as you did. You and the other participants will then be asked, as a group, to 
comment on the similarities and differences between your results. These interviews 
would take approximately 10 minutes each and, with your permission, would be taped.
Your results will then be compared with those of other participants and AcciMap 
experts so that an assessment can be made of the reliability and validity of this 
approach.
The results of this study will be included in my PhD thesis and may be included in a 
subsequent journal article. However, the names and job titles of the participants will 
not be disclosed. This information, as well as the participants’ completed accident 
analyses and interview notes and tapes will be stored in a locked fding cabinet to which 
only I have access, so far as the law allows.
Participation in this project is entirely voluntary. Refusal to participate will not impede 
my research in any way, so please do not feel obligated to participate if you would 
prefer not to. If you choose to participate, you are free to withdraw from the study at 
any time.
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If you have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact me: 
Kate Branford
Sociology Department, ANU 
Based at: Air Operations Division,
Defence Science and Technology Organisation 
PO Box 4331, Melbourne, VIC 3001 
Ph: (03) 9626 7446 Fax: (03) 9626 7084 
Email: Kate.Branford@dsto.defence.gov.au
If you have any concerns regarding how this research was conducted, please contact the 
ANU Human Ethics Officer
ANU Human Ethics Officer 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Research Office 
Chancelry 10B
The Australian National University, ACT 0200 
Ph: (02) 6125 2900 Fax: (02) 6125 4807 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au
298
Consent Form
Title of Study:
An Investigation into the Reliability and Validity of the AcciMap Approach.
Researcher: Kate Branford, Sociology Department, ANU.
I .............................................. (please print) hereby consent to participate in the
research project entitled ‘An Investigation into the Reliability and Validity of the 
AcciMap Approach’. I have read and understand the following information:
1. This research will contribute to knowledge about the reliability and validity of 
the AcciMap approach.
2. The results of the study will be published in a PhD thesis and may be included in 
a subsequent journal article.
3. The names and job titles of the participants will be suppressed in all published 
work. This information, as well as the participants’ completed accident 
analyses, and interview notes and tapes will be stored in a locked filing cabinet 
to which only the researcher has access, so far as the law allows.
4. Participation is voluntary and participants are free to withdraw from the study at 
any time.
5. Further questions about the study can be directed to:
Kate Branford
Sociology Department, ANU 
Based at Air Operations Division,
Defence Science and Technology Organisation 
PO Box 4331, Melbourne VIC 3001 
Ph: (03) 9626 7446 Fax: (03) 9626 7084 
Email: Kate.Branford@dsto.defence.gov.au
6. Any concerns about the research may be directed to:
ANU Human Ethics Officer 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Research Office 
Chancelry 10B
The Australian National University 
ACT 0200
Ph: (02) 6125 2900 Fax: (02) 6125 4807 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au
Signed Date
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Appendix F — Coding Rules
FOR VALIDITY:
CAUSAL FACTORS
1) Did they identify a cause with the same meaning as the expert’s cause? (Y/N) If 
yes, identify the cause (e.g. Y: 3 or Y: 2,3 or lA: 2)
Example expert cause: “ The driver experienced dizziness and disorientation "
Y : n u m b e r i f  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  a  c a u s e  t h a t  m e a n s  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  a s  t h e  c o r r e c t  c a u s e ,  w h e t h e r  
o r  n o t  t h e  w o r d i n g  is i d e n t i c a l
o  e .g .  “ T h e  d r i v e r  w a s  d i z z y  a n d  d i d n  7 k n o w  w h e r e  h e  w a s  ”
i f  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  a  c a u s e  t h a t  m e a n s  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  a s  t h e  c o r r e c t  c a u s e ,  b u t  a l s o  
h a d  a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  ( t h a t  is n o t  a  c a u s e )
o  e .g .  “ T h e  d r i v e r  e x p e r i e n c e d  d i z z i n e s s  a n d  d i s o r i e n t a t i o n  f o r  a  p e r i o d  o f  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  1 5  m i n u t e s ”
i f  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  a  c a u s e  t h a t  m e a n s  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  a s  t h e  c o r r e c t  c a u s e ,  a n d  a l s o  
i n c l u d e d  a n o t h e r  c a u s e  in t h e  s a m e  s e n t e n c e
o  e .g .  “ T h e  d r i v e r  e x p e r i e n c e d  d i z z i n e s s  a n d  d i s o r i e n t a t i o n  a n d  l o s t  
c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  v e h i c l e ”
i f  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  m u l t i p l e  c a u s e s  t h a t ,  t o g e t h e r ,  m e a n  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  a s  t h e  
c o r r e c t  c a u s e  ( i f  so ,  i n c l u d e  b o t h  c a u s e  n u m b e r s )
o  e .g .  “ T h e  d r i v e r  w a s  d i z z y ” a n d  “ T h e  d r i v e r  e x p e r i e n c e d  
d i s o r i e n t a t i o n  ”
V i:  n u m b e r i f  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  h a l f ,  b u t  n o t  a l l ,  o f  t h e  c a u s e  
o  e .g .  “ T h e  d r i v e r  e x p e r i e n c e d  d i z z i n e s s ”
N i f  t h e y  d i d  n o t  i d e n t i f y  a  c a u s e  t h a t  m e a n s  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  a s  t h e  c o r r e c t  c a u s e
i f  t h e  c o r r e c t  c a u s e  w a s  i m p l i e d  in  t h e  c a u s e s  t h e y  d id  i d e n t i f y  b u t  w a s  n o t  
e x p l i c i t l y  i d e n t i f i e d
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
2) Did they propose a safety recommendation with the same meaning as the correct 
recommendation? (Y/N) If so, what was the recommendation number? (e.g. Y:
5)
Example expert recommendation: “Singapore Airlines should require flight crews to 
verify their route on an airport map prior to movement o f the aircraft towards the 
runway”
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Y :  n u m t e r i f  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  m e a n s  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  a s  t h e  c o r r e c t  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  w o r d i n g  is id e n t i c a l
o  e .g .  “P ilo ts sh o u ld  he re q u ired  to check their rou te  to the runw ay on an  
a irport m ap before they  start ta x iin g ”
i f  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  m e a n s  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  a s  t h e  c o r r e c t  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  is  n o t  a n o t h e r  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n
o  e .g .  “S ingapore  A irlin es sh o u ld  requ ire  f i g h t  crew s to  verify  the ir rou te  
on an a irport m ap p r io r  to m ovem en t o f  the aircraft tow ards the runw ay  
so  tha t they w ill be un like ly  to  take an incorrect turn  ”
i f  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  m e a n s  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  a s  t h e  c o r r e c t  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  a n o t h e r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n
o  e .g .  “Singapore  A irlin es sh o u ld  requ ire  f l ig h t  crew s to  verify  the ir route  
on an a irport m ap p r io r  to m ovem en t o f  the a ircra ft tow ards the runw ay  
a n d  to v isua lly  confirm  the runw ay signs before com m encing  ta k e - o f f ’
i f  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  m u l t i p l e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t h a t ,  t o g e t h e r ,  m e a n  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  
a s  t h e  c o r r e c t  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  ( i f  so ,  i n c l u d e  b o t h  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  n u m b e r s )  
o  e .g .  “S ingapore  A irlines sh o u ld  requ ire  f l ig h t  crew s to verify  the ir rou te  
on an airport m ap  ” a n d  “R oute verifica tion  sh o u ld  be com p le ted  p rio r  
to m ovem en t o f  the  a ircra ft tow ards the ru n w a y ”
N i f  t h e y  d i d  n o t  i d e n t i f y  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  m e a n s  t h e  s a m e  t h i n g  a s  t h e  
c o r r e c t  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n
i f  t h e  c o r r e c t  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  w a s  i m p l i e d  in  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t h e y  d id  
i d e n t i f y  b u t  w a s  n o t  e x p l i c i t l y  i d e n t i f i e d
i f  t h e y  i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  s a m e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  b u t  d i r e c t e d  it a t  a  d i f f e r e n t  p a r ty ,  so  
t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  a c t i o n s  a r e  n o t  t h e  s a m e
o  e .g .  “F ligh t crew s sh o u ld  m ake su re  tha t they verify the ir rou te  on an  
airport m ap p r io r  to m ovem en t o f  the a ircra ft tow ards the runw ay a n d  to 
visua lly  confirm  the runw ay signs before com m encing  ta k e -o ff  ”
FOR RELIABILITY: 
CAUSAL FACTORS
Each participant's causes will be printed in a different colour. The aim is to arrange the 
causes so that those with the same meaning are grouped together. Leave those that 
don't have the same meaning as another separate. Try to use the same sort of 
judgements as involved in the validity assessment.
When deciding whether two causes have the same meaning, just consider whether they 
are generally similar. It is not necessary to check that every component in one cause is 
present in the other - just that they are referring to the same type of thing. However, if 
participant A includes two or more causes in one box, and participant B identifies only 
one of these, underline the causes in participant A’s box that was missed by participant 
B.
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e.g. Participant A Participant B
The driver experienced The driver experienced
dizziness and dizziness
disorientation
You can have two (or more) causes by the same person in one group, if you think that, 
together, they are essentially saying the same thing as the other person's cause(s).
e.g. Participant A Participant B
The driver experienced 
dizziness and 
disorientation
The driver experienced 
dizziness
The driver experienced 
disorientation
(grouped)
If both participants identify the same cause but one includes extra detail that the other 
does not, include that extra detail as different
e.g. Participant A Participant B
Truck was not fitted with 
driver seatbelt
Truck was not fitted with 
driver seatbelt
(ungrouped)
Driver was not wearing a 
seatbelt
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
Follow same process as for causes
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Appendix G -  Sample Coding Sheet
CAUSAL FACTORS
Did they identify a cause with 
the same meaning as the expert 
cause? Y/N (If Y, identify cause)
ParticipantExpert Cause
Inadequately resourced regulator
Inadequate regulatory auditing of RailCorp’s 
Safety Management System
Inadequate RailCorp Safety Management 
System
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
Did they identify a 
recommendation with the same
Expert Recommendations Participant meaning as the experts’ 
recommendation? Y/N (If Y, 
identify recommendation)
The Government should ensure that the Rail 
Safety Regulator is adequately resourced to 
effectively oversee the NSW train network, 
particularly with respect to auditing operator 
Safety Management Systems
1 Y: 5
2 Y: 8
3 N
The Rail Safety Regulator should review and 
improve its capacity to effectively audit 
operator Safety Management Systems
1 N
2 N
3 Y: 3
The Rail Safety Regulator should consider 
mandating task-linked vigilance control 
systems in NSW trains
1 Y: 2
2 Y: 6
3 Y: 3
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Appendix H -  Definitions for Coding
General Rule:
“Inadequate’' in these cases often means the same as “deficient“, “contained deficiencies”, 
“unsatisfactory”, “insufficient”, “poor” etc. The wording doesn’t have to be identical; it just has to match 
what was meant in that context.
CAUSES
Inadequately resourced regulator (EXT)
This means that the government did not provide the regidator with sufficient resources (in the form o f 
money, staff etc.)
Count as same if:
they say things like “stretched due to lack of resources” or “under-funded” or “insufficiently
resourced” instead of “inadequately resourced”
they say things like “staff' or “money” instead of “resources”
Count as different if:
They do not say who was inadequately resourced or if they say that a party other than the 
regulator was under-resourced
Inadequate regulatory auditing of RailCorp's Safety Management System (EXT)
This means that the regulator did not adequately audit (i.e. check the suitability/appropriateness/ 
adequacy o f  RailCorp ’s Safety Management System (the documented and integrated set o f procedures 
designed to identify, assess and control risks in an organisation)
Count as same if:
they say that the regulator did not audit RailCorp’s SMS
they use words like “check the adequacy o f ’ or “oversee” etc. instead of “audit”
they say something like “procedures designed to identify, assess and control risks ...” instead of
SMS
Count as different if:
they don’t refer to the Safety Management System e.g. if they just say that the regulator didn’t 
adequately audit RailCorp
Inadequate RailCorp Safety Management System (ORG)
This means that the SMS that RailCorp had in place was inadequate (i.e. it did not adequately identify, 
assess and control risks)
Count as the same if:
they say something like “procedures designed to identify, assess and control risks” instead of 
SMS
Count as different if:
they say that there was no SMS or the SMS was not followed etc.
they say that the RSR failed to identify deficiencies in the SMS (the focus should be that the 
SMS was inadequate, not that the deficiencies were not identified)
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RailCorp medical standards inadequate (ORG)
This means that the medical standards that were adopted at RailCorp were not sufficient or strict enough 
(in the sense that, in accordance with the standards, drivers were ‘fit for duty’ even i f  they were in a high 
risk category for heart attack)
Count as different if:
They say that the medical examiner was inadequate, medical procedures were inadequate or the 
medical examination was inadequate (because the focus should be on the medical standards)
Driver had heart attack risk factors (Physical/Actor...)
Count as the same if:
they say something that means heart attack risk factors e.g. characteristics that made him 
susceptible to heart attack etc.
Count as different if:
they just say he suffered from obesity (this is a separate cause)
Driver suffered heart attack (Physical/Actor...)
Count as same if:
they say he probably had a heart attack
they say “coronary heart attack” instead of “heart attack”
Driver became incapacitated (Physical/Actor...)
Count as same if:
they say he became unconscious or physically unable to control train etc.
Driver was overweight (Physical/Actor...)
Count as same if:
they use other words for overweight (obesity, too fat etc.) or words indicating that the driver was 
over 110 kg (or that he weighed 118 kg)
RailCorp failed to address known problems with deadman system for overweight drivers (ORG)
This cause has two parts: 1) There were problems with the Deadman system, and 2) RailCorp knew about 
these problems and failed to address them
Count as same if:
they incorporated both of these i.e. that there were problems with the deadman system and that 
these problems weren’t addressed/fixed
(count as !4 if they only got one of these)
Deadman system failed to activate (Physical/Actor...)
This means that the deadman system did not activate (i.e. did not perform the function o f activating the 
brakes when the driver became incapacitated)
Count as same if:
they say the deadman system didn’t perform as intended etc. 
they say the deadman system failed to apply the brakes 
they say the footman pedal failed to activate the brakes
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Count as different if:
they say that something else failed to activate (e.g. foot pedal), but don’t mention that the brakes 
were not activated as a result
RailCorp did not provide effective guard training for emergency situations (ORG)
This means that the guard's training did not provide them with the critical decision-making skills for  
ensuring they would reliably interpret an emergency situation (e.g. recognise a speeding train) and react 
appropriately
Count as same if:
they say RailCorp did not provide effective guard training for one (or more) of the following: 
critical decision making, emergency situation recognition, action in emergency situations, 
recognising speeding trains etc.
they just say that the guard did not receive adequate training (without specifying that it was 
inadequate for emergency situations) but that the causal chain stemming down from this cause 
includes the guard’s failure to identify that the train was out of control and his failure to apply 
the emergency brake (count as !4 if the causal chain includes only one of these causes)
Guard did not identify that train was out of control (Physical/Actor...)
This means that the guard did not realise/notice that the train was out o f control (this is different from  
him actually doing anything about it —  it ’s just referring to him recognising the situation)
Count as same if:
they say “runaway” etc. instead of “out of control”
Guard failed to apply emergency brake (Physical/Actor...)
This means that the guard failed to apply the emergency brake, which is different from the activation o f 
the brake by the de adman system
Count as same if:
they say something like guard failed to intervene or to stop the train/reduce speed etc.
Count as different if:
they just say something like ’emergency brake not applied’ (unless it is clear from the arrows in 
the diagram that they are referring to the guard’s failure to apply it)
Task-linked vigilance control system not required by regulator (EXT)
This means that RailCorp (and other rail companies) were not required, by the regulator, to have a task- 
linked vigilance control system installed
Count as same if:
they say that a TLVCS was not required (but don’t add 'by regulator’) 
they say “mandatory”, “obligatory”, “compulsory” etc. instead of “required”
RailCorp failed to fit task-linked vigilance control system (ORG)
This means that RailCorp did not fit/install a task-linked vigilance control system on this train 
Count as same if:
they say that the system wasn’t fitted/installed (but don’t add that RailCorp failed to fit/install it)
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Speed too great for curve (Physical/Actor...)
This means that the speed the train was travelling at (117 km/h) exceeded the overturning speed for the 
curve (110 km/h)
Count as same if:
they say the train was travelling too fast, or exceeded the speed limit etc., if there is also some 
reference to the curve
they say the train was travelling at 117 km/h or at a speed greater than 110 km/h around the 
curve
(count as Vi if they said that the speed was too fast, but didn’t mention that this was with 
reference to the curve)
Close proximity of rock face (Physical/Actor...)
This means that the rock face was near the track 
Count as same if:
they say something about the rock face being near/next to/close to the curve/track 
Count as different if:
they say the train collided with a rock face (this is a different cause)
Train overturned (OUTCOMES)
Count as same if:
they say ‘derailed’ or ‘turned over’ etc.
Collision with rock face (OUTCOMES)
Count as same if:
they use say “hit” or “crashed into” etc. instead of “collision”
Multiple deaths (OUTCOMES)
Count as same if:
they say deaths/fatalities etc. resulted or if they specify the number who died
Extensive damage to train (OUTCOMES)
Count as same if:
they say just damage (rather than extensive damage) or use other words for damaged (e.g. 
broken, smashed up etc.)
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SAFETY RECS
General notes:
Count recommendations to consider doing something as the same as recommendations to do it. 
Count recommendations to '‘review” or “investigate” something as different from those that 
recommend a concrete action e.g. to “improve” or “replace” it. However, if one says something 
like “review and improve” and the other just says “improve”, these can be treated as the same.
1. The Government should ensure that the Rail Safety Regulator is adequately resourced to 
effectively oversee the NSW train network, particularly with respect to auditing operator Safety 
Management Systems
This means that the government should provide more resources (money, staff etc.) to the Rail Safety 
Regulator so that it will be able to carry out its oversight duties effectively, and particularly so that it will 
be able to audit safety management systems
Count as same if:
they say something like increase funding/resources etc. instead of ensure the RSR is adequately 
resourced
(count as 14 if they said that funding/resources should be increased, but don’t specify any reason 
i.e. to allow effective oversight etc.)
Count as different if:
they say that the RSR should acquire or reallocate funds
2. The Rail Safety Regulator should review and improve its capacity to effectively audit operator 
Safety Management Systems
This means that the regulator should assess (and, i f  necessary, improve) its own capacity to ensure that 
operators ’ safety management systems are adequate
Count as same if:
they say something like “check the adequacy o f' instead of “audit” 
they say that the RSR should audit RailCorp’s/operators’ SMS (because the accident report 
indicates that an audit might not have been carried out at all) or ensure that SMSs are 
periodically audited
they just say “review” and not also “improve”
3. The Rail Safety Regulator should consider mandating task-linked vigilance control systems in 
NSW trains
This means that the RSR should consider whether or not they should make TLVCSs mandatory in NSW 
trains
Count as same if:
they say that the RSR should mandate the system (rather than consider mandating it)
they say that the RSR should consider mandating the system but don’t specify which trains they
should be fitted to
4. RailCorp should review and improve its Safety Management System so that risks are effectively 
identified and addressed
This means that RailCorp should review and fix the problems with its SMS (the procedures it has in place 
to identify, assess and control risks) to ensure that RailCorp ’s risks are effectively identified and 
addressed/fixed
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Count as same if:
they just say improve and don’t also say review
they say that the SMS should be improved but don’t say the purpose (i.e. so that risks are 
effectively identified and addressed)
(count as Vi if they say something like review but not improve)
5. RailCorp should review and improve its medical standards, particularly with respect to the 
health of safety-critical personnel
This means that RailCorp should reconsider and improve (or toughen) the medical standards that it uses 
to assess the health o f staff, particularly safety-critical staff (i.e. drivers, guards etc. whose health 
problems could hcn>e severe consequences)
Count as same if:
they just say that medical standards should be reviewed and improved but don’t specify that 
particular attention should be paid to safety-critical personnel 
they say improve but don’t also say review
they say procedures for assessing the health of staff, rather than medical standards 
(count as Vi if they say review but don’t also say improve)
(count as Vi if they say that these standards should be introduced, rather than improved)
Count as different if:
they say the examinations or examiners should be improved (since it is the medical standards 
that are relevant here)
6. RailCorp should address defects with the Deadman system
This means that RailCorp should do something about the problem with the Deadman system not 
activating in all circumstances when drivers are incapacitated (i.e. when drivers weigh 110 kg+). By 
‘address ’, it means fix the system or consider replacing it with something that works
Count as same if:
they say try to address the defects with the deadman system, or consider how to improve the 
deadman system, etc.
they say something like ‘replace the deadman system with something that works’
they say something about addressing problems with the deadman foot pedal instead of system
7. RailCorp should ensure that crews are adequately trained for emergency situations
This means that RailCorp should make sure its crews (drivers & guards) are properly trained in 
emergency situations (i.e. can recognise emergency situations and respond appropriately)
Count as same if:
they say improve guard training, rather than ensure guards are adequately trained 
they say introduce guard training in these areas
(count as Vi if they say that crew/guard training should be improved, but don’t mention 
emergency situations)
8. RailCorp should consider fitting task-linked vigilance control systems to its fleet of trains
This means that RailCorp should investigate the feasibility/use etc. o f fitting TLVCSs to its trains (in 
order to compensate for the problems with the Deadman System)
Count as same if:
they say that RailCorp should fit the TLVCS (rather than consider fitting) 
they say “all trains” or “trains” etc. rather than “its fleet of trains”
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Appendix I -  Coding Process
Causal Factors
Safety Recommendations
Items are grouped 
together when they are 
judged to have the 
same meaning
Items are left separate 
when they are judged to 
be unique to one 
analysis
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Appendix J -  Participants’ AcciMap
Results
Participant A
External
Organisational
Physical / Actor 
Events, 
Processes & 
Conditions
13. Deadman 
system failed 
to activate
Outcomes
11. Driver had 
coronary heart 
attack
15 Train 
overturned at 
high speed
14. Train 
travelling too 
fast on curve
12. Driver was 
incapacitated 
at the controls
16.
Overturned 
train collided 
with rock face
7. Guard did 
not receive 
adequate 
training
10. Guard 
failed to 
recognise out 
of control train
4. The RSR 
did not identify 
deficiencies in 
RailCorp's 
SMS
5. No task- 
linked 
vigilance 
system 
installed
9. Driver suffered 
from obesity and 
other heart attack 
risks
6. RailCorp 
medical 
examiner not 
sufficiently 
rigorous
3. Rail Safety 
Regulator did 
not conduct 
audit of 
RailCorp’s 
SMS
1 The RSR was 
inadequately resourced to 
oversee NSW train network
2 RailCorp 
was not 
required to 
install task-L 
vigilance 
systems
8. A heavy and 
incapacitated 
person could 
circumvent the 
deadman 
system
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Participant A Recommendations:
NSW Government
Recommendation 1: The NSW government should increase funding into the Rail Safety 
Regulator so that it could be adequately resourced to oversee NSW’s train network.
Rail Safety Regulator
Recommendation 2: The Rail Safety Regulator should review and change the 
compulsory safety equipment aboard all trains to include the installation of a task linked 
vigilance system.
Recommendation 3: The Rail Safety Regulator should implement a schedule where rail 
operator safety systems are periodically audited on a regular basis.
Recommendation 4: The Rail Safety Regulator should review and improve the process 
in which it conducts audits of safety management systems so that deficiencies can be 
identified and corrected.
RailCorp
Recommendation 5: RailCorp should increase the thoroughness in which train drivers 
and other critical operators are medically examined.
Recommendation 6: RailCorp should consider setting a standard of medical fitness that 
all operators must pass before they are to be allowed to continue work.
Recommendation 7: RailCorp should review and improve the training that is provided 
to guards, enabling them to interpret and act quickly in an emergency situation.
Recommendation 8: RailCorp should consider revamping or replacing the existing 
Deadman safety system so that an incapacitated driver cannot inadvertently circumvent 
the emergency brake.
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Participant B Recommendations:
Government
Recommendation 1: Provide more resources to the Rail Safety Regulator so they can 
fullfill (sic) their required duties.
Rail Safety Regulator
Recommendation 2: Should conduct timely and thorough assessments and audits of 
safety management systems of all rail operators.
Recommendation 3: Should legislate that task-vigilance system be installed in trains as 
well as investigate a solution to the 110 kg weight problem with the deadman system.
Recommendation 4: Ensure that any future track building or upgrades minimise the 
collision risks with stationary objects such as a ‘rock face' and provide as much run-off 
zone as possible in the case of future de-railments.
RailCorp
Recommendation 5: Installation of task-vigilance system to all trains.
Recommendation 6: Implementation of training regime for guards to identify and act in 
emergency situations.
Recommendation 7: Toughen medical procedures to identify and address health issues 
of employee’s (sic) in safety critical areas.
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Participant C
External
Organisational
Physical / Actor 
Events, 
Processes & 
Conditions
Outcomes
20. Train 
overturned at 
high speed
23. 4-car train 
extensively 
damaged
9 RailCorp 
not fitted 
TLVCS
2. Railcorp not 
required to fit 
a TLVCS
17. Emergency 
brake not 
applied
22. The driver 
and 6
passengers 
were killed
18. Guard failed to 
take action to 
reduce speed
21. Train collided 
with rock face next 
to track
3 Rail Safety 
Management 
system was 
not adhered to
8 TLVCS 
could have 
reduced 
speed of train 
by 10 km/h
12. Guard failed to 
identify the train was 
out of control
7 Deadman footpedal 
fails to account for an 
overweight operator
5. Medical examination 
failed to identify risk 
factors
11. Guard training 
inadequate in regard to 
critical decision making
6. Railcorp failed to remedy 
known shortcomings of 
Deadman foot pedal
16. Deadman system failed to 
activate emergency braking system
14. Train driver was 
incapacitated due to coronary 
heart attack (probable)
1. The safety 
management 
system was 
stretched due 
to lack of
4. Railcorp medical standards 
insufficient to ensure health 
problems are identified
15. Deadman system foot pedal failed 
to detect an incapacitated driver
13. Train driver suffered from 
obesity and other heart attack 
risk factors
19. Train travelling at full speed into a curve 
(117 km/hr) curve overturn speed 110
10. Railcorp consider the 
guard system' as a risk 
reduction in the event of 
driver incapacitation
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Participant C Recommendations:
Rail Safety Regulator (RSR)
Recommendation 1: RSR should assess the companies (sic) adherence and resource 
comitment (sic) to its safety management systems.
Recommendation 2: The RSR should independently assess the suitability of companies 
(sic) safety management systems.
Recommendation 3: RSR should enforce fitting TLVCSs51 to trains.
RailCorp
Recommendation 4: RailCorp's safety management system must be changed to include 
appropriate levels of training for guards.
Recommendation 5: RailCorp's medical assessment procedures must be changed to 
identify relevant health risk factors that may lead to driver incapacitation.
Recommendation 6: RailCorp must fit TLVCSs to their trains.
Recommendation 7: RailCorp must remedy or provide a suitable alternative to the 
deadman footswitch (its failure to detect an overweight incapacitated driver).
51 TLVCS is the abbreviation for task-linked vigilance control system.
316
317
Participant D Recommendations:
Rail Safety Regulator
Recommendation 1: More funding and resources are needed for the RSR so that it can 
properly administer NSW trains.
Recommendation 2: RSR should ensure vigilance systems are mandatory on all trains 
(this needs to be written into its policy).
RailCorp
Recommendation 3: Fix the deadman system to work for a person of any weight. 
Recommendation 4: More through (sic) training for guards (safety).
Recommendation 5: RailCorp's medical examiners need to be more rigourous (sic). 
Recommendation 6: Investigation into RailCorp's SMS.
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Participant E
External
Organisational
Physical / Actor 
Events, 
Processes & 
Conditions
'19. Train travelling' 
, around curves j
Outcomes
13. Driver 
suffered a 
heart attack
18. Driver 
failed to slow 
down for curve
16. Driver 
incapacitated 
at controls
22. Driver & 6 
passengers 
killed
23. Train 
extensively 
damaged
17. Deadman 
system was 
not activated
14. Guard did 
not apply 
emergency 
brakes
20. Train 
travelled too fast 
around a curve
11. Guard did 
not identify 
emergency 
situation
5. Medical standards 
not stringent enough 
for drivers
9. Medical
examinations of driver 
not stringent enough
10. Driver was 
cleared to 
drive although 
suffering from 
obesity
15. Task linked vigilance 
control system did not 
slow train
6. Deadman 
system faults 
were not 
corrected
21. Train overturned at 
high speeds colliding with 
a rock face
8. Task linked 
vigilance control 
system was not 
installed
12. Task linked 
vigilance control 
system was not 
activated
2. Task linked vigilance 
control system was not 
required to be installed
7. Guard was 
not trained to 
identify 
emergency 
situation
3. Target audit of RailCorp's 
safety management system 
was not conducted
4. Deficiencies in RailCorp's 
safety management system 
not identified
1. Rail Safety 
Regulator had 
insufficient resources 
to conduct audit
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Participant E Recommendations:
Government
Recommendation 1: Government should allocate more funds and resources to the Rail 
Safety Regulator.
Rail Safety Regulator
Recommendation 2: Make the installation of the task linked vigilance system 
mandatory.
RailCorp
Recommendation 3: Review medical standards/examinations for assessing safety 
critical personnel.
Recommendation 4: Correct/replace deficiancy (sic) of the deadman system.
Recommendation 5: Install the task linked vigilance control system.
Recommendation 6: Review and improve training of guards to recognise & deal with 
emergency situations.
320
Participant F
External
Organisational
Physical / Actor 
Events, 
Processes & 
Conditions
12. Driver weighed 
118 kg
17 The train continued to 
accelerate to top speed
19. There was a rock 
face near the curve
Outcomes
21. The driver 
and 6 passengers 
were killed
11. Guard did not 
apply the 
emergency brake
22. The train was 
extensively 
damaged
10. Guard did not 
identify that the train 
was out of control
4 RailCorp’s safety 
management system 
was unsatisfactory
15. Driver was 
unconscious 
and not in 
control of the 
train
8. A task-linked 
vigilance control 
system was not fitted
5. Critical decision­
making was not part of 
the guard's training
20. The train 
overturned and collided 
with a rockface
3. A task-linked 
vigilance control system 
was not required
6 Guard was not 
trained to recognise a 
speeding train & stop it
9. RailCorp knew of flaws 
in Deadman system but 
did not fix them
13. Deadman system 
could be “fooled" by a 
person weighing > 110 kg
16. Deadman system did 
not activate when driver 
became incapacitated
18. Train was travelling 
above the overturn speed 
when it reached the curve
14. Driver was 
driving the train 
when he had a 
corinary (sic) heart 
attack
1. The audit & investigation 
sections of the Rail safety 
regulator were under-resourced
2. Rail safety regulator did not 
conduct an audit of RailCorp’s 
safety management system
7. RailCorp medical 
standards were not 
sufficiently rigorous. 
Therefore the driver's 
heart attack risk 
factors went 
undetected and driver 
was found fit for duty
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Participant F Recommendations:
Rail Safety Regulator
Recommendation 1: RSR should reallocate funds and resources to its audit and 
investigation sections.
Recommendation 2: RSR should regularly audit the safety management systems of all 
rail companies.
Recommendation 3: RSR should require rail companies to install task-linked vigilance 
control systems.
RailCorp
Recommendation 4: RailCorp should install a task-linked vigilance control system.
Recommendation 5: RailCorp should regularly assess their safety management system 
to uncover any hazards.
Recommendation 6: RailCorp should incorporate critical decision-making into the 
training of guards with a focus on recognising emergency situations and acting to rectify 
them.
Recommendation 7: RailCorp should fix the flaws in the Deadman system to ensure that 
the brake will always be applied when the driver is incapacitated.
Recommendation 8: RailCorp should modify the medical standards to ensure that health 
problems among safety-critical personnel are identified and addressed.
Recommendation 9: Guards should be trained to recognise & stop speeding trains.
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Participant G
External
Organisational
Physical / Actor 
Events, 
Processes & 
Conditions
14. Driver was 
over 110 kg
15. Deadman 
system did not 
activate
Outcomes
12. Train 
driver was 
incapacitated
18. Train 
accelerated to 
full speed
8. Inadequate 
deadman system 
present
6. Heart attack 
risk factors were 
not identified
7. Unfit train 
driver was found 
fit for duty
20. Train collided with 
rock face next to track
22. The four- 
car train was 
extensively 
damaged
16. Guard did 
not identify 
that train was 
out of control
5. Insufficiently 
rigorous medical 
standards
21. Train 
driver and six 
passengers 
were killed
17.
Emergency 
brake not 
applied
11. Task-linked 
vigilance control 
system not installed
1. Rail Safety 
Regulator not 
adequately resourced
9. RailCorp did not 
correct known problem 
with deadman system
13. Driver 
slumped at driving 
desk with legs on 
deadman pedal
19. Train exceeded overturning 
speed for curve and came off track
10. Inadequate guard 
training in 
interpreting and 
responding to 
emergency situations
4. Task-Linked 
Vigilance Control 
system not 
required by Rail 
Safety Regulator
3. Deficiencies in RailCorp's safety 
management system were not 
identified
2. Rail Safety regulator did not 
perform targeted audit of RailCorp’s 
safety management system
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Participant G Recommendations:
Government
Recommendation 1: The Federal/State government should adequately resource the Rail 
Safety Regulator to enable it to effectively oversee the NSW train network.
Rail Safety Regulator
Recommendation 2: RSR should conduct targeted audits of all railway companies' 
safety management systems and ensure that deficiencies are corrected in a timely 
manner.
Recommendation 3: RSR should consider mandating a task-linked vigilance control 
system in all trains.
Recommendation 4: RSR should specify medical standards that all safety-critical 
personnel must meet.
Recommendation 5: RSR should require rail companies to train guards how to reliably 
interpret an emergency situation and react appropriately.
Recommendation 6: RSR should be given/use its power to fine or otherwise punish rail 
operators who do not address deficiencies in their safety management systems (force to 
comply or remove operator's licence).
RailCorp
Recommendation 7: RailCorp should apply more rigorous medical standards for safety- 
critical personnel, to ensure that heart-attack risk factors are identified, and that unfit 
personnel are not found fit for duty.
Recommendation 8: RailCorp should review and improve guard training, with particular 
attention to the interpretation of emergency situations and appropriate reactions.
Recommendation 9: RailCorp should consider installing task-linked vigilance control 
systems in its trains to ensure that full power is not applied if the driver becomes 
incapacitated.
Recommendation 10: RailCorp should consider a modification to the existing driving 
desk/deadman pedal so that the deadman pedal will still activate in cases where the 
driver’s legs remain on the pedal if they are incapacitated.
Recommendation 11: RailCorp should consider preventing people who are over 110 kg 
from driving trains fitted with the deadman system.
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Participant H
External
Organisational
Physical / Actor 
Events, 
Processes & 
Conditions
Outcomes
21. Extensive 
damage to 
four-car train
20. Driver + 6 
passengers 
killed
15. Guard failed to 
slow train / apply 
emergency brake
17. Train continued 
to accelerate to full 
speed into curve
5. Inadequate 
risk control of 
driver
incapacitation
10. Driver suffers 
heart attack at the 
wheel of the train
14. Deadman 
system fails to 
apply emergency 
braking
3. Task-linked 
vigilance system 
not required to be 
fitted
8. No action to fix / 
reduce limitations 
of deadman 
system
7. Inadequate 
guard training in 
critical decision­
making skills
19. Train overturned 
around curve and 
collided with rock face
12. Guard failed to 
interpret 
emergency 
situation
16. Brakes were 
not applied after 
driver failed to carry 
out certain tasks
18. Train entered curve 
at full speed, exceeding 
overturning speed
13. Failure to install 
task-linked vigilance 
control systems
11. Deadman foot 
pedal stays in set 
position due to 
driver's overweight
1. Regulator 
inadequately 
resourced to oversee 
NSW train network
9. Medical examination 
fails to identify driver 
obesity and risk of heart 
attack
2. Rail Safety Regulator 
did not conduct adequate 
auditing of safety 
management system
4. RailCorp safety 
management system 
was inadequate in risk 
identification, 
assessment and control
6. Medical standards 
used by RailCorp not 
rigorous enough for 
safety-critical personnel
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Participant H Recommendations:
Rail Safety Regulator
Recommendation 1: Rail Safety Regulator should review its resources to effectively 
oversee the NSW train network.
Recommendation 2: Rail Safety Regulator should review its auditing and investigation 
sections for assessment of safety management systems.
Recommendation 3: Rail Safety Regulator should consider mandating task-linked 
vigilance systems on trains with the deadman system as a form of redundancy.
RailCorp
Recommendation 4: RailCorp should improve its safety management system in risk 
identification, assessment and control, in particular risk control of driver incapacitation.
Recommendation 5: RailCorp should raise its medical standards used by appointed 
medical examiners for safety-critical personnel on trains.
Recommendation 6: RailCorp should improve its guard training to provide them with 
critical decision-making skills and adequate emergency awareness and response.
Recommendation 7: RailCorp should consider actions to reduce limitations of deadman 
system by either
a) fixing the deadman system foot pedal so that driver weight is not a 
consideration
b) installing task-linked vigilance system, or
c) raise medical standards as in recommendation 5 above to include driver's
weight.
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Participant I
External
3. The safety regulator did not identify 
defficiencies (sic) in RailCorp’s safety 
management system
4. Regulator did not make it 
manditory (sic) to fit task 
vigilance monitoring system
Organisational
Physical / Actor 
Events, 
Processes & 
Conditions
Outcomes
14. Driver 
suffered from 
heart attack
18. C311 overturned
20. Driver & 6 
passengers died
15. The 
deadman 
system did not 
activate
19. The 4 car train 
extensively damaged
9. RailCorp 
did not fit a 
task vigilance 
monitoring 
system
5. RailCorp aware of 
Deadman deficiency for 
14 years
13. Train not 
fitted with 
Task linked 
vigilance 
system
17. The train exceeded the 
overturn speed for turn
16. Train continued to 
accelerate after driver 
is incapacitated
11. The deadman 
system can be 
kept inactive by a 
person weighing 
>110 kg
7. RailCorp 
failed to 
address dead 
man switch 
defficiency 
(sic)
10. Drivers 
previous med 
exam by 
RailCorp 
standards was 
satisfactory
6. The standard of 
RailCorp's med 
testing is not 
adequate for safety 
crit workers
8. The guards 
training may have 
been inadequate to 
handle an
emergency situation 
like this one
12. The guard on 
train did not identify 
the train was out of 
control and did not 
take appropriate
2. The rail safety regulator had not 
conducted a targeted audit of 
RailCorp’s safety management system
1. The regulator’s resource level 
disallowed targeted audit of RailCorp's 
Safety management system
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Participant I Recommendations:
Rail Safety Regulator
Recommendation 1: RSR should acquire the extra resources it needs to perform regular 
safety audits of train operations, that is (sic) traceable and meets [relevant ISO “ 
standards].
Recommendation 2: RSR should make task vigilance monitoring system a mandatory 
component on all trains.
RailCorp
Recommendation 3: RailCorp should install task vigilance monitoring system on all 
trains.
Recommendation 4: RailCorp needs to update medical examination standards for safety 
critical workers to the latest [relevant ISO standards].
Recommendation 5: RailCorp needs to upgrade training schemes of all guards to ensure 
that they are equipped with the training to deal with emergency situations.
5~ International Standards Organization.
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Appendix K -  Group AcciMap Results
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Group Recommendations:
Government
Recommendation 1: Govt should allocate more funds to the regulator.
Regulator
Recommendation 2: Make the installation of TLVCS mandatory.
Recommendation 3: The RSR should independently assess companies' adherence & 
resource commitment to SMS.
Recommendation 4: The RSR should review & improve its audits of SMS.
RailCorp
Recommendation 5: Must fit TLVCS.
Recommendation 6: Review and improve medical standards for assessing safety critical 
personnel.
Recommendation 7: Remedy or provide a suitable alternative to the existing deadman 
system.
Recommendation 8: Provide guards with improved training.
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